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ABSTRACT 
Using previously unresearched archives from the British 
Council of Churches (BCC), a constituent assembly of the World 
Council of Churches and the established vehicle for 
communicating official non-Catholic approaches to the nuclear 
dilemma, this thesis raises two questions: (1) How did 
Christians in the BCC evaluate the role of the British State 
and their responsibility as citizens in the Cold War years 
1945-59? (2) How did such evaluations affect a Christian 
policy-making process that aimed to influence Western defence 
attitudes? 
Answers are provided by analysing the BCCrs role in developing 
and promoting the limited war nuclear strategy, a just War 
alternative to the Macmillan Government's formula of massive 
retaliation. The study contends that the British Churches' 
stance vis-&-vis the ethics of nuclear deterrence was largely 
influenced by judgements on the legitimacy of the State and 
its compatibility with Christian values. These judgements 
determined the nature of advice offered to Government and 
favoured the articulation of an 'Augustinian' form of 
political realism. 
The thesis makes two substantive claims. On one hand it 
suggests that the significance of the BCC approach lay, not in 
its challenge to Government policy, but in its role as a 
counter to the radical idealism represented by the Campaign 
for Nuclear Disarmament. On the other hand it argues that the 
just war should be conceptually located within the realist 
rather than idealist theoretical frameworks. The study 
concludes that discussions of just war cannot be separated 
from qualitative judgements about the character of the State. 
Christian attitudes to war are grounded in particular 
assumptions about legitimate social authority, the right of 
the State to determine policy, personal and collective 
political res]ýonýibility. 
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AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL NOTE 
This study has had a long gestation. It began while I was 
at Coventry Cathedral, one of a wide variety of jobs I had 
in the five years between leaving school and going to 
university. Here I became fascinated with the different 
approaches Christians had to political problems. On one 
hand there were those who saw the absolute sovereign State, 
in its liberal democratic form, as representative of all 
sections of society and were able to endorse the status quo. 
Ranked against them, there were those who saw the State 
standing "over against' society, not so much a permanent 
necessity, but as the embodiment of certain assumptions that 
should be called into question. All this was accepted with 
support from the Bible. Attitudes were entrenched and woven 
into the fabric of people's spirituality. 
The tensions between these competing traditions are brought 
into sharp focus when the problem of war is considered. The 
dominant Christian approach, the just war, possesses the 
critical and self-questioning tone that enables it to judge 
on inter-State conflict, yet its prerequisite for war to be 
conducted by the 'State-as-legitimate-authorityl makes it 
unable to qualify cases of intra-State violence, civil war, 
and revolution. The ability to judge on these latter is 
vital for any articulate theory on the morality of war in a 
divided world. This led me to question the extent to which 
just wa-r amounted to just-war -- a culturally specific set 
of presumptions. 
This project, therefore, has developed as a result of a 
variety of experiences which explain how it came to be 
written and take the form it has. Its origin is rooted in 
personal experience: the theological conversations I had 
with various priests whilst working at Coventry Cathedral. 
But I have also been motivated by the undertaking of 
retrospective analysis from the perspectives of politics and 
international studies. These disciplines have formed the 
analysis of detailed and extensive archival material which 
form the bulk of the data on which this thesis is based. 
For these reasons it is a Christian position on the State, 
legitimate authority, and political responsibility that is 
of interest rather than other aspects of the just war. 
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CHAPTER ONE: 
INTRODUCTION 
Duncan Sandys' Defence White Paper of 1957 has been 
described as the purest expression of the doctrine of massive 
retaliation ever put into practice. ' This declaration 
reflected an increased willingness by the Macmillan Government 
to resort to total nuclear warfare. The British Council of 
Churches (BCC )2 responded to this controversial policy by 
developing and promoting an alternative 'theology of 
deterrence' known as limited war. 3 This just wa-r strategy 
called for renewed efforts to achieve incremental 
multilateral4 nuclear disarmament whilst condoning the 
1 Groom 1974, p-581- 
2 Since 1990 the BCC has been known as 'The Council of Churches in Britain 
and Ireland' or CCBI -- the name change coinciding with the incorporation 
of the Catholic Church in Britain and Ireland. 
3 This philosophy, currently known as flexible response, still guides 
Western nuclear policy. See Garnett 1977; and Buzan 1989 for information 
on recent applications of the theory. Also see the collection of essays in 
Booth (ed. ) 1991 which serves as a useful introduction to thinking about 
the nature of international security, deterrence, and nuclear strategy from 
both realist and idealist perspectives. 
4 The distinction between uni and multi-lateralism is more heuristically 
useful than terminologically precise. Indeed the limited war approach 
involved a combination of both initiatives. Following John Elford, it is 
accepted that the standard conceptual polarisation between those opposed to 
nuclear weapons in principle (unilateralists) and those who are not 
(multilateralists) is inadequate and can be misleading (see Elford's 
introduction in Bauckham and Elford [eds. ] 1989, p. 1). It is necessary 
however, to argue that the defining feature of the BCC line on disarmament 
was its essential incremental, gradualist, or conservative attempt to 
manage change. The key distinction is hence not so much between 
unilateralism and multilateralism per se but one crucially between 
conditional (incremental) and unconditional approaches to the nuclear 
dilemma. 
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potential use of nuclear weapons on a restricted scale. The 
theory was seen by the BCC as the appropriate moral response 
to an unethical defence policy. Yet the Churches sponsored 
limited war despite the ethico-political appeal of 
organisations such as the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament 
(CND) who called for the immediate unilateral and non- 
contingent renunciation of British nuclear weapons. . It 
is 
not the purpose of this study however, to expose the 
limitations of Government action5 or assess the CND's 
sociological development. 6 Rather, the objective is to lay 
bare the discussions and policy options that led the British 
Council of Churches to endorse the idea that a war fought 
with nuclear weapons could be 'just'. 
5 Representative examples of this include the work of Noel-Baker 1958; 
Pierre 1972; Groom 1974; Freeman 1986; Dockrill 1988; Clark and Wheeler 
1989; Navias 1991; and Melissen 1993. 
6 There is a huge literature concerning the history, development and 
motivations of the peace organisations particularly CND. Driver 1964 is 
probably the most famous and most quoted introduction. Parkin 1968 offers 
the accepted social analysis of the Campaign, an approach up-dated by 
Mattausch's 1986 PhD. Taylor and Pritchard 1980; Taylor 1988 and Taylor's 
1983 PhD locate the peace movement within its historical context and are 
very knowledgeable about the development of CND and its various ideologies. 
Duff 1971; and Collins 1966 are autobiographies by the Campaign's first 
General Secretary, and Chair respectively. Minnion and Bolsover 1983 offer 
a similar history in the words of the people involved. Myers' 1965 PhD is 
an useful American study comparing CND with its associated Committee of 
100. Hinton 1989; Taylor and Young 1987 deal with CND in the context of 
the wider British peace movements. Most of these accounts are written by 
activists obviously sympathetic to CND aims. Brandon 1987 offers a highly 
critical study of British peace movements including CND. 
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The following chapters unravel this aspect of Church 7_ 
State8 relations by providing answers to two questions: (1) 
How did Christians in the BCC evaluate the role of the 
British State and their responsibility as citizens in the 
Cold War years 1945-59? (2) How did such evaluations affect 
a Christian policy-making process that aimed to influence 
Western defence attitudes? 
This focus is justified on three counts. First, the 
study utilises the extensive archives and official 
publications of the British Council of Churches. The 
British Council of Churches was the UK based associated 
assembly of the World Council of Churches (WCC) constituted 
to speak as an authoritative Protestant voice in political 
and social affairs. No other study has utilised these 
primary sources (located in the Church of England Record 
Centre, Bermondsey) and most of the archive was unsorted and 
uncatalogued. The work is an original contribution to 
substantive empirical research in an area largely ignored by 
the literature on politics and international studies. 
Secondly, it is a unique examination of the policy-making 
process within the British Council of Churches with special 
7 When this thesis uses the title 'Church' it refers to the collective 
Christian Church and not one particular denomination (i. e. Church of 
England) unless so specified. 
8 The term "State' throughout this thesis is used to describe not only 
elected Government (Cabinet and Prime Minister) but also the permanent 
institutions of the Civil Service, and coercive apparatuses such as the 
police, armed forces, and judiciary. For an introduction to debates on the 
term 'the State' see Jessop 1990; Burnham 1994. For more detail and 
guidelines for further reading see the collection of essays in Clarke (ed. ) 
1991. 
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reference to defence and disarmament. The BCC is an 
appropriate study because it was also the principal vehicle 
for developing and communicating official non-Catholic 
approaches to the nuclear dilemma. Finally, the thesis 
makes positive contributions to the ever-expanding 
literature on the just war with particular reference to its 
relationship to organisational practice, and conceptual 
location within International Relations (IR) theory. 
It is surprising to find that the diverse accounts of just 
war are not accompanied by contrasting analysis that helps 
establish why the State should be accepted as the primary 
social organisation worth defending and killing for. 
Traditional accounts are more interested in the practical 
application of the theory (the conflicts it is used to 
justify) and specific theoretical limitations (which 
conflicts it could actually juStify). 9 Most existing 
literature thus conceptualises the State in realist fashion 
(viz. the repository of national interest and primary focus 
for legitimate political allegiance), whilst accepting just 
Examples include: Walzer 1977; Holmes 1989; Teichman and 1985 and 1986; 
Johnson 1981 and 1984; Ramsey 1961 and 1968; Paskins and Dockrill 1979. 
Jean Bethke Elshtain is particularly representative when she concludes that 
just war should be accepted as an approach whose "specific strength 
embedded in its ontology of peace is the vantage point it affords with 
reference to social arrangements" (1985, p. 44). A recent text in moral 
philosophy (Norman 1995) does, nevertheless, point away from such orthodoxy 
by arguing that, if the just war is to be useful in deciding whether a 
community has the right to defend its cultural and political life, it has 
to show what it is about that community that is worth preserving. Stephen 
Toulmin's essay "The Limits of Allegiance in a Nuclear Age" (in Elshtain 
[ed. ) 1992, pp. 280-98) also calls on people to re-think the assumption that 
the State should be the primary focus for legitimate allegiance. 
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war and realism as opposing categories (because thinking about 
justice in war is "idealistic'). " These assumptions appear 
based on a Weberian ethic of 'responsibility', where realism 
earns its label by emphasising political consequences over 
moral principles, and one of "ultimate ends' where idealism 
emphasises moral imperatives over expediency. " By focusing 
attention on a tradition that aims to prevent war and. govern 
its conduct, many see just war as an alternative to 
Realpolitik. 
10 Tucker 1960; Osgood and Tucker 1967. Elshtain sees just war as 
realism's most important contender (1985, p. 39); whilst Adeney's 1982 PhD 
compares just war and realism as the main contrasting and widely used 
conceptual systems for explaining and evaluating international conflict. 
11 See Weber's "Politics as a Vocation" in Gerth and Mills 1991, pp. 77- 
128; analysis by Smith 1986; Rosenthal 1991; Warner 1991. For Weber "we 
must be clear that all ethically orientated conduct may be guided by one of 
two fundamentally differing and irreconcilably opposed maxims: conduct can 
be orientated to an 'ethic of ultimate ends' or to an 'ethic of 
responsibility. ' This is not to say that an ethic of ultimate ends is 
identical with irresponsibility, or that an ethic of responsibility is 
identical with unprincipled opportunism" (p. 120). It is striking that 
Weber's discussion is suffused with theological content with the Sermon on 
the Mount constituting his 'personal' ethic of ultimate ends. The terms of 
the debate are familiar. Realists see idealism as an utopian, or 
normative political theory that attempts to moralise IR. The decisive 
point is that whereas idealist ethics are not supposed to ask about 
consequences, for realism "expediency becomes a moral duty" (Morgenthau 
1946, p. 186) based upon an awareness that what is done in the political 
sphere concerns others who would suffer from imprudent (i. e. idealistic) 
action. Morgenthau (1951, p. 33) saw the distinction as not really "between 
moral principles and national interest devoid of moral integrity, but 
between one set of moral principles divorced from political reality and 
another set of principles derived from political reality". Rosenthal 
(1991, p. 47) concurs that "the realists' main concern about morality ... was 
that 'good intentions' not become the sole factor or even an especially 
prominent factor in the making of policy decisions. " Elshtain (1985, p. 40) 
concludes that "realism's bracing promise is [hence] to spring politics 
free from the constraints of moral judgement and limitation, thereby 
assuring its autonomy as historic force and discursive subject-matter, and 
to offer a picture of the world of people and states as they really are 
rather than as we might yearn them to be". For additional commentary see 
Kegley (ed. ) 1995 (especially his introduction pp. 1-24; and Joel 
Rosenthal's "Rethinking the Moral Dimensions of Foreign Policy" pp. 317-34); 
Brown 1992; and the selection of essays in Nardin and Mapel (eds. ) 1993 
particularly Jack Donnelly on "Twentieth-Century Realism" pp. 85-111. 
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Such assertions are not borne out by the research for this 
thesis. By adopting a perspective which first examines the 
origin of just war attitudes to the State, legitimate 
authority, and political responsibility; and secondly 
illustrating the debates surrounding the development, 
articulation, and eventual dissemination of the BCC's limited 
war, an alternative interpretation has emerged. The -thesis 
shows that in the 1950s the British Churches combined a 
Christian idealism with a realist pragmatism in an approach 
that was distinctly 'Augustinian"' in its ancestry. This 
focus is an analysis of the Augustinian position on the State, 
its support for the exigencies of statecraft, as opposed to an 
evaluation of other aspects of just war (i. e. the traditional 
emphasis on issues of intentionality, discrimination, and 
proportionality). 
This study suggests two hypotheses: the first of these is 
that, from the perspective of International Relations, the 
BCC's approach can best be understood as a form of 
'Augustinian' realism. This is to argue that the Churches' 
maintained a confrontational view of international relations 
1z Several recent attempts have been made to revive Saint Augustine, the 
fourth century instigator of just war, in order to claim a post-positivist 
methodology for IR. These include: Roger Epp's 1990 PhD (see also his 1991 
research paper) where Epp values the approach for its "more fixed moral 
references beyond consequences alone, mere order, or national interest" 
(1990 PhD p. 212); Ian Thompson's essay "Liberal Values and Power Politics" 
(in Davis [ed. ] 1986 pp. 82-102) who utilises Augustine in his drive to find 
a "positive political ethic" for the nuclear age; and post-modernists who 
enlist Augustine in their construction of post-structuralist paradigm (Der 
Derian 1987; Connolly 1993). 
6 
by subscribing to a particular conception of the State, 
national interest, and Christian political responsibility. 
The second hypothesis is that, following a consideration of 
the first proposition, the BCC's just war should be 
conceptually located within the realist rather than idealist 
theoretical f rameworks. This analysis brings forward two 
possible conclusions. on one hand, the idea that the 
significance of the BCC approach lay, not in its challenge 
to Government policy, but in its role as a counter to the 
radical idealism represented by the CND position. on the 
other hand, the notion that discussions of just war cannot 
be separated from qualitative judgements about the character 
of the State. Christian attitudes to war are grounded in 
theological and ethical assumptions about legitimate social 
authority, the right of the State to determine policy, 
individual and collective political responsibility. 
Quite apart from the suggested divergence between 
unilateralist and multilateralist positions, the complexities 
of Christian Cold War attitudes took various forms. Tensions 
between paci fiSM13 and pacific-ism, between personal ethics 
1-5 In this thesis it is necessary to define 'pacifist' (without the 
qualification 'nuclear') as the position held by individuals and groups who 
reject the use of direct force and violence. The category includes 
non-coercive resistance that relies only on persuasion, as well as 
resistance that uses indirect coercion (e. g. strikes, boycotts, etc. ). 
James Hinton's excellent study Protests and Visions offers a useful 
commentary: he argues that the word 'pacifist' did not acquire its modern, 
restricted meaning until the 1930s. When the word was first adopted at the 
beginning of this century, a pacifist was someone who rejected the idea 
that the best way to preserve peace was to prepare for war. Pacifists, 
whilst working for peace and the prevention of war, looked for the removal 
of force from international relations. This did not mean that a pacifist 
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and public policy, between the Church as it is and the Church 
as it could be, have been part of Christianity since its 
earliest days. Between different approaches there is 
passionate debate but no agreed answers. Such tensions, 
however, were mostly avoided by the early Church, 
institutionalised with the fourth century adoption of 
Christianity by the State, before being exacerbated by the 
development of weapons of mass destruction in the twentieth 
century. A major theme of this study is to consider the 
nature of these disagreements and trace their origins. 
rejected the use of force in all circumstances. For instance, those who 
were opposed to the Great War described themselves as pacifists even though 
many were not opposed to war in some circumstances: those who did used 
terms like 'non-resistance', 'absolute pacifism', 'extreme pacifism', or 
'Christian pacifism'. The modern identification of 'pacifism, with what 
would previously have been called 'absolute pacifism' is a direct result of 
the division of the peace movement in the 1930s over the appropriate 
response to fascism. This etymological schism is particularly problematic 
for it leaves no single word to describe many of the ideas and people under 
discussion. In 1956 A. J. P. Taylor overcame this problem by distinguishing 
'pacifists' (the absolutists) from 'pacific-ists' (the rest). See Hinton 
1989, pp. x-xi. Complementary typologies offered by Ceadel 1987 (Chapter 
7); and Teichman 1986 (Chapter 1). In this thesis pacifist and pacific-ist 
follows this modern usage whilst utilising the generic terms 'peace 
activist' and 'peace movement'. 'Peace activist' includes all Christian 
idealists who challenged from within the 'peace movement' the culture of 
war. The term includes pacifists, pacific-ists, anarchists, international 
socialists, as well as traditional liberals. Whilst most pacifists were 
peace activists, not all peace activists were pacifist. It is argued that 
before the nuclear age many peace activists would have in fact associated 
themselves with the just war tradition particularly viz. the battle against 
fascism. 
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Plan of the Thesis 
This research falls into three sections: Section One 
(Chapter Two) considers the study's theoretical context. 
Section Two (Chapters Three-Five) examines historical 
precedents, the context and development of ecumenical 
attitudes to war and nuclear weapons from 1945-57. Section 
Three (Chapters Six-Eight) details the Churches' specific 
response to Western nuclear strategy in the years 1957-59. 
Section One, Chapter Two provides a framework of theory 
for the rest of this thesis. Its specific intention is to 
locate, in terms of IR, the Augustinian position on the State, 
legitimate authority, and political responsibility as 
neglected aspects within the just war tradition. By 
highlighting the realist assumptions of Augustine's just war 
the tradition is presented in terms suitable for the purposes 
of this study. Its significance lies, subsequently, in the 
way it institutionalised a particular theoretical approach to 
questions of authority, legitimacy, and political 
responsibility within Christian thinking. 
Section Two, Chapter Three locates the empirical focus of 
this thesis by introducing the British Council of Churches 
as an organisation. It examines the driving forces and 
policy implications of international ecumenicalism in the 
years 1910-48. These efforts resulted in the creation of 
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the World Council of Churches and its constituent assembly, 
the BCC, during World War II. 
Chapter Four locates, against the background of Chapter 
Three, the development of late twentieth century British 
Church debate towards war. It is particularly concerned 
with the increase in tensions between different traditions 
generated by the West's use and manufacture of the atomic 
bomb 1945-48. The chapter examines the BCC's first 
exploration of just war logic: The Bra of Atomic Power (also 
known as the Oldham Report). 
Chapter Five shows that, although the development and 
deployment of thermonuclear weapons in the years 1950-57 
raised new ethical questions for Christians, the attitudes 
of the British Council of Churches and its member Churches 
were as divided as their attitudes to the atom bomb. The 
chapter illustrates the nature of this growing tension 
between Christian peace activists and just war advocates. 
It considers the development of Christian responses towards 
thermonuclear weapons, whilst outlining the controversy 
regarding the testing of hydrogen weapons. 
Section Three, Chapter Six establishes the central 
concern of this thesis by introducing massive retaliation 
and limited war as strategic concepts. It develops the 
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proposition that the controversy surrounding the Churches, 
failure to come out strongly against the H-bomb, rather than 
nuclear weapons as such, brought the BCC to a detailed 
consideration of nuclear strategy. The chapter assesses the 
reasons why Admiral Buzzard, a strategic expert, was invited 
into BCC circles. This leads to a discussion and comment on 
Buzzard's address delivered to Council in October 1957.. 
Chapter Seven reveals that the most important consequence 
of Buzzard's address was the creation of a working-group to 
examine the moral aspects of defence and disarmament: 'The 
Study Group on the Moral Aspects of Disarmament. ' By 
examining Study Group method and processes the chapter 
illustrates the development of Buzzard's limited war realism 
within the BCC. 
Chapter Eight analyses the impact of CND on the peace 
debate within the British Churches by locating its attitude 
to the State, and understanding of political responsibility. 
It argues that, as a consequence of the CND, the debate in 
the Churches moved beyond tensions between pacifist and just 
wa. r into a debate primarily between gradualist 
multilateralism (just war) and non-contingent unilateralism 
(nuclear pacifism). It develops this with a detailed study 
of the final product of the Study Group's labour: Christians 
and Atomic War. 
11 
The study concludes in Chapter Nine by drawing these 
elements together into some final analysis. It refers once 
more to the twin hypotheses introduced above and 
theoretically located in Chapter Two (i. e. the BCC's 
response was an 'Augustinian' form of realism, and the just 
war is realist). The chapter asserts the idea that 
discussions of just war cannot be separated from qualitative 
judgements about the character of the State. Christian 
attitudes to war are grounded in particular assumptions 
about legitimate authority, the right of the State to 
determine policy, personal and collective political 
responsibility. 
An appendix examines the informal problems of conducting 
research into Christian attitudes to war based on archival 
material. 
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SECTION I. - 
THEORETICAL CONTEXT 
CHAPTER TWO: 
THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS 
Introduction 
This chapter does not attempt an extensive review of 
just war. ' The focus of study is rather more specific and 
orientated to locating, for students of International 
Relations (IR), the Augustinian position on the State, 
legitimate authority, and political responsibility as 
neglected aspects within the just war tradition. 
Part One of this section claims that an objective Christian 
attitude to what should constitute a 'legitimate' political 
authority does not exist and that students are forced to 
interpret competing Christian traditions. It emphasises that 
in Christianity's first three centuries a form of idealist 
pacific-ism dominated the early Church. This utopian 
inheritance pointed towards a Christian role in questioning 
the legitimacy of, as Clifford Allen notes, the "claim of the 
State to dispose of a man's life against his Will. "2 
Part Two contends that this idealism was marginalised, 
following the fourth century adoption of Christianity as the 
1 An introduction can be found in an examination of Walzer 1977; Holmes 
1989; Teichman and 1985 and 1986; Johnson 1981 and 1984; Ramsey 1961 and 
1968; Paskins and Dockrill 1979. 
2 Allen cited by Kaldor in Taylor and Young (eds. ) 1987, p. 3. 
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religion of State, largely due to Saint Augustine's pragmatic 
response to the exigencies of statecraft. By highlighting the 
realist presuppositions of Augustine's just war the tradition 
is presented in terms suitable for the purposes of this study. 
Its significance lies in the way it institutionalised a 
particular approach to questions of authority, legitimacy, 
individual and collective political responsibility within 
Christian thinking. 
Part 1: Interpretation and the Early Church 
Jenny Teichman has pointed out "the idea that war must be 
renounced comes to us from Christianity. "3 Although there 
is no explicit New Testament discussion of the morality of 
war most commentators accept that Christ's teaching 
4 condemned killing, violence and warfare . Yet it cannot be 
assumed that there is one objective Christian attitude to be 
discerned. A consensus on the most 'legitimate' of Christian 
responses does not exist. Thinkers, both secular and 
Christian, remain divided not only over the detail of Christ's 
teaching but also over whether his comments on political 
resistance should be separated from the locus of his general 
message. The study of this thesis has revealed Christian 
attitudes to be as much a contest over interpreting the 
3 Teichman 1986, p. 10. 
4 e. g. Harries 1986a, pp. 13-25; Sider and Taylor 1962, pp. 109-54; 
Kertesz 1989, pp. 1-16; Teichman 1986, pp. 10-15. Potter's biographical 
essay (1969, pp. 87-121) surveys the literature up to 1970 and suggests 
further reading. 
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politics of meaning within the Bible, as it is a conflict over 
assessing particular ethical responses to authority, political 
responsibility, and war. This is important because Christians 
look to the Bible as a way of giving meaning to their temporal 
existence and understanding the nature of their social 
obligations. 
It is only natural to find different responses to Christ as 
a moral teacher. Ernst Bloch has warned that attempts to 
understand Christ's message should always begin with 
"detective work' because the Bible is nothing other than a 
contested, multi-layered, contradiction-riddled text, 
reflecting conflicting principles and interests. 5 For him the 
teasing out of evidence begins with the recognition that 
religious traditions are handed down, interpreted and 
reinterpreted, in light of changing conceptions about God and 
society. The Bible contains symbols, or allegories, of 
diffe. rent political and spiritual truths. Tendencies of 
accommodation lie alongside tendencies of resistance. on one 
hand the Gospel material can be related to themes of prophecy 
and political protest; whilst on the other hand, it is a 
potent tool in the service of the status quo. 6 
To start here is to draw the conclusion that ideological 
preference is inherent in the choice and treatment of 
secondary accounts. It involves interpreting 'meaning' 
5 Bloch 1972, particularly pp. 21-38. 
6 This is a central theme of 'liberation theology'. See Cadorette, 
Giblin, Legge, and Synder (eds. ) 1996 for a recent reader from the 
leading exponents. 
is 
rather than 'truth' and concerning ourselves with what is 
being said in political terms, rather than in theological 
terms. Yet the two sorts of debate are not (and cannot be) 
kept apart. Theology, like any intellectual pursuit, is 
shaped by society even if it is also shaped by non-social 
7 
sources (i. e. prayer, inspiration) . Theological themes 
affect political interpretation; vice versa, political 
interpretation affects theology. To follow Moltmann: "'while 
there may be a naive and politically unaware theology, there 
can be no apolitical theology. "a 
The history of Christianity has been a story of the ways in 
which its symbols have been used by different groups and 
classes. The Bible has sustained and constituted various 
social relationships. McLellan points out: "'theology has 
been both a dependent and an independent variable: theology, 
and religious belief in general, socially constructed 
realities -- but that means that they are both socially 
constructed and social realities. "9 If the scriptures are 
accepted as suggestive documents offering both a critique of 
State institutions and projects, whilst also enabling the 
legitimisation of State activities, it helps in the 
understanding of why thinkers disagree over whether Christ's 
message about violence was one for personal consumption, or 
7 The assumption that the Churches' structures and ideas are likewise 
determined by the particular societies within which they are placed 
forms the basis of Robin Gill's interesting study "Prophecy in a 
socially Determined Church" (Gill 1979). 
8 Moltmann cited by Nicholls in Nicholls and Williams 1984, p. 28. 
9 McLellan 1992, p-116. 
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one which demanded a collective response. This means, 
however, that both text and interpreter are constrained and 
conditioned by social context. It means that the Church as 
an institution cannot distance itself from the State as the 
form of social organisation to which its members belong, nor 
the ethical dilemmas citizenship brings. 
James Childress has set the parameters for a constructive 
appraisal of the material by stating "'that modes of 
resistance, non-violent and violent, have been controversial 
for Christians who have drawn different lines and set 
different limits in individual and social responses to evil 
and injustice. "10 Determining the Amost appropriate' 
Christian ethical response is a subject of considerable 
disagreement and controversy. It is here we are faced with 
the question: is the Christian vocation to be achieved (i. e. 
God's will fulfilled) by efforts to instigate justice through 
the transformation of the State, or is it to be experienced 
inwardly through the transformation of the self? The 
scriptures are extraordinary ambivalent with regard to either 
individual or collective responsibility. " Following this 
10 Italics mine. See Childress's essay "Niebuhr's Realistic-Pragmatic 
Approach to War and the Nuclear Dilemma" in Harries (ed. ) 1986b, p. 127. 
This 'level of analysis' problem (i. e. private as opposed to collective 
responsibility) is vital and one that bears a striking resemblance to 
the liberal-communitarian divide within political science. Liberals 
(e. g Rawls, Nozick, Dworkin) tend to assume or argue that the individual 
has an identity and value prior to and independent of society whilst 
communitarians (e. g. MacIntyre, Walzer, Sandel) argue that individuals 
are constituted by the communities in which they live and that the 
values which influence the individual's behaviour, together with the 
meanings by which they make sense of their life, derive from their 
community. For an introduction see Morrice 1995; Brown 1992. 
on this see Rowland 1988, p. 156ff. 
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dichotomy between communitarian and cosmopolitan 
interpretation it is easy to pluck texts at random and out of 
context to prove or justify one position over another. 
Take as an example Christ's teachings on the Sermon on 
the Mount: 
Ye have heard that it hath been said, An eye for an 
eye, and a tooth for a tooth: But I say unto you., that 
ye resist not evil: but whosoever shall smite thee on 
thy right cheek, turn to him the other also. And if 
any man will sue thee at the law, and take away thy 
coat, let him have thy cloak also. And whosoever shall 
compel thee to go a mile, go with him twain. 12 
On the one hand, idealists typically point to such sentiments 
to support a position of 'non-violent resistance', ranked 
against them, realists argue that the relationship between 
Christ's injunction and its operational i sat ion within modern 
politics is rather more complex. The realism of Reinhold 
Niebuhr is particularly important to consider if the attitudes 
of many of those involved in the BCC debates of the late 1940S 
and 1950s are to be located. 
Niebuhrian Realism and Christian Idealism 
For Niebuhr 'realism' "denotes the disposition to take all 
factors in a social and political situation which offer 
resistance to established norms into account, particularly the 
12 Matt. 5: 38-41. Similar sentiments can be found among the 
beatitudes: "Blessed are the meek: for they shall inherit the 
earth.... Blessed are the peacemakers: for they shall be called the 
children of God. " (Matt. 5: 5,9). Also see Matt. 5: 21-2; Luke 14: 31-3; 
john 14: 27. Throughout this thesis all classical texts will be 
referenced, not by page number, but in the standard form of Chapter; 
Book and Chapter; or Book, Chapter, and Verse as appropriate. 
Individual expositions, articles, or commentaries are placed in inverted 
commas and volume titles italicised. 
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factors of self-interest and power. ,, 13 This implies that 
Christian idealists are 'subject to illusions about social 
realities': ""Idealism' is, in the esteem of its proponents, 
characterised by loyalty to moral norms and ideals, rather 
than to self-interest, whether individual or collective. it 
is, in the opinion of its critics, characterised by a 
disposition to ignore or be indifferent to the forces in human 
life which offer resistance to universally valid ideals and 
"14 norms . Idealists, however, are more willing to make an 
ultimate commitment in terms of political choice because their 
intrinsic optimism leads them to assume that rational 
reasoning can master human destiny. Yet the idea that 
Christ's ethics could be a "historical possibility" was 
rejected by Niebuhr because he believed politics involved 
compromise and pragmatism, rather than ideological purity, and 
that the Christian should enter politics only in order to 
check evil rather than in pursuit of Christ's ethical 
injunctions. 
To Niebuhr these contrasting traditions, at all times, 
"emphasise disposition, rather than doctrines; and they are 
bound to be inexact. It must remain a matter of opinion 
whether or not a man takes adequate account of all the various 
factors and forces in a social situation. "15 This is the crux 
of the matter. In the tensions between different approaches 
- "Augustine's Political Realism" in Niebuhr 1953, p. 114. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid., p. 115. 
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there is passionate debate, creativity, but no agreed answers. 
Differences in interpretation allow multifarious Biblical 
readings to suggest violent support for the State as one 
legitimate Christian response, peaceful direct non-violence 
one other approach, with categorical non-resistance yet 
another possibility. 
on one side the recognition that the world is flawed and 
imperfect leads some Christians to take a realist view. 
This idea is based on the notion that failures of 
intelligence and imagination with regard to moral behaviour 
are to be ascribed to 'natural limitations'. Michael 
Howard, the international theorist and contributor to the 
BCC's 1959 Report Christians and Atomic War, has succinctly 
summed up this approach: "The best a 'moral' statesman 
involved in such a dilemma (i. e. a struggle between ethics 
and politics) can do is to realise that it is a dilemma; 
that he is an actor in the familiar tragedy brought about by 
a conflict of values; and that nothing can be gained by 
renouncing his role, that role is a tragic one. " 16 
On the other side, however, the recognition that the 
essential equality of all humanity before God brings forward 
a desire to transform the form and conduct of the State. 
16 Howard 1970, p. 247. Similar sentiments are voiced by Richard 
Harries (in Bridger (ed. ) 1963, p. 76) when he wrote: "That we have only 
a limited capacity to take into account the interests of others is not 
the sign of some dramatic fall from grace but an indication of our 
immaturity .... We are infants struggling through to immaturity rather 
than perfect beings thrown out of paradise. " Compare with Deane 1963, 
p. 167. 
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Rather than striving for a this-world free from 
imperfection, proponents of such idealism challenge the 
notion that the conflation of politics and ethics confuses 
the 'real issues' or that the State, politics, or 
international affairs constitutes an immutable realm of the 
"given'. It is this view that brought forward the "peace 
movement'. 
The above observation does not render the search for a 
Christian approach superfluous, but adds the dimension that 
context and ideological perspective should be considered 
paramount in any analysis of competing traditions. 
The Early Church 
It should come as little surprise that scholars are 
undecided on the attitudes of the early Church towards the 
State, war, and political responsibility. Some argue"' that 
the early Church was united in its opposition to the State 
because the evidence points to a pacifist idealism, whilst 
others claim"' that Christians were supportive of the State 
because they served in the Roman army long before the fourth 
century adoption of Christianity as the religion of Empire and 
that purity of commitment was far from universal. Simplistic 
claims are to be avoided. 19 
17 The most important being Cadoux 1919; Bainton 1960; and Lassere 
1962. To be fair to Bainton, as Price points out (in Bauckham. and 
Elford [eds-1 1989, p. 81), he did modify his claim and was forced to 
concede different levels of commitment among early Christians. Also see 
Elshtain 1985; Ferguson 1973; and Gill 1979 for similar interpretations. 
'a e. g. Helgeland 1974; Harnack 1981; Kertesz 1989. 
19 Both Frances Young 1989 and Geoffrey Price in Bauckham and Elford 
(eds. ) 1989 advise this. 
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The attitude of the early Church has been the subject of 
extensive controversy. On these terms it would be entirely 
naive to suppose that diversity of view was a modern 
phenomenon and the practice of subsequent generations 
represent a failure to live by the ideals of Christ. It is 
necessary to note that the early Church, rather than being 
pacifist in the modern sense, contained a wide spectrum of 
views and opinions about legitimate authority, political 
responsibility, and war. Attitudes were not homogeneous and 
diversity was as much the order of their day as it is in ours. 
Michael Howard points out: "the teachings of the Gospels and 
the policy of the Church were sufficiently flexible for 
Christianity to become, and to remain for a thousand years, 
one of the great warrior religions of humankind. ., 20 
Yet for the first three centuries after Christ's death the 
early Church seemed to understand the ""Gospel of Peace "21 to 
include the rejection of war and the State as a legitimate 
authority. Although more than one New Testament writer 
arguably enjoined obedience to Government, 22 the Christian 
faith did subvert the authority of the State. The early 
Church put into operation Christ's idealism as best it 
could. As both private individual and political citizen, the 
faithful were obliged to respond to injury by turning the 
other cheek and disregard the consequences for the State. 
20 Howard 1989a, p. 9. 
21 Eph. 6: 15. 
22 e. g. Rom. 12: 1-7, and I Peter 2: 17. 
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This held good however much Christians appreciated the order 
established by Rome which enabled them to spread their new 
f aith. Almost all Christian moralists saw war and the State 
as incompatible with the principles of peace with justice as 
laid open by Jesus Christ. 23 In this respect the early 
Church's method can be considered idealist in two main ways: 
first, because it was an 'ideal, an abstraction, that 
transcended social arrangements and was subject to no 
political authority; and second, in the sense that it 
brought into popular life the idea of the essential 
fellowship of all human beings under God rather than 
Emperor. Christian hope, whether present or future, long 
24 deferred or imminent, lay ultimately in eschatology . The 
23 See Latourette (Vol. I) 1937, p. 293. 
24 Etymologically-speaking leschatology' deliminates the Christian 
discussion of 'Last Things' (traditionally: heaven, hell, judgement, 
eternal life). Theologically-speaking its significance is contested. 
On one hand, the term describes the orthodox belief in an lend of the 
world' or a supernatural 'other-world'. Conservative commentators (e. g. 
Keith Ward in Harries [ed. ] 1986b, p. 82) tend to hold the term important 
insofar as it: (i) indicates a goal outside temporal concerns; and (ii) 
opposes the view that such a goal can be secured by human agency. 
Niebuhr (1941 p. 67) concludes that 'God' as a concept cannot be 
understood without taking in the eschatological dimension vis "the 
ethical demands made by Jesus are incapable of fulfilment in the present 
existence of humanity. " On the other hand however, eschatology suggests 
that the hope which relates Christians to the future cannot ignore the 
world and its future. In this respect it serves as a motif for 'this- 
world' social struggle -- a general term describing the hope for the end 
of the present order and the future destiny of society within history. 
The term hence covers all revolutionary expectations which: (i) speak of 
a radical discontinuity between the present age and the future (and thus 
are happy to speak of the end of the world); and (ii) views which want 
to stress continuity between the old order and the new within the fabric 
of human history (Rowland 1988, p. 11). In this respect eschatology, 
prophecy, future-talk, the not-yet, future-orientation, become first 
words and dominant themes in theorising the CND's 'theology of hope'. 
Alan Race (1989) highlights three features of the nuclear age that make 
eschatological theorising a political priority: (i) the possibility of 
human extinction and irreparable damage to the planet; (ii) the need to 
reconsider human responsibility for the created order; and (iii) the 
need to rediscover human limitations in a technological sense. Marty 
and Peerman (eds. ) 1968 provide a way into the 'secular' or 
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dominant concern of the Church, however, was not the 
legitimacy of social authority or political responsibility but 
the pursuit of orthodoxy and ecclesiastic order. 
Throughout these f irst three centuries critics maintained 
that the Christian presence, its philosophy and its ethics, 
threatened the security of Rome' s Empire. The Platonic 
philosopher Celsus in his True Discourse (written toward the 
latter part of the second century) argued that Christians 
were willing to accept the benefits of belonging to the 
Roman State yet were unwilling to discharge political 
responsibilities. 25 This was a common charge and one the 
early Fathers, particularly Tertullian, Origen, and 
Lactantius took great pains to refute. 
The most important of the early Christians was the third 
century Carthaginian scholar, Tertullian (c. 160-c. 225) . His 
writing makes clear that, even before Constantine, 
Christians were serving in the army and occupying State 
positions despite prohibitions against military service and 
the holding of public office. 26 In The Apology written in 
197, Tertullian used this knowledge to rally against 
%eschatologicall theologies of Ernst Bloch, JUrgen Moltmann, and Roger 
Garaudy. Of interest is also Russell's (1948, p. 382-3) note on the 
psychological importance of eschatology in radical political theory 
(5e. g. Karl Marx's schema). 
Celsus's long and detailed criticism of Christianity is refuted 
point by point in Origen's eight books Against Celsus. See the 
translation in The Ante-Nicene Fathers Vol. IV. 
26 This was because in both professions Christians would need to 
compromise with idolatrous practices. See Tertullian's Apology, Chap. 
42, The Ante-Nicene Fathers Vol. III; and the Octavius of Minucius Felix, 
Chap. 12, The Ante-Nicene Fathers Vol. IV. 
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Celsus's criticisms by arguing that Christians supported the 
State in every conceivable way: 
We have filled every place among you -- cities, 
islands, fortresses, towns, marketplaces, the very 
camp .... We sail together with you, we go 
to war, we 
till the ground, we conduct business together with 
YOU. 27 
Tertullian maintained that Christians were as good, if not 
better, citizens than any other. Christians were loyal 
subjects who offered prayers for the Emperor to have a long 
life, brave armies and a peaceful reign. 28 Any suggestion 
that they might rise against the State was unjust because 
Christians would "rather be killed than kill". 29 Such 
evidence suggests that substantial sections of the Church 
were not pacifist, at least in the modern sense, if there 
were those who could square military services with their 
consciences. In these passages Tertullian intimates that 
the ethical problem suggested by military service was not a 
live issue in the Church at this time. To be sure the 
powerful Church at Alexandria, for one, looked askance upon 
the reception of soldiers into its membership and believed 
30 
enlistment was only possible in exceptional circumstances. 
Yet as Latourette points Out, 31 it is necessary to note that 
Jews and slaves were legally disqualified from membership in 
27 Tertullian, Apology, Chap. 42, The Ante-Nicene Fathers, Vol. III. 
28 Tertullianf Apology, Chaps. 30-33, The Ante-Nicene Fathers, Vol. III. 
29 Tertullianf Apology, Chap. 42, The Ante-Nicene Fathers, Vol. III. 
30 The thirteenth and fourteenth Canons of the Church of Alexandria 
state: "of a prince or a soldier, that they be not received (to the 
Church) indiscriminately" and "That a Nazarene may not become a soldier 
unless by order" translated in The Ante-Nicene Fathers, Vol. V, p. 257. 
31 Latourette (Vol. I) 1937, p. 269. 
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the legion and- such Christians as were drawn from these 
groups were ineligible for service anyway. (The Roman State 
could nearly always obtain as many soldiers as it wished 
through voluntary enlistment without recourse to Christian 
conscription. ) The 'early' Tertullian thus tacitly condones 
soldiering and by implication the State-as-legitimate- 
authority. Tertullian, however, is particularly interesting 
because his position changed over time. By his later 
commentary, De Co-rona ("The Chaplet"), Tertullian had moved 
away from his early catholic position towards a much more 
confrontational attitude towards political authority. 
Tertullian's opposition 
In "The Chaplet" (204) Tertullian is adamant that a 
soldier who converted to Christianity should give up 
32 
military service . This was for several reasons. First, 
the soldierfs "sacred oath' of allegiance and loyalty to the 
State contradicted the baptismal vow. Christ taught that 
believers could not serve two masters. 33 Second, soldiering 
involved taking part in heathen ceremonies, idolatrous 
practices, and a "morally loose' lifestyle. This made the 
military profession incompatible with obligations to God and 
family. Finally, taking the sword made it necessary to 
inflict punishment, when to a Christian revenge was 
forbidden. To shed blood whether as soldier or executioner, 
32 Tertullian, De Corona, Chap. 11, The Ante-Nicene Fathers, Vol. III. 
33 c. f. Matt. 6: 24, Luke 16: 13. 
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was contrary to Christ's commandment. 34 The significant 
point Tertullian was making was that Christian military 
service, on behalf of the State, was spiritually 
compromising. Although his 'new' position was still a 
spirited defence against Christianity's critics, it can also 
be considered an attack upon a hierarchically defined Church 
attitude to war. Young conclude S35 however, that Tertullian 
was less than consistent and in all probability a hypocrite. 
According to Young, Tertullian was happy to refute the 
suggestion that Christians were enemies of the State when 
addressing Romans, but equally happy to warn against 
military service if he was addressing a Christian audience. 
This view precludes the possibility that Tertullian had a 
change of heart in his later years. 
For Tertullian the increasing moral laxity of converts 
signalled that the prevailing Christian orthodoxy was no 
longer to be trusted as the sole repository of the apostolic 
revelation. Legitimate authority belonged to those who 
possessed the Spirit and not simply to the bishops by virtue 
of their position. In this way he became a theological 
radical, a free-lance who saw no difference between clergy 
and laity, and a great denouncer of those who appealed in 
the Apologist tradition to secular Greco-Roman philosophy 
Jq As Bailey reports several cases are recorded by both Christian and 
non-Christian authors of converted soldiers suffering martyrdom because 
of their unwillingness to renounce their allegiance to Christ. Bailey 
1987, p. 9. 
35 Young 1989, p. 499. 
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for revelation. For Tertullian a true knowledge of God 
could be found through theological reflection coupled with 
social witness. Christians needed to struggle between the 
absolute individualism and the universalism that the Gospel 
demanded. In other words, the tension between private faith 
and political responsibility needed to be sternly faced and 
not avoided. Yet the issue that really exercised Tertullian 
was never war per se but war as a tool of illegitimate 
authority. Tertullian condemned military service not 
primarily on deontological grounds but in terms of the 
prevailing depravity and immorality of both State and 
Church. This is a major reason for his indifference, and 
even hostility, to Church and State which he saw as impure 
and spiritually defiled authorities. For these reasons 
Harnack categorises Tertullian as the innovator of a 
Christian attack on military service and political 
authority. 36 
The Alexandrian philosopher Origen (184-254) also worked 
at rebutting pagan criticism. To Celsus, Christianity like 
Judaism, had originated as a violent rebellion against the 
State. It encouraged the frequent Barbarian rebellions 
against Rome. Origen was keen to repudiate both charge and 
comparison: 
... if a revolt had led to the formation of the Christian 
commonwealth-the Christian Lawgiver would not have 
altogether forbidden the putting of men to death; and yet 
He nowhere teaches that it is right for His own disciples 
36 See Harnack 1981. 
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to offer violence to any one, however wicked.... Jesus is, 
then, not the leader of any seditious movement, but the 
promoter of peace. 37 
For Origen Celsus was free to see Judaism as violent, 
dangerous, and revolutionary because Christianity was 
passive, peaceful, and law-abiding. If all people were 
Christian, proclaimed Origen, even rebellious Barbarians 
would be rendered meek and mild. Whilst Christians should 
be exempt from military service on grounds similar to that 
of the Roman Priests (who kept their right hand pure for the 
sake of sacrificial purity) they were still politically 
responsible and always supported the State: 
As we by our prayers vanquish all demons who stir up 
war, and lead to the violation of oaths, and disturb 
the peace, we go into the field to fight for them. And 
we do take our part in public affairs, when along with 
righteous prayers we join in self-denying exercises and 
meditations, which teach us to despise pleasures and 
not be led away by them. And none fight better for the 
king than we do. We do not indeed f ight under him, 
although he require it; but we fight on his behalf, 
forming a special army of piety -- by offering our 
prayers to God. 38 
For Origen the Scriptures were 'a vast ocean of mysteries' 
impossible to fathom, or even perceive completely, with 
every line replete with meaning and symbolism. In a 
practical sense he concluded that no interpretation could be 
true which did not promote the love of God or the love of 
His people. 39 In a mystical sense Christ's communion 
37 Origen, Against Celsus, Book III Chap. 7 and Book VIII Chap. 14, The 
Ante-Nicene Fathers, Vol. IV. 
38 Origen, Against Celsus, Book VIII Chap. 73, The Ante-Nicene Fathers, 
Vol. IV. 
39 on Origen see Kelly 1968, particularly pp. 73-5 and pp. 126-38. 
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compromised the whole of humanity, the whole of creation. 40 
Origen's position, however, differed from Tertullian's in 
that it has been seen to be truly pacifist in its rationale. 
This is to say, as Kertesz argues, that based on his 
interpretation of the commandments of Christ and the teachings 
of the Bible, Origen was convinced that war was a great 
evil, it was wrong to take part in it, support or condone it 
in any way. " Yet even this interpretation is problematic 
because Origen constantly Ispiritualizes' everything. 
Ultimately he believed that wars were caused by evil 
'demons' and that the Emperor had a duty to maintain the law 
and order given him under God. The Christian's role was to 
f ight the demons and support the State through prayer and 
spiritual exercises. Once the world was Christianised, the 
need for war would disappear. 42 
The last of the great Christian writers to be considered 
in the period before Constantine was Lactantius (died AD 
325). In his major work, The Divine Institutes, he writes: 
... when God forbids us to 
kill, He not only prohibits 
us from open violence, which is not even allowed by the 
public laws, but He warns us against the commission of 
those things which are esteemed lawful among men. Thus 
it will be neither law-full for a just man to engage in 
warfare, since his warfare is justice itself, nor to 
accuse any one of a capital charge, because it makes no 
difference whether you put a man to death by word, or 
rather by the sword, since it is the act of putting to 
death itself which is prohibited. Therefore, with 
40 Kelly 1968, p. 202. 
41 KerteszIs pacifist label for Origen and definition of pacifism 
(Kertesz 1989, p-11 and p. 162) is contentious in that it can be said 
that a "special army of piety" who prayed for Rome's military success 
was surely condoning war albeit war fought by non-Christians. 
42 Young, 1989, p. 500. 
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regard to this precept of God, there ought to be no 
exception at all; but that it is always unlawful to put 
to death a man, whom God willed to be a sacred 
animal. 43 
Lactantius constitutes Christian political responsibility as 
standing over against Greco-Roman (i. e. realist-type) 
conceptions of order and rationality. The early Church was 
familiar with the Roman philosophers' ideas of universal 
reason, from Stoicism the conception of 'natural law"' (which 
the Apologists regarded as identical with the Christian moral 
law) was already passing into prominence in Christian 
political thought .45 For Platonists and Stoics the need for 
order, enforced by the State through violence, was seen as 
the necessary expression of this rational 'natural law'. To 
Lactantius, however, free human will spoke not of the 
"necessity' for such violence but the bestowal of love and 
the rejection of war. 
Summary 
All these thinkers can be theorised as idealist. This is 
because they had a particular vision of hope and change 
46 
within a this-world future: a telos. This desire for a 
43 Lactantius, Divine Institutes, Book VI Chap. 20, The Ante-Nicene 
Fathers, Vol-VIII. 
44 For a consideration of "Natural Law and International Ethics" see 
Boyle in Nardin and Mapel (eds. ) 1992, pp. 112-35. 
45 Troeltsch 1931, p. 144. Niebuhr (1941, p. 160) echoes Troeltsch's 
sentiments when he argues that Christianity had no social ethic until it 
appropriated the Stoic ethic. It is significant, as Russell informs (1948, 
p. 285), that the Stoic gospel "was one of endurance rather than hope. " To 
this might be added Nietzsche's observation that Christianity is thus "a 
Platonism for the people" (see Garaudy's "Communists and Christians in 
Dialogue" in Marty and Peerman [eds. ] 1968 pp. 212-21 for a discussion). 
46 See MacIntyre 1985, pp. 54-5 for a relevant discussion of this 
concept. 
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new age was of central feature of New Testament writing. As 
Kelly explains the Christian hope, as delineated by the 
Biblical writers, was ""a two-fold consciousness of blessing 
here and now in this time of waiting, and blessedness yet to 
come; and the final denouement was conceived realistically 
as a series of events to be carried out by God on the plane 
of history. 114 7 Yet the message is confused, the evidence 
complex, and firm conclusions difficult to draw. 
There is little evidence to suggest Christ founded a 
%peace movement'. Theoretically, Christ's teaching was 
idealistic and at odds with the demands of the militaristic 
political order. Believers were loyal to God not State and 
rejected its universalist claims. Christianity, by bringing 
the Church into existence, was thus an institution whose 
principles rivalled, if not physically menaced, existing 
political authority. Yet practically, whilst many Christians 
rejected military service, they did not see it as the 
abnegation of their political responsibilities. The convert 
was opposing a specific demand of the State, not its general 
right to rule which the Church seemed to qualify. It is 
noteworthy that no Christian rebellion were aroused by the 
repeated and often violent persecutions of the first three 
centuries. " Apologists insisted that the State owed its 
stability and prosperity to their faith. 49 
47 Kelly 1968, pp. 459-60. 
48 Cadoux 1925, p. 101. 
49 Troeltsch has pointed out that the true temper of the time was 
actually conservative precisely because the message of Jesus was not a 
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It is necessary to conclude that the early Church was 
generally a pacific-ist but not pacifist organisation. Its 
efforts to represent Christ's message did, nevertheless, give 
life to a subversive, idealist inheritance that pointed 
towards a Christian role in challenging secular attitudes to 
the State, political responsibility, and war. It was these 
elements that Augustine challenged with his fourth century 
formulations. Arendt argues it was Augustine who transformed 
Christianity from these utopian and anti-State impulses into a 
great and stable political institution: "'That this was 
possible without the complete perversion of the Gospel was 
almost wholly due to Augustine, who, though hardly the father 
of the Western concept of history, is probably the spiritual 
author and certainly the greatest theorist of Christian 
politiCS.,, 50 
Part II: Augustine's Just War 
In the fourth and fifth centuries Christian attitudes to 
the State, questions of authority, legitimacy, and political 
responsibility underwent a radical transformation. Beginning 
51 
with the conversion of the Emperor Constantine in AD 312, 
programme of revolution, reform, or justice but principally a summons to 
prepare for the coming of the Kingdom of God. Troeltsch 1931, pp. 55-9 
and pp. 126-8. 
50 Arendt 1993, p. 73. For a similar conclusion see Knowles 1971, 
PF. 19-20. 
According to the story Constantine received a vision in which he was 
informed that if he marked his standard with the sign of the cross he would 
be assured of victory in his battles. Constantine's subsequent successes 
in war were from then on were ascribed to the fact that he had adopted the 
Christian faith, see Kertesz 1989, p. 13; and Latourette (Vol-I) 1937, 
pp. 158-9. Most theologians and Church historians agree that 312 is the 
correct date for Constantine's conversion, but at least one just war 
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followed by the adoption of Christiani ty52 as the official 
Roman religion in 380, the distinction between Church and 
State largely ceased. The Constantinian revolution can be 
theorised as an attempt on the part of the State to take over 
the Church. 53 Prior to this d6tente the Church was a 
persecuted body struggling to adapt to its social environment 
whilst fighting off intellectual challengers to its developing 
world-view. The Church's new relation to the State meant, as 
Kelly observes5', that the success or failure of a doctrine 
might now hinge upon the favour of the reigning emperor. Yet 
it remains true that Christianity was adopted by Rome without 
a substantial shift in the application of its politics, power, 
55 or ideology . For Christians 
the conversion of Constantine 
led to the assumption that if a State no longer persecuted the 
Church, it was a sure sign of it being a legitimate authority. 
The Roman Empire's adoption of Christianity, however, led to 
compromise, accommodation, and the institutionalisation of 
faith. It marginalised a Christian nostalgia for utopian 
discipleship, and the conviction that a reign of God was 
56 possible on earth. The Church became society. Christians 
were now free to see themselves as "the salvation of the 
philosopher (i. e. Santoni 1991, p. 83) however, cites Constantine's 
conversion in 337 -- the year of his death. 
52 The Edict of Thessalonica (under the joint rule of Emperors Theodosius 
I, Gratian, and Valentinian) made Christianity the official religion. See 
Latourette (Vol. I) 1937, pp. 180-2. 
53 Hall 1986, p. 117. 
54 Kelly 1968, p. 237. 
55 Rowland 1988, p. 14. 
56 For a extended analysis of this perspective on the rise of Christian 
Europe see Hall 1986, pp-111-44. 
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coimonwealth , 57 rather than constituting an idealist 
opposition to it. 
Historically, the context was one in which Rome was 
besieged by Germanic barbarians. The sacking of Rome by 
Alaric the Visgoth in, AD 410 brought dramatic proof that the 
Roman State's political, administrative, and military system 
was in terminal decline. For Roman Daaans the barbarians 
success increased the legitimacy of their claim that Christian 
attitudes to questions of political authority and 
responsibility weakened the State. 
Saint Aurelius Augustine, bishop of Hippo (354-430) 
responded to this momentous event by composing his magnum opus 
the City of God. Like previous Christian Apologies the City 
of God was written as a response to pagan charges of Christian 
culpability in the decline of Rome. Yet the City of God was 
more than an defence of the Catholic Church and a call for 
spiritual regeneration. It was a systematic attempt to 
establish one orthodoxy that would help Christians def ine the 
State and everything it stood f or. With a characteristic 
verve Augustine shifted attention away from discussing whether 
a Christian should be allowed to serve in the army to the kind 
of force that was acceptable to the Church. For Augustine 
sharing in the ambiguities of power included the revision of 
attitudes towards the State's monopoly of violence. 
- Augustine's "Reply to Faustus the Manichean" in Schaff (ed. ) 1979, 
Vol. IV. 
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Augustine was essentially a polemicist. He set out to 
refute blatant heresies, criticism against Christianity, and 
erroneous teachings that threatened the establishment of 
,, 511 "sound doctrine . Previous to this period, as was shown 
above, the attitude of Christians to social authority, 
political responsibility, and war was divided. The idealism 
of Tertullian, Origen and Lactantius were not explicit 
heresies as such but rather, as Hartigen suggests, 
"tenaciously maintained positions which orthodox Christians 
could support with ample New Testament authority and a 
substantial theological tradition. "59 What marks the Civitas 
Dei is the repudiation of their view that individual or 
collective felicity was of theological concern. 
Augustine wished to savage the idea that following the 
Christianisation of Rome God had assigned a special divine 
role, whether positive or negative, for political authorities. 
The State's legal and institutional adoption of Christianity 
was theologically neutral: it would neither bring an end to 
war and conflict or usher in an age of ever-lasting temporal 
peace. The chief end of humanity was simply to glorify God. 
Augustine's whole work turns on this contrast between worldly 
and other-worldly motives. " 
58 Augustine's Confessions 1961, Book VII Chap. 19. 
59 Hartigan 1966, p. 196. 
60 Figgis 1921, p-9. Also see Deane 1963; Markus 1970; Epp's 1990 PhD. 
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The Roots of Just War Thinking 
It is widely accepted that Augustine was the formal 
instigator of just war theory. Robert Holmes, for instance, 
accuses Augustine of being "Christianity's principal 
philosopher of war" who 11turn[ed] Christ's teaching on its 
head. 1161 Santoni describes him as "the pivotal thinker in 
Christianity's move from its early paci fiSM62 to its 
"63 acceptance of some wars as justifiable whilst Jenny 
Teichman deplores the "'heavy blows" dealt to the "quasi- 
pacifist aspects of Christianity. , 64 James Turner Johnson 
concludes that Augustine "recast Roman (and Hebraic) ideas on 
war into a Christian mould while erecting a systematic moral 
justification for Christian participation in violence. " 65 
Theoretically, Augustine drew upon the Old Testament 
paradigm of war commanded by God 66 , the ideas of Saint Ambrose 
(the pioneer in asserting the claims of the Church vis-ci-vis 
the State in the post-Constantine era 67) , and established 
Roman positions on the circumstances in which war could or 
should be legitimately waged. He addressed two particular 
issues: first, was it possible for the Christian to wage war 
bi Holmes 1989, pp. 166,117. 
62 Santoni defines the Christian's renunciation of violence and refusal 
to serve in the army as the acceptance of "a form of pacifism" (Santoni 
1991, p. 83). Above has suggested this to be a contentious definition 
but the essential thrust of his argument is applicable. 
63 Santoni 1991, p. 84. 
64 Teichman 1986, p. 47. 
65 Johnson 1981, p. xxiv. 
66 Andrew Chester (1989) provides a complementary discussion of the 
themes of peace and war in the Old Testament 
67 On Saint Ambrose and his role in just war ideas see Bailey 1987, 
p. 11; Kertesz 1989, p. 19. 
37 
without sinning? Second, what constraints should be put upon 
the conduct of the Christian if war was waged? War was 
divided into two classes: those that were just and those that 
were unjust. Augustine understood just war as the appropriate 
response by Christians, as individuals and as part of Church 
and State, to international conflict. 
According to Augustine "'the wretched condition of humanity 
in this life" is the "**punishment for sin. "68 Death, misery, 
suffering, war, robbery, and violence were all penal 
consequences of sin: they were inherent and unavoidable 
69 aspects of the human condition. Political authority, 
however, was instigated by God to provide the element of 
order, stability, and peace necessary in this "anarchicall 
world rendered no longer spontaneous by the Fall. Two 
presuppositions are paramount here. 
First, a pessimistic "metaphysics of fallen man 1170 __ the 
idea of the moral culpability of humanity, the sense that 
humans are ineradicably biased towards evil. The causes of 
war are not rooted in 'politics' but within a corrupted human 
nature. A just war is waged so that wicked people may be 
overcome by kindness, or rather that the evil which is in the 
68 Augustine 1972, Book XXII Chap. 24. 
69 e. g. Augustine 1972, Book XII Chap. 14; Book XV Chap. 4; and Book XIX 
Chap. 15. 
70 The phrase is Ashley's 1981, p. 217. Both Holsti in Kegley (ed. ) 
1995, p. 38; and Booth in Booth and Smith (eds. ) 1995, p. 333 follow 
Ashley in suggesting that this Augustinian sense of human nature informs 
every facet of classical realism. To quote Niebuhr (1964, p. 83): "where 
there is history at all there is freedom; and where there is freedom 
there is sin". On the 'Fall' see Genesis 3. Analysis in Russell 1948, 
p. 384; Kelly 1968, pp. 344-74; Deane 1963, pp. 13-77; Epp's 1990 PhD, 
pp. 27-32; and McGrath 1997, pp. 425-6. 
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wicked may be overcome by good, and that the 'just' may be 
delivered from evil. Power and its pursuit by individuals and 
States is unavoidable because "such is the instability of 
human affairs that no people has ever been allowed such a 
degree of tranquillity as to remove all dread of hostile 
attacks on their life in this world. "71 Augustine arguably 
ascribed, in a mechanical deterministic fashion, an 
ahistorical universality to human behaviour. This deep-rooted 
evil behaviour, however, was restricted to the biographies of 
individuals not groups or organisations . 
72 Where the 'late' 
Tertullian, in particular, began in communitarian fashion with 
the salvation of individuals within society, Augustine began 
with the salvation of isolated individuals outside society. 
As Markus acknowledges, "human society is irremediably rooted 
in a tension-ridden and disordered condition where there can 
be no resolution, save eschatologically. "73 
Second, the idea that the State is a necessary bulwark 
against sin, and sin is something that can be controlled by 
74 
rational government . Political authority was to be accepted 
71 Augustine 1972, Book XVII Chap. 13. 
72 Whilst Figgis (1921, p. 43), for example, accepts that Augustine 
"reduces all to individualism", he rejects the idea that the concept of 
predestinarianism is 'deterministic' (pp. 45-6) because Adam's sin was 
not 'predetermined'. A position endorsed by both Epp's PhD, p. 28; and 
Deane 1963, p-114. Yet such abstract metaphysical conjuncture is 
socially irrelevant. In an empirical sense Augustine opened the way for 
the justification of all forms of oppression in the here and now with 
his fatalistic concept of 'original sin'. 
73 Markus 1970, p. 83. 
74 e. g. Augustine 1972, Book XI Chaps. 1-2; and Book XIX Chaps. 13 and 
17. 
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as both punishment and remedy for sin. *5 Here "the idea of 
original sin as individual and ahistorical", as Milbank 
reveals, "merges with the notion of government as a technical 
manipulation of chaotic human forces. Organised power is 
strangely seen as itself immune from this taint, and is 
absurdly imagined that it can keep the effects of this taint 
"76 'under control' . Augustine 
believed that without order, 
legal institutions, and private property society would 
collapse into chaos. Political authority was divinely 
instituted, for the benefit of the individual, in order to 
serve as the criterion for authority and establish the 
77 'relative' justice possible in this-world . Here there is a 
'dilemma' between what is possible, given political 
'necessity', and what is desirable in an absolute (i. e. other- 
world) sense. State utility appears superior to morality and 
Augustinian metaphysics (Christian, idealist, and absolutist) 
move perceptibly into a utilitarian (realist, pragmatic, and 
calculating) viewpoint. The rational analysis of this 
dichotomy led Augustine to the concept of just war waged in 
obedience to a series of stipulative requirements. On one 
'ý' c. f. Romans 13: 1, "Let every soul be subject unto the higher powers. 
For there is no power but of God: the powers that be are ordained of 
God. ". 
76 Milbank 1986, p. 17. Though Milbank is referring to Niebuhr and the 
modern multilateralists with this criticism (Potter 1970, p. 108: "The 
same old Niebuhrian questions, are to a great extent, the same old 
Augustinian questions") the analysis remains relevant. 
77 e. g. Augustine 1972, Book IV Chap. 3; and his letter to Marcellinus 
(CXXXVIII) in schaff (ed. ) 1979, Vol. I. Also see the analysis on 
Augustine's Platonic conception of 'relative justice' in Foster 1969, 
p. 204; Williams 1992, p. 27; Hare and Joynt 1982, p. 59. Also see Niebuhr 
1944, p-xiii: "Man's capacity for justice makes democracy possible; but 
man's inclination to injustice makes democracy necessary". 
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hand, deterrence or encouraging 'evil' people to respect one 
another's rights, and on the other, the goal of the State to 
ensure just retribution. As Williams notes: "Augustine's 
starting-point is realism's starting-point: a divorce between 
the actual and the desirable. """ 
The State's Duty to Preserve the Status Quo 
Given that Augustine saw a fundamental imbalance in the 
state of nature between people's needs and their capacity to 
satisfy them", it is not surprising that he saw international 
affairs as a realm in which relations between States were 
fraught with difficulties. " In this 'natural order' civil 
authorities had been provided with the power and means to 
perform military duties in order to secure the safety of the 
community. 81 The State had a God-given duty to safeguard the 
social good and a responsibility to resort to force if 
threatened. obedience to rulers, consequently, was in the 
common interest and the Christian should only disobey laws if 
they contravened God's law. 82 War and violence, like greed 
and injustice, was inevitable and the prophecy that God 
"maketh wars to cease unto the end of the earth 1183 : 
78 Williams 1992, p. 27. 
79 c. f. Hobbes's Leviathan for similar sentiments. 80 e. g. Augustine 1972, Book XIX Chap. 7; and Book XVI Chap. 4. 
Commentary in Deane 1963, p. 168; and Cartwright's "Biblical Arguments in 
International Ethics" in Nardin and Mapel (eds. ) 1992, pp. 275-6. 
81 Augustine's "Reply to Faustus the Manichaean" Book XXII Chap. 75 in 
Schaff (ed. ) 1979, Vol. IV. 
82 e. g. Augustine 1961, Book III Chap. 8; and Augustine 1972, Book V 
Chap. 17. C. f. attitudes to the sacrifice of Christian martyrs in 
Augustine 1972, Book VII Chap. 19. 
E13 The Book of Psalms 46: 9. 
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This not yet see we fulfilled: yet are there wars, wars 
among nations for sovereignty; among sects, among Jews, 
Pagans, Christians, heretics, are wars, frequent wars, 
some for the truth, some for falsehood contending. Not 
yet then is this fulfilled-but happily it shall be 
fulfilled. 8' 
As this quotation suggests Augustine believed that not only 
were wars inevitable but that some wars were 'relatively just' 
and defensible. In this way no matter how evil or unjust the 
cause, war does not escape the net of God's Providence. Deane 
notes: "Just as God does not force men to sin -- to rob, to 
kill, to injure one another -- and yet regulates and uses 
their sinful actions so that they become instruments for 
carrying out His eternal designs for the world, so He permits 
states and rulers, even if they are acting unjustly, to wage 
war only insofar as their battles and campaigns contribute to 
His ends -- the punishment of the wicked and the testing and 
training of the good. "85 
War as Lesser of Two Evils 
Because war has a tendency to engender great evil, for 
Augustine, the resort to violence in order to secure temporal 
order alone was never sufficient justification. Yet peace or 
order was always the object of desire when war was waged. 86 
The issue was not peace per se but rather the type of peace 
84 Augustine's exposition on "Psalm XLVI" in Schaff (ed. ) 1979, 
Vol. VIII. Also see commentary by Deane 1963, pp. 155-6; and Markus 1970, 
?. 52 * Deane wrongly cites the Psalm as XLV. 5 Deane 1963, p. 157. 
86 Childress in Harries 1986b, p. 125 makes the point that the principle 
of order is used interchangeably with peace in Augustinian (i. e. 
Niebuhrian) accounts. 
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87 
sought. Most of the wars waged between states are, 
consequently, in no sense "just' but internecine quarrels. 8, 
Augustine was quite aware of the suffering caused by war and 
convinced the State's recourse to war had always to be the 
lesser of 'two evilsý: 
But the wise manf they say, will wage just wars. Surely, 
if he remembers that he is a human being, he will rather 
lament the fact that he is faced with the necessity of 
waging just wars; for if they were not just, he would not 
have to engage in them, and consequently there would be 
no wars for a wise man. For it is the injustice of the 
opposing side that lays on the wise man the duty of 
waging wars; and this injustice is assuredly to be 
deplored by a human being, since it is the injustice of 
human beings,, even though no necessity for war should 
arise from it. And so everyone who reflects with sorrow 
on such grievous evils, in all their horror and cruelty, 
must acknowledge the misery of them. And yet a man who 
experiences such evils, or even thinks about them, 
without heartfelt grief, is assuredly in a far more 
pitiable conditionf if he thinks himself happy simply 
because he has lost all human feeling. 89 
War was so dreadful that conquest, glory, or wealth were not 
justifiable reasons for war. " It was only justifiable in 
order to correct wrongdoing and ensure injustice did not 
flourish. War must be waged as a necessity, and waged only 
that God may by it deliver people from that necessity and 
preserve them in peace. 91 
Augustine of f ered four suggestions for determining whether 
or not a war was just. First, all defensive war was 
automatically just. Aggression was a breach of peace and 
87 Augustine 1972, Book XIX Chap. 12. 
88 Deane 1963, p. 157. 
89 Augustine 1972, Book XIX Chap. 7 
90 Augustine 1972, Book IV Chap. 6. 
91 Augustine to Boniface (letter CLXXXIX) in Schaff (ed. ) 1979, Vol. l. 
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self-defence a legitimate response to that breach. The 
meaning of peace was summed in terms of the preservation of 
the status quo. Self-defence was a proper justification for 
attacking another State (Augustine does not discuss the 
problems involved in determining the aggressor 92) Second, an 
offensive war was just so long as it was waged against a State 
who refused to make reparations for wrongs committed. In this 
case war was "acted not in cruelty, but in righteous 
retribution, giving to all what they deserved, and warning 
those who needed warning"93 . Referring to Rome's First Punic 
War with Carthage, Augustine felt: 
Now obviously the Romans had a just excuse for 
undertaking and carrying on these great wars. When they 
were subjected to unprovoked attacks by their enemies, 
they were forced to resist not by lust for glory in men's 
eyes but by the necessity to defend their life and 
liberty. 9' 
Third, an offensive war was also just if waged against a State 
who violated property-rights: "If some nation or some state 
which is warred upon has failed either to make reparation for 
an injurious action committed by its citizens or to return 
what has been wrongly appropriated. "95 Augustine conflates 
private property with 'absolute dominion': because property is 
enforced by the law of the State, individuals must hold to 
92 Deane 1963, p-162. 
93 Augustine's "Reply to Faustus the Manichaean" Book XXII Chap. 74 in 
Schaff (ed. ) 1979, Vol. IV. 
94 Augustine 1972, Book III Chap. 10. 
95 Augustine's Quaestionum in Heptateuchum Book VI Chap. 10. Translated 
and cited by Deane 1963, p. 312. 
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that law. (This pagan conception of absolute property became 
the foundation of modern capitalism. 96) 
The final criteria Augustine believed in determining 
whether a war was just was that, following Cicero (106-43 
BC), the ideal State should never engage in war except in 
defence of its honour or safety. According to Cicero 
although death often rescued individuals from pain (instead 
of bringing disaster) the death of a whole community was 
always a disaster. 97 War was justifiable if it stopped an 
individual from misusing their liberty, or alternatively, 
protected the innocent. The reluctant and limited use of 
force was thus a charitable response by Christians to the 
needs of an innocent neighbour assailed by an aggressive 
power. 
Augustine's criteria seems to suggest that, for Rome's 
Christian leaders, the loss of political power was a greater 
"evil' than war itself. This tough . and pragmatic decision 
making -- namely, that some wars are just if they are 
necessary to avenge injuries and maintain the earthly status 
quo -- signalled the birth of just war thinking. The just war 
became a form of punishment inflicted when a Staters behaviour 
violated the norms of temporal order. As Williams argues: 
A State may justly wage a war where its own existence is 
threatened or the established order is placed in doubt. 
Although we cannot be sure that the existing world order 
is divinely sanctioned we can be sure that there is a 
96 See Figgis 1921, pp. 53 and 99 for a discussion. 
97 Augustine 1972, Book XXII Chap. 6. 
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relative temporal obligation to uphold whatever order 
exists. 9' 
In these ways Augustine moved the Christian analysis of war 
away from the early Fathers ambivalence towards political 
authority. Such analysis presupposes that for war to be just 
the individual has to believe that the State or order which is 
being fought f or, equals the best 'relative' justice 
available. 
Legitimate Authority 
To counter the quasi-pacifism of Origen, Tertullian, and 
Lactantius, Augustine needed to justify why the idea of just 
war did not contradict Gospel precepts. On one hand, he 
needed to establish why Christians must obey political 
authority. On the other hand, he needed to establish the 
right of Christians to kill for political authority. 
Augustine set to do this by declaring a personal form of 
pacifism insofar as the Christian individual was concerned. 
In doing so he prefigured Weber by erecting a conceptual 
barrier between private and public imperatives. This approach 
subscribed to a dualism of Christian faith (ethics) and social 
life (politics) . 
To Augustine the act of murder (i. e. the taking of life in 
a private capacity) was a heinous crime always regarded as 
evil. This 'natural law' would be so even if Civil law 
permitted it. He asserts differences between two types of 
98 Williams 1992, p-29. 
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law: temporal and eternal. Temporal (secular) law offers 
inadequate Christian guidance. Eternal law (Christ's law of 
love) enshrines all human life as inviolate. Because 
Christian salvation was sought beyond history the individual 
was literally enjoined to turn 'the other cheek' when personal 
rights were violated even if the assailant or aggressor was 
particularly evil. 99 Passivity and stoicism in the face of 
adversity was called for. 100 Although this meant that a 
Christian was forbidden from killing in a private capacity 
they were, however, permitted to do so if acting on the behalf 
of a legitimate political authority. Augustine confirmed this 
principle in a letter: 
As to killing others in order to defend one's own life, I 
do not approve of this, unless one happen to be a soldier 
or public functionary acting, not for himself but in 
defence of others or of the city in which he resides, if 
he acts according to the commission lawfully given him, 
and in the manner becoming his office. '01 
Augustine established the needs of 'legitimate authority' as a 
necessary exception to the general prohibition against the 
taking of human life. This is because the Christian 'warrior' 
makes war not for themselves but out of love for others. it 
is "'these precepts [that] pertain rather to the inward 
disposition of the heart than to the actions which are done in 
the sight of men. "102 As Roland Bainton puts it: "'The 
inwardness of Augustine's ethic served to justify outward 
99 Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff 1990, p. 194. 
100 Cadoux 1919, pp-49-66 and pp. 102-60, pp. 255-57. 
101 Augustine to Publicola (letter XLVII) in Schaff (ed. ) 1979, Vol. I. 
102 Augustine to Marcellinus (letter CXXXVIII) in Schaff (ed. ) 1979, 
vol. I. 
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violence, because right and wrong were seen to reside not in 
acts but in attitudes. "103 
The definitive expression of Augustine's notion that 
homicide committed on behalf of the State is not murder 
appears in an early chapter in De Civitas Dei: 
There are however certain exception to the law against 
killing, made by the authority of God himself. There are 
some whose killing God orders, either by a law, or by an 
express command to a particular person at a particular 
time. In fact one who owes a duty of obedience to the 
giver of the command does not himself 'kill' -- he is an 
instrument, a sword in its user's hand. For this reason 
the commandment forbidding killing was not broken by 
those who have waged wars on the authority of God, or 
those who have imposed the death-penalty on criminals 
when representing the authority of the State in 
accordance with the laws of the State, the justest and 
most reasonable source of power. 'O' 
Augustine affirms that the soldier or politician, when acting 
in an official capacity, is not morally culpable for their 
actions. This is because they are ethically obliged to bow to 
a greater wisdom: the wisdom personified by legitimate 
authority -- the State. This means: first, even an 
unrighteous command on the part of the politician must be 
obeyed by the soldier because their vocation makes obedience a 
duty. 105 And second the politician who, perhaps through errors 
of judgement, condemns the innocent to death should simply 
acknowledge the wretchedness of their responsibility and pray 
to God "Deliver me from my necessities! "106 Because the 
103 Bainton 1960, p. 92. 
104 Augustine 1972, Book I Chap. 21. 
105 Augustine's "Reply to Faustus the Manichaean" Book XXII Chap. 75 in 
Schaff (ed. ) 1979, Vol. IV. 
106 Augustine's advice given to a judge who has executed an innocent man 
in Augustine 1972, Book XIX Chap. 6. 
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soldier and politician are not morally free agents they 
perform their duties in automaton fashion, in the manner of a 
executioner. This, unfortunately, is also the traditional 
defence of those who commit atrocities and claim they were 
107 'only' following orders . As Hartigen states: ý'The 
requirement to vindicate justice in the public realm seems to 
supersede the demands of charity which should obtain in the 
Christian's private life. "108 
The Christian pacifist's policy of non-resistance appeared 
to Augustine as "mere cowardly dislike (of death], not any 
109 
religious feeling" Because all are destined to die, death 
was not to be regarded as the great evil involved in war. The 
pacifist's worse sin was not 'political irresponsibility' but 
that they shunned conflict and proposed capitulation to 
'tyranny', individually and collectively, at the price of 
subjection to injustice. "O The breakdown of social and 
political norms caused by pacifist 'anarchy' would be the 
worst of all possible earthly evils. "' By waging war 
Christians were actually doing an 'aggressor' a service: 
107 See Walzer 1977, pp. 287-324 on this aspect of responsibility. 108 Hartigan 1966, p. 200. 
109 Augustine's "Reply to Faustus the Manichaean" Book XXII Chap. 74 in 
Schaff (ed. ) 1979, Vol. IV. 
110 c. f. Niebuhr 1957, p. 277: "It [thus] becomes rather ignoble when the 
idealist suggests that others besides himself shall be sold into slavery 
and shall groan under the tyrant's heel. " 
111 Augustine 1961, Book III Chap. 8. Deane 1963, p. 161. C. f. Weber in 
Gerth and C. Wright Mills (eds. ) 1991, p. 334: "The Sermon on the Mount 
says 'resist no evil. ' In opposition, the State asserts: "You shall 
help right to triumph by the use of force, otherwise you too may be 
responsible for injustice. ' Where this factor is absent, the 'State' is 
also absent; the 'anarchism' of the pacifist will have then come to 
life. " 
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... many things must be done 
in correcting with a certain 
benevolent severity, even against their own wishes, men 
whose welfare rather than their wishes it is our duty to 
consult; and the Christian scriptures have most 
unambiguously commanded this virtue in a magistrate.... 
And on this principle, if the commonwealth observe the 
precepts of the Christian religion, even its wars 
themselves will not be carried on without the benevolent 
design that, after the resisting nations have been 
conquered, provision may be more easily made for enjoying 
112 in peace the mutual body of piety and love . 
Augustine's stark dichotomy between individual and collective 
responsibility, juxtaposed with an acceptance of the State as 
a legitimate authority, forms the basis for his consideration 
of war itself. 
Retribution 
Above has shown that the 'Politician' and they alone, have 
the right and duty to judge whether another country has 
violated the 'natural order' and must be punished. Political 
authority, not the private individual, was the only legitimate 
initiator of violent hostilities. For Deane: "The major 
difficulty in this solution. of the problem is, of course, that 
the ruler is one of the parties to the dispute, and yet he 
must also act as the judge who decides whether or not the 
other state is guilty of injustice and whether its wrongdoing 
is great enough to warrant the infliction of punishment. "113 
Augustine saw an intimate connection between social and 
moral orders, a sin against the former logically involved 
sinning against the latter too. If one State violated the 
112 Augustine to Marcellinus (letter CXXXVIII) in Schaff (ed. ) 1979, 
Vol. I. 
113 Deane 1963, p. 162. 
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legal sovereignty of another it had broken 'natural law' . 
"This", as Hartigan reveals, "is the essential fact which 
explains why for Augustine just war is action designed above 
all else to restore a violated moral order. It also explains 
his emphasis on the subjective guilt or culpa of the enemy, 
which not only justifies the use of force but indeed requires 
it. 11114 As Deane notes: "the just war is the punishment 
imposed upon a state and upon its rulers when their behaviour 
is so aggressive or avaricious that it violates even the norms 
"115 of temporal justice . For the limited peace created to be 
reinstated, it is sometimes necessary to employ force. 
Augustine, therefore, justified war in the same terms he used 
to justify criminal punishment. 116 The authority for waging 
war was the same as for meting out punishment for criminal 
behaviour. The end to be achieved through a just war was the 
re-establishment of the exiting peace, but the means employed 
nevertheless provided a suitable chastisement of those 
presumptuous enough to disturb the status quo. This 
117 "forfeiture of rights" appears as punishment . 
When one State injured another, or failed to make 
reparations for its wrong doings or the wrongdoings committed 
by its citizens, the aggrieved State had a "just' reason for 
punishing the State in the same way it was 'justified' in 
114 Hartigan 1966, p. 199. 
115 Deane 1963, p. 156. 
116 See Deane 1963, pp. 95-7,134-6, and 138-41. 
117 Norman 1996, p. 123. 
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inflicting pain or death on domestic criminals. "Those wars 
are normally called just" writes Augustine "'which avenge 
injuries. ""8 
Conduct 
Richard Hartigan observed: "It is surprising... to turn to 
the actual statements of St. Augustine on the permissibility 
of killing innocents in war to discover that he exhibited an 
unexpected degree of harshness and seeming indifference to the 
fate of the innocent. ""9 Although Augustine affirmed the 
concept of just or righteous war under certain conditions, he 
was still concerned with how political authorities conducted 
war. 
Augustine believed wars could be just and as such, served 
as an instrument of God's purpose. Whilst all war was an 
inevitable product of sinful human nature some wars were more 
defensible than others. Not only were some wars fought for 
just ('"truth"), and others for unjust ("' for falsehood 
contending") reasons, when force was used justly it was a good 
not an evil. He carefully distinguished between discriminate 
and indiscriminate use of State violence. 
The Christian was to wage war with moderation, to show 
mercy to prisoners and the vanquished. Cruelty was 
incompatible with just war fighting. To Augustine the State, 
if it was to wage war, must do so with "kindness'. In this 
llu Deane's translation of Augustine's Questionem in Heptateuchum 
(Book VI Chap. 10) in Deane 1963, p. 160. 
119 Hartigan 1966, p. 195. 
, 
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respect he made a distinction between the possession of 
weapons (deterrence) and their use (war-fighting) . 
120 War 
could only be just in relation to the 'natural laws' that 
governed human society. It was never morally attractive and 
could render unjust even the most just of causes. The 
question here, as Hartigan points OUt121 is, if war is a 
necessary means of achieving a temporal peace, then why does 
Augustine also consider it evil? Augustine, however, stated 
that the real problem was not war per se but rather "the real 
evils in war are love of violence, revengeful cruelty, fierce 
and implacable enmity, wild resistance, and the lust of 
power. , 122 
Augustine valued the physical evil of war less than the 
moral lapses brought about by its prosecution. Yet he showed 
abhorrence to the cruelties and atrocities common to war. The 
normal customs of war: the looting, pillaging, slaughter of 
children and women, the killing of prisoners, and cruelties of 
every description were to be avoided by Christians. 123 This is 
why Augustine demanded that the Christian soldier killed only 
out of necessity, and never choice: ""As violence is used 
towards him who rebels and resists, so mercy is due to the 
120 Bailey 1987, p. 12. 
12 1 Hartigan 1966, p. 198. 
122 Augustine's "Reply to Faustus the Manichaean" Book XXII Chap. 74 in 
Schaff (ed. ) 1979, Vol. IV. 
123 Augustine 1972, Books I Chap. 4 and 5; V Chap. 23; and his letter to 
Marcellinus (CXXXVIII) in Schaff (ed. ) 1979, Vol. I. 
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vanquished or the captive, especially in the case in which 
future troubling of the peace is not to be feared. r1124 
Augustine is nevertheless insistent that soldiers should 
125 
not determine the justice of war for themselves. To do so 
would invite anarchy and desertion of duty and throw a State 
or an army into utter confusion. 126 This has led Der Derian to 
argue that Augustine was a 'crusader' because "CicerorS 
concept of proportional violence was diminished in favour of a 
"127 militant piety, as would be proven in the holy wars. As 
Hartigan puts it: ""Just war ... becomes a crusade of retribution 
in which the enemy population's guilt may be presumed. The 
death of the "innocents' is an accidental consequence of the 
just act of war. " 128 
Yet because the just war was waged for honourable or 
defensive reasons Augustine was confident that, both in the 
conduct of the war and in the establishment of the peace, the 
just State would strive to punish the evildoers and the 
aggressors without being cruel, vengeful, or avaricious. He 
follows his conflation of social and State morality by 
concluding that an unjust war would not be fought by a just 
State ""for peace is not sought in order to the kindling of 
war, but war is waged in order that peace may be obtained. If129 
124 Augustine to Boniface (letter CLXXXIX) in Schaff (ed. ) 1979, Vol-I. 
125 Augustine's "Reply to Faustus the Manichaean" Book XXII Chap. 75 in 
Schaff (ed. ) 1979, Vol. IV. 
126 Deane 1963, p. 163. 
127 Der Derian 1987, p. 63. 
128 Hartigan 1966, p. 204. 
129 Augustine to Boniface (letter CLXXXIX) in Schaff (ed. ) 1979, Vol. l. 
Hartigan (1966 p. 198) references this passage but wrongly accredits as 
Augustine to Marcellinius (letter CXXXVIII). 
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Whilst Augustine acknowledged that the innocent should be 
protected he also believed that it was not so much of a 
problem because they would be in a small minority in the 
130 unjust State . 
Augustine felt that the deaths caused by war were not the 
real evils to be shunned and thought it lamentable, but not 
condemnable, that the good and wicked would suffer the same 
consequences. In both cases the punishment of war was a rough 
justice in which the innocent suffered with the guilty. The 
death of good and bad alike justified because: 
... although the good dislike the way of life of the 
wicked, and therefore do not fall into the condemnation 
which is in store for the wicked after this life, 
nevertheless, because they are tender towards damnable 
sins of the wicked, and thus fall into sin through fear 
of such people (pardonable and comparatively trivial 
though those sins may be), they are justly chastised with 
afflictions in this world, although they are spared 
eternal punishment; ... 
131 
Augustine's refusal to recommend mercy over justice, until 
victory was assured and just peace restored, is a striking 
feature of his writing. 132 
In conducting wars, as in peaceful relations with other 
States, government should also fulfil and guard the 
agreements, treaties, and conventions made by friends and 
enemies alike: "For, when faith is pledged, it is to be kept 
130 c. f. Richard Hartig . an's discussion of "The Problem of the Innocent" 
in Hartigan 1966, pp-201-4; and Deane 1963, pp. 154-71. 131 Augustine Book I Chap. 9. 
132 Hartigan (1966 p. 202) confirms this by acknowledging that he has 
been unable to find a single instance in any of Augustine's writings on 
war wherein he recommends that mercy should ever replace justice in 
dealings with an enemy. 
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even with the enemy against whom the war is waged, how much 
more with the friend for whom the battle is 
ji133 fought! 
The Development of Augustine's Ideas 
Above has shown that Augustine's efforts to reconcile 
Christ's teaching with the participation of Christians in 
certain wars led him to became the founder of a theory of 
rights in warfare known as just war. Christian attitudes to 
war have largely been determined by this tradition. "Thus 
Augustine, " according to Niebuhr, "whatever may be the 
defects of his approach to political reality, and whatever 
may be the dangers of a too slavish devotion to his 
insights, nevertheless proves himself a more reliable guide 
than any known thinker. ff 13 4 over time the term just war was 
applied both to a Western line of moral thinking on war and to 
its specifically Christian component. 
Throughout the medieval period and into the modern age 
scholars and lawyers 135 refined Augustine's ideas. In the 
Middle Ages the most important of these scholars were St. 
Thomas Aquinas and Vitoria who stressed six principles for a 
just war: (i) war must be waged by a legitimate authority; 
(ii) it must be proportionately worse not to fight than 
fight; (iii) it must be undertaken with the right desire -- 
133 Augustine to Boniface (letter CLXXXIX) in Schaff (ed. ) 1979, Vol-I. 
134 "Augustine's Political Realism" in Niebuhr 1953, p. 138. 
135 For an interesting commentary see Oestreicher's essay in Martin and 
Mullen (eds. ) 1983. For more detail see Tooke 1965. Walzer 1977 
provides a provocative modern application of these ideas whilst Elshtain 
1992 edits a collection of relevant essays. 
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i. e. to secure a just and lasting peace; (iv) war should 
only be engaged in if all peaceful remedies are exhausted -- 
it should be a last resort; (v) there should be af air 
chance of success; and (vi) war should be a morally 
legitimate venture -- civilians should not be targeted, the 
consequences of war should not bring disproportionate evil 
upon the parties concerned or the international community. 
Two principles became firmly embodied in the tradition: Jus 
ad Bellum and Jus in Bello. The former governed the 
conditions necessary for a State to wage war, whilst the 
latter concentrated on the conduct of war itself. It was 
right to go to war, Jus ad Bellum, if a ruler's judicial 
rights were violated by a neighbour and all available peaceful 
means (usually arbitration) had been exhausted before the 
initiation of force. War was permissible if the legal 
authority in the State could morally justify intent ('just 
cause') and aims ('right motive'). The initiators of war had 
to be sure that more good than evil would be brought about by 
their actions. Hostilities were only appropriate if there was 
a reasonable chance of success. A just war, however, could be 
rendered unjust if prosecuted by means that were intrinsically 
immoral. This second group of requirements, Jus in Bello, 
specified that the suffering and destruction caused in war 
must not be disproportionate to the cause justifying the 
resort to war. This latter specify the principles of 
discrimination (or non-combatant immunity) and proportionality 
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in the conduct of war itself. Some wars were just and some 
unjust, some means were immoral and some permissible, the task 
of the Christian was to render judgement on actual situations. 
It was these issues of intentionality, discrimination, and 
proportionality that re-emerged to dominate the terms of the 
debate in the modern period. 136 Although an awareness of these 
aspects is important they have led, arguably, to less focus 
and/or emphasis on the main theoretical interest here -- the 
Augustinian position on the State, legitimate authority, 
individual and collective political responsibility. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has located Augustinian positions on the 
State, legitimate authority, and political responsibility as 
aspects within the just war tradition. Historically, these 
positions were fashioned to help determine the circumstances 
in which war could, or should, be legitimately waged by 
Christians. Theoretically, Augustine's distinctive emphasis 
helped effect the Church's first significant adoption of the 
presuppositions of political realism. Niebuhr affirms that 
"'Augustine was, by general consent, the first great "realist' 
in western history. " 137 
Augustine was largely responsible for the rejection of the 
anti-militarism, quasi-pacifismr and idealism of many of the 
13 6 For analysis on the development of these aspects of the just war see: 
Santoni 1991; Acton 1991; the review essay by Winters 1986; Bailey 1987; 
Kertesz 1989; Holmes 1989; Bainton 1960; Johnson 1981 and 1984. 
137 "Augustine"s Political Realism" in Niebuhr 1953, p. 115. 
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early Church's Fathers (e. g. Tertullian, origen, Lactantius) . 
In the process he undertook a fundamental re-analysis of the 
nature and function of a Christian in politics. Augustine's 
formulations were products of both his understanding of the 
inevitability of a close relationship between Church and 
State, and a pragmatic or realistic response to the 
requirements of statecraft. Those who endorse the Augustinian 
tradition believe it is the best understanding of human nature 
realistic enough to make good politics possible. 138 
Augustinian realism suggests that existing societal 
arrangements are to be (albeit relatively) justified and 
worth saving. This distinction between individual (ethical) 
and collective (political) spheres leads to a conflation of 
social legitimacy with that of the State apparatus. For 
Niebuhr, however, this aspect was excessive because it could 
not differentiate between the degrees of injustice on which 
Christian judgements about 'this-world' political choices must 
invariably rest: "On the basis of his principles he could not 
distinguish between government and slavery, both of which were 
supposedly the rule over man by man and were both a 
consequence of, and remedy for, sin; nor could he distinguish 
between a commonwealth and a robber band, for both were bound 
"139 together by collective interest; ... 
Just war ideas, nevertheless, rest squarely on this 
particular understanding of political responsibility and the 
13 8 Lovin 1995, p. 159. 
139 "Augustine's Political Realism" in Niebuhr 1953, p. 121. 
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legitimacy of the State. In the first instance war is an area 
in which the sinfulness of humanity is most apparent. 
Christians ought to hate all war and desire peace but be 
resigned to the fact that real peace could not be achieved on 
earth. Because war and violence, like greed and injustice, 
was inevitable the Christian was morally obliged to try and 
affect the terms in which the debate over war was conducted. 
In the second instance the State apparatus is a legitimate 
authority with a God-given duty to safeguard the social good: 
it could resort to force if threatened. Niebuhr recognised 
that such realism was flawed precisely because it endeavoured 
to be so consistently realistic about issues of self-interest 
and power. Although this conceptualisation avoids the 
absolute sanctification of Government "its indiscriminate 
character", Niebuhr again notes, "is apparent by a failure to 
recognise the difference between legitimate and illegitimate, 
between ordinate and inordinate subordination of man to 
man. " 140 
140 Ibid. p. 123. 
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AIS'l'Te CTION IP 
HISTORICAL PRECEDENTS 
CHAPTER THREE: 
ECUMENICALISM AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 1910-48 
Introduction 
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
evolutionary philosophy and idealist metaphysics combined in 
'liberal-internationalism. ' 1 Here eighteenth century 
rationalism and nineteenth century radicalism produced a 
broad ethical consensus that understood international 
relations, not in terms of the maximising of national 
interest, but as the establishment of a community of mutual 
tolerance, coupled with the resolution of conflict by 
peaceful, rational means. This was to be achieved by the 
creation and management of international organisations, and 
via the education of public opinion in loyalties wider than 
1 The literature available to delineate liberal idealism as a process, 
and transnational organisations as representative aspects of that 
process, is vast: e. g. essays in Booth and Smith (eds. ) 1995; Dougherty 
and Pfaltzgraff 1990; Nardin and Mapel (eds. ) 1992; Viotti and Kauppi 
1987. In particular see, Michael Doyle "Liberalism and World Politics 
Revisited"; Mark Zacher and Richard Matthew "Liberal International 
Theory: Common Threads, Divergent Strands" (in Kegley [ed. ] 1995, pp. 83- 
106 and 107-72 respectively); and Scot Burchill "Liberal 
Internationalism" (in Burchill and Linklater 1996, pp. 28-66). A dated 
yet nonetheless worthy summary of the problems, progress and theory of 
international organisation was provided by Claude 1966. For the impact 
of war on the liberal conscience see Howard 1977 and 1989a. A useful 
consideration and comparison of the role of the Roman Catholic Church as 
transnational actor is provided by Vallier 1971. Finally, Virginia 
Austin's 1991 PhD is also noteworthy because her transnationalist 
hypothesis used the Church of England as case-study. 
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narrow, state-centric patriotism. It was hoped, as Michael 
Howard reveals, that "Britain's own national affairs would 
be conducted in accordance with a Kantian imperative, to 
provide an example for other nations and to smooth the path 
towards the development of a higher national community based 
on the rule of law. "2 The intention was to replace an old- 
order based on national power, with a new one based on 
consent. The problem for Christianity, however, was that in 
these conceptions: "In place of the promise and providence of 
God as the ground for hope and the creative power of the 
future, the new philosophies of history substituted both human 
action and an immanent teleology [i. e. a secularised sense of 
Providence] within history. ir3 The European Protestant 
Churches faced with this pluralist challenge, set to 
conceptualise a programme that was complementary with, not in 
opposition to, liberalism and its consequences. The drive 
towards ecumenicalism, the process in which Christians of 
different denominations united, was a principal result of 
this normative shift in social reasoning. The intention in 
this chapter is to locate the subject-matter of this thesis 
by illustrating how the plan for a 'supranational Christian 
council' was principally a consequence of this optimistic 
epistemology that saw itself grasping the inevitable, 
2 Howard 1977, p. 367. 3 Richard Bauckham "Challenge to Secular and Theological 
Presuppositions" in Bauckham and Elford (eds. ) 1989, pp. 31-32. 
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progressive direction of history. This is accomplished in 
two ways. First, by examining the driving forces and policy 
implications of international ecumenicalism. Secondly, by 
showing how these efforts resulted in the creation of the 
World Council of Churches and its constituent assembly, the 
British Council of Churches, during World War II. 
Part I: Christians and Liberal-Internationalism 
Professor Latourette has observed 4 that the nineteenth 
century, measured in terms of geographical spread and 
influence, was Christianity's greatest. In spite of the 
intimate connection with the expansion of European, ostensibly 
Protestant Empires, there was less direction and active 
assistance from the State than in any era since Constantine 
adopted Christianity in the fourth century. The expansion 
was chiefly a result of voluntary organisations financially 
supported by private individuals. By the end of the century 
Christianity was truly global yet nonetheless still divided 
by doctrinal differences, political disputes, and 
exclusivity. 5 For many Christians such fragmentation was 
4 Latourette (Vol. IV) 1941, p. 458. 
5 There are a plethora of texts dealing with the growth and consequent 
fragmentation of Christianity. The most comprehensive and impressive 
being the seven volume set by Kenneth Scott Latourette A Histoxy of the 
Expansion of Chzistianity. Christianity in the European setting is 
dealt with admirably by McLeod 1981. The structure, organisation and 
sociology of Christianity is covered by the classic study by Troeltsch 
1931. There are several books that seek to offer explanations for the 
particular divisions, and continued fragmentation of the British 
churches such as Gilley and Sheils (eds. ) 1994; and Bruce 1995. Bruce 
is particularly useful in that he highlights both the corrosive effect 
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hard to justify in the light of prodigious missionary 
activity, and the growth of new Churches in Africa and 
Asia. 
Various transdenominational bodies began to form in the 
hope of fostering Christian reunion. of particular 
importance was the creation of the Young Men" s Christian 
Association (1844), the Evangelical Alliance (1846) 
promoting 'Scriptural Christianity' , and the World Student 
Christian Federation 7 (1892). These events were swiftly 
followed by the merger of international and inter-church 
groupings with a similar doctrinal basis. Here the Lambeth 
Conference of Anglican Bishops (1867) became the precursor 
to international associations such as The Alliance of 
Reformed Churches throughout the World holding the 
Presbyterian System (1875), the World Methodist Council 
(1881), and the Baptist World Alliance (1905). " In 1888 
Britain, the Society of Friends founded the Friends' Peace 
of cultural pluralism, and the relaxation of State support as the main 
dynamics behind the evolution of different and distinct denominations. 
Alternatively Hastings 1987 (especially for the period 1920-59) is 
invaluable for thumb-nail sketches of the politics, theology and 
ersonalities involved in this thesis. 
on missionary expansion see Renwick and Harman 1985, pp. 174-81; 
Vidler 1988, pp. 246-56; Worrall 1988, pp. 183-202. 
7 The forerunner of the Student Christian Movement and the influential 
theological press (SCM). By 1910 the SCM was seen as the "ecumenical 
think-tank of the Protestant Churches" (Kent 1992, p. 15). Hastings 
(1987, pp. 86-99) attests to the "quite extraordinary importance" of the 
SCM in the birth of ecumenicalism. " Up to the 1950s the SCM enjoyed 
considerable influence in university circles and attracted a number of 
able clerics who went on to influential academic and administrative 
posts. The theologically liberal, and somewhat politically progressive, 
ethos of this organisation played a significant part in crystallising 
the thinking of many of the Church's leaders (Medhurst and Moyser 1982, 
F. 177). 
Renwick and Harman 1985, pp. 205-6. 
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Committee9, and throughout the 1890s the main English and 
Welsh Nonconformist or 'Dissenting' Churches -- Baptist, 
Congregationalist, Presbyterian, and Methodist -- came 
together to create a National Council of Evangelical Free 
Churches. 10 In 1900 the majority of the Free Church of 
Scotland united with the United Presbyterian Church to form 
the United Free Church of Scotland. Although these 
developments are ecclesiastically significant in their own 
terms it was not until the early half of the twentieth 
century that the ecumenical movement as it is known today 
began to take shape. 
Influential scholars such as Kenneth Slack" argue that 
the birth of the modern ecumenical movement began with the 
World Missionary Conference of 1910.12 One of the principal 
architects of this Edinburgh-held conference was the 
thinker, administrator and ecumenical strategist Dr. Joe 
9 This organisation would put its considerable resources (money, 
publishing) at the disposal of all sections of the peace movement. 
Ceadel 1980, p. 63. 
10 For a concise overview of 'The English Free Churches' and 
developments in Scotland see Hastings 1987, pp. 100-30,262-72,436-72; 
Vidler 1988, pp. 134-45,169-78; and Worrall 1988, pp. 134-58. 
11 Kenneth Slack was General Secretary of the BCC 1955-65 and later 
Moderator of the United Reformed Church. For Slack's thesis see Slack 
1960. Martin 1960 is sympathetic to Slack's analysis. Rouse and Neil 
(eds. ) 1954, however, argue that the ecumenical movement has sixteenth 
century roots. The 'official' history of twentieth century 
ecumenicalism is contained in the two volumes by Fey 1970. Two other 
books of note are Hogg 1952; and Neill 1960 whose Men of Unity gives 
some idea of the patriarchal nature of the movement. 
12 Here I am primarily interested in developments in Britain. It is 
worth noting that the establishment of the first genuinely national 
Protestant council actually preceded the Edinburgh Conference by two 
years. In 1908 The Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America 
was formed in the United States. 
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Oldham. 13 The Archbishop of Canterbury (Davidson) attended 
the Conference and summed it up as "the most serious attempt 
which the Church has made to look steadily at the whole face 
of the non-Christian world, and to understand its meaning 
and challenge. irI4 From the success of this gathering 
developed the 1912 Conference of British Missionary 
Societies (CBMS), and from there the establishment of 
various National Christian Councils, 15 and Councils of 
13 Oldham (1874-1969) is the most important actor in this chapter and 
has been described as "undoubtedly the greatest pioneer of the twentieth 
century ecumenical movement" (van der Bent 1978, p. 16). At this time 
Oldham was not only secretary of the Conference but secretary of the 
International Committee of the Young Men's Church Aid and of the World 
Student Christian Movement. He later became secretary to the Edinburgh 
Missionary Conference continuation committee, and then of the 
International Missionary Council before taking the vice-presidency of 
the newly formed BCC 1944-46. Hastings describes Oldham as the "spider 
at the heart of almost every non-Roman missionary web, the mind who 
could best interpret the future, the tactician who could handle ... the 
Colonial office, the international ecclesiastical statesman in 
comparison with whom almost every bishop appeared immeasurably 
provincial in outlook" and the figure "more responsible than anyone else 
for the development of ecumenical institutions and a Christian sense of 
social responsibility. " Oldham was the Athenaeum Whig, accepting the 
principle of progress (at least within Britain), whilst quietly devising 
the new strategies, spotting and bringing together the 'people who 
really mattered. See Hastings 1987, pp, 95r 264,304 and 497 * 14 This does not suggest the proceedings went completely smoothly. 
Whilst the Conference heralded increased co-operation certain Anglican 
Missionary societies and a number of small interdenominational ones were 
unsure as to whether they should have committed themselves to such a 
suggestive venture. See van der Bent 1978, p. 16. 
15 For example in 1916 a more official and representative Federal 
Council of the Evangelical Free Churches came into existence. Whilst 
this Council proved more adept at fostering relations with the Church of 
England than the existing National Free Church Council, it was not until 
1939 that both Free Church organisations came together to form the 
present Free Church Federal Council. In 1929 the majority of the 
United Free Church of Scotland joined the Church of Scotland to bring 
together a large percentage of the Scottish population. Both unions 
left behind minorities, which formed the present Free Church of Scotland 
and the United Free Church of Scotland respectively. The three 
Methodist bodies that had united in 1907 as the United Methodist Church, 
joined with the Wesleyan and Primitive Methodists to form the present 
Methodist Church of Great Britain and Ireland in 1932. See Hastings 
1987, pp. 100-30, pp. 262-72; Vidler 1988, pp. 134-45 and 169-78; Worrall 
1988, pp. 134-58. 
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Christian Congregations. 16 The most important consequence 
of the Edinburgh Conference, in terms of ecumenical 
developments, was the creation of the International 
Missionary Council and its -subsequent 
Faith and Order 
Movement. It was this Faith and Order Movement that became 
the first major strand to constitute modern ecumenicalism. 
The Faith and Order Movement 
In 1920-21 Oldham helped create and organise the 
International Missionary Council (IMC) . 
17 Oldham had two 
aims. First, he envisioned that the IMC would act as an 
organisation that would link together existing National 
Christian Councils. This aim was supported by the Church of 
England bishops in their 'Appeal to All Christian People. ' 18 
Here the bishops urged that "all should unite in a new and 
great endeavour to recover and to manifest to the world the 
unity of the Body of Christ for which he prayed. "19 
Oldham's second aim was to "co-ordinate the activities of 
the national missionary o rganisations of the different 
countries and to unite Christian forces of the world in 
seeking justice in international and inter-racial 
16 Bolton, Manchester, and St. Albans were the first. The object of 
the Bolton Council was: "To bring near the realisation of the kingdom of 
God by witnessing to and upholding in all its fullness the Christian 
ideal of faith and morals, both in the congregations and the community 
at large. " Quote taken from Payne 1972, p. 2. 
17 The IMC managed to sustain this separate identity until it was 
merged with the World Council of Churches in 1961. 
'a Sent out via the Lambeth Conference of 1920. 
19 Payne 1972, p-3- 
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relations. tf20 Bishop Charles Brent, an American 
Episcopalian who had attended the Edinburgh Conference, 
helped to further this last intention by proposing a series 
of world missionary assemblies. It was Brent's hope that a 
series of conferences on "Faith and Order' would include 
representatives of "all Christian communions throughout the 
world which confess the Lord Jesus Christ as God and 
Saviour. /12l The first World Conference on Faith and Order 
was held at Lausanne, Switzerland in 1927. Complementing 
this international, inter-denominational, and growing 
missionary co-operation, came two other Aprongs' that 
illustrate the ways in which Protestantism was endeavouring 
to perform a Promethean role in the world. 
The second prong of ecumenicalism, parallel to the 
essentially ecclesiological developments of Faith and Order, 
came from peace activists. Three strands of opinion played 
a part: pacifist, international socialist, and liberal- 
internationalist. 22 All strands regarded war as an 
unnecessary aberration from normal intercourse and believed 
that in a rational world, wars would not exist and could be 
abolished, as slavery was abolished, by a collective effort 
of the conscience of humanity. This impetus from both 
within and without the Churches to foster international 
20 Quote from van der Bent 1976, p. 19. 
21 Ibid., p. 21. 
22 A detailed analysis of these separate but historically intertwined 
elements is provided by Myers' 1965 PhD, pp. 1-36. Also see Beales 1931; 
Ceadel 1980; Hinton 1989; Taylor and Young 1987. 
68 
friendship, involved not only accepting that Christian 
thinking had failed to bring peace but arguing that it was 
still a force, despite secularisation, that could have public 
effect. The principal focus for this developing ethic of 
universal fellowship, nonetheless, was the absolutist 
pacifists with their belief in the rejection of war as an 
instrument of policy. Articulated in Pelagian terms as the 
imitation of Christ as highest moral example, of war as an 
anachronism in human evolution, or of the aspiration for 
"One World" beyond the evil of national attachments, 
Christian pacifism typically looked to the force of love and 
moral suasion as the essence of its alternative political 
programme. 23 
Concern over the increased competition in naval armaments 
in the years leading up to the Great War led many of these 
peace campaigners, both British and German, to form a World 
Alliance for International Friendship through the 
Churches. 24 This organisation held a series of meetings 
supported by a mixture of Quaker S25" pacifists, socialists, 
anarchists, and concerned liberals including the American 
industrialist and philanthropist Andrew Carnegie 26 . Despite 
23 Epp's 1990 PhD, p. 69. 
24 Payne 1972, p. 2. Strangely the World Alliance for International 
Friendship through the Churches is ignored by reputable texts, including 
Ceadel 1980. 
25 In 1913 the Quakers extended their influence particularly in the 
north of England when they established the Northern Friends Peace Board. 
26 The steel baron Andrew Carnegie had a social conscience that was 
very weak in dealing with the 'sins' of capitalism but made him a great 
financial supporter of libraries and schools. He gave money to official 
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the outbreak of war in 1914 the British section of the World 
Alliance was sufficiently established to withstand an 
27 inevitable hostility to its aims . Also 
in 1914 the 
Cambridge based, but globally focused, Fellowship of 
Reconciliation (FoR) was founded to bring together Christian 
pacifists of the world into one organisation. This body was 
particularly successful in drawing British Nonconformists 
and Quakers together. 28 Support for such cosmopolitan 
initiatives increased after 1918 when many radicals 
concluded that the national Churches had damaged just war 
29 credibility by supporting the Great War . The success of 
these independent attempts to join together members of 
disparate denominations with an interest in avoiding war 
encouraged many more Christian peace activists, pacifist and 
pacific-ist alike, to become active in ecumenical affairs. 
The Life and Work Movement 
The third complementary prong of ecumenicalism was 
completed when Nathan Sbderblom, Archbishop of Uppsala in 
policy-orientated peace agencies particularly the Church Peace Union 
(later the Council on Religion and International Affairs) and the 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Theodore Olson's 1962 PhD 
(p. 10) reveals that although neither of these organisations were 
government sponsored they maintained close relations with the US 
Administration. Thomas (1971, p. 305) notes that the actual service to 
peace of these institutions has been very moderate. 27 R. E. Burlingham was secretary of the British Committee from 1925. 
In 1946-47 he was acting General Secretary of the BCC. 
28 See Ceadel 1980 for detail. A prominent early member of the FoR was 
the Congregationalist minister Cecil J. Cadoux, later Professor of 
Church History at oxford, and author of influential books see Cadoux 
1919 and 1940. 
29 Kent 1992, p. 99. 
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Sweden, drew attention to the wider political potentiality 
of a united project. The Archbishop proposed an inter- 
Church conference to promote the application of Christian 
ethics to international relations, social and economic 
life. 30 There had been various antecedents for this idea, 
particularly the nineteenth-century Christian Sociali StS31 
and the American Social Gospel movement32. An important 
element of the first Universal Christian Conference on 'Life 
and Work' held at Stockholm in 1925 was the call to give the 
League of Nations a "Christian Soul' and thus make it an 
33 
associated instrument of a Christian political movement . 
This invocation of a 'Christian West' was intended to: 
first, bring security to Europe by reawakening 
30 out of this Stockholm conference came the Universal Christian Council 
for Life and Work with its slogan "Service unites, doctrine divides". See 
van der Bent 1978, pp. 21-2. 
31 Rowan Williams reveals the name to be deeply misleading. Although 
Christian Socialists reacted strongly against the worst excesses of 
nineteenth century laissez-faire capitalism and supported co-operative 
labour and workers' associations of a trade union kind, its leaders like 
F. D. Maurice and J. M. Ludlow, were basically conservative monarchists 
with a markedly hierarchical indeed State-centred view of society 
(Williams in Nicholls and Williams 1984, p. 18). An observation that 
surely justifies Marx's dismissal: "Christian Socialism is but the holy 
water with which the priest consecrates the heart-burnings of the 
aristocrat. " See Section III of The Communist Manifesto in McLellan 
(ed. ) 1977, p. 239. 
32 At the beginning of the twentieth century Social Gospel preachers 
were confident that a new era of social Christianity was about to begin, 
transforming the raw reality of industrialism and ushering in an era of 
international peace. Here Walter Rauschenbusch's manifesto Christianity 
and the Social Crisis (1907) presupposed that progressive politics 
reflected Christ's ethical values and rallied liberal Protestants to the 
task of "Christianising the social order". Augustinian realism argues 
that the ethics of Jesus cannot provide meaningful social ethics. 
33 Kent 1992, pp. 97 and 5. It was Oldham who in fact pointed out to 
Randall Davidson (Archbishop of Canterbury) that there was no reference 
to freedom of conscience or religion in the League's convent. Randall 
subsequently wrote to Lord Robert Cecil (Britain's League 
representative) in Paris to insure it was inserted 'in the nick of time, 
in Article 22 on the Mandated Territories. See Hastings 1967, p. 95. 
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Christianity's Pre-Constantine essence as peace-maker; and 
second, radiate out to the whole world and transform social 
life in one dynamic and peaceful 'Kingdom of God' . 
34 
Sbderblom henceforth called upon the Churches to widen the 
social area to which a 'Christianf meaning could be given. 
Yet this intention made little sense if the Churches had no 
equivalent of the League through which to apply its 
spiritual pressure. By creating a socio-religious movement 
that united all Churches, a Christian liberal- 
internationalism could react to a rapidly changing post-war 
situation by furthering peaceful coexistence. Europe, 
therefore, could be reconciled in a single Christianity and 
rediscover its former central position in the world as far 
as politics, culture and faith were concerned. Out of these 
discussions emerged George Bell, a well-known social 
activist, committed to the programme. 35 Bell' s inclusion 
was particularly invaluable because he was both highly 
energetic, motivated and hence described by S6derblom as the 
34 An approach detailed by Howard 1989a in his study of "War and the 
Liberal Conscience". Also see Eberhard JUngells essay "The Gospel and 
the Protestant Churches of Europe: Christian Responsibility from a 
Protestant Perspective" 1993, pp. 137-50. 
35 Hastings characterises Bell (Hastings 1987, p. 374) as the "obstinate 
little priest who was quite determined that the Church should not sink 
in war to being the State's spiritual auxiliary. " The indomitable Bell 
(1883-1958) figures largely in this thesis as a prophetic voice opposed 
to just war thinking and a figure well used to standing in marked 
contrast to the largely silent and inactive Church leadership of his 
day. In 1925 he was the Anglican Dean of Canterbury, and later a 
particularly vocal Bishop of Chichester (1929) until his death in 1956. 
Bell became the prime 'peace activist' (but not pacifist) voice on both the 
conunissions that led to the 1946 BCC report The Era of Atomic Powez and the 
1959 report Christians and Atomic War. 
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, ri 36 "bell that never rang for nothing Bell became the new 
President of Life and Work. 
The British preparations for the Stockholm Life and Work 
conference included a large and important Conference on 
Politics, Economics and Citizenship (COPEC) held in 
Birmingham. From the 5 to 12 April 1924 William Temple 37 
(then Bishop of Manchester) chaired the conference supported 
by the secretarial skills of Canon Charles Raven 38 . Temple 
saw the Conference as an opportunity to galvanise a wilfully 
lethargic Church and guide it towards the form of common 
social action that would serve as the foundation for a 
global Christian pressure-group. Like Sbderblom and most 
other Christian leaders of the time, Temple assumed that the 
Church should be the spiritual and political motor of human 
36 Quoted by Carey 1995, p. 434. 
37 William Temple (1881-1944), like Oldham, was a ceaseless worker for 
Protestant internationalism. He had attended the Edinburgh Conference 
as a spokesperson for the SCM and believed that unity would bring the 
Churches a greater voice in international affairs. Eventual first 
official leader of the World Council of Churches, Archbishop of 
Canterbury (1942-44) and passionate advocate of Christians working on 
the side of greater social equality and hence a 'peace activist'. John 
Elford (1985, p. 176-77) attests that it was Temple who "vigorously urged 
the Churches to enter spheres of social, political and economic thought 
where, previously, religion had been regarded as a trespasser.... (he) 
had the effect of preparing both the Churches and the political 
establishment for a much closer Christian engagement with political and 
military issues than had often previously been the case. " Kent's 1992 
biography is very good in detailing the social activity of 'The People's 
Archbishop'. For Temple the British State was constant, but not 
identical, with his vision of 'Christendom' (Suggate 1981). Hastings 
concludes (1987, p. 253) that it would be entirely naive to point to the 
moderately radical opinions of either Temple or indeed Bell, as proof that 
the Church of England had then a left-wing rather than right-wing slant. 38 Charles E. Raven, Anglican priest, Regius Professor of Divinity at 
Cambridge (later vice-chancellor) and 'Christian Communist' become 
particularly active in peace activist circles (especially the Fellowship 
of Reconciliation) after his conversion to pacifism in 1930. He 
authored several influential books (e. g. Raven 1938 and Raven 1951) and 
was well-known for his attacks on Augustinian-style realism. 
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history, and that no real kind of lasting progress was 
sustainable without it . 
39 Because of this Temple believed 
that the COPEC movement should proceed from primary Gospel 
principles to secondary principles in order to offer 
effective guidance over the whole of contemporary life. 'O 
This meant that the Christian Gospel would not lay down rules, 
but rather that the Church would indicate what was expected of 
secular legislators. Templers hopes of building a forward- 
thinking coalition werer however, thwarted and resulting 
reports far from novel. 
Alec Vidler, the radical theologian who in 1957 would 
turn down an opportunity to serve on the British Council of 
Churches' Study Group on the moral aspects of nuclear 
deterrence, reported that "seldom was a satisfactory balance 
struck between idealism and realism. There was an awful 
amount of amateurishness and lack of expertise. t14 
1 This 
amateurishness was particularly apparent in the publication 
Christianity and War with its implied ambivalence to the use 
of just war thinking to sanctify the prosecution of the 
Great War. On one hand the report suggested that: "'the mode 
of conducting war since 1914, and much of the sentiment 
39 Kent 1992, p. 148. 
40 The title of the published documents are testimony to the breadth of 
subjects covered: The Nature of God and his Purpose for the World, 
Education, The Home, The Relation of the Sexes, Leisure, The Treatment 
of Crime, International Relations, Christianity and War, Industry and 
Property, Politics and Citizenship, The Social Function of the Church, 
and Historical Illustrations of the Social Effects of Christianity. For 
analysis of the Conference see Kent 1992, pp. 115-34. 
41 Hastings 1987 p. 179. 
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shown since the peace, derive far more obviously from the 
Old Testament, even from the standards of our pagan 
forefathers, than from the Gospel of Christ" yet on the 
other hand felt able to declare, "all war is contrary to the 
spirit and teaching of Jesus Christ, and that therefore in 
time of war more than ever the Church of Christ must witness 
and labour for the Christian way of life against hatred and 
cruelty. " 42 Such confusion has led other commentators to 
conclude that the Conference as a whole showed how little 
thought had really gone into the relationship between 
individual conscience and political authority, and how many 
13 
broad questions endured untaxed by critical questions. 
Despite Temple's impassioned call for a united front the 
memories of war seemed to painfully problematic for further 
discussion by many in the British Churches, particularly the 
Church of England. " It was not until 1928, ten years after 
Armistice, that the Churches felt confident to challenge 
ideas about war once more. 
The Christ and Peace Campaign 
Beginning in October 1929 the 'Christ and Peace Campaign' 
was launched to awaken the Churches to the importance of 
42 My italics. COPEC Commission Report: Christianity and War (Vol. 
VIII) 1924, p. 23. Both Ormrod 1987 p. 191; and Ceadel 1980, p. 67, refer 
to Christianity and War. 
43 Chandler 1995, p. 84. 
44 Charles E. Raven would later argue, perhaps by way of justification: 
"No man who has offered his life for a cause and is still bearing the 
psychic and physical evidence paid, can, while the wounds are still 
fresh, discuss whether his offering was a mistake". Raven 1938, p. 44. 
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condemning modern warfare and ultimately question the 
State' s propensity to resort to violence in pursuit of its 
foreign policy objectives. This Campaign held twenty-five 
meetings and conferences between October 1929 and April 
1931. Its major success was the declaration (at its 1930 
Lambeth Conference) that "war as a method of settling 
international disputes is incompatible with the teaching and 
example of our Lord Jesus Christ. t/4 5 Whilst, as Ceadel 
argue S46, Anglican clergy took as active a role as their 
Nonconformist colleagues, lack of clear organisation and the 
failure to distinguish between condemning war and preaching 
outright hostility to any war dented the Campaign's impact. 
In spite of such interdenominational attempts there was 
still no clear formula to guide Christian attitudes to 
war. 47 Attitudes remained polarised, yet pacifists were 
forcing the pace of debate. 
In 1929 the Church of Scotland Peace Society was revived 
and the Fellowship of Reconciliation quietly increased its 
membership. Pacifist movements within the Congregationalist 
and Methodist communities soon emerged, swiftly followed in 
1933 by the formation of a Council of Christian Pacifist 
45 Ormrod 1967, p. 191. 
46 Ceadel 1980, p. 68. 
47 Norman 1976, p. 298 argues that the 'Christ and Peace Campaign' was 
no serious advance on the earlier COPEC approach. As a guide to 
Christian duty on the question of war-prevention both were 'ambiguous 
formulas'. 
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Groups to co-ordinate denominational efforts. " In May 1936 
the Anglican Canon, Dick Shepard, together with his Peace 
Pledge Union (PPU) gave birth to the New Pacifist Movement 
in an attempt to combine the pacifist and pacific-ist 
traditions. " It was not until 1937, however, that the 
Anglican Pacifist Fellowship (i. e. an official voice from 
the Established Church) was heard. Nevertheless, Church 
interest in peace issues, particularly pacifism, was 
stimulated by such organisation even if the unresolved 
tensions between just war and pacific-ism remained. 
By the mid-1930s all of these organisations and 
activities had succeeded in introducing local and national 
Church leaders to one another. Vital networks of personal 
links had been forged and growing co-operation now 
transcended geographic borders. On Bishop Brent's death-in 
1929 William Temple, the new Archbishop of York, took over 
Brent's role as Chair of the Edinburgh Continuation 
Committee on Faith and Order. In 1934 Oldham resigned from 
his position as secretary to the IMC to become Chair of the 
Research Committee of the Life and Work movement, and in 
practice holder of "the most strategic position in the 
48 The founder members of this Council included not only the Methodists 
and Congregationalists, but also the Quakers, the Unitarians, and the 
FoR. Ceadel 1980, p. 174. 
49 In 1939 the PPU would secure 136,000 signatures to their declaration 
"I renounce war and will never sanction another". Taylor and Pritchard 
(1980, p. 16) argue that by the 1950s the PPU had come to represent the 
individualistic and rather 'conservative' wing of the Pacifist movement. 
For more information see Morrison 1962; Collins 1966; Ceadel 1980; and 
Ormrod 1987. 
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ecumenical movement as a whole"., 50 Around William Temple 
"the pope in petto"51 a small group of committed religious 
professionals had risen whose theoretical centre was no 
longer the restricted ethos of national Churches. Temple, 
Oldham, and Bell were now the heart of a small, efficient 
and growing international spiritual and political 
bureaucracy. 52 The many different and diffuse strands 
involved in the ecumenical project were slowly beginning to 
bind together. 
Service Unites, Doctrine Divides 
In 1937 the Archbishop of Canterbury (Lang), supported by 
Free Church leaders, urged a "Recall to Religion'. One of 
the consequences of this was, later that year, a Life and 
Work conference held in Oxford, with a Faith and Order 
conference organised for Edinburgh. The slogan "Service 
Unites, Doctrine Divides" was adopted to inspire delegates 
53 
and avoid too much discussion of a doctrinal nature. 
Oldham undertook the main secretarial work for the Oxford 
(Life and Work) conference with a programme geared to 
understanding the relationship between religious and 
political responsibility. 54 
50 Hastings 1987, p. 303. 
51 Ibid. 
52 See Kent 1992, pp-95-114 for detail. 
53 Van der Bent 1978,22. 
54 This conference was called 'Church, Community and Statef and was 
particularly concerned with defining the relationship of Church to State. 
Discussions fill eight thick volumes and in van der Bent's words (1976, 
p. 19-22) "remains to this day the most comprehensive ecumenical 
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The oxford Conference on 'Church, Community and State' 
was undoubtedly the central ecumenical event of the 1930s. 
Here the three Christian attitudes to war and peace: 
unconditional obedience to the State, just war theory, and 
pacifism, that have formed the basis for subsequent 
ecumenical statements were stated for the first time in 
official form. 55 What the Church should do, Oldham and 
others concluded, was refrain from normative discussions of 
the 'rightness' or 'wrongness' of particular State policy 
(i. e. the means with which that policy would be implemented) 
and confine itself to a rather more generalised discussion 
that could express the Church's opinion on the ends sought 
by policy. Even though such statements were considered, in 
terms of Christian social ethics, 'middle axioms' 56 they 
nevertheless suggest the same logic and instrumentalism that 
is associated with political realism. This is particularly 
so because it seems that means and ends were separated for 
statement on problems of church and society and Christian social 
responsibility". Contributors included Sir Alfred Zimmern, the 
incumbent of the first Chair in IR recently established Chair at 
University College Aberystwyth, the American politician John Foster 
Dulles, the High Anglican Christian Socialist R. H. Tawney and many of 
the most distinguished theologians of the day. The report of the 
Conference has been reprinted as the volume Foundations of Ecumenical 
Social Thought: Oldham [ed. ] 1966. 
55 Oldham (ed. ) 1966, pp. 118-23. Hastings 1987, p. 304; and Dyson in 
Bauckham and Elford (eds. ) 1989, p. 104. 
56 Elford 1985, p. 193. Dyson notes (in Bauckham and Elford [eds. ] 
1989, p. 108) that liberation theologians take particular exception to 
this approach to Christian social ethics because it suggests that if the 
Christian way of life cannot be concretely embodied in personal life and 
social structure with a very high degree of specificity, then it lays 
itself open to the Enlighterment/Marxist/Nietzschean charge that 
Christianity distracts attention from, and weakens commitment to, the 
characteristically human responsibilities in this world. 
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tactical reasons -- in order for the Church to express its 
political witness more clearly. 
Sensitive to the implications behind these discussions 
the British branch of the World Alliance for International 
Friendship lobbied for a more representative body to 
prosecute common political concerns. It soon became clear 
that it would be more practicable if such efforts were co- 
ordinated with the Faith and Order movement. 
In Edinburgh delegates (including William Temple and 
Reinhold Niebuhr 57) were faced with a problem. On one hand 
the Faith and Order movement could be transformed into a 
federation of independent Churches based on doctrinal 
compromise, yet separate from the Life and Work movement. 
Alternatively Faith and order could play a part in something 
more innovative and far-reaching. Professor Adrian Hastings 
summarised the Churches' dilemma thus: 
The ecumenical movement had grown with the League of 
Nations and must have seemed at times in the 
comfortable twenties but a pale religious reflection of 
the League's secular aspirations. But now the League 
was breaking down, its aspirations scorned. Faced with 
the challenge of Nazism and stiffened by the revival of 
a more conservative theology the churches of the 
thirties saw themselves as the Church over against the 
world-The ecumenical movement and its earlier 
international organisations long claimed to be in no 
way a replacement for existing churches. In a profound 
57 Here Temple, then Archbishop of York, greeted Reinhold Niebuhr with 
the words: "At last I've met the troubler of my peace" (Scott 1963, 
pp. 29-30). A sentiment doubtlessly shared by many of Christendom's 
idealists. Temple, it should be noted, moved in basic position from a 
relatively Hegelian idealism to a relatively Augustinian (i. e. 
Niebuhrian) outlook (c. f. Preston 1981) in his later years. A useful 
comparison of the political theologies of Temple and Niebuhr is 
presented by Suggate 1981. 
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way, however, in the thirties the movement felt called 
to make of itself a unified body precisely so as to 
fulfil the first duty of the Church and witness in 
faith and with independence to the world of sin, modern 
ideology, and secular tyranny when the [independent 
national] Churches could, or would, not do it. 51 
Although Archbishop Temple"s biographer, John Kent, 59 
criticises Professor Hastings' exaggeration of the 
importance of the Churches' protests against 'ýmodern 
ideology and secular tyranny", he might well have drawn 
attention to the fact that what could have been a plan for 
radical change and social transformation, in practice 
resembled an attempt to sustain existing power structures in 
a sure "Wilsonian' fashion. Although the likes of Temple 
and Oldham can be credited with ensuring that the shift in 
thinking away from the individualism and imperialism of the 
nineteenth century had not produced a sharp schism with 
Christianity, 60 a major obstacle was the fact that the Great 
War had collapsed faith in progress and international 
relations, concurrently encouraging the revival of a more 
conservative theology and Christian political activity which 
sought to extend the power of the State. 61 This situation 
had driven many previously liberal-internationalists away 
from thoughts of federation towards a more chauvinistic 
58 Hastings 1987, p. 305. 
59 Kent 1992, p. 31. 
60 See Hastings 1987, particularly pp. 172-85. 
'51 For detailed analysis on the demise of idealism and the reassertion 
of Augustinian realism see Epp's 1990 PhD. Also see Smith's "The 
Idealist Provocateurs" (1986, pp. 54-67) for a summary of the main 
outlines of 1920s-40s idealism that serves to locate the realist 
reaction of the 1950s. 
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state-centred realism. To people like Oldham and Temple 
what mattered above all was that Christianity defended 
itself against the encroachment of the great secular 
excesses that were Fascism, Nazism, and Stalinism. 62 In 
this limited way many conservatives were indeed justified in 
thinking that Faith and Order, a rather cautious body, was 
being hijacked by the more ambitious but pragmatically 
minded leadership of Life and Work. 63 Yet even the 
leadership of Life and Work offered, in Hegelian fashion, 
support for the ideal State that would counter secular 
tyranny and disseminate a Western Christian world-view. At 
no time was Faith and Order seen as an acceptable 
alternative to the State-centred model of Christendom. 
Temple, for example, was a impassioned believer in the 
concept of State sovereignty (as represented by the League) 
and opposed those 'cosmopolitans' who sought a world-wide 
federal system that would limit the sovereignty of member 
Churches. 
After heated debate it was decided to bring the two 
streams of Faith and Order and Life and Work together. The 
logistics of such an ambitious transnational venture 
required equivalent national and international structures 
along similar lines to the IMC. The idea of a World Council 
62 Kent 1992, p. 55. 
63 Kent 1992, p. 306. 
62 
of Churches linked to some form of national counterpart was 
64 
consequently born . 
Part II: The Formation of the WCC and the BCC 
once it had been decided to bring the Life and Work and 
Faith and Order movements together, a provisional committee, 
chaired by Temple, was convened at Utrecht in the 
Netherlands during the Spring of 1938 to establish a draft 
constitution. In the very year the League of Nations 
Assembly held its last session, the Dutch theologian Dr. 
Visserlt Hooft became the first General Secretary of a World 
Council of Churches (WCC) 'In Process of Formation'. 
65 
Because of the outbreak of war, however, the formal 
inauguration of the WCC was delayed until its first official 
meeting at Amsterdam, August 22 to September 4 1948. 
In these early years the Geneva based WCC was 
consolidated and designed as "a fellowship of churches which 
confess the Lord Jesus Christ as God and Saviour. t, 
66 
Membership was open to any Church who could accept this 
ethos. In practice this meant an original membership of 146 
Churches from 44 countries including Anglicans, Baptists, 
Congregationalists, Calvinists and Lutherans, Methodists, 
64 Payne 1972, p. 4. 
65 Hastings points out (Hastings 1987, p. 306) that the Geneva-based 
'It Hooft theoretically shared the organisation of the World Council with 
William Paton, the new London-based secretary of the IMC, due to the 
outbreak of war however, It Hooft soon acted in practice as sole 
secretary. 
66 official quote, source not specified. Taken from van der Bent 1978, 
p. 35. 
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Mennonites, Quakers, Moravians, Disciples, old Catholics, 
the Salvation Army and a number of the Orthodox Churches. 
The majority of Protestant Churches in Europe, North 
America, and Australia joined but the Roman Catholics and 
67 
most of the Orthodox community abstained . Inevitably, the 
organisation was dominated by white, Western males who 
conceptualised the values of the modern Western State mostly 
in positive terms, as a kind of secular off-spring to 
Christianity. The Council, nevertheless, did not see itself 
as an universal authority controlling Christian thought, 
belief or practice. Temple as the Council's first official 
leader, in particular, did not intend the WCC as a 'super- 
church' or an alternative Vatican but as an organisation 
providing the non-Roman Catholic Churches with a way of 
transcending national limitations and playing a creative 
68 role on the world stage . It was hoped that by ensuring 
the WCC acted outside direct Church control it would serve 
as the political equivalent to the Victorian Missionary 
Societies. The Council saw itself as an authoritative 
international source that would help guide national member 
Churches on problems of State, society, and Christian 
responsibility. On these terms the WCC saw itself as the 
moral custodian of the State, pointing society towards God, 
whilst helping Protestantism reinvent itself as a form of 
G7 See Latourette (Vol. VII) 1946 for detail. 
68 Kent 1992, p. 6. 
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po 1 itico- ideological pressure that could help mould the form 
of liberal society. 
Statements and policies would be determined by 
representatives from national Churches meeting in Assembly, 
normally every seven years. More detailed decisions would 
be taken by the 150 members who made up the Central 
Committee (elected by the Assembly and meeting annually) and 
a smaller Executive Committee (22 members appointed by the 
Central Committee meeting twice a year). The General 
Secretary would serve to implement and co-ordinate such 
efforts and give leadership to the World Council as a 
whole. 69 At Amsterdam Bishop Bell was elected as the first 
chair of the Central Committee, the Council's most important 
office (other than that of General Secretary). 
At the end of the second world war the WCC, before it 
was formally inaugurated, set up a specialised sub-unit on 
international affairs. This Commission of the Churches on 
International Affairs (CCIA) began as a free-wheeling, 
largely independent outfit run by the diplomatic Kenneth 
Grubb in London and the activist Fred Nolde in New York. 70 
Kenneth Slack has argued that it was only with the formation 
of this Commission that: "'the Churches of the world other 
than Roman Catholic (have) had a body possessed of the 
69 "The Way it Works" by van der Bent 1978, pp. 34-46. 70 There is a wealth of material on the setting up, and consequent 
activities of, the CCIA in BCC/CCIA Box 1. 
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necessary expertise to study large international issues 
and... [the ability] to formulate Christian judgement upon 
them. "71 The CCIA was intended to serve as a political 
instrument for "calling the Churches' attention to the 
causes of particular conflicts, . to the violation of human 
rights in particular places and to the evils of militarism, 
and by being available to represent the Churches' concern in 
areas of tension, it stimulates Christians to work for the 
healing of the nations, through peace and reconciliation. Ir72 
The CCIA's officers would henceforth serve to ensure that 
the voice of the WCC was heard by those charged with making 
73 decisions of an international political nature . 
From the start the life of the WCC was fraught with 
controversy. Out of the WCC's first assembly came a four- 
volume compendium of essays Man's Disorder and God's Design, 
whose temper belied the Council's progressivist theological 
and social heritage. Many saw the intellectual climate of 
the time as indicative of a "un-Christian" or "post- 
Christian" world in crisis. The axes of dispute lay between 
those who (following Niebuhr) prodded the WCC to take side 
on the West's relative justice vis-&-vis Communism, and 
74 those (following Barth) who sought a neutralism . As the 
71 Slack 1960, p. 38. 
72 van der Bent 1978, p. 39. 
13 For a evaluation of the methods and effectiveness of the WCC and 
CCIA as non-governmental organisation see Hudson 1977. 
74 See Epp's 1990 PhD for an excellent discussion of the intellectual 
currents and debates fostered at this time. 
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Cold War was enjoined many idealists and leftists began to 
see the WCC as a propaganda design against an atheist Soviet 
Union. The American secretary of state John Foster Dulles, 
for instance, intimated as much at Amsterdam. The Soviets 
thought so which encouraged the Eastern European Churches to 
agree. Evangelicals, however, disagreed and hence formed a 
militant rival, the International Council of Christian 
Churches (ICCC) with Dr. Carl McIntire, an American 
Presbyterian minister as its main driving force. This 
organisation was marked by strong doctrinal convictions, and 
75 
an opposition to both ecumenism and communism . 
The British Council of Churches 
In Britain, the success of the 1937 oxford Conference had 
inspired Joe Oldham to form a British Advisory Committee to 
pursue relevant avenues of a political-theological nature. 
After the conference this committee developed in 1938 into a 
interdenominational Council on the Christian Faith and the 
Common Life. In July 1939 a chaplain from Glasgow 
University, Archibald C. Crai g76 , established ""A Commission 
of the Churches for International Friendship and Social 
Responsibility. " Despite the pressures of war, these 
organisations helped keep the spirit of ecumenical unity 
alive and by 1942 plans for a British Council of Churches 
75 Renwick and Harman, 1985, p. 229. 
76 Craig would eventually be the General Secretary of the BCC 1942 
through 1946. Appendix to Payne 1972. 
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were well advanced. Ecumenical plans were further 
encouraged by the enthronement in April 1942 of William 
Temple as Archbishop of Canterbury. Temple's sermon 
enthused about "the great new fact of our era... (a) 
Christian fellowship which-extends into almost every 
nation. "77 Within weeks the British Council of Churches 
would be formally constituted. 
At the inauguration of the BCC and before its first 
meetings were held on the 23rd and 24th September 1942,713 
Archbishop Temple summed up the aims of the BCC from the 
pulpit of St. Paul's Cathedral: 
To-day we inaugurate the British Council of Churches, 
the counterpart in our country of the World Council, 
combining in a single organisation the chief agencies 
of the interdenominational co-operation which has 
marked the last five years .... These departmental 
agencies ... could never catch 
the public imagination. 
The newly-formed British Council of Churches may very 
likely do this, and so become the channel of new 
influences upon our common life. Our differences 
remain: we shall not pretend that they are already 
resolved into unity or harmony. But we take our stand 
in the common faith of Christendom, faith in God, 
Creator, Redeemer, and Sanctifier; and so standing 
together we invite men to share that faith and call on 
all to conform their lives to the principles derived 
from it. 79 
The First Article of the BCC Constitution stated that "the 
British Council of Churches is a fellowship of Churches" 
17 Recalled by Payne 1972, p. 6. 
78 Articles of Amalgamation, BCC Constitution, aims and basis, Standing 
orders, Policy Documents, Annual Reports, and Minutes of the first 
meetings in BCC/1/6. The only attempt at a history of the BCC (from a 
ecclesiastical perspective) is Payne 1972. 
19 Quoted by Payne 1972, p-7- 
so These Churches are situated in the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland and in the Republic of Ireland. 
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which confess the Lord Jesus as God and Saviour according to 
the Scriptures and therefore seek to fulfil together their 
common calling to the Glory of the one God, Father, Son and 
Holy Spirit. "81 Invitations to join were sent out to all 
those Churches which had collaborated in the earlier 
agencies. A total of sixteen denominations joined the BCC 
in 1942 including all the major Anglican, Baptist, 
Congregationalist, Methodist, Presbyterian, Quaker, 
Unitarian and Free Christian Churches of England, Scotland, 
Wales and Ireland. Several interdenominational bodies 
including the SCM, the YMCA (Young Men' s Christian 
Association), and YWCA (Young Women's Christian Association) 
also joined. Article VI of the BCC Constitution defined the 
objectives of the Council as "the advancement of the 
Christian religion, the relief of poverty and the 
advancement of education and any other purposes which are 
charitable according to the law of England and Wales. "82 
The Council aimed to provide the means of consultation 
between the Churches, and serve as an instrument of common 
action by the Churches in questions of 'faith and order. ' 83 
From the start the Council aimed to do this by fostering 
links with Government departments (especially the Foreign 
and Colonial Offices) and with both national and 
61 Constitution and Rules n. d., p. 3. 
82 Ibid. r p-4- 03 This phrase is actually used. See Article VI of BCC constitution 
and Rules n. d., p. 5. 
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international organisations, statutory and voluntary, such 
as the United Nations Association. The BCC served as the 
focus for the pooling of limited resources whilst being an 
expression of British Churches who found it expedient not to 
'go it alone', but were still not entirely united 
organisationally. It is no surprise that the basic 
structure of the BCC was similar to that of the WCC. Whilst 
the BCC was not a branch office or committed to every 
decision and action of the WCC, it was of the same 
'ecumenical family' and did share common interests. The WCC 
in turn granted to the BCC the status of "an associated 
national Council' . This organic relationship did much to 
stimulate BCC participation in the concerns and work of the 
84 World Council . Yet the BCC was financially autonomous of 
the WCC and controlled its resources independently. Each 
member body maintained the BCC's work through annual grants 
proportionate to their size and financial capacity. 85 
A 'General Assembly' (also known simply as 'the Council') 
was formed to serve as the principal source of authority for 
the British Council of Churches. It was decided that the 
BCC would best discharge its broadly defined remit if member 
Churches appointed representatives to serve in this 
Assembly. This would meet every six months for sessions 
normally lasting a weekend. Public statements, resolutions, 
84 See Slack 1960 p. 38. 
85 Article IX, Constitution and Rules n. d., p. 7. 
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and policies (including the commissioning of reports) would 
be determined by this Assembly. 86 The Assembly in turn 
appointed an 'Executive Committee' to meet at least six 
times a year in order to supervise Council work between 
Assembly meetings. The Executive was chaired by a General 
Secretary (Archibald Craig became the first secretary) . 
other Council officers included a President (normally the 
Archbishop of Canterbury), two vice-president S87 , and a 
Treasurer. This central secretariat was supported by 
Departments (each chaired by a Secretary with their own 
staff) providing information, advice and practical support 
to members, and to other organisations that requested help 
whether local, national or international. The BCC began in 
time to develop a distinctive life of its own and its 
debates, resolutions and reports reflected a wider spread of 
Christian insight and commitment than could be found in any 
single Church. 
International Affairs 
The two main issues that brought together the BCC were 
international relations and social questions. It was 
accepted that "theology' could not ignore the 'social' and 
that the responsibilities of the British Churches should not 
be limited to Britain. Two specialised departments were 
86 There was also a proviso for Private Members' Motions to be voted on in 
Assembly. See Constitution and Rules n. d., p. 20. 
87 Oldham was voted as vice-president for the years 1944 to 1946. 
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thereby set up within the BCC to deal exclusively with these 
issues. The department that dealt with international 
relations was at first known as the Department for 
International Friendship, which was the lineal descendent of 
Burlingham's British section of the World Alliance -for 
International Friendship through the Churches. In 1947 the 
Department of International Friendship came officially to be 
called the 'International Department' and later the Division 
of International Affairs (DIA) . 
8" In 1952 the Council of 
British Missionary Societies (CBMS) entered into formal 
association with the BCC, and from this point the DIA acted 
as a joint department for both Council and Conference. 
There were no hard and fast rules determining the range 
of the International Department's activities. Essentially, 
the DIA was concerned with the "relationship between nations 
as political entities. This (was) not meant as a precise 
definition, but as a guide post. "" A considerable amount 
of the Department's work was spent in formulating and 
expressing, on behalf of the BCC, a politico-moral judgement 
on areas of international political concern where they 
thought they had a duty to express such judgement such as 
de-colonisation and war. In the formulation of such 
judgements the Department used the specialised knowledge and 
as Payne 1972, p. 8. 
89 See 'Confidential Working Paper on Future of the International 
Department', dated January 1963, in BCC/CBMS International Department 
Box 15. 
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expertise of individuals, advisory, support, specialist, and 
ad hoc groups, not necessarily directly associated with the 
BCC such as the UN Association. Once the Department's 
judgement was determined it needed to express its considered 
opinion to different constituencies. A main constituency 
the BCC wanted to reach was the British Government. Here 
the DIA saw itself as a pressure group speaking on behalf of 
a section of British Christian society (i. e. particularly 
the BCC and its members). At the autumn 1944 Council 
meeting Oldham had spoken of the need for the BCC to 
safeguard its character as a Council of Churches. He 
argued: 
At all costs the Council must preserve its church 
character and not seek to exercise the greater freedom 
which belongs to a private body. This means that the 
responsible church leaders who are members of the 
Council have no right to support any course of action 
which they are not prepared to commend and defend 
within their own several Churches. " 
It was, nevertheless, envisaged that such a joint approach 
would be both more informed and effective than views 
expressed by individual Churches. The Department aimed to 
keep regular Governmental department contacts and to secure 
'top level' deputations to help in the formulation of their 
ideas. It aimed to ensure that they understood Government 
policies and that Government was made aware of the views of 
the Churches on major issues. The DIA also wanted to reach 
90 Oldham in Payne 1972, p. 9. 
93 
individual British Churches and their members with the 
intention of articulating an informal voice on international 
affairs among British Christians. The Department did this 
with several 'executive actions'. 
First, it issued reports and statements of general policy 
to the BCC Assembly. The basis of this was the 'Seven Point 
91 
Policy for Joint Action by the British Churches' This 
formulation charged the Department to work for: (i) the 
strengthening of communication with the Churches of Eastern 
Europe and East Asia; (ii) European unity, with a 
recognition of Britain's common spiritual inheritance with 
the peoples of the Continent; (iii) supporting the United 
Nations; (iv) persistence in negotiation with the Soviet 
Union and the People's Republic of China; (v) opposition to 
racial discrimination; (vi) increased overseas service in 
terms of both personnel and money; and (vii) assistance to 
under-developed peoples. Next, the DIA created 'working 
parties' that would publish well-researched papers, reports, 
and reviews on major international developments in order to 
"help others understand the complex factors at work. "92 (it 
was this working-party method that was mainly used in 
influencing public opinion on nuclear matters . 
93) Thirdly, 
91 Adopted by the BCC in April 1951. In 1960 this plan was replaced by 
a four-point statement of action called "A Pattern of International 
Action". See BCC/DIA/1/l/4. 
92 The British Council of Churches and International Affaixs n. d., p. 2. 
93 A useful consideration of the various motives, styles and intended 
audience for Christian documentary engagement in the socio-political 
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it ensured comprehensive press coverage of BCC deputation's 
to Government sources. Fourthly, it expressed views to the 
CCIA. - This was important because the International 
Department acted essentially as the national commission of 
the CCIA in Britain. If the DIA needed to make a 
representation to a government (other than the British 
Government) or to the United Nations, it would do so through 
the CCIA. Finally, the Department wanted to express its 
views to Christian Councils of other countries. These 
expressions may have been messages of greeting on 
significant political occasions (for example, the political 
independence of a country), or alternatively an expression 
of concern over questions of human rights9' (e. g. missionary 
freedom). If the country concerned was within the British 
Empire or Commonwealth the DIA approached them directly, if 
in another territory the Department approached the CCIA. 
All significant questions over the actions or policies of 
another country would be directed to the Christian Council 
of that country. The Department would never contact the 
Government of another country directly but hope their 
r egistered concern (e. g. over perceived threats to world 
peace) would be related via the indigenous Christian Council 
to their own government sources. 
realm is provided by Anthony Dyson in Bauckham and Elford (eds. ) 1989, 
v4p. 95-114. 
See material in BCC/DIA/l/l/4. 
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In practical terms the DIA was interested in bringing a 
Christian judgement to bear on international relations. By 
drawing together representatives from groups of Christians 
who could speak with knowledge and experience the Department 
intended to make informative decisions vis-A-vis Government 
and other State apparatuses. The Department consequently, 
saw its role as educational, even prophetic, through the 
provision of information and the drawing out of the moral 
factors involved in international political decisions. Such 
authority as they had was moral and political rather than 
legal or canonical. This however carried the intrinsic 
disadvantage that the BCC as a Christian institution making 
pronouncements on ethical, social and political matters 
thereby gave the misleading impression of the unanimity of 
its own membership. "5 It also gave the DIA a very high 
informal authority to speak on behalf of the BCC. Genuine 
differences were therefore effectively ignored and it was 
95 Peter Hinchliff's intriguing article "Can the Church 'Do' Politics? " 
(Hinchliff 1981) questions the extent to which institutional organs such 
as the BCC really represent the Church. He suggests that it is in fact 
impossible for Church leaders to speak for the Church in any real sense 
and the debate over whether the Church loughtf or 'should' be involved 
in politics is hence misconceived. Hinchliff's conclusion is that the 
Church cannot go into politics in any way at all -- except that it can 
and should make political statements, which will inevitably be chiefly 
negative and critical about moral ideals. Christians cannot go into 
politics either. They are there already and even political apathy will 
have political consequences. The assumption that the Churches' structures 
and ideas are determined by the particular societies within which they are 
placed forms the basis for Robin Gill's "Prophecy in a Socially Determined 
Church" (Gill 1979). This interesting sociological study however, also 
contains the error that no theologian before Constantine and the new-found 
relation of Church and State "was ever anything but a pacifist" (Gill 1979, 
p. 27). 
96 
down to individuals within their midst to expose those 
96 differences and justify their disagreement. 
Conclusion 
The WCC and BCC were products of an optimistic world-view 
that involved three separate strands: Faith and Order, peace 
activism, Life and Work. The ecumenical movement, 
consequently, was established to further a spiritual and 
material reformation, to bring "God back" into social life 
and counter a secularised understanding of history. 
The BCC became the principal (indeed the only truly 
interdenominational) non-Catholic body dealing with 
political issues for the British Christian community. 
Questions, however, should be asked of its contribution. 
Canon John CollinS97, for instance, had been asked to be 
General Secretary of the BCC by Geoffrey Fisher in 1945. 
Collins decision to decline the invitation is a telling 
indictment: "What, I then had to ask myself, could I hope to 
accomplish through an official body like the BCC, a body 
which, whenever a question demanding decisive action arises, 
is hampered by feeling itself representative of and 
answerable to so many and conflicting interests? The BCC 
96 See Mascall 1971 for the organisational weaknesses to which such 
ecclesiastical assemblies are subject; and Ridley 1976 for a 
consideration of the 'time-factor' that prevent Church Assemblies from 
dealing satisfactory with controversial issues. 
91 Famous for his Christian Socialism, Canon John Collins would become 
the first chair of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament in 1958. See 
his autobiography (1966); and Gorry 1995 for Collins' role in the peace- 
movement. 
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inevitably goes the pace of the slowest man, and is a body 
through which unorthodox voices can be heard but faintly, if 
at all. "9" 
One obstacle to a progressive approach appears to be 
that, despite ecumenicalism. being grounded in an optimistic 
theory of human nature, many of its precepts became 
increasingly defeatist. This was because it came to 
fruition at precisely the time nineteenth century 
progressivism was rejected in a retreat to orthodoxy. Two 
world wars and the failure of the League of Nations provoked 
a neo-orthodox protest within the Churches, just as realism 
had been the response to idealism within academia. Indeed, 
fears over the increasing conservatism of the project led 
figures like Canon John Collins, George Bell, Victor 
Gollancz, and Roger Wilson to set up 'Christian Action' (CA) 
in December 1946. Here Christian Aid saw itself marshalling 
the marked Christian post-war revival in a more politically 
radical direction than was being achieved through the BCC. 99 
The desire of some Christians not to invest all their hopes 
in one project was strong, and accounts for the setting up 
of similar projects throughout the period of this study. 
98 Collins 1966, p. 134. 
99 Hastings 1987, pp. 428-35. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: 
THE CHURCHES AND THE ATOMIC BOMB 1945-49 
Introduction 
The outbreak of world war in September 1939 prevented 
the WCC carrying out its mission immediately. Yet, as Ernest 
Payne pointed out, although World War II delayed the formation 
(or more accurately the implementation) of the World Council 
of Churches, it hastened the establishment of the British 
Council of Churches. ' These productive developments however, 
belie the striking divisions that the war exacerbated in 
British Church attitudes to warfare. The 1939-1945 war 
exaggerated the traditional divisions between just war and 
pacifist approaches. Against this background this chapter 
locates the development of late twentieth century British 
Church debate towards war. It is particularly concerned with 
the increase in tensions between different traditions 
generated by the West's manufacture and use of the atomic bomb 
in 1945-48. The chapter examines the BCCfs first contribution 
to nuclear thinking in 1946, The Era of Atomic Power Report 
(also known as the Oldham Report). 
1 Payne 1972, p. 4. 
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Part I: The Debate 
During World War Two pacifism became tainted by its 
association with appeasement and was blamed for the outbreak 
of hostilities. 2 Absolutists like Dr. Donald Soper (a 
Methodist) and the Revd. Dr. George Macloed (the Scottish 
Kirk), along with Canon Charles Raven, were discredited and 
banned from broadcasting by the BBC due to their anti-war 
efforts. Such action weakened pacifist credibility amongst 
many Christians who thought the war against Hitler a just one. 
Christian academics on the liberal wing of pacifism, including 
the major author Cecil John Cadoux, 3 began to give weight to 
non-pacifist arguments. Many pacifists (not just Christian) 
concluded that war was now "'relatively justified /jA in the face 
5 of evils like fascism. If, as Ceadel has argued , Hitler 
helped rehabilitate warfare amongst pacifists (inasmuch as he 
made opposition to Nazism a moral prerogative) he also spurred 
interest in the idea of a just war within the British 
Churches. 
Despite serious defections from the Christian pacifist camp 
throughout the war the British Churches were not fully 
decisive in their acceptance or rejection of the just Wa-r 
I Ceadel 1980, pp. 294-315 for detail. 
3 Cadoux 1940. 
4 Cadoux argued that pacifists should "admit that it is better that (the 
war against fascism) should be victoriously carried through than that it 
should be discontinued before the undertaking is completed. " See Cadoux 
1940, p. 216; and the coimnentary by Ceadel 1980, p. 298. 
5 Ceadel 1980, p. 2. 
100 
doctrine. 6 An indication of the depths of division is 
illustrated by the Church of England's 1940 Convocation (an 
assembly of bishops and clergy) at Canterbury. A resolution 
declaring just war as appropriate in the struggle with Germany 
was tabled, yet the bishops felt it better to refrain from 
such a decision until after the war. The British Churches 
found it difficult to criticize Allied action even the 'carpet 
bombing' of German cities. The lone, but vociferous, protests 
of George Bell (now Bishop of Chichester) were a notable 
exception to this rule. 
Polarization of Christian opinion in Britain did not seem 
to affect the Americans. American pacifist and just war 
theologians participated in a study formally known as The 
Relation of the Church to the War in the Light of the 
Christian Faith: Report of A Commission of Christian Scholars 
Appointed by the Federal Council of Churches of Christ in 
America' in 1944. This report (also referred to by the name 
of the Commissionrs Chair -- Robert Calhoun9) concluded that 
"the war is an event in the providential reign of God whom we 
know best through Christ crucified and triumphant. For 
6 S. G. Evans 1954, pp. 280-3 recalls this episode. Also see Ormxod 1987, 
191. 
Canon Collins (1966, p. 97) argues that these lone protests of George 
Bell were an important factor in preventing him becoming Archbishop of 
Canterbury after Archbishop Temple's death in 1944. This suggestion is 
also supported by Kent 1992, p. 161. For detail of Bellfs war-time protests 
against obliteration bombing and his heroic support for Bonhoeffer and the 
anti-Nazi German Confessing Church see Clements and Chandler 1995; Chandler 
1995; Carey 1995. 
8 The equivalent American council to the BCC, also a member church of the 
WCC. Potter (1969, pp. 109-10) briefly discusses the report. 
9 Professor of Historical Theology, Yale University. 
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Christian faith the whole cataclysm... is a tragic moment in 
God's work of creating and redeeming man, and in man's long 
struggle with himself and his Creator. "10 
Throughout the spring and summer of 1942 the possibility of 
a controlled atomic explosion had been discussed by British 
and refugee scientists joined by the MAUD Committee. In 
Government circles the idea of atomic weapons was linked to 
'Great Power Status'. Prime Minister Churchill in particular 
saw the idea of the Bomb as an agent of fundamental change in 
world society. It was seen to be a cheaper (because it could 
be delivered by existing bombers) but more powerful potential 
form of destruction than existing conventional weapons. 
Whilst Britain was prepared to 'go it alone' and develop the 
source independently, most officials accepted that it would be 
advantageous for Britain to work with the United States. Yet 
the British still valued the idea of an independent atomic 
device and made clear to the US government that they wanted 
their own project once the war was won. Although the British 
did not want to rely on American goodwill, co-operation was 
seen as a valued pragmatic decision based on cost analysis and 
the fear that Hitler would manufacture the A-bomb first. Such 
fears led to decisive British-US government collaboration in 
the Manhattan project. " 
10 The Federal Council of Churches 1944, p. 12. 
11 A full and comprehensive treatment of British atomic policy making is 
found in Gowing 1974. For the development of British strategic ideas see 
Groom 1974; Pierre 1972; Melissen 1993; Kemp's 1986 M. Litt; and Clark and 
Wheeler 1989. The Clark and Wheeler volume is particularly valuable in 
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By the end of November 1944 it was clear that Germany or 
Japan were not close to developing an atomic capability. 
Nevertheless the Allied development of the Bomb continued. on 
8th May 1945 the European war ended with Germany's surrender. 
As the Pacific war dragged on the first atomic test was 
carried out in New Mexico on the 16th July 1945. Strengthened 
by this success the US government took the unilatera112 
decision to use the bomb on Japan with the argument that it 
would save lives by shortening war. on 6th August 1945 the 
first bomb was dropped on Hiroshima killing approximately 
200,000 people. Three days later a second more powerful 
atomic bomb was dropped on Nagasaki 13 . 
In 1945 the first chills of the Cold War were beginning to 
be felt and the prophetic sentiments of Professor Patrick 
Blackett" were striking an uncomfortable note: "the dropping 
of the atomic bombs was not so much the last military act of 
the Second World War, as the first act of the cold diplomatic 
war with Russia"'5. With the end of the second world war on 
the 14th August, the British Government was faced with the 
decision whether to opt out of the new atomic club. The entry 
into the nuclear age had been welcomed by many outside of 
Japan as it was commonly believed the Bomb had brought an 
that its survey of strategy during the first post-war decade-is based on 
official archival material. 
12 Groom 1974 offers detail on this decision. 
13 A summary of the development, and horrifying effects of atomic weapons 
is found in Cox 1981, pp. 15-58. 
14 The British physicist and 1948 Nobel Prize winner. In 1958 Blackett 
would act as a founding member of the Institute for Strategic Studies. See 
Chapter Six. 
15 Cited by Cox 1981, p. 26. 
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early end to war. Exaggerated beliefs in the political (as 
opposed to military) potential of the 'Bomb that Ends War, 
reinforced Britain's decision to stay in the 'Iclubl. 16 
Despite such tumultuous events, the birth of the nuclear 
age did -not create unity of thought in the British Churches. 
Even so, for the first decade of the atomic age Church reports 
and Commissions were the only real forum for debate in 
Britain. 17 The main source of further debate came from the 
BCCls sister organisation in the United States. 
On the 9th August 1945, the day the second atomic bomb 
dropped on Nagasaki, the US Federal Council of Churches 
Commission on a Just and Durable Peacele issued a 'Statement 
on the Atomic Bomb. 119 Whilst the Commission was prepared to 
accept President Truman's assertion that '"atomic power can 
become a powerful and forceful influence toward the 
maintenance of world peace, "20 the statement called for US 
self-restraint and the development of the United Nations as an 
16 It was not until 1946 that the new Attlee government, with virtually no 
public discussion, decided to manufacture the British A-bomb. The decision 
to develop the bomb was actually taken in 1946 by the Defence Committee of 
the Cabinet. Other Cabinet members learned of the decision through the 
circulation of its minutes. Passing references were made in the House of 
Commons but it was not until shortly before the testing of the first 
British device in the early 1950s that a formal announcement was made. For 
further commentary see Groom 1974, pp. 20-39. For an example of a passing 
reference by the Minister of Defence see Hansazd: House of Commons, 
Vol. 450, col. 2118,12 May 1948. 
17 See Groom 1974, p. 196 for a reflection on the health of the debate at 
this time. 
18 Interestingly the chair of this Commission was the international lawyer 
John Foster Dulles. Son of a minister and earnest Presbyterian, Dulles, 
became President Eisenhower's controversial Secretary of State between 
1953 and 1959. His concept on massive retaliation would have a huge impact 
on later BCC thinking about nuclear warfare. See Chapter Six of this 
thesis. 
19 'Statement on the Atomic Bomb' dated 9 August 1945, in BCC/5/7/2v. 
20 Ibid. 
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organ of international control. This became the first 
resolution advocating the control and use of nuclear weapons 
adopted by an official body, secular or otherwise, in the 
21 United States . Mindful of this 
dramatic attempt by US 
Churches to lead opinion, concerned Christians in Britain 
began to write to Archibald Craig (in his capacity as BCC 
General Secretary) urging the BCC to declare against the 
Allies' use of the Bomb. 
The Churches and the A-bomb 
Letters from the BCC's constituent Churches began to arrive 
throughout August 1945 calling on the Council to lead in 
efforts to persuade the new Attlee government not to 
manufacture a British atomic device. The Hull Methodist 
Mission, 22 for example, wrote to Craig asking for the BCC to 
declare against the Bomb and organise a mass Christian 
plebiscite so that British Christians could have their say 
over its manufacture. Whilst Craig shared the concern felt 
over the Bomb, he argued that it was very difficult for the 
BCC to speak with any authority on behalf of its constituent 
member Churches, or of Christians generally and it wasn't for 
23 him to urge what action, if any, the Council ought to take . 
Craig did think, however, the suggestion of a 'Christian vote' 
z' The BCC General Council would express formal approval of this statement 
when the Council met in October 1945. See resolution in BCC/DIA/l/l/4. 
22 The Hull Methodist Mission had recently declared that "The use of the 
atomic bomb by any nation constitutes a sin against God and a crime against 
humanity". The letter accompanying this resolution is dated 16 August 1945 
and signed by 'Mr. Blacknell'. Letter in BCC/5/7/2i. 
23 Craig to Blacknell dated 22 August 1945, in BCC/5/7/2i. 
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impractical because the result of "*mass votes of this kind 
were often very misleading. "24 The calls for the BCC to take 
a lead in nuclear matters greW25 and on the 30th August 1945 
the Archbishop of Canterbury Geoffrey Fisher, 26 as President 
of the BCC, wrote to Craig suggesting action must be taken. 
Whilst Fisher thought nothing could be gained from discussion 
over whether the Bomb should have been used because there was 
"room for difference of opinion "27 he did think a universal 
declaration by Christendom a good idea. For the Archbishop 
atomic bombs would certainly be used if there was another war. 
The important thing, therefore, was the universal repudiation 
of war and support for the US Federal Council's idea of 
transferring the control of the atomic bomb to the United 
Nations. Fisher suggested the BCC take up the challenge and 
produce a considered document. This according to the 
Archbishop s hould be submitted to the Council's member 
Churches for ratification and "not (have) the diffused weight 
of the BCC. " 28 Once this was the document could be affirmed 
by "Christendom, America, Rome and the East. 1129 
24 Ibid. 
25 Harrison (the President of the Methodist Conference) for example wrote 
to the President of the BCC (the Archbishop of Canterbury, Geoffrey Fisher) 
on the 22 of August 1945 arguing that because the atom signified a turning 
point in history it demanded a response from the BCC because it showed that 
Britain at least, should be ready for a renunciation of war. Letter in 
BCC/5/7/2i. It is interesting that the pacifist publication Peace News 
(August 25 1945) contradicted the spirit of Harrison by treating the A-bomb 
not as a historic revolution, but simply as an increase in humanity's 
2T 
lantitative capacity for destruction. 
Fisher had replaced William Temple who died suddenly in 1944 after only 
thirty months of office. 
27 Hastings 1987, p. 381. 
28 Letter from Fisher to Craig 30 August 1945 in BCC/5/7/2i. 
29 Ibid. 
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30 
Craig produced a considered reply to Fisher's request. 
He agreed that the atomic dilemma called for a united voice 
but felt the difficulty was in finding a procedure at once 
authoritative and reasonably speedy. Craig thought it best to 
leave out the possibility of united action on a scale larger 
than an all-British venture. A larger scale approach should, 
in Craig's opinion, be left to the WCC and if that were done 
the British statement would be a useful basis for discussion. 
For Craig the possibilities of British action were: first, a 
statement by the 'Big Five' -- the Anglican (English and 
Scottish), Roman Archbishops plus the two Moderators 
(Methodist and Presbyterian). This would be much the quickest 
way and very influential in the general Christian community. 
Yet this option would raise particular problems for the 
Moderators who, because they had no personal authority in 
matters of Church policy, would find it difficult to co- 
operate. Second, a statement could be issued by the BCC "off 
its own bat or after consultations with appropriate Church 
committees "31 (e. g. the Church and Nation Committee of the 
Church of Scotland who were engaged in preparing their own 
Report). Such a statement could not, however, be properly 
drafted in time for the forthcoming meeting of the General 
Assembly (October 1945), but could be done well by April 1946. 
Even then such an option would not be a statement 'of the 
Churches'. The third option, as Craig saw it, was a statement 
30 Craig to Fisher dated 3 September 1945, BCC/5/7/2i. 
31 Ibid. 
107 
drafted and approved by the BCC and then referred to the 
Churches for endorsement at individual assemblies meeting next 
in 1946. on the whole he was personally inclined to think 
that, because the atomic issue looked like being a long-term 
one, the disadvantage of a slow tempo should be accepted and 
this last option adopted. 
The pressure on the BCC to act was steadily growing. 
Fisher was also under personal pressure to act in his capacity 
of Archbishop. A number of Church of England members led by 
Canon Hudson (St. Albans), approached the Archbishop 
requesting that he form a Commission to consider and report on 
the moral and spiritual implications . of modern warfare. 
Fisher's correspondence 32 with Craig reveals that he was 
against the idea 33 and hoped a BCC report would relieve the 
pressure for him to act personally. The Archbishop wrote to 
Craig arguing that the BCC start work on the British project, 
but rather than dealing with pacifism as such, consider 
whether ""the old phrase the just war still had any definable 
"34 meaning or relevance . Craig decided that the best 
candidate to draw together and act as Chair for such a 
commission would be his friend and vice-president of the BCC, 
Joe Oldham. 
32 Letter from Fisher to Craig, 15 October 1945 in BCC/5/7/2i. 
33 Reasons why are not specified but one can assume that the Archbishop 
wanted to avoid becoming embroiled in such a controversial and potentially 
divisive project. 
34 Fisher to Craig, 15 October 1945, in BCC/5/7/2i. 
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Oldham's Task 
Joe Oldham was less than enthusiastic at being 
approached . 
35 He wished that Craig would find someone who was 
"less of a lame dog to help", but in the circumstances found 
it difficult to refuse. Oldham accepted: first, out of 
friendship and "because of the office confirmed on me by the 
BCC (i. e. vice-president), the claims of which I do so little 
to meet, I feel under an obligation to respond to the best of 
my ability to any demands you make on me. "36 Secondly, 
because he could give the time required and provide the 
connections desired. Finally, because he felt the commission 
might contribute to what he saw as the highly desirable end of 
cementing relations between the BCC and his new Christian 
Frontier Council. 37 
At the October 
. 
1945 General Council meeting the BCC 
instructed its Executive Committee "to set up, after 
consultation with the President (Fisher), a small committee, 
membership of which shall not be limited to members of 
Council, to consider the problems created by the discovery of 
atomic energy and to draw up a statement to be submitted to 
the Council. "38 Oldham was formally offered, and accepted, 
'): ) See letters to Craig from Oldham dated 19 and 21 October 1945 in 
BCC/5/7/2i. 
36 Letter dated 19 October 1945, BCC/5/7/2i. 
37 The Christian Frontier Council was the lineal descendent of Oldham's 
Council on the Christian Faith and the Common Life, which in turn was the 
successor to the Oxford conference on Church, Community and State. This 
contemporary project produced an important publication dealing with social 
issues called the Christian News-Letter which published articles by well- 
known contemporaries including Anthony Eden, Arnold Toynbee, Richard 
Crossman, Sir Stafford Cripps, R. H. Tawney and Basil Liddell-Hart. 
38 BCC/5/7/2i. 
109 
the Chair of the committee. The Council decided that the 
'working party' should communicate with the Executive 
Committee of the WCC (as Craig had earlier argued) and that it 
would be best if the WCC refrained from issuing its own 
statement until it could build on the work of national bodies 
and co-ordinate conclusions. The Council Executive thought 
the Commission should be about 12 strong (with six lay- 
members) with powers to draw others into consultation as 
necessary. Oldham was keen on securing a short title to 
convey the group's labours succinctly to the press: 
... to bring in anything about problems which concern 
Christians would make the title too long. The same 
objection applies to anything like 'the moral and 
spiritual implications of atomic energy', apart from the 
fact that atomic energy in itself has no moral or 
spiritual implications, which have to do with the use 
which human beings make of it. I incline to suggest for 
a title as a compromise 'Commission on the New Era of 
Atomic Energy. ' 39 
It was decided that the theological foundations of the Report 
should be well and truly laid. 40 
The composition of the Commission was not without 
controversy. Oldham was keen for the Commission to achieve a 
good balance between Left and Right" and urged a solid 
foundation in Christian ethics. The views of the arch- 
39 Oldham to Craig, 9 November 1945, BCC/5/7/2i. 
40 See unsigned letter from the director of Council of Church Training 
Colleges to the Bishop of Bristol (Wooder), 5 November 1945, BCC/5/7/2i. 
41 Commission members Mary Stocks and Donald MacKinnon are described as 
belonging markedly to the Left. Bishop Bell is ignored. Pointedly, Right- 
Wing members of the Commission are not listed. Oldham to Craig 9 November 
1945, BCC/5/7/2i. MacKinnon, a well-known pacifist, critic of Platonic 
theology, and Marxist sympathiser, went on to join Bell. as a notable 
supporter of CND after its 1958 formation. 
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conservative Fisher 42 are important in understanding the 
eventual composition of the group. It was Oldham who 
suggested that, if the Archbishop wanted to keep an eye on 
43 things, it would be possible to appoint someone . The Bishop 
of Winchester (Haigh"), despite his Manichaean attitudes, was 
seen by both Oldham and Archbishop as a natural choice. 
Bishop Bell was seen by Oldham as the "sensible alternative", 
but Fisher did not like Bell's well-establi shed reputation as 
'trouble-maker'. Oldham, like Craig, was mindful to be 
sensitive to the Archbishop's views despite criticism 
15 regarding Mervyn Haigh as ""theologically incompetent" . 
When 
Bishop Haigh proved to be too busy to serve on the 
Commission, 46 Oldham wrote a series of letters to the 
Archbishop firmly requesting an alternative bishop if Fisher 
did not want a ""pacifist Bishop" (sic) serving on the 
47 Commission . Although Oldham was content with Bell 
he wanted 
the Archbishop to relieve Bell of some of his duties. He 
became increasingly exasperated by Fisher's refusal to reduce 
Bell's work-load or offer an alternative bishop. Oldham was 
44 Victor Gollancz knew Fisher very well from his days, after the first 
world war, as a teacher at Repton under the Headship of Fisher. Gollancz's 
writings are full of barbed criticisms of both Fisher's conservatism and 
distinctly bellicose attitudes to war. See particularly Gollancz 1958, 
p. 122; or the many references in the excellent biography by Dudley Edwards 
1987. 
43 Letter from Oldham to Craig 21 October 1945, BCC/5/7/2i. 
44 Mervyn Haigh, Bishop of Winchester, was well known for his extreme 
attitude to Soviet Comunism. 45 This description of Haigh is McCaughey's, who in his capacity as 
Secretary to the Cormnission, used it in a letter to Craig on the 31 October 
1945. Letter in BCC/5/7/2i. 
46 A letter from Haigh to Craig on the 8 November 1945 details his 
engagements. See BCC/5/7/2i. 
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keen to fix up a meeting of the Commission before, or just 
after, Christmas to insure the Report was ready for the 
Council meeting in April. To Oldham the Commission was the 
top BCC priority as "unless something effective can be done 
about this, all our other activities are reduced to 
futility"'8 and couldn't understand the Archbishop's attitude. 
Oldham eventually secured Bell's membership but without the 
Archbishop's help. 
Some of the names suggested by Oldham were greeted with 
dismay by John McCaughey, employed as an assistant to Oldham 
with the rank of Assistant Departmental Officer. 49 The 
exclusion of Oxford professor Canon Mortimer "one of the most 
brilliant and accomplished minds of his generation", was seen 
as preposterous whilst the inclusion of both Violet Markham 
and the Professor of IR at Aberystwyth, Sir Alfred Ziinmern, as 
50 "scraping the barrel". McCaughey was amazed that Philip 
Mairet was omitted. For him, Mairet's "articles on the 
complexity of problems raised by the discovery of atomic 
energy have been widely acclaimed as far more penetrating than 
47 The series of letters between the Archbishop and Oldham have not 
survived, but Oldham repeats his frustration with Fisher in a letter to 
Craig dated 19 November 1945, in BCC/5/7/2i. 
48 Oldham to Craig, 19 November 1945, in BCC/5/7/2i. 
49 McCaughey, as secretary of the Commission particularly voiced his 
dismay at some names suggested in his letter to Craig on the 31 October 
1945. Letter in BCC/5/7/2i. 
50 McCaughey states "surely the Commission could find better class minds 
and more up to date than these". See letter to Craig, 31 October 1945, in 
BCC/5/7/2i. These names were not consequently included as full-commission 
members. Zimmern would, however, serve as an advisor. Women it seems were 
also not a first choice. Oldham argued (in a letter to Craig dated the 26 
October 1945) that "we might perhaps to have a woman. She (Violet Markham) 
would markedly add to the wisdom and insight of the group. " 
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anything else which has appeared. The quality of 
sensitiveness to the whole range of associations which you put 
among the first desiderata of the Commission's personnel, is 
most highly exemplified in him. "5' 
The Commission 
By the 28th November 1945 the membership of the Commission 
was finally secured but Oldham was concerned about the lack of 
a scientist within the group. 52 He thought any press release 
should therefore include a note about consultations with the 
scientific community. 53 
The Commission was fifteen-strong (two women) and a mixture 
of theologians, philosophers, lay Christians, clergy. The 
members were: Oldham as Chair, the Rev. M. E. Aubrey (General 
Secretary of the Baptist Union of Great Britain and Ireland), 
John Baillie (Professor of Divinity in the University of 
Edinburgh), Sir Robert Birley (Head of Charterhouse), Kathleen 
Bliss (editor of The Christian News-Letter), the Bishop of 
Chichester (Dr. George Bell), Newton Flew (Principal of Wesley 
House, Cambridge), Rev. Norman Goodal 154 (Chair of the BCC' s 
DIA and Secretary to the IMC) , Kenneth Grubb 
55 (London Chair 
51 Ibid. 
52 There was also no military, strategic experts or politicians. Kenneth 
Grubb (later Sir) would, however, make a name for himself as a political 
commentator. 
53 Oldham wrote to Craig explaining that the "only reason for not 
including a scientist is that we are so ignorant of the people concerned 
that a good deal of explorative work is necessary in order to make the 
right choice. " Oldham to Craig 28 November 1945, BCC/5/7/2i. 
54 Goodall would serve in the BCC Group that produced the 1959 Report 
Christians and Atomic War. 
55 Grubb also served in the BCC Groups that produced the 1959 Report 
Christians and Atomic War, and the 1961 Report The Valley of Decision. 
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of the CCIA and secretary-general of the Hispanic and Luso- 
Brazillian councils), Rev. C. E. Hudson (Canon at St. Albans), 
Donald MacKinnon (Oxford Lecturer in Philosophy, Natural and 
Comparative Religions, member of the British Committee on the 
Theory of, International Politics), Sir Walter Moberly, 
Professor A. D. Ritchie (Professor of Logic and Metaphysics at 
the University of Edinburgh), Dennis Routh (former fellow of 
All Souls, Oxford), Mary Stocks (Principal of Westfield 
College, University of London), and Rev. J. D. McCaughey, as 
secretary. 56 
The Commission appointed by the BCC ***, to consider the 
problems created by the discovery of atomic energy, f57 
discussed issues over three weekends between January and March 
1946. *58 Members were asked to provide written comments on 
memoranda, circulated drafts of chapters, and aim "to 
understand what is implied in the challenge of this event to 
"59 mankind and what answer it demands. 
In procedural terms Oldham saw it necessary for the 
Commission to be both workable and able to secure the 
representation of relevant experience and knowledge. In this 
way others were co-opted6o on the clear understanding that the 
members of the Commission had ultimate responsibility for the 
Do Information from preface to The Era of Atomic Powex, BCC 1946. 
57 BCC 1946, p. 7. 
58 4-7 January; 2-4 March; and 29 March-1 April 1946. 
59 BCC 1946, p. 7. 
60 Drafts of chapters were sent to 22 prominent non-Commission members for 
comments including the controversial poet T. S. Eliot (a friend of Bell); 
lay-theologian Prof. Dorothy Emmett; Prof. Karl Mannheim (author of 
ideology and Utopia, lecturer at the LSE) ; Prof. Michael Polanyi (chemist 
and social philosopher); and Canon Charles Raven. See BCC/5/7/2iv. 
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Report. It was, however, not clear which "constituency of 
believers' the Report should be aimed at. Oldham was not sure 
whether the Report should be addressed solely to Christians, 
or whether it should also be aimed at reaching readers outside 
the Churches. Robert Birley saw the Report as something which 
should appeal to all sorts of intelligent non-believers, and 
consequently "must produce something which would startle the 
intelligent non-Christian public, something both useful for 
the BCC and also alarming and interesting to other people. ff6l 
Dennis Routh thought the Report should be as un-contentious 
and popularist as possible and "'stimulate but not shock 
(because] it would be difficult to provoke and shock the 
"62 ordinary public without provoking and shocking the BCC . 
Eventually it was agreed that while the Report should be 
presented to the Churches, it should be written to enlist the 
interest of the intelligent public, Christian and non- 
Christian. The target in view was the ""intelligent sixth- 
former. "63 It was hoped that the Report would be thoroughly 
competent and written in a challenging way. The intention was 
to provoke and stimulate adults. 6' There was a strong 
consensus of opinion that the Commission should establish as 
close contact as possible with other countries. Archibald 
Craig (who appears in the minutes to these meetings but not in 
61 Minutes of first meeting of Corrmission, 4-7 January 1946, in 
BCC/5/7/2ii, p. l. 
62 Ibid. p. 2. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Ibid. 
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the acknowledgements of the published report) was particularly 
keen that the recently convened Church of Scotland sub- 
committee looking into 'Peace and War' should co-operate with 
the BCC Commission 65 . This was not only sensible because the 
Church of Scotland was a member Church of the British Council, 
but also because John Baillie, Professor of Divinity in the 
University of Edinburgh, was member of both Commissions. 
Whilst the Scottish sub-committee welcomed the BCC suggestions 
they were nevertheless anxious to declare their own mind 
despite being represented in Council. To the Scots it was a 
case of appreciating the Council's. greater resources and wider 
range of contacts, whilst not evading their own local 
responsibilities. The sub-committee's secretary (John Pitt- 
Watson 66) summed up their view in a letter to Craig dated 
November 1945. He writes: "the atomic bomb has created a 
situation which each church must face, not -- let us pray -- 
by itself but certainly for itself. A united Christian front 
is doubly to be wished, but, to be of real value, it must be a 
real front along which the Churches are officially aligned. "67 
The Scottish report would not be published until May 1946 
(i. e. after the BCC Report). 
Oldham 'was in close contaCt68 with John Foster Dulles' 
Commission on a Just and Durable Peace, and with the recently 
65 Craig to the secretary of the Church of Scotland sub-conunittee (John 
Pitt-Watson): 12 November 1945, BCC/5/7/2i. 
66 Pitt-Watson would go on to be joint vice-president of the BCC 1954-56. 
67 Pitt-Watson to Craig 17 November 1945. 
68 Letters were written and received at least twice a month. Plans were 
exchanged, ideas tested, conclusions broached. Every chapter of the 
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reconvened US Federal Council of Churches Commission under the 
Chair of Professor Calhoun 69 Contact was kept with 
Continental Churches through Oldham's links with the 
Provisional Committee of the WCC in Geneva. The Commission 
agreed it was appropriate to privately communicate related 
papers to Dr. Vissor It Hooft (WCC General Secretary) but felt 
it undesirable for such BCC material to be used in any 
pronouncement the Provisional Committee of the WCC may make at 
their February 1946 meeting. 
Oldham saw four main topics that needed to be dealt with. 
These topics were grouped into broad areas: first, a diagnosis 
of the atomic power situation; second, questions relating to 
the control of the Bomb (e. g. prevention of war, world 
government etc. ) ; third, questions relating to modern methods 
of warfare; and finally, questions involving a challenge to 
prevailing assumptions and values. It was this last group 
that would serve as the main area for discussion. By the 13th 
February 1946 the first drafts of the report's chapters were 
ready. Some of the comments received are particularly 
revealing. Birley notes: 
May I say, most earnestly, that we must avoid one 
mistake. We must not write our report for the older 
scientists who are worried by what has happened, and for 
the Modernists of the last generation, who found some 
kind of synthesis between Religion and Science which 
means nothing to the present generation. We should write 
'Reports in Progress' were sent to each party for comments. Correspondence 
in file BCC/5/7/2v. 
69 This Commission had already released the 1944 Report 'On the Relation 
of the Church to the War' (see above). The Federal Council had now asked 
the Conumission to consider the moral and spiritual implications of the 
atomic bomb. 
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it for the young scientist (the young men overwhelmed by 
curiosity) , for the young Communist Utopians who have a 
real faith in Science (which is doomed to be 
disappointed) , and to the young Christians who do not 
find in Modernism any solution. We must beware, of 
course, of Petainism, using Christianity to bolster up a 
bad social system, and of Wilberforeism, refusing to 
accept the truth when it is found.... Do not let us be 
afraid of the "strong protest". It will be a sign that 
we have said something worth saying. 70 
The essential optimism Birley feels in the face of the. atomic 
age is clear. The "strong protest" advocated was not for 
pacifism or any form of unilateralism. This sense comes out 
distinctly in the final draft despite a rather more radical 
alternative developed by the US Churches. 
Throughout 1945-6 a constant ebb of correspondence flowed 
between Oldham and the Federal Council of Churches of Christ 
in America. The US Commission had been quick to reconvene in 
order to supplement their 1944 Report The Relation of the 
Church to the War in the Light of the Christian Faith '71 in 
view of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. 
The 1946 US Federal Council Report 
In March 1946 the Calhoun Commission issued their statement 
Atomic Warfare and the Christian Faith: Report of the 
Commission on the Relation of the Church to the War in the 
Light of the Christian Faith Appointed by the Federal Council 
of the Churches of Christ in America 72 . This warned that "our 
70 These comments are found on a draft chapter in BCC/5/7/2ii. 
71 Federal Council of Churches 1944. 
72 Federal Council of Churches 1946. This report is referred to by Driver 
1964, p. 205; mentioned by Ormrod 1987, p. 196; and reviewed by Potter 1969, 
p. 110; Veldman 1994, p-157. 
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latest epochal triumph of science and technology may prove to 
be our last. "7 3 It asserted "'In the light of present 
knowledge, we are prepared to affirm that the policy of 
obliteration bombing as actually practised in World War II, 
culminating in the use of atomic bombs against Japan, is not 
jj, 74 defensible on Christian premises . Whilst the Calhoun 
Commission did not disavow the just war doctrine, they did 
argue that the methods of modern warfare were not 
"proportionate" or "discriminatory between combatants and non- 
combatants". As a consequence they "recognise [d] important 
new light on man's part in history (because it is now 
possible] ... that by misdirection of atomic energy, man can 
bring earthly history to a premature close. His freedom, 
"'7 5 then, is more decisive and dangerous than we had suspected 
Because nuclear fission raised the ultimate question of God's 
relationship with humanity "I ... if a premature end of history 
should come-the problem then is whether beyond the end of 
history God's justice are still a ground for hope, or whether 
the stultification of human life by a premature end is to be 
feared. "76 The conclusion that atomic warfare was "morally 
indefensible" shocked many in its certainty. The Report made 
a seminal contribution to Christian debate: it was the first 
official statement of a Christian nuclear pacifist position. 
The Commission did not reject war pe-r se but weapons of mass 
11 Federal Council of Churches 1946, p. 3. 74 Ibid. p. 11. 
75 Ibid. p. 20. 
76 Ibid. p. 23. 
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destruction, especially (but not exclusively) the atom bomb. 
On the 6th March 1946 the Federal Council's Executive 
Committee adopted one of the most controversial sections of 
its findings as a message on "The Churches and World Order'. 
The Council stated: 
In the initial use and continued production of atomic 
bombs, the US has given and is giving sanction to these 
weapons of mass annihilation. We believe that this 
policy must not be continued. our nation having first 
used the atomic bomb, has a primary duty to seek to 
reverse the trend which it began. Unless the US will 
give moral leadership and accept risks for the sake of a 
new birth of confidence, we see little hope for escape 
from the growing cri sis . 
77 
This impassioned plea for a moral international politics 
suggested: first a well-defined Christian eschatological hope 
for a this-world future; second, that the unilateral 
renunciation of atomic weapons was a legitimate and necessary 
aspect of this hope; and third, that the Churches had a role 
to play in rejecting pessimistic international theory and 
international politics. The Report became a salutary lesson 
in applied theology and ethics. 
In March 1946, within three months of the first meeting of 
the Commission, the BCC group completed its task. On Thursday 
2nd MaY713 the Council accepted the Report, authorised its 
publication as The Era of Atomic Power", and instructed its 
Executive Committee to take steps to give it wide publicity. 
77 See BCC/5/7/2v. 
78 The Council endorsed the Report through a resolution, see BCC/5/7/2ii. 79 For a comprehensive review see BCC 1973 pp. 5-8; Ormrod 1987, pp. 194-98; 
and William Johnston's "The Churches' Role in the Nuclear Debate" in Davis 
(ed. ) 1986, pp. 243-7. Driver 1964, pp. 204-5; Potter 1969, p. 111; Bailey 
1987, p. 29; and Veldman 1994, p. 157 mention the Report incidentally. Groom 
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Part II: The Era of Atomic Power 
The Oldham Report opened by outlining the Commission's 
understanding of its task. It acknowledged that, because the 
Commission was expected to report back to the Councilrs half- 
yearly meeting on April 30th, the time allocated to the 
Report's composition had been inadequate. The alternative 
option (delaying its findings until September) was not 
considered because it was known that some of the Churches 
would be considering the issues at the meetings of their 
Assemblies in the summer: 
If the report of the Commission were delayed, separate 
and isolated action would have to be taken by the 
Churches in place of action in the light of consultation 
between their representatives and of joint enquiry into a 
question of the deepest common concern. It was believed 
that there were many in the Churches, and perhaps outside 
them, who were much perplexed and would welcome such 
information and guidance as the Commission might be able 
to give them. For these reasons the Commission decided, 
in spite of the difficulties, to do its best to present 
its report in April. 80 
It began by describing the discovery of the atom as an event 
comparable to the discovery of fire and one of the great 
turning points in history. Not surprisingly (considering the 
propensity of theologians and philosophers on the Commission) 
the Report is philosophical and speculative in tone. It asks 
"What has happened? ' in the aftermath of Hiroshima. To the 
Commission the atomic bomb was the culmination of a process 
(the advancement of science) which had been going on for two 
1974, pp. 196-98 also includes a detailed report but great care has to be 
taken when considering it. Groom mixes up his review of the BCC 
publication with a later (1948) Church of England publication. 
BCC 1946, p. 7. 
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or three generations. The atom bomb, however, did not present 
people with new problems but made more acute and urgent 
problems already present: "'Our aim in this report is to 
understand what is implied in the challenge of this event to 
mankind and what answer it demands. 1181 
The atomic discovery had both good and bad potentialities. 
It confronted society with an immediate threat to the survival 
of the human race but placed at the disposal of states 
hitherto unimagined sources of power. On one hand, the Report 
acknowledged that there could be no 'adequate defence' to the 
Bomb and appreciated the logic of the US Federal Council of 
Churches: 
The atomic bomb has so increased the scale of 
destructiveness that a single stroke, or a few successive 
blows, may annihilate the industrial capacity, and 
consequently the recuperative power, of the nation 
attacked... The incentive to strike a crippling blow 
first and the possibility of doing this are incalculably 
increased, and a premium is thus placed on swift, 
ruthless aggression-The use of atomic weapons makes war 
not only more destructive and treacherous, but more 
irresponsible than ever. " 
It accepted that humanity was overshadowed by the fact that 
for the first time in history it was equipped with the power 
to "blot out in a moment of wickedness or folly an entire 
civilisation. , 83 Yet, on the other hand, the Commission saw 
in the social utility of nuclear power grounds for hope. 
Caught up in the optimism of the post-war period the 
Commission talked of a new energy source, economic recovery, 
81 Ibid. 
82 BCC 1946, abstracts from pp. 10,11, and 12. 83 Ibid. p. 12. 
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and the Allied victory. The Report looked forward to a new 
era of 'Anglo-American hegemony in which the Bomb would serve 
as a new power to promote human well-being. The Era of Atomic 
Power was concerned not so much with the impact of the Bomb on 
the Japanese, but rather in examining the 'social strains' 
created by its development within the West. The Commission 
felt that the Bomb had unleashed such feelings of despair and 
hopelessness that it threatened future birth-rates: 
The mere discovery of the atom bomb itself, even if it is 
never used, might well create such strains in our society 
as to destroy it. If human experience counts for 
anything we can only conclude that in such a state of 
insecurity most men and women would be forced back into a 
life that accepted impermanence as something inevitable, 
and would live only for the present. 84 
Fundamental to the group's thinking was the Augustinian belief 
that '"there are no Christian grounds for supposing that God 
will take back the freedom bestowed on man, or will certainly 
intervene to prevent its abuse. "85 This did not tip the 
Report into the- eschatological radicalness of the 1946 US 
report", but towards a new self-awareness: 
An event so stupendous in the physical world as the 
disclosure of the secret of the atom may well demand and 
evoke a corresponding change in the human mind. It need 
cause no surprise if men's thoughts were to begin to take 
137 a radically new direction... 
84 Ibid. p. 17. 
85 Ibid. p. 20. 
96 In December 1945 Dr. John Bennett, secretary of the Calhoun Commission, 
had wrote to Oldham suggesting that a draft of the BCC report pay increased 
attention to the necessity of eschatological thinking. The note suggested 
that, though the BCC was competent in historical study, it was paying 
insufficient attention to the ramifications of nuclear power (i. e. its 
potential to extinguish all life). Letter from Bennett to Oldham, 11 
December 1945, BCC/5/7/2v. 
87 BCC 1946, p. 20. 
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Responsible Citizenship 
The Report saw 'progress' as a Christian idea that demanded 
faith and continuing hope. Christians were asked to adopt a 
pragmatic attitude by participating in "responsible 
citizenship", and not separating spheres of Christian 
obligation (i. e. temporal from spiritual): 
To advocate withdrawal, not merely as an individual 
vocation, but as a generally right attitude to society, 
is to deny the significance of politics and to despair of 
civilisation. It is a criticism directed not simply 
against the rot in western society, but against its 
foundations. It calls in question the whole attempt to 
fuse spirituality and power in a just and human social 
order, and by so doing writes off whole tracts of history 
and experience as irrelevant to the divine purpose. 98 
The Church had a social contract to fulfil here because it was 
morally obliged to draw upon the resources of faith and ensure 
the control of scientific power. 89 The writers believed that 
it was the liberal democratic State that allowed people to 
influence, make and shape their own futures: 
... the idea of democracy, as it has been worked out in the thought and practice of the British people, of f ers 
the possibility of subjecting power to the control of 
reason and justice and is, for this reason, directly 
relevant to the problems of the atomic age. 90 
A view of secular progress alone, however, was a myth because 
democracy had made freedom and rights more than mere 
expressions of the interests of a dominant class. In liberal 
democracy power was limited by law in the interests of justice 
and this was '"the outstanding political achievement of the 
Be Ibid. p. 28. 
89 Ibid. p. 30. 
90 Ibid. p. 32. 
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West. 1191 The Church, however, should not let the State forget 
the lessons of Thrasymachus and allow "Justice to be nothing 
but the interest of the stronger. t, 92 Have the Churches the 
courage, the Report asks, to inspire some counterpart to the 
secular myth of progress rendered more profound by the insight 
of the Gospel, and more capable of tiding people through the 
nuclear era ? 93 
91 Ibid. p. 39. 
9' i. e. Plato 1941, Book I Chap. 3; c. f. Augustine's discussion (1972, Book 
XIX Chap. 21). This Platonic reference is a sure sign of the Colmnission's 
determination to escape both 'cynical' (hard-line) and God-less realism. 
It is true that Thrasymachus stands, next to the Athenian generals in 
Thucydides' History, as a figure from the ancient world most scholars would 
classify as realist. It is true also that the Oldham Report suggests 
Socrates more than Thrasymachus, for Thrasymachus would not have talked of 
responsibilities or obligations between states, and certainly not of the 
application of ideals (Christian or otherwise) to a global society. Two 
clarifications are necessary. First, during the course of his discussion 
with Socrates, Thrasymachus as Hare and Joynt (1982, pp. 24-7) point out, 
came to use the terms "just" and "unjust" more conventionally so that 
"injustice" was equated with the unbridled pursuit of self-interest. For 
Thrasymachus "the best and most perfectly unjust state" is hence the State 
most likely to be "unjustly attempting to enslave other states", or to have 
N%already enslaved them, and be holding them in subjection" (Book I Chap. 4). 
It seems logical that a State that was perfectly unjust on these terms 
would not be able to cooperate with any other in the pursuit of goals it 
was unable to attain single-handed. Most twentieth-century realists would 
not deny this inevitable overlap between the interests of states, and the 
need for relations of co-operation or 'balances of power'. Second, Hans 
Morgenthau (1946, p. 35) ascribed to Thrasymachus the view that "the 
political sphere was governed exclusively by the rules of the political art 
of which ethical evaluation was a mere ideological by-product". Morgenthau 
thereby disassociated his realism from Thrasymachus's 'sophist realism' 
(c. f. the 'Nietzschean' realism heralded by Der Derian in Der Derian [ed. ] 
1995, p. 385) because he believed that there were universal ethical demands 
but ones in 'tragic' tension with the demands of power. These ethical 
demands could not hence be made of states because states could not operate 
by them; the best they could do was to operate by the perverted reflection 
of them, namely ideology (see Hare and Joynt 1982, p. 36-7). If 
conventional realists like Morgenthau felt it necessary to distance 
themselves from Thrasymachus's foolishness then it should not diminish the 
BCC-as-realist claim but rather reinforce the many flavours realism can 
take as well as the difficulties in putting thinkers into categories. In 
other words, although there is conceptual distance between Plato's 
(Socrates, the BCC, and Morgenthau) 'soft' realism and Thrasymachus's 
"hard' Realpolitik, both are versions of realism as classically understood. 
93 BCC 1946, pp. 30-1. 
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The Commission wanted to encourage Christian groups of 
democratic fellowship to become the nuclei of a new social 
consciousness. As democracy could only become effective 
through being embodied in institutions it was a vital task to 
preserve, and foster tradition, whilst adapting to meet the 
demands of a changing society: 
It may be a special function of the Church in the present 
crisis to offer to men a creative interpretation of their 
political activities, in order that with the aid of 
Christian insight they may have a clear understanding of 
what it is that they are striving, often unconsciously, 
to embody. 94 
This was a field in which the Churches were peculiarly suited 
by their distinctive interests, purposes and inherited 
opportunities. With regards to unilateral disarmament: 
'**a nation which decided as a deliberate and declared 
act of national policy in all circumstances to renounce 
the use of the atomic bomb... would, in fact, be 
committing itself to a policy of unilateral disarmament 
which, in any conflict with a power still ready to use 
the bomb, would render all other attempts of armament 
totally useless .... The renunciation by Great Britain of the use of the bomb ... does not, of course, mean immunity for Britain from the threat of attack by the atomic 
bomb... Radical as it may seem, the policy of unilateral 
renunciation of atomic warfare can by no means be 
dismissed as absurd.... Uncompromising obedience to the 
claims of the kingdom which is not of this world may have 
95 a direct political relevance. 
The Report was concerned with the protection of imperial 
responsibilities and 'Great Power' status. It supported the 
British State (because of its social and educational 
advancement of colonial peoples) and the British Constitution 
(for its ideas of popular sovereignty and the supremacy of 
94 Ibid. p. 38. 
95 Ibid. pp. 40-1,53. 
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law) . This particular emphasis on 'power' and 'national 
interest' leads to what is characterised by Ormrod as the 
"dangerous analogy"96 -- the idea that for Britain to renounce 
the Bomb would be tantamount to renouncing Great Power status, 
"equivalent to an attempt, in the naval age, to wage naval war 
without the use of capital ships. 1,, 97 It was the political 
advantages of the atomic bomb, rather than its m ilitary 
utility, which was thus paramount in the Commission's 
thinking. In this light the Commission's position was no 
different to that of British Government thinking. 98 The 
implication being that the right to use atomic weapons was not 
rejected, but indeed reserved, for the protection of the 
State. Britain's renunciation of the Bomb, and her Great 
Power status, would be pointless because it would not bring 
immunity from the threat of attack. Unilateralism would mean 
the surrender to any power which was without British scruples. 
It would bring the end of the British way of life and the 
system of political and moral ideas embodied in the 
Commonwealth. 
To the Commission, unilateralism was both absurd and 
dangerous. This was because Western society had developed 
within, by virtue of its close interlocking system of material 
organisation and power, a special body of ideals and 
principles. For the British State, modern warfare was 
96 
Ormrod 1987, p. 198. 
97 BCC 1946, p. 41. 
98 Clark and Wheeler (1989) support this view of official British 
thinking. 
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profoundly ideological because its genius lay in a balance 
between power and ideas. It was this distinctly British 
awareness of the unity between political independence and way 
of life '*which led [Britain] to stand and fight on alone in 
1940 against apparently hopeless odds. "99 An effective world 
community was the only "reasonable hope of eliminating from 
human society the danger of atomic war and therefore of 
preserving western civilisation from destruction. " This was 
so because public opinion in the Soviet Union could not 
restrain government in the same way it could in the West: 
We must therefore be prepared for a period during which 
Russia will appear as the crucial obstacle to the 
emergence of world community and even as a menace to 
world peace. 100 
Force, consequently, was probably the best means open to 
defend a just way of life and maintain the conditions 
necessary for the growth of world community. 
Modern warfare and the Christian Conscience 
Although a minority on the Commission wanted to condemn the 
American use of the Bomb as "morally indefensible"1011 a clear 
majority felt unable to issue unqualified condemnation. 102 The 
Commissioners claimed that: first, they were not sufficiently 
in possession of the facts; and second, using the bomb had 
undoubtedly saved lives by forcing the Japanese to surrender 
earlier than they wished. Whilst the writers supported the 
99 Ibid. p. 42. 
100 Ibid. p. 46. 
101 c. f. Federal Council of Churches 1946, p. 11. 102 i. e. Stocks, Bell and MacKinnon. 
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just war limitation that condemned the use of violence in 
excess of strict military necessity, without access to the 
facts they believed such an assessment was impossible to 
ascertain. They declared that Christians could not form 
proper judgement on the use of the Bomb unless they lobbied 
Government to obtain the facts upon which a considered 
judgement could be made. Whilst the Report acknowledged that 
the Bomb involved a great extension of the practice of 
indiscriminate massacre and accepted that 'Total War' failed 
to justify the criteria of just war (i. e. they accepted that 
the end does not always justify the means), it endorsed: 
The argument that on balance the use of the atomic bomb 
saved hundreds of thousands of lives, both in the forces 
of the forces of the United Nations and in Japan itself, 
undoubtedly has weight. But it is one of peculiar 
danger, since it can be used to justify any kind of 
barbarity. 103 
Atomic warfare did not present a new ethical problem, but 
rather introduced a new quantitative element into an old 
problem. For the Report, ignoring the "carpet bombing' of 
World War Two, the problem was that until the advent of the 
atomic bomb it was possible to limit aerial attack to 
precision bombing and refrain from using weapons of mass 
destruction: 
... the decision to introduce atomic warfare... brought into operation a new weapon, the nature of which involved 
of necessity a great extension of the practice of 
indiscriminate massacre. The initiative in introducing 
these new weapons was taken by those who claimed to be 
the champions of civilisation... What we have to deplore 
is the steady deterioration of public sensitiveness to 
103 Ibid., p. 50. 
129 
the indiscriminate massacre of non-combatants ... It is 
clear insofar as war becomes 'total', in the sense that 
every means may be adopted that appears conducive to 
victory, and that the attack is directed not against 
armies but against nations by methods of mass 
destruction, the restraints in waging war which have been 
regarded by the Christian tradition as essential to a 
"just' war disappear. The question has to be asked 
afresh whether the destruction of an entire population, 
including the aged and the young, is not an act so 
absolutely wrong in itself that no Christian can assent 
to it or share in it. 104 
In suggesting that the effects of the bombing of Hiroshima 
were not worse than the obliteration bombing of German cities, 
the Report reveals three points about the Commission's 
attitude. First, the writers favoured the just war tradition. 
Second, that the BCC were ignorant of both the immediate and 
long term consequences of radiation and fallout. Finally, 
that they viewed atomic weapons as being nothing other than 
105 extremely efficient explosives. 
Responsibility for Defence 
Although loyalty to Christ was stressed as more important 
than loyalty to the State, in Augustinian fashion, Christians 
had certain responsibilities towards defence. The Report did 
very little to oppose atomic weapons. It declared opposition 
to them as an optional product of individual conscience. The 
seemingly unconditional character of the demand for peace was 
seen as no less insistent than the Christian responsibility to 
'"defend the fundamental rights and liberties of men and the 
104 Ibid., pp. 49-52. 
105 This is, of course, not so surprising considering the lack of a 
scientist on the Comnission. 
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institutions through which in our society these are affirmed, 
protected and developed. //106 Whilst the Report agreed that no 
Christian should approve of the use of nuclear weapons, it 
also stressed other 'this-world' responsibilities. It is 
because of these responsibilities (including, but not 
exclusively, the responsibility for defence) that the main 
stream of Christian thought had recognised the legitimacy of 
war for a just cause (i. e. just war): 
If there is a responsibility of the secular power, which 
Christians must acknowledge, to defend the right, if 
necessary by force of arms, this responsibility is not, 
it may be argued, and cannot be, diminished or altered by 
technical advances and the introduction of new weapons, 
even though the resulting problems may be far more 
07 acute' . 
Western democratic institutions were, in this way, a 
profoundly significant transcription of Christian insight that 
demanded active support. Here the Report comes close to a 
Manichaean 'Better Dead than Red' argument: "even the chance 
of preserving for future generations the framework of free and 
responsible political action may be preferable to a surrender 
to tyranny. """' The Commission felt the atomic question was 
thus misconceived if attention was focused on the results or 
ends of war. The true concern was to prevent war: 
From this point of view, the important fact is that no 
effective means has thus far been suggested of deterring 
a would-be aggressor except the fear of reprisals ... the 
problem with which we have to deal is, at least in 
principle, not so much the prevention of war in the old 
sense of a conflict of interests between rival nations, 
106 These rights and responsibilities are however not defined. BCC 1946, 
F. 53. 
07 BCC 1946, p. 53. 
108 Ibid. 
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as the provision of effective means of police action to 
restrain a lawless and anti-social member of the 
community of nations from seeking to attain its ends by 
violence. In that case the weapon of the atomic bomb 
ought in the future to be used for one purpose, and one 
purpose alone, to deter by the threat, and if necessary 
by the execution, of reprisals a nation which attempted 
to use it for aggressive purposes. If greatly superior 
power can be concentrated in the hands of the United 
Nations, or of a group of nations determined, and for 
that reason alone, this might be expected to act as a 
sufficient deterrent and thereby prevent the outbreak of 
war. 109 
The Report was ahead of its time in one important respect -- 
it advocated the principle of nuclear weapons being used as a 
deterrent. 110 
Pacifism and Non-Pacifism 
The Commission had no solution to the dilemma between 
pacifism and the just war. The Report believed the Church 
unable to pronounce between the two alternatives. Each 
tradition was seen as an expression of loyalty to one side of 
Christian political responsibility and the Church "must throw 
the shield of its protection and sympathy over those who make 
either choice. ""' 
109 Ibid., p. 53. 
110 'Deterrence' was defined in a later report to mean 'the prevention of 
hostile action by fear of counter-attack'. See The Church and the Bomb 
1982, p. 176. The idea of deterrence, of course, became a mainstream of 
British government nuclear policy. The development of such ideas was led 
by a small group of professional strategists, the most prominent of which 
was Rear Admiral Sir Anthony Buzzard former Chief of Naval Intelligence and 
director of Vickers-Armstrong. Buzzard exercised a powerful influence on 
both the debate in the Churches (Buzzard served on four successive BCC 
commissions 1959 Christians and Atomic War, 1961 Valley of Decision; 1963 
The British Nuclear Deterrent; and the 1973 Search for security) and in 
710, vernment. See Section Three, Chapters Six-Eight of this thesis. 
BCC 1946, p-55. 
132 
Christian pacifism was a claim of moral absolutes. It was 
seen as the instinctive conviction that Christians cannot have 
a stake in a conflict in which there was no place left for 
mercy and where the individual counted for nothing. For those 
who made -this choice, the Commission believed, the end of 
citizenship had come. 
Just war theorists or non-pacifists, conversely, were 
attempting to discharge the political responsibility which 
through God' s providence people owed to the State. For those 
who made this decision the atomic crisis was seen as the 
crowning reason why citizenship should be affirmed: 
... 
it is a serious question whether it is right for 
Christians to weaken the hands of their government by 
announcing in advance that, if hostilities take place, 
they will have no part in them. Such an attitude, if 
adopted on a large scale, might have the effect of 
encouraging an aggressor and thus of precipitating the 
catastrophe which it is hoped to avert .... If the supreme 
object of our endeavours is to save humanity from the 
appalling fate of atomic warfare, to assume the best 
means of doing so is to renounce in advance the right of 
defence might well prove to be a serious political 
miscalculation. 112 
Security considerations were too important for collective 
Christian dissent. The individual should keep objections to 
themselves and security should be the concern of the State 
apparatus alone. 
The Era of Atomic Power saw two positive thoughts emerging 
from the dilemma before it. First, the nature of the atomic 
question was an overwhelming reason for the Churches to do all 
112 Ibid., p. 56. 
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in their power to further any proposal to eliminate weapons of 
mass destruction from all states (i. e. multilateral 
disarmament). Second, the crisis was an unavoidable necessity 
that must be lived with in order to bring people closer to 
God: 
... we believe that to live with the dilemma, refusing the false peace of mind which obviousness to either 
disturbing alternative might bring, is a necessary 
discipline through which we must pass in order that the 
solution may in the providence of God in due time 
overtake us. Only through such a discipline also can we 
come to understand the dilemma of our whole society, of 
which the ambiguities of war are only one expression. 113 
It concluded by reminding readers that God had created 
humanity in order to both discover and transform. Science 
presented trials and tribulations as well as benefits. 
Because of this the Churches must confront the nature of 
science to fulfil its mission in a scientific and technical 
society. The Report noted: "the true temper and proper 
employment of a Christian is always to be working like the 
sea, and purging ignorance out of his understanding and 
exchanging notions and apprehensions imperfect for more 
perfect, and forgetting things behind to press forward. it 114 
Paraphrasing Reinhold Niebuhr (who had sat on both US Federal 
Council Commissions), the Report reminded readers that the. 
humanist movement that began with the Renaissance had a more 
profound insight into the potential of human existence, 
113 ibid., p. 57. 
114 Quotation by A. D. Lindsay, oxford political theorist and keen 
contributor to Oldham's Christian News-Letter. See p. 60 of BCC 1946 
Report. 
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individual and collective, than either Roman Catholicism or 
Protestantism. What was required was a synthesis between 
similar secular insights and the Christian world-view. In 
other words, a Christian (liberal) realism. Such a synthesis 
would allow the Churches to acknowledge with gratitude the 
powerful support brought by the scientific community to the 
defence of those human values which Christians were equally 
concerned to vindicate. In this way: 
The most immediate and urgent question raised by the 
atomic age... is whether man, as he actually is, can be 
trusted to use wisely the multiplying powers which 
science is pouring into his hands. '15 
At all times Christians must be, however, aware of the 
wholeness of living and ensure that science did not outstrip 
moral progress: "life can be redeemed not by more zealous 
striving after what ought to be, but only by finding a new 
relation to that which is. ""6 Here we see a Platonic cast of 
mind in that, for the Commission, the Bomb ultimately must be 
lived with: it could not be ignored or "disinvented' .A 
prophetic function on behalf of the Church was therefore 
unnecessary and unwarranted. 
Individual Church's Responses 
The May 1946 Council meeting was an eventful one. it 
resolved to send The Era of Atomic Power to all its member 
Churches, and other associated bodies, and invite official 
115 BCC 1946, p. 63. 
116 Ibid., p. 65. 
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consideration. Oldham sent copies to each member Church as 
well as to the US Federal Council of Churches, the National 
Council of Churches in New Zealand, the National Christian 
Council of South Africa, the Australian Section of the WCC, 
the Canadian Committee for the World Council, and the 
equivalent national councils in Norway, Sweden, Finland, 
Denmark, France, Switzerland, Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy, 
117 Czechoslovakia, Greece, Bulgaria, Austria . 
By October 1946 individual Churches had responded to 
Oldham's Report. The Quakers were amongst the first to 
respond. A short reply was first published in the 2nd August 
1946 copy of The Eriend"". The Historic Peace Church did not 
believe the Report was radical enough. They asked "'Is the 
Christian Church really faced with an 'Irresolvable dilemma'? " 
To the Quakers, God existed in every situation and the BCC had 
over-emphasised the negative aspects of preventing war. For 
them there was a clear constructive option to solving the 
nuclear problem: 
The true peacemaker should advocate the destruction of 
all atomic bombs now, and the discontinuance of 
experiments and processes for producing them, rather than 
seek to retain them for possible use on future 
occasions .... The 
impression left on our minds after 
studying the Report is that the complexities of politics 
have been allowed to cloud moral and spiritual issues. '19 
117 Letters of introduction and replies in BCC/5/7/2v. 
11B A longer version of the Quaker reply was published the 15 November 
edition of The Friend. This version was later published in pamphlet form 
as The Era of Atomic Power., Reply to the British Council of Churches from 
the Society of Friends 1946. Criticism is taken from this pamphlet. 
119 Quakers' Reply 1946, pp. 2-3. 
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At the very least the BCC should have followed the example of 
the US Federal Council and expressed penitence for the Allied 
use of the Bomb. The Quakers called on the BCC not to be so 
dismissive of, but face squarely, the pacifist option. 
To develop this last theme the Quakers proposed a 
conference between the Commission and a equivalent amount of 
Friends to discuss and face the task together. They believed 
"... Christ is calling His church to renounce war 
altogether. 11120 The Friends wanted to publish their reply to 
the Era of Atomic Power in pamphlet form but were prepared to 
delay publication until the BCC had held a corporate 
121 examination of the subject. The Quakers were disappointed 
that the BCC delayed their examination to the Spring of 1947 
and dismissed their request for a bilateral conference. They 
thus went ahead and published their reply in pamphlet form in 
November 1946. 
The Baptist Union of Great Britain and Ireland, however, 
commended the BCC for their "sound thought and fearless 
judgement" and thought it of first importance for the BCC to 
produce a positive statement on the constructive purposes to 
which nuclear energy could be applied. 122 The Presbyterian 
Church in Ireland was more critical, they found the Report 
"too deep and too difficult to be of great practical use to 
the average man. Yet it is practical guidance that is of 
'" Letter dated 18 September 1946, BCC/5/7/2i. 
121 The series of letters between Oldham and the Quakers, dated the 20 
September; 11 October; 17 October; 18 October 1946 is in BCC/5/7/2i. 
122 Baptist statement dated 2 may 1947, BCC/5/7/2/iv. 
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vital and immediate importance, if disaster is to be 
averted. if 12 3 
The Church and the Atom 
The Church of England took their reply to the BCC seriously 
and aimed to produce the 'other worldly wordiness' which 
had 
been called for by the Oldham Commission. 124 This reply-was in 
the form of a Report of a Commission appointed by the 
Archbishops of Canterbury (Fisher) and York (Garbett) at the 
request of the Church Assembly and under the chair of the Dean 
125 
of Winchester (Selwyn) . The Commission was asked 
to look 
into the wider moral and theological aspects of atomic war. 
The Report was completed in 1948 and entitled The Church and 
the Atom. 12'5 It is an important contribution to the debate 
because it came at a time when the Cold War was intensifying 
123 Presbyterian Church in Ireland reply, n. d. in BCC/5/7/2iv. 
124 i. e. a position that ignores neither Christianity's spiritual and moral 
resources, nor the worldly events which challenge them. See Elford 1985, 
FR. 178 and 180. 
The Enabling Act of 1919 set up this National Assembly (always called 
the Church Assembly) as the successor to the Representative Church Council. 
It had three Houses (Bishops, Clergy and Laity). In 1969 the Synodical 
Government Measure reconstituted the Church Assembly into the present-day 
General Synod. See Peter Cornwell's "The Church of England and the State: 
Changing Constitutional Links in Historical Perspective" Moyser (ed. ), 1985, 
pp. 33-54; Hastings 1987, pp. 252-3; Kent 1992, p. 26. 
126 The Church and the Atom: A Study of the Moral and Theological Aspects 
of Peace and War. Church Assembly, 1948. Wight 1949; Thrall 1972; 
MacKinnon 1968a; Groom 1974; Elford 1985; and Ormrod 1987 offer reviews. 
Martin Wight's review for International Affairs is interesting because it 
reinforces the extent to which ecclesiastical thinking was being given a 
hearing in contemporary IR circles. Donald MacKinnon's "An Approach to the 
Moral and Spiritual Problems of the Nuclear Age" is a re-print of a BBC 
Third Programme commentary given in 1948. Elford's essay "The Church and 
Nuclear Defence Policy- is the most detailed and covers the Report's 
acceptance debate in the Church Assembly where he notes opinions were 
evenly divided. Although Groom (1974, pp. 196-98) is also detailed care has 
to be taken when considering it for Groom wrongly suggests that this Church 
of England publication is in fact a BCC publication. 
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and confirmed the basic drift of official British Church 
thinking. 
For the Church of England the problem raised by the Bomb 
was not so much a matter of its effects, but more to do with 
who possesses its power: '"... the Commission believes that the 
principal challenge confronting the civilisation of our day 
arises from the rapid growth and concentration of political 
and technological power in the hands of despotic 
oligarchies. ,, 127 Because of this they felt the use of atomic 
bombs must be judged, in conjunction with any other act of 
mass-destruction, by the imposition of prior limitation of its 
aims. In this way "'... the properties of the atomic bomb are 
such as to expose it to the same objections as poison gas and 
bacteriological weapons. "128 Whilst the Commission hesitated 
in defending the use of the Bomb to achieve objectives in 
inhabited cities, if that objective could not be attained in 
any other way, "... there is no objection on other grounds than 
of humanity.... in such circumstances the suffering and death 
caused will not be needless. But in most imaginable 
situations the charge of inhumanity would lie. It129 The Bomb, 
therefore, was not qualitatively different to any other 
weapon. As Groom points oUt130, such a doctrine was dangerous 
because a subjective evaluation of such a situation in the 
'fog of war' was not likely to err on the side of caution. 
. 11 Church Assembly 1948, p. 110. 
128 Ibid., p. 111. 
129 Ibid., p. 45. 
130 Groom 1974, p. 197. 
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This approach was as likely to start a series of reprisals or 
escalation. Nevertheless, the Commission did uphold the just 
wa. r principles of discrimination and limitation. 
The Report argued that the object of bombing Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki was, not to destroy, but to administer a 
%psychological shock' that would force the end of hostilities. 
The political importance of the weapon was stressed in the 
same way the Government, followed by the BCC, had justified 
the decision to manufacture the Bomb. The Commission 
generally supported, and logically developed the BCC line, 
declaring that "'today the possession of atomic weapons is 
generally necessary for national self-preservation, (and] a 
government which is responsible for the safety of the 
community committed to its charge, is entitled to manufacture 
them and hold them in readiness. "131 
The Report ended on an optimistic note when it asked 
Christians to always bear in mind that the problem of peace 
and preventing war was a spiritual, not political, task. The 
consequence of this was that Christians had a duty "... which 
rests upon the Church and individual Christians alike, of 
bringing the illumination of the Gospel, and the Christian 
insight into natural law, to the quest for policies which may 
alleviate, in accordance with reason and justice, the evils 
131 Church Assembly 1948, p. 111. 
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that covetousness and the pursuit of false aims have 
caused. it132 
Oldham saw the Church and Atom as a good piece of work. 133 
For him the Church of England developed themes the BCC should 
have developed. Yet the Church and Atom had not been any more 
successful than the BCC in overcoming the fundamental division 
between pacifist and just war thinking. It was sympathetic to 
the BCCrs attempt to avoid prophecy. For Oldham the Church of 
England had succeeded in carrying forward a dialectic: "" I 
think that with the main criticism of our Report,, that we 
treated the dilemma as irresolvable, I am unable to agree. It 
is all very well to say that the human mind desires serenity. 
It certainly does, but in some situations it can't have it, 
and for myself I think that we have just to accept the fact 
that in the present state of the world there is no clear way 
Out. "134 Both Reports covered such wide ground, and the issues 
dealt with so involved and inter-related that they proved not 
easy to discuss in public. Oldham regarded the recently 
released Lillenthal Report, and the Baruch 135 proposals based 
on it, as '"an act of statesmanship of the highest order which 
136" is one of the bright spots in the post-war situation. He 
132 Ibid., p. 112-113. 
133 See letter from Oldham to the new BCC General Secretary, David Say, 
23rd April 1948, BCC/5/7/2i. 
134 Letter from Oldham to Say, 23 April 1948, BCC/5/7/2i. 
135 The first official Western approach to disarmament and arms control. 
The main thrust of the Baruch proposals were to keep atomic bombs out of 
the hands of sovereign states by placing them under the supervision of a 
supranational body. For detail see Noel-Baker 1958; Mandelbaum 1979, pp. 23- 
33; Groom 1974, pp. 166-68. 
136 Letter from Oldham to Say, 23 April 1948, BCC/5/7/2i. 
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was certain that the problem caused by the dilemma had "'ceased 
to be one of the control of atomic energy and has become 
absorbed into the larger problem of the relation of Russia and 
the West. , 137 
Towards the end of 1948, Oldham thought the time had come 
for his Commission to be disbanded. He thought the atomic 
debate had reached a stage at which things must, at least for 
the present, be allowed to rest. At the November 1948 meeting 
of the BCC's Executive Committee an assessment of BCC member 
Churches replies to the Era of Atomic Power was set before the 
meeting, thereafter the Oldham Commission was formally 
disbanded. 
Conclusion 
The extent to which political crisis had shifted the 
essential optimism behind ecumenical integration into 
pessimism was particularly apparent in the orthodoxy of the 
Oldham Commission's exploration, and comment on, the atom 
bomb. Archbishop Fisher's anti-pacifist hand was decisive in 
the forming of the Commission and Oldham saw no need to move 
the Commission in a qualitatively different direction. Oldham 
believed it was possible to correlate theology with the best 
available social analysis. Yet by nature he was a observer of 
ruleS139 content with the rewards of a 'club diplomacy' 139 , and 
137 Ibid. 
138 Oldham admits this in a letter to Say dated 26 October 1948, 
BCC/5/7/2i. 
139 Kent 1992, p. 189. 
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not in favour of Christian social prophecy (A la Bell). To 
Oldham being 'realistic' meant accepting that war was waged 
out of 'necessity' and acknowledging that the Churches' 
function was to respond to the situation as it appeared. 
Talking about what 'is' and not speculating or advocating 
action that 'ought to be' was his intention. 
The Commission that produced The E-ra of Atomic Power 
subscribed to a confrontational view of international 
relations. The authors' were prepared to "live with the 
atomic dilemma", were against attempts to unilaterally disarm, 
and concerned themselves with protecting Britain's 'Great 
Power' status. The result was a strongly anti-pacifist report 
that supported the idea that Britain should retain the Bomb as 
a legitimate just war deterrent. This approach, however, was 
by no means original and mirrored official British State 
policy. 
The Report's understanding of the appropriate Christian 
response rested on an understanding of 'realistic faith' 
(realism) coupled with 'responsible citizenship' (faith in the 
liberal democratic process). To the Commission there was no 
novel ethical or spiritual implication inherent in atomic 
power and their approach was a via media between a particular 
moral and political responsibility. They were concerned more 
with the ends (i. e. the preservation of international order) 
rather than the means with which Western security concerns 
were articulated. The basic presuppositions of the 
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Commission, particularly their decision not to see any 
qualitative differences in the issues raised by the Bomb, was 
understood as very Augustinian. The Commission was content to 
turn to 'middle axioms' and pay attention to the ends rather 
than the means of policy. This philosophy rested squarely on 
the categorical imperative that the British State was an 
acceptable holder of the nuclear means and hence a just, 
trust-worthy, or legitimate authority. This faith in Western 
democracy resulted in a refusal to condemn the Bomb's use, or 
indeed, its continued retention and development. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: 
THE CHURCHES AND THE HYDROGEN BOMB 1950-57 
Introduction 
From the 22nd August to September 4th 1948 Church 
leaders from around the world met in Amsterdam, under the 
auspices of the First Assembly of the World Council of 
Churches, to try to develop a solution to the dilemma posed 
by atomic weapons. No definitive answer could be given to 
the question, 'Could War Still be Just in the Atomic Age? ', 
but it was agreed that "the Churches must continue to hold 
within their full fellowship" not only those split between 
Christian pacifist and just wax arguments, but also embrace 
"those who hold that, even though entering a war may be a 
Christian's duty in particular circumstances, modern 
warfare, with its mass destruction, can never be an act of 
justice. "' This so-called "Nuclear Pacifist Position' of 
Amsterdam, first enunciated by the US Federal Council of 
Churche S2 in 1946, would come to dominate Church discussions 
in the years to come. Christian attempts to limit war was 
thus divided three ways. It was split between those who 
thought war was not morally permissible in any circumstance 
Review in Potter 1969, p. 113. 
c. f. Chapter Four of this thesis. 
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(pacifists), those who thought war, even war fought with 
nuclear weapons, was unavoidable in some circumstances (just 
wa. r), and finally those who thought war fought with nuclear 
weapons could never be morally acceptable, yet nevertheless 
accepted the need to use violence in certain situations if 
it was waged without the use of nuclear weapons (nuclear 
pacifist). President Truman's January 1950 announcement 
that the USA was working on developing a hydrogen 
(thermonuclear) or super-bomb 3 served to exacerbate these 
divisions and, in particular, spread and develop the 
'nuclear pacifist' view throughout Christianity. In the 
light of such developments, this chapter details: first, the 
development of Christian thinking towards the developing 
debate; and second, attitudes to the testing of a British 
hydrogen bomb in 1954. 
Part I: The Debate Develops 
The Executive Committee of the WCC meeting at Bosey, near 
Geneva, on the 21-23 February 1950, re-affirmed the 
necessity to declare in favour of nuclear pacifism by 
unanimously condemning: "'The hydrogen bomb (as) the latest 
and most terrible step in the crescendo of warfare which has 
changed war from a fight between men and nations to a mass 
murder of human life .... All this is a perversion; it is 
against the moral order by which man is bound; it is sin 
ý Mandelbaum 1979; Groom 1974. See The Church of England's 1982 
Report, The Church and the Bomb, for a sophisticated discussion of the 
processes and differences between nuclear fission (i. e. the A-bomb) and 
thermonuclear fusion (i. e. the H-bomb) pp. 1-18. 
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against God. "4 In July the WCCI s Central Committee met in 
session in Toronto, Canada and called for an international 
5 ban on all methods of modern warfare. 
The British Council of Churches responded to the WCC 
Executive Committee statement at its April 20 1950 meeting 
in Cardiff. While agreeing with the sentiments expressed by 
the WCC the Council felt unable to go beyond urging 
"governments to enter into negotiations once again for the 
control of atomic energyit6 in war-like situations. Finding 
the right policy towards the hydrogen bomb, nevertheless, 
produced anxious debate in BCC circles. Yet their seven- 
point policy for joint action in international affairs still 
suggested that that the meaningful debate for the BCC was 
still one between just war and pacifist approaches. Point 
III called on all British Christians: 
To support H. M. 
their efforts to 
aggression and 
recognised that 
conviction, cam 
7 action). 
Government and the United Nations in 
uphold the Law of Nations, to resist 
to succour its victims. (It is 
some, from a no less Christian 
aot support resistance by military 
Whilst BCC constituent Churches had already passed 
resolutions and issued their own statements and studies on 
the morality of war in the nuclear age8, official Church 
4 Statements on Nuclear Weapons (Geneva: WCC, 1958), p. l. 
5 Ibid. 
6 The Churches and the Hydrogen Bomb (London: BCC n. d. but 1955), p. 2. 
7 The Churches and the Hydrogen Bomb, p. l. 
8 For example Atomic Energy: Report of the Sub-Committee of the 
Standing Committee of the Church of Ireland (December 1946); Report of 
Sub-Committee set up by the General Purpose Committee of the 
Congregational Union of England and Wales and the British Council of 
Churches Report on the Era of Atomic Power (January 1947); and the 
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interest in Britain dramatically increased in 1954. This 
was for two main reasons: first, on the 5th April 1954 the 
Conservative government announced it was planning to develop 
its own independent H-bomb9; second, also in April the 
effects of radiation poisoning caused by the USA's Pacific 
H-bomb test fall-out on a Japanese fishing boat, Lucky 
Dragon, was revealed. 'o 
After the Government announced that it was developing a 
British hydrogen bomb a great number of people began to look 
to the Churches to say something on the spiritual 
implications of this dramatic development. " Most BCC 
members were aware that the Council had appointed the Oldham 
Commission in 1946, but they also appreciated in the manner 
of the 1950 WCC/BCC statements, that British Christians were 
called upon to respond afresh to the new stage in scientific 
military development heralded by thermonuclear weapons. 
There seemed to be at least two factors in the contemporary 
situation which made it desirable that consideration should 
be given to the subject or some kind of new statement made. 
First, there seemed to be new and real danger, not only from 
the possible use of the H-bomb, but also from experiments 
with them for scientific purposes. If an unrestricted 
previously discussed Church of England study Church and the Atom 
(February 1948). 
9 The decision was actually not clearly enunciated until the 1955 
Statement on Defence White Paper. 
10 Cox 1981, pp. 39-42. 
11 BCC General Secretary David Say began to receive a steady flow of 
correspondence from members of BCC constituent Churches demanding 
action. BCC Box 12. 
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atomic arms race continued it was feared that incalculable 
forces of destruction would be unleashed, even without a 
deliberate act of war. Second, many Christians were looking 
instinctively to the Churches for spiritual comfort, 
reassurance, and some moral lead in an attempt to break the 
intellectual dead-lock. As a consequence there were fresh 
calls for the BCC to appoint another special commission to 
investigate the moral and spiritual issues raised by recent 
experiments in the hydrogen bomb. 12 Kenneth Grubb as Chair 
of the BCC's International Department, however thought the 
Council should respond by simply adopting some kind of 
statement at the 27 April 1954 Council meeting. 13 
Grubb argued that the BCC should take a lead f rom the 
resolutions recently sponsored by the United Nations 
Association" calling on the leaders of the "Great Powers' 
to proceed with an immediate halt in the armaments race and 
to proceed with world disarmament. He favoured a 
12 For example, the Rev. Dr. N. Davidson (Glasgow Cathedral) conveys 
this impression to Say. See letter dated 8 April 1954 in BCC Box 12. 
13 Grubb to Say 27 April 1954, BCC Box 12. 
14 From June 1946 the West had adhered to the same disarmament 
objectives expressed through the Baruch Plan proposals. These 
objectives were reiterated in the Anglo-French Memorandum of 1954. Here 
a Draft Disarmament Treaty was prepared by the UN Disarmament Commission 
and submitted by it to the UN Security Council, to the UN General 
Assembly, and to a World Disarmament Conference in Geneva. This treaty 
advocated (a) the total prohibition of the use and manufacture of 
nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction of every type, together 
with the conversion of existing stocks of nuclear weapons for peaceful 
purposes; and (b) major reductions in all armed forces and conventional 
armaments. In the Disarmament Sub-Committee of the UN (i. e. Britain, 
the US, the Soviet Union, France, and Canada) Western delegates pressed 
these objectives until May 1955. The Soviets, however, professed great 
scepticism about the sincerity of the West in proposing the total 
abolition of nuclear weapons including existing stocks. The 
contemporary Labour MP and idealist scholar, Phillip 
Noel-Baker (1958) provides a comprehensive survey of these proposals. 
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particularly British lead in these disarmament talks 
supported by the British Churches. Indeed, Grubb wanted the 
specific issues raised by the H-bomb subject through the 
statements adopted by the WCC in February 1950, and the BCC 
in April 1950, to be acted on in a distinctive fashion. He 
suggested the Council could do this with a non-controversial 
approach that both endorsed the resolutions of the United 
Nations Association, and by reiterating the BCC's 
"conviction that this tragic sickness of the World will not 
be permanently cured by the devoted labours and good will of 
peace-loving statesmen alone. [Because] it has its roots in 
the sinful nature and in the selfishness of all men and 
nations. It can only be lastingly healed by the removal of 
the means of war and of the political, economic and 
spiritual causes of war, and this involves the return of men 
to God, Judge of the Nations, ever ready to forgive and 
renew those who seek His will in humility and truth. "'5 At 
the April Council meeting the following statement was 
henceforth adopted: 
The consciences of men and women have been stirred and 
shocked by the terrible possibilities revealed by the 
Hydrogen Bomb experiments, which re-inforce the urgent 
need for a process of general disarmament. In this 
human situation, the Churches have a triple task; to 
call men to repentance; to assure men that God reigns 
supreme whatever wickedness is planned or wrought; and 
to witness in daily living to the peace given by God's 
spirit which nothing can remove or destroy. As a matter 
of immediate challenge, the Council calls upon all 
Christian people to pray earnestly for the Conference 
now in session in Geneva, that under the providence of 
God, it may relieve the present tensions, secure just 
15 Grubb to Say 27 April 1954, BCC Box 12. 
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settlements and so open the way to the coming of peace 
for all nations. "3 
The H-bomb Debate Begins 
This orthodox policy towards the H-bomb from the BCC was 
not surprising considering the implicitly pro-hydrogen bomb 
attitudes aired by significant figures within the British 
Christian Establishment. The most important of these was 
expressed by the Anglican hierarchy at the Convocation of 
Canterbury, 
, meeting 
at Church House Westminster. On May 
llth 1954 the Bishop of Birmingham (Wilson) introduced a 
resolution 17 to the Assembly seconded by the Dean of 
Winchester (Selwyn'8) This expressed the view that the 
existence of the hydrogen bomb was a grievous enlargement of 
the evil inherent in war but only called on politicians to 
limit and control armaments and encourage the return of 
mutual confidence. Bishop Wilson argued that as Convocation 
was one of the most authoritative voices in the Church, its 
silence over the H-bomb suggested that the Church of England 
was so engrossed with domestic affairs that it had no mind 
on the weightier matters of ""national righteousness and 
international peace. " Because the H-bomb now made it 
possible, for the first time, to destroy all human life the 
16 The Churches and the Hydrogen Bomb, pp. 3-4. 
17 The Convocation of Canterbury (established 1852) is the most 
important of the two Synods (the other being York established in 1851) 
in the Church of England. Resolutions were introduced to the 'joint 
Synod' by two speakers and then referred to the 'Lower House' (House of 
Laity) and 'Upper House' (House of Bishops) for consideration. See 
Moyser (ed. ) 1985 for history and detail. 18 Dr. Selwyn was Chair of the 1948 Church of England Commission which 
produced The Church and the Atom. 
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Church could not simply avoid the debate. It was for the 
Bishop theologically true that because the whole of this 
world was in statu co-rruptionis, Christians could not escape 
the dilemma of having to choose between the lesser of two 
evils (i. e. seeking a constructive Christian policy towards 
the Bomb). The Dean of Winchester supported these just war 
sentiments by declaring unilateral disarmament as neither 
practicable, nor could the Christian Church ever accepted 
such a solution. The choice was simple: "The issue should 
be dealt with at a deeper level -- did they [the Dean asked 
the Church] regard death as the worst of all evils and would 
they not prefer to live and die under freedom than live 
under slavery? "19 
Most of the Anglican hierarchy present felt able to 
subscribe to such Augustinian reasoning. Canon Lindsey 
Dewar 20 (St. Albans) , for example, argued that circumstances 
might arise in which failure to use the Bomb might result in 
people having to live under a regime where suffering would 
be greater than any inflicted by weapons. The Bishop of 
Winchester (Haigh) agreed: "It might be better to perish 
than submit to the parody of civilisation which seems to be 
the alternative presented from the other side of the Iron 
"21 Curtain The Bishop of Southwell (Barry) thought that 
the H-bomb raised no new question, and the Bishop of Derby 
19 The Times 12 May 1954. 
20 A 1948 Church of England Commission member. 21 The Times 12 May 1954. 
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(Rawlinson) compared it to a hand-grenade. Even these 
sentiments, however, did not go far enough for some. An 
amendment demanding the dropping of the clause calling on 
politicians to seek a reduction in armaments was moved by 
the Dean of Chichester (Duncan-Jone S22 ) and supported by the 
Provost of Portsmouth (Goff). The Dean thought that 
armaments should not be regarded as a cause of war but 
rather as an indication of a dangerous situation. The 
Church, consequently, should steer clear of 'political' 
entanglements and it was not the business of Convocation to 
call on politicians to do anything in particular. 
There were, however, contrary voices raised. The 
pacifist Archdeacon of Stoke (Harthil 123) moved an amendment 
declaring that the use of the Bomb would be a sin, and 
called on Christians not to co-operate either in its 
manufacture or use "'thereby showing that the Christian 
faith, unlike Marxian Communism, regards moral law as 
absolute and not relative to the needs of the State. "24 
Harthill asserted that 'evil' lay not in the risk of being 
destroyed by the Bomb, but in that Christians should 
participate in exterminating others and thereby 
irretrievably "blacken their souls". Rather, it was 
preferable to live under even a Stalinist regime than be 
party to dropping the H-bomb. The Bishop of Exeter 
22 Duncan-Jones also served on the 1948 Church of England Commission. 23 A 1948 Commission server, but unlike the above, Harthill was 
responsible for the 'minority pacifist note' carried at the end of The 
Church and the Atom 1948, pp. 114-18. 
24 The Times 13 may 1954. 
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(Mortimer), one of the Church of England's more respected 
theologians also argued that he could not condone the H-bomb 
and would have to advise his congregation to follow his 
lead: 
It would be immoral and unchristian if Britain were to 
use the hydrogen bomb, either offensively or even in 
retaliation after attack. The bomb is a weapon of 
indiscriminate destruction, and those who used it would 
put themselves on a level with those who, in the days 
of Old Testament history, massacred their enemies and 
exterminated men, women and children, regarding 
themselves as doing the will of God. The hydrogen bomb 
is destructive of God's natural creation. It can have 
no conceivable moral warrant, and it would be directed 
25 against the helpless . 
Nonetheless Geoffrey Fisher, Archbishop of Canterbury and 
President of Convocation, summed up the mood within the 
Church of England by declaring the Anglican role as simply 
to present 'the Christian point of view'. Christians should 
not be afraid to face human sin whatever the consequences 
may be. For Fisher this meant that the Church "could not 
become a negotiating party in the politics of the matter, 
nor could it identify itself (except in extreme cases) with 
any particular solution to the problem. "26 
The Re-assertion of 'Middle Axioms' 
The 1954 Church of England Convocation passed the 
resolution stating that the hydrogen bomb enlarged the evil 
inherent in war, yet rejected both amendments. The dominant 
25 Driver 1964, p. 198. 
26 Fisher became well known for reiterating this idea of a "Christian 
point of view". For example in December 1955 the Archbishop told the 
Royal United Services Institution that over the past ten years the 
Church had approved of most steps Government had taken. See Driver 
1964, p. 198. 
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position was still that the end justifies the means. New 
bombs could not be outlawed merely by virtue of their 
destructive potential. In essence the Church of England 
felt that what was important was to trust Government 
intention. To bomb a city for strategic purposes was far 
less repugnant than for Government (or anyone else for that 
matter) to kill an individual in cold blood without reason. 
In terms of this chapter the significance of this was, as 
Groom notes, that "the Church of England did not -- could 
not -- establish the line between what was permissible in 
certain circumstance, and what was not permissible. Ir27 
Other British Christian leaders strengthened 
Convocation's adoption of just war reasoning. In a June 
1954 sermon at St. Paul's Cathedral, the Archdeacon of 
London, O. H. Gibbs-Smith, reiterated the argument between 
Christian pacifism and just war by stating that the New 
Testament did not condone the pacifism "which would suffer 
the blotting out of civilisation or the enslavement of whole 
countries .,, 
28 For Gibbs-Smith not only was pacifism a 
heresy of perfectionism in a world that had not achieved 
perfectionism, but the existence of unconventional weapons 
was an enormous deterrent against armed aggression. Rather, 
the "'horrors of the atom" were a "mighty force" on the side 
of peace and it was "wrong-headed" to deplore the existence 
of the H-bomb or to be embarrassed by their possession. The 
27 Groom 1974, p. 198. 
2B Sermon reported in The Times 7 June 1954. 
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Archdeacon took refuge in the BCC Oldham, and the 1948 
Church of England Reports' theme of the Bomb entailing 
certain 'responsibilities' In particular the holding of 
these weapons constituted the greatest challenge that had 
ever faced the Western world -- the trusteeship of atomic 
bombs for the sake of all humanity. Although every effort 
must be made for the outlawing of all weapons of mass 
destruction, as soon as the international situation made 
this possible, "there was nothing to be said for unilateral 
disarmament or unilateral banning of any class of weapon; 
but gradual world disarmament by mutual agreement was 
clearly part of the new morality for which we must 
strive. it29 Traditional techniques of diplomacy should be 
overhauled and "'the new science 30 of International 
Relations" studied. Gibbs-Smith concluded that although all 
states should eventually move towards the limitation of 
national sovereignty and the ultimate creation of a world 
State, it should never be forgotten that it was people 
the '"unprincipled and the unconsecrated" in particular 
who were dangerous not bombs. 
Such an example of shoring up the Establishment position 
was applauded by The Times. The Leader of 7th June 1954 
29 Ibid. 
30 By 1954 the more notable signposts in the development of the 
discipline (from both sides of the Atlantic) included: Reinhold 
Niebuhr's Moral Man and Xmmoral Society (lst ed. 1932); E. H. Carr's 
Twenty Years Crisis (1939) ; Martin Wight's Power Politics (1945) ; Hans 
Morgenthau's Politics Among Nations (1st ed. 1948); John Herz's 
Political Realism and Political Xdealism (1951); George F. Kennan's 
American Diplomacy (1952); and Herbert Butterfield's Christianity, 
Diplomacy, and War (1953). 
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argued that the Christian doctrine of war could only apply 
to unconventional weapons, and that the Archdeacon had made 
two simple but crucial points. First, that the overwhelming 
authority of Christian opinion throughout the ages had been 
just war. Second, although Christians cannot avoid the 
consequences of using atomic weapons, they equally could not 
escape the consequences of using thermonuclear devices if 
necessary. Pacifism in the Church was thus only an 
"eccentric minority" that rested less on the literal 
interpretation of Scripture than on the perfectionist view 
that human nature, however depraved, will always respond to 
the power of defence-less charity. The Times believed that 
the New Testament did not authorise such views: "to try to 
support it by Christ's refusal to lead his disciples to the 
establishment of an earthly kingdom is to ignore the 
fundamental distinction between the role of the Church and 
that of the State which Christian thought has always 
emphasised. ', 31 This, of course, was the Augustinian crux of 
the matter. To The Times, as to many others, the Church was 
a institution concerned with "winning and healing souls. ' 
Physical force -- politics -- by its very nature was 
unfitted to these ends. The State: 
... exists for the purpose of maintaining just order in human affairs, or the nearest approach to such an order 
as human imperfection makes possible. It is entitled 
and obliged to use physical force, because human sin 
makes physical force essential to the attainment of its 
ends. The functions of these two institutions [Church 
and State] are complementary but separate. Their 
31 The Times 7 June 1954. 
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separation, which is unaffected by people belonging to 
both simultaneously, is essential to Christian 
teaching. 32 
The Times argued that physical force should not be used for 
either spiritual or aggressive ends, but allowed that it may 
be a Christian duty to use it for defensive and temporal 
purposes "'so long as no more of it is employed than... 
strictly necessary. fi, 33 The writer seemed unaware that his 
just war position was dangerously close to suggesting the 
end justified the means used whilst ignoring the principal 
of proportionality, despite his avowed intentions: 
Here the point to be emphasised is that the fundamental 
distinctions are of kind and of intention rather than 
of degree. The new bombs cannot be outlawed merely by 
virtue of their devastating power. The shooting of one 
man in cold blood, as part of a campaign of terror, is 
far more repugnant to the Christian mind, both in 
respect of its corrupting effect and of the attitude to 
human life which it reflects than the destruction of a 
city for strategic purposes. 34 
For The Times what was needed was that Christians not shrink 
f rom their 'responsibilities'. Such responsibilities 
started from the premises as laid out by Augustine and 
followed by the Archdeacon in his sermon: "it is a task 
which calls for patience and realism as well as faith. " 
Such sentiments serve well to illustrate the gulf between 
conflicting definitions of the Gospel and interpretations of 
Christian responsibility. For conservatives the response to 
nuclear weapons was dictated, even ordained, by a 
necessarily close partnership between Church and State 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid. 
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within the civitas terrena. Although The Times presented 
the functions of the Church and State as complementary, they 
were also separated and distinct in true pluralist fashion. 
The State being temporal, the Church spiritual. This view 
saw the State as existing 'to maintain a just order' and 
defined the Church's natural role to legitimise such 
patterns of 'justice'. In effect such distinctions between 
Church and State appear based on a conservative theology 
that rested on particular presuppositions of Christian 
responsibility. The 'objective reality' and 'realism' 
spoken of were simply distinctive (subjective) 'ideological' 
constructions. To dissenters such as the WCC, with their 
different (i. e. global as opposed to national) 
constituencies, Christian social life was a totality not to 
be compartmentalised. 
The WCC and Bishop Bell 
Although the BCC had expressed its concern with its April 
1954 statement it was left to the World Council of Churches 
Second Assembly held at Evanston, Illinois, in August 1954 
to challenge the idea of a nuclear just war with its theme 
35 'Christ, the Hope of the World' . 
": ) See extracts from the Report of Section 4 on The Struggle for World 
Community at the Second Assembly of the WCC; and Statements on Nuclear 
Weapons, pp. 2-4 WCC 1958. Also The Churches and the Hydrogen Bomb, 
pp. 4-6. Discussed by Vincent 1962, p. 88; and Ormrod 1987, p. 199. 
Hastings argues (1987, p. 459) that the WCC at Evanston succumbed to a 
"partisan note of Cold War anti-communism". This sentiment, however, is 
not self-evident in these anti-nuclear declarations. 
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This lengthy Report called for a pledge from all states 
to refrain from the threat or the use of hydrogen, atomic 
and all other weapons of mass destruction. In particular 
the WCC saw the development of the H-bomb as creating "an 
age of fear". For them true peace could not rest on fear 
and "It [was] vain to think the hydrogen bomb or its 
development has guaranteed peace because men will be afraid 
to go to war, nor can fear provide an effective restraint 
against the temptation to use such a decisive weapon either 
in hope of total victory or in the desperation of total 
defeat. j, /36 The foremost responsibility of the Christian 
Church in the face of this "new moral challenge" was 
undoubtedly to bring the transforming power of Jesus Christ 
to bear on the hearts of a common humanity. Christians must 
pray more fervently for peace, repent more earnestly of 
their individual and collective failures to further world 
order, and strive more urgently to establish world contacts 
for reconciliation, fellowship and love. Lofty objectives, 
so often invented to justify war, could not conceal the 
truth that war, violence and destruction were inherently 
evil. Christians must not lend themselves to, but expose, 
this deceit. 37 It was, however, not enough for the Churches 
just to proclaim war as evil. The Christian approaches to 
peace, both pacifist and just war, must be studied afresh in 
order to "seek out, analyse, and help remove the 
36 WCC 1958, p. 2. 
37 Ibid. 
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psychological and social, the political and economic causes 
of war. "38 If nuclear catastrophe was to be avoided, the 
World Council suggested, all Christians must give their 
energies to securing two conditions of crucial importance. 
These were: 
(1) The prohibition of all weapons of mass destruction; 
including atomic and hydrogen bombs, with provision for 
international inspection and control, such as , would safeguard the security of all nations, together with 
the drastic reduction of all other armaments. 
(2) The certain assurance that no country will engage 
in or support aggressive or subversive acts in other 
countries. " 
In January 1955 Bishop Bell of Chichester wrote to The 
Times" endorsing the WCC line and calling on Christians to 
escape just war logic by seeing thermonuclear weapons as a 
dramatic socio-moral issue that could end human history. 
Bell understood that H-bombs caused destruction out of 
proportion to any possible end desired, and could not be 
justified even in retaliation. He wrote: 
H-bombs are morally indefensible because they (1) 
inflict destruction... altogether out of proportion to 
the end desired... ; (2) are incapable of discriminating 
between military targets and centres of population; and 
(3) radiation fall-out would diffuse such poison that 
(paraphrasing Bertrand Russell) a war with hydrogen 
bombs might quite possibly put an end to the human 
race. 41 
The true significance of the hydrogen bomb lay, Bell argued, 
not in a choice between thermonuclear or nuclear devices. 
Rather, it had become a choice between weapons used 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid., p. 3. 
40 The Times, 17 January 1955. 
41 Ibid. 
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primarily for offensive purposes, and between those that 
could be used tactically to repel aggression. He called on 
the US President and British Prime Ministers to prohibit all 
nuclear weapons. If prohibition was not possible at least 
the West should renounce testing and pledge never to be the 
first to use the bomb. 
In response to Bell's appeal other British Christians 
began to call on the BCC to toughen their resolve. The Rev. 
Dale wrote to the BCC's General Secretary (David Say) 
enclosing his concerns in a pamphlet entitled Wanted A 
Church that Offends. Here he called on the BCC to take a 
stand against the H-bomb because 'Christian expediency' was 
leading to moral and political disintegration. For Dale the 
thermonuclear invention brought two issues to the fore. 
First, that the power of the State was such that it had 
become a stultifying factor and a menace. As a result, it 
was unthinkable that any political party could now seriously 
challenge State policy. Second, following this awareness, 
responsibility lay with the Church to reinvigorate its life 
and democratic witness by restoring a spiritual awareness of 
the worth of humanity. Dale saw the Christian Church, as 
personified by the BCC, on trial in a way and to a degree it 
had not been before. It must rise to the challenge because 
all too often the Church had spoken either not at all, or 
with such an uncertain voice, that it had failed to carry 
conviction. Indeed: 
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Much of the Church's weakness is due to its hands being 
tied -- by an all too willing subservience to the will 
and behest of the State and the secular interests it 
seeks to serve. As a consequence it is powerless to 
speak that decisive word mankind is waiting to hear. 
So afraid is it of giving offence, or of appearing to 
support unpopular views, or of endangering its own 
security, it refuses to raise its voice in condemnation 
of what it admits is in complete contradiction to the 
faith it claims to hold. But surely our Christian 
faith is not to wait until others pledge themselves to 
refrain from evil. The Church's task is not to follow, 
but to lead; not to be guided by the standards that 
commonly govern human conduct, but to set before men's 
eyes those ideals of divine righteousness in obedience 
to which alone true peace, happiness and good can be 
achieved. It is a cause of deep regret that at the 
present juncture of world events, the Church is largely 
under the domination of a sycophantic leadership that 
for fear of imperilling its own status and security is 
more concerned with safeguarding its self-interest than 
with declaring the counsel of God. 42 
The problem, as Dale saw it, went back to Augustinian 
accommodation in the fourth century. This act from which 
the Christian faith has suffered disastrous consequences 
ever since had meant that, for the most part the Church 
throughout the world approved and justified the policies 
being pursued by their respective governments. In the 
contemporary setting this subservience had resulted in 
colossal rearmament proceeding with such momentum. And the 
Church, even within an ecumenical setting, had grievously 
failed in the trust committed to it. To Dale the logical 
way of redressing this situation must be that: 
The Christian's primary concern can never be with the 
advancement of worldly interests, still less with the 
support of policies that are wholly at variance with 
the spirit of the Gospel .... The Church's first loyalty is not to a crown, or to an empire, or to a flag. To 
Jesus Christ and Him alone it owes its allegiance. All 
42 Dale's Wanted a Church that Offends, n. d. p. 2. BCC Box 12. 
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other authority is secondary and relative. Christian 
citizenship is in heaven. The apostolic injunction 
still holds: 'We must obey God rather than men'. 43 
Say responded defensively to Dale's call for a Christian 
democratic renewal. 44 The General Secretary reminded him 
that more than once statements had been issued, in addition 
to the BCC being the first body'5 to have published a Report 
in the 'Era of Atomic Power. ' 
At their annual meeting in Northampton the Federal 
Council of Free Churches 46 supported the sentiments 
suggested by the WCC, Bishop Bell, and the Rev. Dale. it 
passed an anti-nuclear resolution calling for the 
prohibition of all weapons of mass destruction including the 
hydrogen and atom bombs and for a drastic reduction in all 
other armaments. The Council urged the Government to spare 
no effort in securing a fruitful outcome from disarmament 
conferences. Several delegates felt the Federal Council had 
even then not gone far enough with its distinctive non- 
pacifist tone. Referring to the country's moral atmosphere 
the Moderator of the Council, the Rev. F. P. Copland Simmons, 
concluded by suggesting England was favourable for a "great 
combined attack on the citadel of indifference. "47 
43 Ibid., p. 4. 
44 Say's reply to Dale, 28 February 1955, BCC Box 12. 
45 Say omits to mention the US Federal Council Report that preceded the 
BCC Report by several months. 
46 The Free Church Federal Council (a constituent assembly of the BCC) 
represented 23,000 churches in March 1955, compared to, for example, the 
17,000 churches in the Church of England. Source: The Times, 24 March 
1955. 
47 The Times 24 March 1955. 
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The Archbishop of York 
The high Tory Archbishop of York (Garbett ) 48, meanwhile, 
felt sufficiently perturbed by the omission of any reference 
to the hydrogen bomb in the Queen's Speech to raise the 
matter in the House of Lords. 49 Garbett who had rebutted 
those 'Manichaeans' with their rigid, black-and-white 
concept of a necessary war of ideology between East and 
Western values, 50 now saw the international control of 
nuclear weapons as the most urgent immediate problem. At 
this stage Garbett had little faith in those who said that 
nuclear weapons were so terrible that they were a deterrent 
to war, and it was unlikely that they will ever be used. 
With a implicit swipe at both the 1946 BCC Oldham and the 
1948 Church of England Reports, the Archbishop stated that 
those who hold the optimistic deterrent view were failing to 
appreciate "'the intensity of the hatred which may obsess a 
nation, and when hatred and fear are combined a nation in 
danger of defeat which possessed these bombs would, almost 
inevitably use them. "51 He opposed the 'realism' as 
48 Margaret Thrall (1972, p. 418-19) considers Archbishop Garbett's 
views in some detail and concludes that he was one leading cleric who 
stands out for his strenuous attempts to ensure that the British 
Government was doing something about the control of atomic weapons. 
Thrall notes that Garbett was in fact the first figure from within 
British Church circles to adumbrate the idea that the West should 
renounce the first use of nuclear weapons in any future conflict. 
Archbishop Garbett made this point in March 1950, and in December of the 
same year Bishop Bell of Chichester gave his support to it. 
49 Archbishop of York, Hansazd: House of Lords, vol. 190, col. 64, 
1 December 1954. 
50 For instance, The Times editorial 28 February 1953. 
51 Archbishop of York, Hansazd: House of Lords, vol. 190, col. 64, 
1 December 1954. 
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exemplified by the Reports and argued that nuclear weapons 
had a very negligible deterrent value. 
Less than four months after these comments, however, the 
Archbishop changed his views during the March 1955 House of 
Lords debate on the British decision to build the hydrogen 
bomb. 52 Garbett opened by acknowledging that his daily 
letters and petitions were testimony to the intensity of 
public reaction. Although he detested these "hateful" 
weapons as much as anyone, he had regrettably, been forced 
to question his earlier position. To the Archbishop, 
protests and petitions against nuclear weapons would not 
influence those who decided whether the Bomb be used or not. 
No matter how many sermons are preached, or how many MPs are 
against nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union ""would continue on 
their chosen path, regardless of remonstrance's and reckless 
1153 of human life . In other words the decision as to whether 
the Bomb be used or not did not rest with Britain, or the 
democratic West alone. The Archbishop went on to offer two 
arguments to counter the view that Britain should 
unilaterally renounce the Bomb. First Garbett questioned 
the unilateralists' argument of expediency -- namely if 
Britain renounced the H-bomb she would remain unharmed as a 
neutral. The Archbishop felt such an argument could not be 
taken seriously. It would be more likely that the UK would 
be destroyed by the Soviet Union or occupied by the US in 
52 Archbishop's speech in Hansard: House of Lords, vol. 191, col. 1148, 
16 March 1955. 
53 Ibid. 
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case the Soviets tried to use Britain as a base from which 
to launch attacks on the USA. In either scenario without 
the H-bomb "the United Kingdom would soon become a 
defenceless satellite of one of those two great Powers, 
fearful of incurring the displeasure of either. 1154 
Garbett's second retort, against the argument that on 
principle Britain should renounce the bomb was he confessed, 
a much more problematic one. The Archbishop found he had to 
ask himself whether: 
... it would be better for the nation to die, rather 
than to save itself by wholesale destruction of its 
enemies. I will not hide from your Lordships that I 
feel tremendously the force of this appeal. It is an 
argument which must appeal to every Christian and make 
55 an agonising challenge to conscience. 
He could nevertheless not support this approach, however 
personally attractive, because he felt that no Government 
could adopt such a position without overwhelming public 
support. This, to the Archbishop, was not practicable 
because in his opinion "all sections of the public" accepted 
the idea of a deterrent. The chief justification for making 
the Bomb must be, henceforth, that it will provide a shield 
beneath which the work of peace-making can be continued. 
From the pulpit of York Minster, he continued to add weight 
to the pro-nuclear lobby through his 'warnings' of the 
danger of concealing from 'ourselves' the awful 
responsibility of the consequences of the Bomb. 56 Garbett 
54 Ibid. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Reported by The Times 18 April 1955. 
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argued that to use the H-bomb for destructive (as opposed to 
defensive) purposes would be a great sin: the Christian 
should resolutely refuse to believe that its use was 
inevitable whilst seeking to conquer the sins which might 
lead to its use. Through such sentiments it was painfully 
obvious that the British Churches generally condoned 
(particularly by their silence) the decision to manufacture 
the H-bomb. 
Responses to the Archbishop 
Although the Archbishop of York was widely applauded from 
both within the Churches and Government for his powerful 
support of the decision to manufacture the hydrogen bomb, 
his recourse to just war theory was bitterly attacked. 
Critics included the Methodist Dr. Donald Soper who wrote in 
The Times": 
The Archbishop's honest and, as he avers, his agonised 
wrestling with his own conscience will evoke general 
respect .... All the same he is dead wrong .... he regards 
the possession of hydrogen bombs by this country as a 
shield (sic) behind which peace-making may go on and 
without which disaster is unavoidable .... Dr. Garbett has got his facts wrong and his ethics wrong, and on 
reflection many ... will come to think that if 
Christianity has nothing more creative than 
58 
this to say 
it has no worth-while contribution to make. 
Yet the Archbishop of Canterbury supported his deputy. In 
March 1955 Fisher went on record to say that as the Bomb 
"purchased time for peace" it must be manufactured by the 
57 Dr. Soper's letter to The Times 25 March 1955. 
58 Ibid. 
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59 British for deterrent purposes In his Easter Day address 
60 he developed this theme. 
Fisher preached on the H-bomb and the Christian duty to 
strive to bring about the change of heart and mind that 
would establish peace. He believed that the hydrogen bomb 
did not differ in principle from the atom bomb which 
preceded it, or the cobalt bomb, "or any other worse horror 
which may succeed it". Weapons made war more hideous but 
not (and crucially in terms of the Church debate) more evil: 
The Christian must regard this hateful thing without 
any illusion born of fear or despair. The first duty 
of the Church and of Christians is to remain unshaken 
in the hope that fails not,... To abolish the bomb you 
must agree with others, and others with you,... It is 
for Christians and Christian Statesmen to bear the 
burden... (of the Bomb) and still to be peace-seekers 
and peace makers. The task is bedevilled by past 
failures and present collisions dividing the world that 
we can only expect progress to be by 'here a little and 
there a little. 61 
Such a speech is almost as interesting for what it suggests 
but doesn't say, as it is for what it actually does say. on 
a theological level, the sermon implied that no matter 
whether there is a nuclear war or not the Christian should 
remain unshaken in the belief that a better after-life 
exists. Concerns of this life are only temporary, and not 
as significant as the after-life. On the political level, 
Fisher warned against unilateral disarmament yet used his 
moral weight to advocate (the far less costly option) 
multilateralism. The sermon condoned the Bomb, as long as 
59 The Times 25 March 1955. 
60 The Times 19 April 1955. 
61 Ibid. 
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it was in Christian (i. e. non-Soviet atheist) hands, and 
almost gratefully accepted the burden of responsibility on 
behalf of 'others'. Finally, the Archbishop says much about 
his fatalistic, deterministic, and incremental attitude to 
change. The Bomb, as presumably life in general, does not 
warrant revolutionary measures. 
Part II: The Churches and Testing 
In August 1955 the Central Committee of the World Council 
of Churches, meeting in Davos Switzerland, unanimously 
adopted a Statement on Disarmament and Peaceful Change62 
endorsed by their Commission of the Churches on 
International Affairs. Kenneth Grubb's CCIA were having 
increasing success at advancing the thesis that the best way 
to tackle the nuclear dilemma was to consider moral and 
political factors in tandem with a ma-thematical and 
mechanical approach to the reduction of armaments. For the 
CCIA these factors applied to two indispensable and 
complementary processes: first, the process whereby all 
armaments were progressively reduced under adequate 
international inspection and contro1; and second, the 
process of developing and securing international acceptance 
of methods for peaceful settlement and change to rectify 
existing injustices, particularly in situations where 
military conflict has arisen. These complementary 
approaches depended upon the extent to which mutual 
See copy of statement in WCC 1958, pp. 4-7. 
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confidence could be attained. They encouraged the 
willingness of representatives of governments to talk in the 
hope of expanding the area of agreement through the United 
Nations Disarmament Commission established in 1951. This 
two-fold approach was the only way the necessary weight 
could be given to the moral and political factors which were 
essential ingredients to peace with justice and freedom. 
In July 19S6 the Commission of the Churches on 
International Affairs, Executive Committee, met at 
Herrenalb, Germany and issued a more comprehensive 
addendum. 63 The CCIA urged that experimental tests of 
nuclear weapons should be discontinued under international 
agreement. -The Committee, however, questioned whether the 
unilateral abandoning of tests would serve peace and 
security. The CCIA followed the argument that unilateral 
action may well disrupt the balance of power "which at 
present offers a safeguard against war and is the principal 
means to order among the nations. " 64 What was necessary was 
for all parties to cease testing under an agreed formula of 
cessation, control, and inspection. The Churches' role in 
such a situation was to: 
... at. all times support measures which will facilitate 
progress towards disarmament such as exchange of 
persons and the communications of ideas across national 
frontiers, ... both internationally and in their several 
countries, (they] must challenge governments to shape 
their policies in accordance with the demands of moral 
" The July 1956 CCIA Executive Conunittee can be found in WCC 1958, 
pp. 7-6. 
WCC 1958, p. 7. 
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authority rather than those of a mere pragmatic 65 
expediency. 
A month later in Hungary, the Central Committee of the WCC 
added their weight to the CCIA's call. This statement66 
called upon the Churches to appeal to their governments and 
the United Nations to negotiate an agreement for the 
discontinuance, or limitation and control, of testing to 
safeguard the health of the people and the security of 
states. The Central Committee urged people to make the 
sacrifices necessary to move away from "'cold war" to "real 
peace". 
In the light of these developments and the H-bomb debate 
in Parliament, the BCC International Department met67 to 
consider whether it was called upon to prepare a statement 
for consideration by Council. The DIA concluded that: 
... any further statement or formal resolution 
by the 
Council would surely add little to the solemn words 
which have been pronounced by leaders of Church and 
State and might even detract from their gravity. When 
all has been said that can be said, the Christian man 
or woman must settle his own attitude before God, 
bearing in mind that he is not to fear them that kill 
the body, but are not able to kill the soul. 'Rather 
fear him, which is able to destroy soul and body in 
hell. 'r"' 
This second official BCC statement repeated the argument 
that to oppose the H-bomb was a matter for individual, not 
collective conscience, 'before God'. 
65 Ibid., p. 8. 
66 The statement of the Central Committee of the World Council of 
Churches, meeting at Galyateto, Hungary is found on pp. 8-9 of WCC 1958. 
67 The Department met on the 19 April 1955. The statement drafted by 
the Department for consideration by Council was entitled: The Hydrogen 
Bomb and Nuclear Fission, BCC n. d. but 1955. See BCC Box 12. 
68 The Hydrogen Bomb and Nuclear Fission, p. 6. 
172 
Despite these attitudes, individual members of the BCC 
were beginning regularly to pass resolutions that viewed 
with deep concern the British Government's decision to 
manufacture thermonuclear weapons. 69 Not only were people 
thinking it was their Christian duty to speak out against 
the H-bomb but specific, localised protests against the 
British H-bomb were taking shape. 
Canon Collins, for instance, rejected the manufacture of 
the hydrogen bomb f rom St. Paul Is pulpit in early January 
1956. He argued that there were certain things a Christian 
could not stand for and the manufacture of hydrogen bombs 
was one of them. For Collins it was inconceivable how any 
member of the Church, the Archbishop of Canterbury included, 
could suppose that the making and testing of atom or 
hydrogen bombs was consistent with the Gospel: "Yet, led by 
the majority of our Church authorities, we Christians are so 
feeble that we find ourselves accepting such things as 
consistent with our Christian convictions . 1,70 The prominent 
Christian Socialist Canon Stanley Evans, likewise described 
the failure of the Church of England to make a stand against 
nuclear weapons as "a paralysis which is gripping 
contemporary Christian morality and as an abdication of the 
Church's right to moral leadership. If7l 
69 For example Loughton Union Church passed a resolution on the 13 
April 1955 expressing their concern. Copies of this resolution were 
sent to the Prime Minister, Foreign Secretary, Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, and Winston Churchill. Resolution in BCC Box 12. 
70 The Times, 2 January 1956. 
71 Quoted by Ormrod 1987, p. 189. 
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In March 1957 Britain's Free Church Federal Council, a 
constituent Assembly of the BCC, urged the end of hydrogen 
bomb tests. The Free Church Council further called upon the 
Government to abandon the forth-coming H-bomb tests on 
Christmas Island in May, 
devoted to peaceful usage o 
now regularly being sent by 
and action against the 
73 testing . 
In March 1957 the BCC 
and demanded that research be 
72 f nuclear energy . Letters were 
the public demanding BCC support 
Government plans for H-bomb 
received an invitation f rom the 
National Christian Council of Japan to join in agitation 
against the nuclear tests. Bishop Bell, in particular, saw 
the necessity of the BCC giving its utmost support to the 
Japanese bearing in mind: first, Nagasaki and Hiroshima; 
second, the radiation poisoning suffered by the crew of the 
Lucky Dragon after the US H-bomb test; and third, the 
constant nuclear experiments in the Pacific Ocean. "' Bell 
72 The Times, 28 March 1957. 
73 For example Mary Bubb from Oxford, wrote to Slack on the 22 March 
1957, appalled by the absence of moral guidance from the main religious 
bodies, believing the tests could still be stopped she pleaded with the 
BCC to speak up. A letter from Hull and District Council of Churches 
(associated to the BCC) Executive Committee, 23 March 1957, asked what 
action the BCC had taken, if any, and what action Council proposed 
taking to try to stop the British tests in the Pacific in May 1957. A 
postcard received from the Bristol Diocesan Youth Chaplain (Bernard 
Brown) dated 28 March 1957, asked what the BCC was doing about the new 
H-bomb tests: "In view of the recently released facts about the 
radiation already caused, is there any hope of the Church making 
effective protest? ". All letters dated March 1957 in Box 14. 
14 Besides the atomic bombing of Japan, Britain had exploded its first 
A-bomb (October 1952)r the US its first H-bomb (November 1952), and 
Britain was preparing to drop its first H-bomb (May 1957) in the Pacific 
region. Norman Dombey and Eric Grove convincingly argue that the 
British tests on May 15 and 31 were actually a thermonuclear bluff. In 
a detailed technical argument they suggest that these British explosions 
were actually based on 'boosted fission designs' and not on the fusion 
process. They conclude that the tests had as much to do with public 
relations, especially relations with the US, as with constructing an 
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thought "'it would be a terrible pity if the BCC were to 
appear as though they were just apologists for the British 
Government.... Not only the Japanese, but the other Churches 
in Asia will be looking very closely at what the BCC says: 
for it is a real challenge. ft 75 The Japanese had resolved 76 
to call upon all world Christian agencies to "create public 
opinion in all countries concerned for the discontinuance of 
such experiments. A Japanese Council against Atomic and 
Hydrogen Bombs was in the process of being set UP77 and the 
Japanese wanted to invite a BCC representative to a World 
Conference against A and H-bombs to be held in Tokyo in 
August. The specific problems of radioactive contamination 
or of international law, plus general issues on atomic 
weapons and disarmament, were to be discussed here. Bishop 
Bell and Dr. Pitt-Watson"8 shared in discussions that led to 
79 
the Japanese request being favourably received by Council . 
In the face of these events a sense developed"O in which 
it was felt that the Council should go much further than it 
had gone before. Although BCC officials were primarily 
concerned about getting out of touch with their 
authentic hydrogen bomb. If so the deception was remarkably successful. 
See Dombey and Grove, 1992. 
75 Bell to Slack, 27 March 1957. 
76 Resolution passed by the Japanese Council at its Annual Meeting in 
Tokyo March 5-6 1957, requesting the cessation of atom and hydrogen bomb 
(remembering HMG's tests on Christmas Island) experiments. Letter to 
Bell from Dr. Michio Kozaki, Chair of Japanese Council, details this. 
Bell repeats Kozaki's message to Slack in a letter dated 21 March 1957, 
BCC/DIA/1/1/4. 
77 See letter dated 25 May 1957, Box 14. 
78 Church of Scotland, see Chapter Four. 
79 See Payne 1972, p. 18. 
80 This sense is conveyed in a letter from Lawrence (Christian News- 
Letter) to Slack 20 March 1957, BCC/DIA/1/l/4. 
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constituency, it was now fairly clear that every test 
explosion that was carried out increased the hazard to the 
health or heredity of humanity (though it was uncertain how 
great the risk was). A pat response would be 
unsatisfactory. Thanks to such pressure in April 1957 the 
BCC Assembly took the unexpected step of opposing the H-bomb 
tests. 
Bishop Bell's Bill 
At the 2-3 April 1957 BCC Assembly meeting Bishop Bell, 
seconded by Dr. John Pitt-Watson, moved a Private Member" s 
Resolution. 81 The event was significant and controversial. 
It declared: 
The British Council of Churches 
(i) records the profound concern felt by Christian 
people in Britain at the continuing experimental 
explosions of nuclear weapons, and at the grave danger 
which they may involve, by the increase of world 
radiation, for humanity as a whole; 
(ii) deplores the decision of Her Majestyfs Government 
to carry out a number of nuclear test explosions, in 
the megaton range, in the near future; 
(iii) appeals to Her Majesty's Government, and to the 
Governments of the USA and the USSR, to make a new and 
determined effort to secure a general nuclear control 
agreement as soon as possible, and in the meantime 
jointly to pledge themselves from any further tests of 
hydrogen bombs. 82 
Although Groom believed that the BCC "deplored the tes tS"83 
this is not borne out in the closeness of the vote (39 to 
32) . 
84 In the circumstances the International Department 
81 i. e. not an official DIA move, c. f. Chapter Three. 
82 Resolution in supplement to The Churches and the Hydrogen Bomb, n. d. 
but 1955. 
83 Groom 1974, p. 201. 
84 Voting was by individual's sitting in Assembly and not by Church 
representation. 
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regretted that this resolution was passed by the Council 
without remitting the subject to the Department first. "-5 
What is perhaps more significant is that the BCC voted 
against the advice of their President86, the Archbishop of 
Canterbury. ormrod describes this act as representing the 
peak of official church opposition up to the formation of 
CND in 1958.87 Driver saw the BCC Spring vote. as a 
political 'weathercock' with which to judge the gale blowing 
in favour of anti-nuclear opinion. 88 Groom concluded it was 
merely an exception to the "embarrassed silence. "89 The 
closeness of the vote and correspondence received by the BCC 
may tell a different story. 
The vote at once revealed a considerable division of 
opinion in the Council and some9o doubted whether it was 
wise to advertise such division to the world. Others felt, 
as the socially progressive Bishop of Sheffield (Hunter) 
expressed it, that it was good to let it be known that the 
BCC thought deeply and cared much about this terrible 
matter. 91 Although some members supported the BCC 
resolution 92 Most were surprised and rather shocked to hear 
85 This sense is conveyed by Keighley in a letter to Anthony Buzzard, 2 
October 1957, Box 14. 
86 ormrod 1987, p. 198 wrongly believes the Archbishop was the chair of 
the BCC. The Archbishop was in fact the President of the BCC. 
87 ormrod 1987, p. 199. 
6B Driver 1964, p. 34. 
89 Groom 1974, p. 327. 
90 Slack, for one, expressed this sentiment in a letter to Father 
Guardian of the "Society of St. Francis" 11 April 1957, BCC/DIA/l/l/4. 
91 Slack reports this in the above letter. 
92 For example, a letter from Colchester Council of Churches to Slack 
dated 5 April 1957, gave their unanimous support for the BCC resolution. 
But this is an exception to a general rule. See letters in Box 14. 
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that the voting on the resolution was so close. " Some 
bristled with anger; fear, and indignation. " 
BCC constituent Churches were also busy passing 
resolutions expressing their alarm that the BCC should be so 
divided on the question of hydrogen bomb testing. Whilst 
many were grateful that 39 members voted in favour of 
discontinuing the tests, some British Christians. were 
convinced that untold harm had been done to the Church by 
the action of the 32 members of the Council who voted in 
favour of their continuation. Appeals were sent to the 
Council to review the position so that in "the name of the 
Prince of Peace we can give a lead to mankind to renounce 
what could easily destroy civilisation if allowed to 
continue. '195 
BCC Relationships with the Wider Peace Movement 
In 1954 Canon Collins' Christian Action discussed the 
movement's role in the anti-nuclear debate but decided to 
limit their energies to trying to persuade the Churches to 
treat the matter as one for serious and urgent 
consideration. An abortive attempt was made to create a 
national campaign against the H-bomb. Sponsored by a group 
of Labour MPs including Fenner Brockway and Tony Benn, Canon 
Collins, Dr. Soper, and a collection of local pacifist 
groups, Christians and humanitarians came together to form 
93 For example Gerald Butt to Slack, 8 April 1957, Box 14. 
94 e. g. Mary Bubb to Slack, 16 April 1957, Box 14. 
95 Resolution passed by Cefn Mawr Methodist Circuit 15 April 1957, Box 
14. 
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the Hydrogen Bomb National Campaign. 96 Although the group 
only lasted a short while it served as an important 
precursor for the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament in 1958. 
Collins withdrew his support from the Hydrogen Bomb National 
Campaign a few days after its inaugural Albert Hall rally of 
30 April 1954. Although his decision upset many people, for 
Collins the campaign was inappropriately timed. In effect 
the campaign was before its time. Collins cites three 
catalysts that were to make later peace movements 
successful. First, the Suez crisis of 1956 increased 
activism. Suez challenged both Government legitimacy and 
the British public's perception of Britain's 'Great Power' 
status. Second, the successful British H-bomb test on 
Christmas Island that encouraged wide spread anti-nuclear 
participation. Finally, the crisis within the Labour Party 
in 1955 -- when Aneurin Bevan challenged his own leader in a 
defence debate and was threatened with expulsion from the 
party, and Sir Richard Acland (an Anglican radical) resigned 
his Gravesend seat with a view to fighting a by-election on 
the H-bomb issue. These three events, more than anything 
else, made people ready to respond positively to anti- 
97 nuclear movements . 
Besides Bell's Private Member's Bill, the Free Church 
Federal Council, the UN Association, the Labour Party, the 
96 Driver 1964; Duff 1971; Groom 1974; Taylor 1988; Taylor and 
Pritchard 1980; and Taylor and Young (eds. ) 1987; and Veldman 1994 all 
give detail on these early protest movements and suggestions why they 
failed to fire public imagination. 
97 Collins 1966, p. 395. 
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Liberal Party, and the Quakers were just some of the 
organisations that called on the Government to abandon or 
suspend tests. BCC attitudes remained divided throughout 
the period. 
From 1955 small groups of both absolute and nuclear 
pacifists had been organising themselves into local groups. 
These 'Peace Groups' looked to the BCC for encouragement, 
co-operation and began asking in what ways the Churches were 
taking a stand on specific matters such as the H-bomb. " 
The British Council of Churches responded by producing a 
collection of BCC/WCC statements and resolutions in a 
pamphlet (""The Churches and the Hydrogen Bomb") in September 
1955. 
Specific requests for help were now "flooding in"99 to 
the BCC. The General Secretary of the Fellowship of 
Reconciliation (FOR), Max Parker, wrote to the new BCC 
General Secretary Kenneth Slack, 100 recording gratitude for 
the lead taken by the BCC in its decision regarding the H- 
bomb tests. 101 The FOR felt able to continue to support such 
Christian leadership and were sure only good would result 
from the stand that the BCC had taken. Slack, however, did 
98 For example see letter received from Bristol Peace Council dated 15 
September 1955, Box 14. 
99 This phrase is used in a letter from Lambeth Palace to Slack, 17 
A ril 1957, Box 14. 
lp' David Say had retired as BCC General Secretary after seven years 
service. He would later become Bishop of Rochester. Say's replacement 
Kenneth Slack, was previously Minister of St. James's Presbyterian 
church, Edgware. He became Say's successor on 6 June 1955. Slack would 
serve as General Secretary until 1965, when he became Moderator of the 
United Reformed Church. 
101 Parker to Slack, 6 May 1957, Box 14. 
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not want the BCC to be so closely associated with such a 
pacifist organisation. 
one of the more organised approaches against the British 
H-bomb tests had come from the Golders Green Co-operative 
Women's Guild led by Gertrude Fishwick, ex-suffragette and 
member of the Anglican Pacifist Fellowship. In February 
1957 this small band of radicals had set up the National 
Campaign Against Nuclear Weapons Tests (NCANWT) . 
102 This 
body soon attracted support and sponsorship from Bishop 
Bell, the Rev. George Macloed, and Dr. Soper. When NCANWT 
began to gain considerable support people like Canon Collins 
felt it was time to organise a national campaign for 
unilateral nuclear disarmament. 103 
Arthur Goss the Chair of NCANWT, wrote to Secretary 
Slack 104 requesting BCC support. Whilst Goss regretted the 
failure to stop the British H-bomb tests in May he wanted to 
know whether the BCC: first, supported an international 
agreement to end all further tests; second, whether the BCC 
would join the NCANWT and other like-minded organisations in 
united action, such as world wide protest to the 'Five 
Powers' represented on the UN disarmament commission. Slack 
replied that the BCC did not support the work of 
102 - For detail see Taylor's 1983 PhD, pp. 28-58. 
103 Collins states (Collins 1966, pp. 295-96) that he was disappointed 
when the Council of Christian Action decided against what he personally 
saw as this organisation's proper role. Ormrod (1987, p. 206) however, 
believes that Collins in fact refused to allow Christian Action to be 
used for this purpose. It is not clear whether this is a simple mistake 
(e. g. like Ormrod thinking the Archbishop of Canterbury was Chair of the 
BCC) on Ormrod's behalf or whether Ormrod is disagreeing with Collins' 
own account. 
104 Goss to Slack, 7 August 1957, Box 14. 
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organisations like NCANWT, and had only passed one 
resolution. '05 
The officers of the International Department shared 
Slack's opinion. The National Peace Council (NPC) had also 
approached the BCC106 suggesting some kind of inter- 
organisational approach to the nuclear issue. Whilst Alan 
Keighley, DIA Secretary, was all for co-operation at a staff 
level with organisations such as NCANWT and the NPC, the 
consensus was that the Department should be an independent 
body that advised the Churches through the BCC, and not an 
inter-organisational group. The only co-operating body 
acceptable to these officers (i. e. Slack, Keighley, and the 
new DIA Chair Robert Mackie) was Kenneth Grubb's CCIA office 
in London. Mackie in particular continued to stress the 
importance of avoiding having the International Department 
regarded as an international peace organisation. He doubted 
whether such organisations could really understand the angle 
of the Churches on such a matter. 107 
Individual Churches were galvanised into issuing public 
statements. The Methodist Church, for example, felt moved 
105 An interesting series of letters in Box 14 make Slack's attitude 
clear. A letter from Peggy Duff (NCANWT organising secretary) to Slack, 
15 October 1957, requests a meeting between the BCC and NCANWT to 
discuss certain aspects of their campaign against nuclear weapons. A 
meeting was scheduled for 1 November 1957 but no record has been left of 
its detail. In reply to a letter from Lincoln and District Branch of 
NCANWT (17 May 1957) in which, as the NCANWT saw it, the BCC supported 
their work, and so requesting the address of the nearest BCC 
representative. Slack writes back (20 May 1957) saying the BCC does not 
support the aims of NCANWT. 
106 it is not clear when this overture took place, but Mackie mentions 
it to Keighley, in memo dated 19 November 1957, Box 14. 
101 Ibid. 
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to issue a statement rejecting the notion that nuclear 
weapons were compatible with the just war doctrine. Nuclear 
weapons did not allow war to be waged with a hope of 
achieving a just victory and "its method was not legitimate 
or in accordance with either man's nature as a rational 
being" or Christian principles and international 
108 
agreements. 
The Yale Resolutions 
By the Summer of 1957 the International Department was 
exercised by the need to study the disarmament situation in 
the light of the so-called Yale resolutions passed by the 
CCIA Executive, and the Central Committee of the WCC, 
meeting in July at their annual sessions. '09 
The CCIA Executive Committee resolution, Atomic Tests and 
Disa. rmament, expressed its concern that the hazards to 
health from nuclear weapons testing were taken seriously. 
This was not only because all people were affected in some 
degree by radio-active fallout, but more importantly, the 
fact that the effect upon generations yet unborn was 
unknown. The question of stopping the testing should, the 
CCIA felt, be considered in the wider context of 
disarmament. The statement made three main points: first, 
the main concern must always be the prevention of war itself 
108 Groom 1974, p. 201. 
109 A copy of the statement by the CCIA, meeting at New Haven (Yale), 
Connecticut in July 1957 is in WCC 1958, pp. 9-11. The same publication 
also contains a copy of the WCC's Central Committee statement (pp. 12- 
13). 
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"'for the evil of war is an offence to the spiritual nature 
of man. ""O Second, the objectives of a strategy to combat 
the menace of atomic war must be seen as inter-related and 
inter-dependent. These objectives should be: (i) an 
international agreement to stop nuclear weapons testing; 
(ii) the halting of nuclear weapon production; (iii) the 
reduction of existing nuclear and conventional armaments 
(with provision, however, made for warning against surprise 
attacks); and (iv) the encouragement of peaceful uses of 
atomic energy, peaceful settlement and peaceful change. 
Finally, if persistent efforts at international governmental 
negotiation did not bring sufficient agreement on any of the 
inter-related objectives, reasonable risks should be taken 
to advance the objectives which must continue to stand as 
inter-dependent. 
The WCC Central Committee resolution Tests of Nuclear 
Weapons, whilst recognising that the question of stopping 
nuclear testing be considered in the wider context as set 
out in the CCIA resolution, was more anxious to emphasise 
the moral principles that affected the whole issue of 
testing. The Committee felt bound to ask whether any State 
was justified in continuing the testing of nuclear weapons 
while the magnitude of the dangers was so little known and 
effective means of protection against the dangers lacking. 
Indeed, the resolution questioned the democratic credentials 
110 WCC 1956, p. 9. 
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of a State who conducted such tests, when citizens had not 
agreed to them. Whilst the Committee accepted that a 
comprehensive programme for disarmament must proceed by 
stages and much depended on the deepening of confidence 
between countries, they concluded "that as a first step 
governments conducting tests should forego them, at least 
for a trial period, either together or individually, in the 
hope that the others will do the same, a new confidence be 
born, and foundations be laid for reliable agreements. " ill 
Both the CCIA and the WCC, therefore, did not rule out forms 
of unilateral action. 
At their September 1957 112 meeting the BCC's International 
Department decided that the issues raised by the Yale 
statements were significant but complex. This meant they 
demanded an official BCC response that could be debated 
before the Assembly of the whole Council at the forthcoming 
annual meeting in October. In accordance with this it was 
agreed that the Yale statements should be communicated to 
Prime Minister Macmillan. The Prime Minister's reply (via 
his secretary P. F. de Zulueta) is revealing. "' 
111 WCC 1958, p. 13. 
112 See Minutes of BCC International Department meeting, 17 September 
1957, in Box BCC/DIA/l/l/4. 
113 Kenneth Slack wrote to the Prime Minister on the llth November, the 
pm's reply is dated 20th November. Filed under the Agenda for 
International Department meeting dated 10th December 1957, Box 
BCC/DIA/l/l/4- 
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Macmillan's Reply 
The Prime Minister had read with great interest the 
statements on disarmament and nuclear weapons made at Yale. 
He was "greatly encouraged by the thoughtful and sincere 
study of the problem which these bodies have made""' and 
could agree with all objectives described and in particular 
on the vital inter-relationship between them. Macmillan 
felt that the current proposals for partial disarmament 
which the British Government had joined in sponsoring 
through the August Disarmament Sub-Committee, 115 suggested a 
plan that could be put into effect with a minimum of delay. 
For Macmillan this plan was founded on the same principles 
of progressive, controlled and secure disarmament that were 
advocated at Yale. In one matter, however, the Prime 
Minister would not agree with the views expressed. While he 
acknowledged that many different and sincere views were held 
about the question of suspending nuclear tests, he was 
nonetheless convinced that to suspend tests in present 
116 
circumstances would not assist the cause of peace . 
Suspension would not prevent the stockpiling of more nuclear 
weapons by those countries that already had them. This 
could only be prevented by an agreement to end the 
production of fissile material for such weapons. The Prime 
Minister concluded that an unconditional suspension of tests 
114 Ibid. 
115 i. e. at the Geneva Conference. See below. 
116 Ibid. 
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was, in the circumstances, a risk that couldn't be 
justified. 117 
Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that the development and 
deployment of nuclear weapons in the years 1950-57 raised 
new ethical questions for Christians. The rationale for 
keeping or renouncing nuclear weapons was not the same as 
when a Western monopoly existed before 1949. This was 
especially so following the Lucky Dragon incident when more 
became known about the harmful effects of radiation. For 
the most part, however, the attitudes of the BCC and its 
member Churches towards the development of thermonuclear 
devices were as divided as their attitudes to atomic 
weapons. Such an attitude prevailed despite many within and 
without the Churches feeling that Christians were morally 
obliged to take a definite stand against nuclear weapons. 
As Driver notes: "there was a persistent feeling that 
protests against the use or possession of nuclear weapons, 
or any other weapons of mass destruction, ought to be a 
function, perhaps chief function, of the Christian 
Church. ""8 Yet the BCC stance encouraged British Christians 
to accept nuclear weapons by affirming the notion of a 
British deterrent. As the issue became overtly political 
(i. e. party political) the official Church line remained 
117 Ibid. 
118 Driver 1964, p. 194. 
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embarrassingly silent. This "embarrassed silence", however, 
was interpreted as in itself a supremely political position: 
%silence' being a political 'claim' of those in favour of 
the status quo. The maintenance of silence allowing the 
State a free hand in determining essential norms, moral, 
civic and human. As the nuclear issue threatened 
established order the BCC revealed itself as a trusted ally 
of the status quo. 
Official BCC policy seemed uncomfortable with the 
political ramifications of an anti-nuclear stance. For the 
BCC to reject nuclear war as a legitimate means with which 
to conduct foreign policy was to question not only the 
State's authority, but its very legitimacy. BCC dialogue 
was neither successful in communicating the concerns many 
people felt over H-bomb testing (save for Bishop Bell's 
Private Member Resolution of April 1957), or responding to 
the moral questions raised by the new anti-nuclear peace 
movement. Whilst the British Churches may have been the 
only real forum for debating nuclear morality, they neither 
formulated progressive policy or drew decisive conclusions. 
The development of the H-bomb had, however, intensified the 
just war debate. 
Although differences of opinion between Christian 
pacifists and just war advocates were continuing to dominate 
the terms in which the debate was articulated within the 
Churches, thermonuclear developments had put increasing 
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strain on the just war demand for conflict to be determined 
by 'legitimate' authority. For many post-war Christians 
involved in the campaign against nuclear weapons, individual 
activism (i. e. outside their constituent Churches) had 
become a vital part of a wider political agenda. To move 
against nuclear weaponry was to move against the type of 
elitist and unrepresentative war-culture that produced such 
technology without democratic consultation. A coherent 
Christian anti-nuclear perspective began to show signs of 
winning greater support if it could successfully engage 
dialogue on two main levels: first, by communicating the 
idea that the nuclear age demanded new Christian thinking 
about the citizen's democratic responsibilities; and second, 
by claiming that the just war synthesis between force, 
political expediency, and morality was rendered obsolete in 
the nuclear era. This priority was not met with much 
sympathy in the larger peace movement. To most peace 
activists outside the Churches the old debate between 
pacifism and just war was not only invalidated but 
irrelevant. Differences of opinion between Christian 
pacifists and just war advocates would continue to have a 
significant impact on the debate in the Churches. 
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SEC TION III. - 
NUCLEAR STRA TEG YA ND THE B CC 
CHAPTER SIX: 
THE NUCLEAR 'NEW' LOOK 1952-57 
Introduction 
The controversy surrounding the failure to secure a 
British H-bomb test ban brought the BCC a particular 
problem. First, Council officers were keenly aware that 
many Christians felt that nuclear weapons, and in particular 
thermonuclear weapons, were abhorrent and immoral. This 
sense was exacerbated when Western nuclear strategy was 
considered. Second, the officers were nevertheless unable 
to disavow nuclear weapons and resort to a nuclear pacifism. 
It was at this point that Rear Admiral Sir Anthony Buzzard 
made his appearance in BCC circles. Here for the first time 
discussion moved from generalised ends-type analysis to 
concerted deliberation over specific nuclear means. To 
understand the impact of Admiral Buzzard's thinking on the 
BCC it is necessary to locate his thinking in the wider 
strategic environment. The chapter is subsequently split 
into two parts. Part One introduces massive retaliation and 
limited war as strategic concepts before discussing the 
events that led Admiral Buzzard being asked to speak to the 
Council in October 1957. Part Two discusses the nature and 
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argument of Admiral Buzzard's address delivered to the 
Council meeting. 
Part I: Massive Retaliation and Limited War 
The first Western government to base its national 
security planning almost entirely on a declaratory policy of 
nuclear 'deterrence' was that of Britain in 1952.1. From 
this time British policy began to move in the direction that 
would culminate in Duncan Sandys' famous 1957 Defence White 
Paper. 2 It is necessary to indicate, from the outset, that 
it would be a mistake to suggest that the British State in 
any way capitulated to US foreign policy requirements even 
if the American economic, strategic and political 
predicament was analogous to that of Britain's. In early 
1953 the Marshal of the Royal Air Force and Chair of the 
Chief of Staff, Sir John Slessor, had stated: 
The aim of Western policy is not primar: 
to win a war with the world in ruins -- 
be as ready as possible to do that if it 
us by accident or miscalculation. It is 
of war. The bomber holds out to us 
perhaps the only hope of that. it 
deterrent. 3 
Lly to be ready 
though we must 
is forced upon 
the prevention 
the greatest, 
is the great 
The official British view was that atomic weapons had 
abolished war (excepting "local' and civil' ) and that the 
primary focus of defence activities should be to bolster the 
1 Howard 1970, p. 160; and Pierre 1972, p. 67. 
2 This is a perspective that has long been recognised in the existing 
literature on British strategic policy: e. g. Groom 1974, p. 207; Navias 
F. 6. 
Slessor "The Place of the Bomber in British Policy". Text of a 1953 
speech at Chatham House. Reprinted in Slessor 1957, p. 123. 
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deterrent. Citizens, as Slessor suggested, "must steel 
themselves to risks and take what may come to them, knowing 
that thereby they were playing as essential a part in the 
country's defence as the pilot in the fighter or the man 
behind the gun. -' The British political-military 
establishment, as Howard argued, seemed to "assume that the 
civilian population might be induced to grin and bear a 
nuclear holocaust as cheerfully as they had endured the Nazi 
Blitz. if5 This new policy of deterrence, a modified 'balance 
of power' was described by Prime Minister Churchill as the 
new "balance of terror". 
By August 1953 both the USA and the Soviet Union had 
exploded hydrogen bombs. 6 Western politicians were 
particularly fearful that a Korean-type Communist aggression 
could now not be stopped. The notion existed that the H- 
bomb probably wouldn't be used to repel limited Soviet 
aggression, and Western nuclear policy had hence little 
credibility. 7 
In the United States, meanwhile, the former Chair of the 
Commission on a Just and Durable Peacea John Foster Dulles, 
became the Secretary of State in Eisenhower's new9 1953 
4 Slessor 1954, p. 108. 
5 Howard 1970, p. 161. 
6 The United States exploded the first H-bomb at Eniwetok Atoll on 
November 6 1952. The Soviet Union exploded its first H-bomb on August 
29 1953. 
7 Groom 1974, pp. 55-92. 
8 Instituted in 1945 by the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ 
in America, see Chapter Four of this thesis. 
9 The Democrat President Truman had been beaten by the Republican 
Dwight D. Eisenhower in the 1953 Presidential elections. 
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administration. He adopted a particularly tough policy of 
confrontation towards the Soviets which depended on 
exaggerating fears of nuclear disaster. 10 These ideas of 
"brinkmanshipl meant it was necessary to sometimes "go to 
the brink' of war: "the ability to get to the verge without 
getting into war is the necessary art. If you cannot master 
it, you inevitably get into war .... We walked to the brink 
and we looked it in the face. " 11 In mid-May 1953 Dulles 
warned the Chinese of his willingness to use the H-bomb in 
the Korean war. When an armistice was signed this served to 
strengthen the view that the Dulles approach was effective 
policy. 
In January 1954, Dulles unveiled Eisenhower's 'New Look' 
foreign policy. The basic structure of the New Look was an 
expanded strategic air force and a much-reduced conventional 
force on land and at sea. It depended upon a huge American 
lead in nuclear weapons and slashing costs everywhere except 
for the Strategic Air Force and its ability to wage atomic 
war. 12 The heart of this policy was an increased reliance 
on nuclear weapons, what Dulles termed as 'massive 
retaliation'. 13 This formulation was a far more precise and 
dogmatic representation of the same policies pursued in 
lu For a good discussion on the origins of strategy see Mandelbaum 
1979, pp. 41-60; also The Church and the Bomb (1982) pp. 19-42. 
11 Cited in Tindall and Shi 1984, p. 845. 
12 Ambrose 1984, pp. 171 and 225. 
13 Bernard Brodie's discussion of the role of massive retaliation in US 
national policy in "The Anatomy of Deterrence" in Garnett (ed. ) 1970, 
pp. 87-105. This chapter is a reprint of Brodie's article of the same 
title in World Politics XI 2 (Jan. 1959). 
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Whitehall over the past two years. Dulles announced the 
intention of the US to place its military dependence 
"primarily upon a great capacity to retaliate, instantly, by 
means and at places of our choosing" thereby gaining "more 
basic security at less cost. "" Massive retaliation was, as 
the Pentagon's public-relations people described it, "fewer 
conventional forces, more atomic firepower, less CoSt,, 
15. 
In the slogan of the time, an attempt to get "more bang for 
the buck"16. 
The rationale, as in Britain, was both political and 
economic. In the US case an attempt by the Republican Party 
to return to financial normalcy after the ruinous military 
expenditure of the past four years . 
17 The assumption was 
that nuclear weapons could be used to replace conventional 
forces and ease the budgetary burden. Eisenhower and his 
cabinet were fearful that the US efforts to build a 
superpower were leading to bankruptcy, and during 1954 the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff set about operationalising this 
economically cheaper military posture. 
To Michael Howard both British and US assumptions should 
be judged not so much as a coherent strategic doctrine but 
more as a political expedient, "a diplomatic communication" 
14 The New York Times, 13 January 1954. Cited by Paul H. Nitze, "Atoms 
strategy and Policy" pp. 187-199, in Foreign Affairs January 1956, p. 187. 
For information on the British response to this strategy see Pierre 
1972, p. 88, and Kemp's M. Litt. 1986, pp. 56-8. 
15 Ambrose 1984, P. 171. 
16 Tindall and Shi 1984, p. 844. 
17 Howard 1970, p. 165. 
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-- itself a manoeuvre in the articulation of the politico- 
military strategy of 'deterrence' . 
18 Yet Dulles in 
particular justified the policy to the public in religious 
or ideological terms. 
Dulles's Manichaean Moralism 
To Dulles the Western world was the repository of 
Christian values, values which were personified and embodied 
in the Western State. The Cold War was a confrontation not 
so much between traditional powers but between ideologies - 
"'Ideological diplomacy" by definition made a genuine 
international order comprising both communism and the Anglo- 
Saxon democracies an impossibility because communism as such 
constituted "The arch-enemy and the seat of all evil,... the 
headquarters of the last remaining wickedness in the 
world. "'9 As Herbert Butterfield wrote in 1953: "Moral 
politics, therefore, amounted to the notion that the West 
must do everything that needs to be done to insure the 
1120 survival of itself, its friends, and its principles . The 
Dulles approach, in Augustinian terms, was not realistic but 
Manichaean. Dulles saw the world as fundamentally an arena 
in which the forces of good and evil were continuously at 
war. Because of this Dulles believed Truman's policy of 
'containment' had been immoral and negative. What was 
18 Howard 1970, p. 165. 
19 Butterfield 1953, pp. 19-25 and 124. 
20 Howard 1970, p. 246. 
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needed was a moral, overtly 'Christian' , tactical foreign 
policy: 
Because of our religious beliefs we attach exceptional 
importance to freedom. We believe in the sanctity of 
the human personality, in the inalienable rights with 
which men are endowed by their Creator and in the right 
to have governments of their own choosing.... We are as 
a nation unsympathetic to systems and governments that 
deny human freedom and seek to mould all men to a 
preconceived pattern and to use them as tools to 
aggrandise the state. 21 
The novelty of such talk, with its notions of 'liberation' 
and 'roll back' from 'Communist enslavement', 
brought 
applause from many in the Churches and on the political 
right. Nevertheless, for all his talk of freedom Dulles' 
policy made no significant departure from the traditional 
Western Cold War policy of containment. He rather set to 
institutionalise containment using rhetoric, and linking it 
with the military strategy of deterrence. As vice-president 
Richard Nixon explained in March 1954, thanks to this 
policy, "no longer would the Communists nibble the West to 
death all over the world in little wars. "22 
In November 1954, Field Marshal Montgomery, NATO's 
DeputY23 Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (SACEUR), made 
it clear that the West were basing all their "'operational 
planning on using atomic and thermonuclear weapons in our 
defence ... 
it is no longer 'they may possibly used'. It is 
21 Quote from Dulles' "Challenge and Response in US Policy" article in 
Foreign Affairs, October 1957, p. 42. 
22 Cited in Tindall and Shi 1984, p. 845. 
23 Kemp wrongly labels (Kemp's M. Litt. 1966, p. 58) Montgomery as the 
supreme Allied Commander in Europe. This is incorrect, Montgomery was 
Deputy to General Greunther, see Groom 1974, p. 66. 
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very definitely 'They will be used, if we are attacked' . 1124 
The scientists had boosted this last possibility by saying 
it was possible, thanks to testing, to alter the character 
of nuclear weapons: 
Recent tests point to the possibility of possessing 
nuclear weapons the destructiveness and radiation 
effects of which can be confined substantially to 
predetermined targets. In the future it may thus be 
feasible to place less reliance upon deterrence of vast 
retaliatory power. It may be possible to defend 
countries by nuclear weapons so mobile, or so placed, 
and to make military invasion with conventional forces 
a hazardous attempt. 25 
In December 1954 NATO integrated tactical (i. e. battlefield) 
nuclear weapons into strategic planning. There were now 
three main levels of armaments: first, conventional (i. e. 
pre-atomic type weapons); second, tactical atomic (i. e. 
smaller atomic bombs whose effects it was thought could be 
'confined' to within several miles); third, the H-bomb (i. e. 
the thermonuclear 'civilisation destroyer'). 
The 1957 White Paper 
From these perspectives, Minister of Defence Sandys' 1957 
White Paper Defence: Outline of Future Policy, simply placed 
contemporary strategic developments into a formulation that 
more strongly than ever reflected the British state's public 
24 Groom 1974, p, 66; Kemp 1986 p. 58. 
25 See Dulles' article "Challenge and Response in US Policy", in 
Foreign Affairs, October 1957, p. 32. 
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willingness to rely on the threatened employment of nuclear 
weapons in response to enemy aggression. 26 
The White Paper emphasised that "scientific advances must 
fundamentally alter the whole basis of military planning" 
and that ', "the time has come to revise not merely the size, 
but the whole character of the defence plan". In the 
context of recent scientific advances, "The only existing 
safeguard against major aggression is the power to threaten 
retaliation with nuclear weapons" which means Britain "'must 
possess an appreciable element of nuclear deterrent power of 
her own". Central to this thesis was the perception that 
without a strong economy "'military power cannot in the long 
run be supported" and that major savings in defence 
expenditure would have to be secured. Even after the 
necessary reduction in armed forces personnel and the 
curtailing of expenditure the Government was confident "that 
Britain could discharge her overseas responsibilities and 
make an effective contribution to the defence of the free 
world with armed forces smaller than they are at present". 27 
In the same manner as the American New Look this policy 
was an attempt to integrate nuclear weapons with the 
requirements of an over-burdened economy and the demands of 
Zb Navias 1991, p. l. Navias's discussion of the Sandys' White Paper 
(particularly pp. 134-87) is probably the most comprehensive source 
available and one based on primary sources. 
27 Defence: Outline of Future Policy, Cmnd. 124, paras. 3-6,14,15, 
and 40. 
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Korean War rearmament programme. 28 Nuclear weapons, as 
Navias argued, "served domestic bureaucratic goals, 
objectives of international political status, as means of 
influencing American policy and as instruments for deterring 
Soviet power as well as, if need be, of helping counter its 
military might. "29 Groom concurs to this assessment when he 
noted that the decisions of the period were "above 
30 all ... motivated by notions of economy and prestige" . 
Four points should be made if the doctrine of deterrence 
by the threat of massive retaliation is to be fully 
appreciated. First, its strategic utility and credibility 
are to be judged within the context of Western war culture 
as a whole. There was no "strategy of options', military 
power was seen as an independent aspect of State policy. 
Second, both "New Looks' were an attempt to maintain an 
effective military capability with the minimum of 
expenditure. An attempt to ensure that any violation of the 
status quo would be punished by the maximum means available. 
This premise inevitably included the idea that effective 
deterrence depended upon the threat of nuclear punishment 
against Soviet cities. The British saw Bomber Command as a 
supplement to, not substitute for, the Uni. ted States 
Strategic Air Command. Third, "the most that the advocates 
of the deterrent policy have ever claim6d for it, " so 
2U Dockrill 1988 provides a clearly written analysis of the main 
currents and developments here. 
29 Navias 1991, p. 36. 
30 Groom 1974, p. 581. 
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Slessor asserted, "is that it will deter a potential 
aggressor from undertaking total war as an instrument of 
policy, as Hitler did in 1939, or from embarking upon a 
course of international action which obviously involves a 
serious risk of total war, as the Austrian Government did in 
1914.113l Finally, the highly classified nature of all 
information pertaining to Bomber Command in Britain meant 
the absence of serious intercourse between State officials, 
free-lance strategic thinkers, international relations 
scholars, and indeed the public. This was particularly so 
from 1952 and up to the public declaration of the 1957 White 
Paper. In this way all ideas had been generated 
independently of democratic control. 
Massive Retaliation or Graduated Deterrence 
Up to the Summer of 1957 Government thinking had been 
dominated by the notion that the post-1945 peace had been 
preserved by the capacity to destroy vast segments of the 
human race. During 1954 alternative strategic approaches to 
"all or nothing" nuclear deterrence policy began appearing 
in academic journals such as Foreign Affairs, International 
Affairs and World Politics. A small circle of well known 
defence and security commentators including Sir Anthony 
Buzzard, Sir John Slessor, Capt. Basil Liddell Hart, and 
Professor Patrick Blackett came to the forefront of an 
31 Slessor "Lecture at Oxford University". Text of a April 1955 
speech. Reprinted in Slessor 1957, p. 181. 
200 
attempt to alter the whole basis of Anglo-American nuclear 
strategy. " These thinkers began from the realist premise 
that the element of force existed in international 
relations, that it could not be eliminated, but believed 
nonetheless that it could and must be intelligently 
controlled. In this manner they equated 'peace' (in a very 
Augustinian way) with *, order'. Here the theory of limited 
war or graduated deterrence 33 was created as a pragmatic yet 
moral3' alternative to New Look massive retaliation. Such 
attempts were seen as nothing short of the pioneering of a 
more flexible range of military options between surrender 
and outright thermonuclear holocaust. For Rear Admiral 
Buzzard, former Director of Naval Intelligence 35 and 
Director of Vi cker s -Armstrong, limited war was a policy of 
limiting wars (in weapons, targets, area and time) to the 
36 minimum force necessary to deter and repel aggression . In 
particular, Buzzard called for a unilateral and immediate 
32 Garnett 1977, pp. 156-7 and 213-34; plus Howard's essay "The 
Classical Strategists" (Howard 1970, pp. 154-83) provide an over-view of 
the development of this debate. 
33 Caution is advised when associating Buzzard with the 'limited war' 
position because, in academic strategic studies, he is usually 
associated with the concept of 'graduated deterrence' (e. g. Howard 1970; 
Clark and Wheeler 1989; Navias 1991). This is to distance Buzzard's 
position from that of Liddell Hart and 'limited war' (which suggested 
Buzzard underrated the capabilities of conventional forces). In this 
study Buzzard's approach is always referred to as limited war because 
this is the term applied in BCC circles. 
34 This is important in understanding the subsequent BCC attraction to 
this policy. 
35 Clark and Wheeler (1989 pp. 183-200), using records from the Public 
Records office, examine Buzzard's role as Director of Naval Intelligence 
in the years 1951 to his retirement in 1954. This perspective considers 
Buzzard's criticisms of British nuclear strategy from within the 
framework of bureaucratic struggles within Whitehall. Also see Baylis 
1991 on Buzzard's role in the making of modern nuclear strategy. 
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distinction between strategic (thermonuclear) and tactical 
(atomic) weapons along with a public adherence to the 
principle of not using more force than was necessary for 
dealing with smaller Soviet incursions or limited wars in 
other parts of the globe. 37 This policy, however, was 
tantamount to the demand that in a future global war Soviet 
cities would be deemed 'hostages' or bargaining leavers to 
bring about the termination of conflict. 38 
The military commentator, analyst and contributor to 
Oldham's Christian News-Letter Basil Liddell Hart, wrote a 
letter to The Times in August 195539 supporting this 
approach. Liddell Hart criticised the argument that massive 
retaliation with the H-bomb was the most effective deterrent 
to "massive aggression". He challenged the "all or nothing" 
nuclear course and in its stead advocated the intermediate 
'graduated deterrence'. The principle here was that the 
West should use the minimum force necessary both to repel a 
particular Soviet aggression and deter its extension. This 
idea, however, did not exclude massive retaliation as an 
ultimate resort. It was hoped an aggressor could be forced 
to abandon their course, but not necessarily forced into 
surrender. Announcing a policy of graduated action was 
intended to: first, make clear the West was prepared to take 
36 e. g. Buzzard 1956; Buzzard, Slessor, and Lowenthal 1956; and Nitze 
1956. 
37 Navias 1991, p. 26. 
38 Groom 1974, pp. 75-84. 
39 The Times 29 August 1955. 
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a firm line if necessary; and second, strengthen the Western 
public's will to resist once they realised aggression was 
non-suicidal. The problem was in establishing and 
maintaining a dividing line between so-called 'tactical' 
action against the forces of an aggressor, and 'strategic' 
action against bases and resources. 'o The ultimate desire 
was to confine nuclear weapons to the battlefield and away 
from civilian targets. Such a strategy would be expensive. 
NATO policy had been geared to building up large 
conventional forces equipped with tactical nuclear weaponsf 
and building large strategic airforces equipped with 
thermonuclear weapons. From the early 1950s, however, the 
Conservative government had attempted to slash defence 
expenditure through the reduction of conventional forces and 
the adoption of a nuclear-biased defence posture that 
weakened a limited war capability. If the West was to 
continue to rely on the hydrogen bomb it was logical (as the 
Eisenhower administration had argued) to continue cutting 
down conventional forces to the minimum level necessary to 
protect against border encroachments. Reliance on the 
'Great Deterrent' (i. e. the H-bomb) should therefore have 
proved a logical, cheaper policy option. Liddell Hart 
argued, however, that a contemporary lack of clarity over 
strategic intentions gave the worse of both worlds -- 
40 Ibid. 
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maximum cost with maximum insecurity. A clarified, 
graduated policy was really the cheapest and safest policy: 
The provision of tactical atomic weapons has now been 
carried so far, and the Western forces so geared to 
them, that a return to the 'great deterrent' policy in 
a clear-cut way has become very unlikely, as a matter 
of practical politics, whatever its economic promise. 
It is thus the more urgent to work out a "graduated' 
policy to diminish the growing risk that, through this 
atomic provision and 'gearing' action to meet a local 
emergency will precipitate a war of total 
destruction. 41 
Alternative Perspectives 
42 The Economist, for one, questioned such reasoning . The 
article argued that a "hydrogen stalemate' or "balance of 
terror' was infinitely better than an unbalance and much 
surer than any balance of conventional weapons. The writer 
defined their understanding of graduated deterrence as: 
In its simplest form, the proposal of graduated 
deterrence amounts to no more than the advocacy of a 
declaration by the Western powers that they would 
employ, in the face of a threat to peace, no more force 
than would be needed to remove it -- for example, to 
hit back with roughly twice the force employed in any 
local aggression. 43 
The Economist article posed two related questions: first, 
would the giving of such an undertaking strengthen or weaken 
the chances of peace? Second, if war comes, will prior 
declarations limit its eventual horror? It concluded: 
With regret, ... a policy of graduated deterrence, in 
any form. .. does not stand up to the test of logical 
examination. one reverts to the major premise -- if 
the effectiveness of the deterrent resides precisely in 
its certainty and its horror, then any attempt to 
41 Ibid. 
42 The Economist 5 November 1955, pp. 457-58. 
43 Ibid., p. 457. 
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reduce either the certainty or the horror will reduce 
its power to deter. 44 
Soon afterwards Anthony Buzzard helped organise a 
'Conference on Limiting War'. He approached Kenneth Slack 45 
to see if the BCC could recommend a list of 10 ecclesiastics 
whom ought to be invited. Buzzard thought it necessary to 
include a wide selection of British Christian thinking, 
particularly from the Foreign Relations Department of the 
Church of England, and the Church of Scotland, as well as 
other denominations, in such a venture. Alan Booth, the 
incipient46 London Secretary of the CCIA was very 
enthusiastic about this overture and suggested to Slack 47 
that the BCC International Department might consider 
establishing a permanent study group to consider Anglo- 
American divergences in policy. Although nothing came of 
this particular suggestion, " Alan Keighley (the DIA 
secretary) thought the BCC should encourage the Conference 
because it was both relevant to Christians and "responsibly 
44 Ibid., p. 458. 
45 Buzzard's first approach to the BCC cannot be located in the BCC 
archives (it is also not clear whether the request was in writing or a 
verbal one). A letter from Booth to Slack dated 31 October 1956, Box 
13, however mentions Buzzard's approach. Michael Howard (1989b, p. 9) 
attests that Buzzard in fact approached his local bishop (Bell) with his 
ideas, who in turn introduced Buzzard to Kenneth Grubb. On this view it 
was Grubb who introduced Buzzard to BCC circles. 
46 Booth officially became the London Secretary of the CCIA from the 1 
January 1957. At the same time he was asked to serve as consultant to 
the BCC International Department. See the Minutes of the 65th DIA 
meeting 4 December 1956, Box 13. 
47 Booth to Slack, 31 October 1956, BCC Box 13. 
48 It is not clear why nothing came of this suggestion. An internal 
memo from Keighley to Slack, argued that the Anglo-American study group 
would certainly be of great value, "... but most of the people on it 
would need to be highly intelligent Christian laymen, for several 
reasons (not suggested). " See memo dated 12 November 1956, BCC Box 13. 
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sponsored. j. -4 9 The 'Conference on Limiting War' was held in 
Brighton on the 20 January 1957 with Booth serving as 
Conference Secretary. The Conference involved 75 Britons 
and Americans interested in the problems of defence in a 
nuclear age. These people were drawn both from those with 
official experience and from voluntary organisations 
concerned with foreign policy and international affairs 
including the Churches. After the Conference the 
participants formed themselves into a 'Brighton Conference 
Association. 50 
The International Department and the Limited War Thesis 
At their September 195751 meeting the International 
Department had decided that the issues raised by the summer 
Yale resolutions demanded an official response. It was 
decided the best way to proceed would be to discuss the 
statements with those WCC Central Committee members who were 
also members of the BCC, with a view to passing a BCC 
resolution. Before deciding to pass a resolution they 
thought it advisable to invite the opinion of a speaker of 
49 Ibid. 
50 on the 28th November 1958, after a donation from the Ford 
Foundation, the Brighton Conference Association was converted into the 
well-known Institute for Strategic Studies with its own permanent staff. 
Kenneth Grubb became Chair of its Executive Committee and John Slessor 
vice-president. Its Council included many of the personalities 
considered by this thesis including Professor Blackett, Alan Booth, 
Anthony Buzzard, Basil Liddell Hart, Denis Healey, Michael Howard and 
Canon Waddams. In 1959 the Institute founded its own periodical 
tellingly entitled Survival. An overview of the history of the 
organisation that is particularly useful (in that it draws out its 
importance to the study and practice of IR in Britain) is provided by 
Howard 1989b. 
51 See Minutes of BCC International Department meeting, 17 September 
1957, in Box BCC/DIA/l/l/4. 
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high calibre who was familiar with the atmosphere in which 
decisions on national defence were taken. The debate over 
who to ask was largely determined by the impact of Henry 
Kissinger's new book Nuclear Weapons and Foreign poliCy. 52 
Kissinger's book has been described as the catalyst which 
initiated the so-called 'golden age' of contemporary 
strategic thought. 53 It was a book in which Kissinger 
aligned himself with Admiral Buzzard's credo that avoidance 
of war meant increasing emphasis on tactical weapons -- 
graduated deterrence at acceptable cost -- and the 
negotiation of limitations in the conduct of war. He 
explored issues of all-out and limited war and declared that 
the doctrine of massive retaliation was dangerously dated 
now the Soviets had built their own bomb. Kissinger argued: 
(1) that the West's attitude to war was rigid in contrast to 
the flexibility, as he saw it, of Soviet theory and 
practice; (2) that the British should declare, along with 
the Americans, a distinction between tactical and nuclear 
weapons making. This would make available small atomic 
weapons for the use of NATO fighting forces in the field and 
acknowledge that thermonuclear strategic weapons were 
irrelevant in the conduct of foreign policy in peripheral 
areas of the world; (3) he called for the appropriate 
conventional forces to be made available with which to fight 
52 Kissinger 1957. 
53 See John Garnet's introduction: Garnet 1970, p. 24. Garnet notes 
this 'golden age' probably concluded in the early 1960s with Robert 
McNamara's famous policy statements. 
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local wars; and (4) that tactical nuclear weapons were an 
appropriate response for this purpose. Rather, as Gordon 
Dean wrote in his introduction, the West should be 
"unwilling to accept gradual Russian enslavement of other 
peoples around the world, which we know will eventually lead 
to our own enslavement, we are forced to adopt a posture 
that, despite Russian military capabilities and d espite 
their long-free intentions, freedom shall be preserved to 
us. " 54 Kissinger argued that the West should be willing to 
find the moral certainty to act without the support of 
extremism, and to run risks without a guarantee of success. 
He suggested NATO's absolute dependence on the means and 
strategy of massive retaliation was ultimately a weak one 
precisely because it went against the grain of Western 
morality. And that the West and the Soviets, though 
ideological adversaries, could still act as potential 
partners in the preservation of a mutually acceptable status 
quo . 
5' From this context Kissinger could also conclude that 
because all real threats were external to the West, 
unilateralists or neutralists operated in fact to support 
the Soviet Union. 56 
The DIA's CCIA consultant, Alan Booth, felt Kissinger's 
book was "required reading for any one seriously concerned 
54 Kissinger 1957, p. vii. 
55 Howard 1989a, p. 5. 
56 A fascinating discussion of Kissinger's role in the development of 
this 'survival of Western values' idea is considered in Olson's 1962 
PhD, pp. 155-84. 
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with international peace and I confess I have not hit on any 
,, 57 similar magnum opus on the subject for many years. Booth 
wrote to the International Department's secretary, Alan 
Keighley enclosing a paper summarising half a dozen thoughts 
derived from reflecting on the current situation and 
Kissinger's book. Booth felt it was very important, in 
particular, to find common ground between BCC concerns and 
the Brighton Conference Association. He hoped the DIA would 
consider convening a small (perhaps meeting bi-monthly, 
drawn from the Brighton Conference) standing group, to 
advise on strategic nuclear matters. For Booth "There (was) 
urgent need for Christian opinion to be technically informed 
and our present set of contacts may give us the chance to 
get the kind of advice we most need. "58 
Booth's paper is revealing in that it serves to 
illustrate how opinion was moving in the Buzzardist 
direction. Booth's paper was concerned with discussing the 
debate on limited war which had drew the Brighton Conference 
together. This line of thinking had developed widely since 
the Conference and had produced a fairly extensive 
literature. It included not only Kissinger"s book, but 
articles by James King of the US Army's Operations Research 
Office in Army (August 1957) and The New Republic (July 
1957), Dulles's article in Foreign Affairs (October 1957) . 
57 Booth to Keighley, 1 October 1957, BCC Box 14. 
58 Ibid. 
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Extensive reviews of Kissinger had also appeared in The 
Times, The Manchester Guardian, The Economist, The Ohserver, 
The Daily Telegraph (September 1957) and such thinking, for 
Booth, had shown "... at least the line along which some 
positive (Christian) thinking can be fruitfully done on the 
question of war in the nuclear age. The ramifications of 
the debate are political, moral and technical.. . "59 Booth 
saw the moral ramifications of the debate as particularly 
relevant for Church thinking. While civilians were 
preoccupied with stopping a drift toward world atomic war, 
the armed forces and politicians were increasingly concerned 
that diplomacy and military pressure was inhibited by the 
"shadow of the great deterrent. "r3o Paralysis had therefore 
set in between the choice of small enlargements of Soviet 
domination and suicidal war. For Booth such considerations 
raised the question of whether Christians, at present, were 
too inclined to concern themselves primarily with the 
question of Peace. In this, Booth asked, are Christians 
" ... not simply adopting the position of a war-weary mankind 
which wants to be left in peace? "61 He felt it instructive 
to reflect how little the Bible concerned itself with peace 
as an end in itself: 
Classical Christian thinking has emphasised rather 
Order and Justice, and has not flinched from the 
thought that the exercise of power and force is 
necessary to secure these two ends. (Contemporary 
59 Booth's paper, p. l. BCC Box 14. 
60 Ibid. 
Gi Ibid., p. 2. 
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Christian thinking would include under Justice the duty 
of preserving and developing a society in which men may 
increasingly make responsible choices, and one which is 
open to constant criticism and correction. In this 
sense we might add a dynamic term "Freedom" to the more 
static concepts of Order and Justice. ) It has never 
been a part of Christian political insight to imagine 
that Order, Justice and Freedom could be secured on the 
basis of a general goodwill and tolerance. 62 
For Booth such thinking was rather the illusion of a 
sentimental generation which looked for easy solutions. The 
crux of the matter was that Christians, fortunately, had 
reason to believe that there are things for which God cared 
for in human affairs more than that humanity should be left 
to pursue its own interests without the disturbance of 
conflict. Since there was no possibility of establishing, 
in the near future, an international authority to enforce 
Order, Justice and the conditions of Freedom, Christians 
"must learn to live in a disorderly situation and extract 
from it what remains available for the creation of a sound 
world society. In practice this meant living with competing 
powers and governments, and using the conflicts of power to 
achieve some measure of stability. , j, 63 Whilst this state of 
affairs was not a safe situation, the Christian must aim to 
make the world as humane as possible, and to train people to 
live creatively in this kind of insecurity. This had to be 
a familiar task for Christians whose security does not lie 
within history. Two policies should therefore be adopted by 
the BCC: first, the recognition that both Great Powers were 
62 Ibid. 
63 Ibid. 
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capable of mutual destruction of 'apocalyptic proportions' , 
and henceforth putting aside any thought of total Western 
victory -- "'In this sense co-existence is the only 
alternative to co-destruction. "64 Second, Christians must 
acknowledge that apart from all-out confrontation there were 
many areas that existed where Super-powers could seek local 
advantages: ""Here the necessity is to produce local balances 
of power, to prevent anarchic action and compel the 
submission of conflicts to the procedures of diplomacy. " 65 
In the creation of such local balances of power the limited 
war school of thought, that Booth and others were concerned, 
could be asserted. With these two policies British 
Christian opinion could, and should, be able to find common 
concern with the Brighton Conference Association and their 
kind. 
Booth's Propositions 
In terms of limiting war, Booth made several propositions 
available for exercising restraining. First, he noted that 
the idea that war inevitably becomes "total" is a modern 
one. In the past rulers often kept control of war, with a 
view to the achievement of ends far short of the crushing of 
the will of the opponent. (The prospect of destroying an 
enemy completely was only conceivable in the nuclear age. ) 
To prevent war becoming total two vital conditions must be 
-- Booth's paper p. 3, BCC Box 14. 
65 Ibid. 
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fulfilled: (i) There must be vigorous political control of 
military plans and performance. "'The means of ensuring this 
are amongst the most urgent to which Christians can give 
their attention. , 66 (ii) Civilians must be prepared and 
informed beforehand as to the sacrifices called for in the 
exercise of military power in circumstances where there can 
be no victory -- only a return to negotiation. ""Otherwise 
the population in democratic countries may be moved to 
demand disastrous actions to "solve' a problem to which 
there was no solution. This demanded a degree of poise and 
balance to which Christians ought to be ready to 
contribute. "67 
Booth's second proposition was that the military 
preparations of the West were ill designed to exert the 
desired local pressures. "Their reliance on the deterrent 
tends to make them incapable of meeting Korean-type 
situations and therefore contributes to world instability. 
If economy and a refusal to imperil living standards or to 
accept the burden of military service tempts them to spend 
their substance chiefly on megaton devices and their 
delivery, they will sign their own death warrant, one way or 
another -- by submitting to piecemeal attacks, or by 
unleashing all-out-war., 168 
66 Ibid. 
67 Ibid., p. 4. 
68 Ibid. 
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A third proposition was that, in the first instance, "the 
limitations set upon a 'Limited War' should be limitations 
of aim rather than of weapons .... The nature of the aim in 
fact controls the nature of the weapons used. "169 This was 
of cardinal importance because if there was a hope to 
maintain limitations, in practice clear objectives must be 
in view from the start. The terms on which hostilities 
would cease and negotiations resumed must be outlined. 
"Only in this way can a serious war, even if it begins with 
the use of 'conventional' weapons, be prevented from rapid 
,, 70 enlargement to 'total' proportions. 
Booth's final proposition was the question as to whether 
small nuclear weapons could be used in a limited war. This 
needed active debate. on one hand, Booth noted some 
specialists said a war of any size could not be fought 
between nuclear powers without nuclear weapons: 
""A Conventional' warfare requires the massing of a striking 
force against a defended line, and such a massing would 
present so tempting a nuclear target that no soldier would 
base his plans on its invincibility. Further, it is argued 
that the vast periphery of the Communist world, its interior 
lines, capacity for secrecy and cheap manpower make it 
necessary for the West to match a local move with the 
nuclear power of a much smaller force. And the development 
of atomic warheads as small as a 10 ton TNT bomb seems to 
- Booth's paper p. 4, BCC Box 14. 
70 Ibid. 
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some to make the distinction between weapons unreal . On 
the other hand, Booth was aware others had argued that 
despite the many temptations to cross any set limits in war, 
the distinction between "conventional' and nuclear weapons 
was so obvious and recognisable it would not be crossed 
lightly. Here public opinion could weigh heavily against 
the use of nuclear weapons to counterbalance military 
advantages. Booth felt that whilst such technical tactical 
and strategic questions could not be judged by the average 
person, they could nevertheless ask the military planners to 
seek for the smallest margin of risk on the battlefield: 
The whole of this debate can be made to appear as an 
attempt to 'make war possible' again. But its 
significance is rather that it attempts to devise 
methods of stability, with clearly preconditioned 
devices for limitations of damage, in a world of 
conflicting power that cannot at present be ordered or 
harmonised. The issue of the debate has consequences 
for other matters such as the continuance of nuclear 
tests, in so far as these could be confined, for 
instance, to the development of increasingly 
discriminating (i. e. 'tactical nuclear') weapons. 72 
Notwithstanding the impact of Kissinger's book, and Booth's 
paper, Admiral Buzzard was not the automatic first choice as 
BCC speaker. It was hoped that Sir Thomas Taylor would 
agree to speak 73 but, because of his chairing of the WCC 
group with this concern 74 , he declined the invitation. 
71 Ibid., pp. 4-5. 
72 Ibid., p. 5. 
73 This fact was revealed in a personal letter from Robert Mackie, 
Chair of the DIA, to Bishop Bell of Chichester, 15 November 1957, Box 
14, 
74 Taylor, along with Dr. Robert Bilheimer, would be responsible for 
the WCC 1956 'Provisional Study Document' Christians and the Prevention 
of War in an Atomic Age -- A Theological Discussion. This document is 
discussed in Chapter Seven of this thesis. 
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Thanks in no small part to Booth's endorsement and 
enthusiasm, the person chosen to represent "the point of 
view of one familiar with the outlook of those responsible 
for decisions on national defence 1175 was Anthony Buzzard. 
Part II: Admiral Buzzard's Council Address 
On the 29th October 1957 the British Council of Churches 
met for their annual Assembly at Leeds. Each Department was 
asked to present a Report and forward resolutions it hoped 
Council to pass. At the spring meeting the Council had 
passed the controversial Private Member's resolution moved 
by Bishop Bell. The obvious texts that needed consideration 
were the Yale statements made by the CCIA and Central 
Committee of the WCC that opened the possibility for a 
Christian endorsement of unilateral nuclear disarmament. 
Alan Keighley, as DIA secretary, was faced with the question 
of what line the International Department should recommend. 
It was Keighley's intention, however, "to avoid a snap 
resolution, and to try to get the Council to face the 
realities of the situation, as well as the moralities of 
it . "76 It was decided that a generalised discussion would 
take place on the basis of Admiral Buzzard's talk on the 
first morning of the Council's meeting. Those members of 
the WCC Central Committee and the International Department 
75 Ibid. 
76 Keighley to Buzzard, 2 October 1957, BCC Box 14. 
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who were present, would then meet and decide what statement 
the Council should be asked to adopt. 
Alan Keighley requested Sir Anthony to speak for twenty 
minutes and discuss two issues. First, something of the 
atmosphere in which defence decisions had to be taken. 
Second, a word pointing out the possibility that "atomic war 
of any kind need not lead to use of the 'Great Deterrent. '" 
Granted the existence of the great deterrent "how could 
Christians learn to carry on the business of running the 
world as before, under its shadow. It77 Buzzard began his 
address by stating his case: 
As a very ordinary Churchman, who happens to have been 
closely connected with defence policy, I have often 
been struck by the gap which exists between Church 
opinion on this matter, and the policies evolved by the 
experts in Whitehall. The reason for this gap is, I 
suppose, that the Church sets its sights on the 
ultimate ideal, with the result that it is sometimes 
accused of having its feet off the ground, whereas 
Whitehall is mainly concerned with what action is 
immediately practicable, and all too often assumes that 
moral considerations cannot apply when dealing with 
Communists and war. That there is a demand for this 
gap to be filled is, I think ' clear from the 
tremendously strong public feelings which are aroused 
on such occasions as the recent Labour Party debate 
78 
79 on the H-bomb . 
Buzzard was not about to suggest what should be done to help 
bridge this problem of 'middle axioms' in the realm of 
77 Ibid. 
78 Buzzard refers to the 1957 Labour Party's October Conference in 
Brighton where Nye Bevan, archetypal hero of the left, denounced nuclear 
unilateralism as tantamount to "sending a Foreign Secretary naked into 
the conference chamber. " For detail of Bevan's painfully 
multilateralist speech see Groom 1974, pp. 300-5; and the sympathetic but 
a pp. 547-83. 
, 
ggrieved analysis by Foot 1975, ý 
p. 1 of the transcript of Buzzard's speech to Council, 29 October 
1957, Box BCC/DIA/1/l/4. 
217 
Christian ethics. He rather wanted to propose four concrete 
steps that would bring the Churches nearer to Government and 
Whitehall. These steps would not only help close the gap 
between the temporal and the spiritual, but help clear the 
current impasse in world defence and disarmament talks. 
Indeed, all proposals could be taken without Soviet 
agreement, and -- with one minor exception -- were 
complementary to the Yale Summer statements, and to the 
current Western disarmament proposals. 80 
Buzzard's first proposal was the formulation of a set of 
moral or legal principles which the world's politicians 
could use when framing defence policies. These were centred 
around a modernised version of the just war and involved re- 
Ou Buzzard is building on notions related to the Western 'Package Plan' 
of 1957. This plan was announced on the 29 August 1957 and included: a) 
the suspension of nuclear tests, under a system to be devised; b) the 
*'cutting-off' of new production of fissile material for military use; c) 
the 'equitable transfer' of all fissile material from existing weapons 
stocks to peaceful use. At first sight these proposals seemed a 
reasonable advance, indeed they might well have proved to be, but the 
Soviets turned them down for the following reasons: a) whilst they 
accepted the suspension of tests and a system of control posts on Soviet 
soil, they felt suspension should not be made conditional on acceptance 
of 'cut-off', indeed they refused to accept cut-off unless an agreement 
for the total abolition of stocks was reached; b) the Soviets argued 
that 'cut-off' by itself was meaningless, because the USA had already 
enough nuclear weapons to blow the world up several times over. Here 
the Soviets had a legitimate point; c) they could not agree to 
%equitable transfers' because the US coupled the proposal with a 
declaration to the effect that the US must retain a substantial part of 
her nuclear stocks, and must be free to place nuclear war-heads on the 
territories of allies and to train allies' troops in their use. The 
basis of 'equitable transfer' proposed was finally 53 kg transferred by 
US for every 47 kg transferred by the Soviet Union. Matters were not 
made any better when afterwards, President Eisenhower told the American 
people that US stocks were far greater in quantity and quality than 
those of the Soviet Union. It was estimated that US stocks were three 
times as great as Russian stocks. This meant that if the Soviet Union 
accepted the proposals, Soviet stocks would approach nil and US stocks 
would be two-thirds of their current levels. In reality it could not be 
hoped the Soviets would ever accept this plan, or anything like it. See 
Noel-Baker 1958, pp. 24-7,220-1. 
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stating old principles. Buzzard suggested these might be 
drawn up and proclaimed by international lawyers rather than 
by the Church, but he felt sure the Church should lead the 
appeal for this task to be done. These principles were 
envisaged as: 
Fighting can only be legally justified if the cause is 
a really just one, such as defence against blatant 
aggression, or the removal of some intolerable basic 
injustice. It can only be justified if all other means 
of removing that cause have been tried first to the 
limit. In carrying out that fighting, only the minimum 
force necessary must be used. The destruction wrought 
must be limited so as never to become disproportionate 
to the issue at stake. The weapons used must always be 
reasonably controlled, and reasonably discriminate, as 
between armed forces and civilians, and as between 
combatants and neutrals. 81 
These just war principles would first be codified by the 
international lawyers of the Western Powers; the Communists 
and uncommitted countries would then be invited to say 
whether (or not) they were in agreement. For Buzzard this 
first step would help the West regain a vital 'sense of 
direction' with which to face disarmament talks. 
Buzzard's second desire was ""to stop the present vicious 
circle in the arms race, in which mutual fear is countered 
by arms, which is then countered by more fear, and then more 
,, 82 arms. The key to this lay in a honest appraisal of 
massive retaliation and the balance of power. Buzzard 
avowed this approach was the best hope for peace until a 
'World Government and Police Force' could be realised. In 
81 p. 2 of the transcript of Buzzard's speech to Council, 29 October 
1957, Box BCC/DIA/1/1/4. 
82 Ibid. 
219 
practice this meant accepting that, notwithstanding the 
Soviets recent lead in system technology (i. e. the launch of 
Sputnik _r83) , the West had not a 
balance, but rather a great 
superiority over the Soviets in massive retaliation 
capability. This was particularly so because the United 
States possessed more nuclear weapons, better techniques for 
delivery, and above all, a tremendous geographical 
advantage. Even though the Soviets could catch up in 
weapons and techniques, geographical advantage would always 
allow the United States to deliver weapons from bases three 
times as close to the Soviet Union, as Soviet bases could be 
to vital US targets. Apart from these relative 
considerations, the power of thermonuclear weapons was such 
that a saturation point had been reached in which relative 
factors were no longer significant. The mere existence of 
the hydrogen bomb was "making total war utterly repugnant to 
both. "a' Buzzard suggested that the West, and the US in 
particular, acknowledged that they were no longer interested 
in a 'neck to neck race' in thermonuclear weapons, but only 
intended maintaining sufficient numbers of H-bombs to ensure 
that any potential opponent would always do their utmost to 
avoid such total war. In other words: "I ... we (the West) 
83 Sputnik proved the Soviets had the ability to launch inte r- continental 
ballistic missiles. For detail see Denis Healey's article 'Sputnik and 
Western Defence' in the April 1958 Xnternational Affairs. Groom 1974, 
pp. 253-66 details the effect of Sputnik on the development of Western 
weaponry. 
84 p. 2 of the transcript of Buzzard's speech to Council, 29 October 
1957, Box BCC/DIA/1/1/4. 
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should openly accept the stalemate or balance of power in 
terms of total war weapons. 118,5 
Following this awareness of the nature of the global 
balance of power, it was henceforth possible for Britain to 
renounce unilaterally her intention of ever again fighting a 
total global war to its logical conclusion. In this respect 
a total nuclear war should be seen as never satisfying the 
requirements of just war. Indeed, "such a disaster could 
never be in proportion to any issue at stake, and it could 
never be the lesser of two evils, since it would virtually 
mean the destruction of the human race. if 86 The maintenance 
of sufficient power to make total war pointless to the 
Communists would permit urgent financial savings to be made, 
not only in H-bombs, but also in the other preparations 
necessary to wage total global war. 
The Local Balance of Power 
The third step Buzzard advocated concerned the balance of 
power in regard to local limited war. Unlike the global 
balance, he believed that here the Soviets enjoyed great 
superiority on account of their inherent strength in 
conventional forces. This superiority was due not only to 
vast reserves of personnel, but also to inherent factors 
such as the communication lines with which geo-politics had 
blessed them, and to the initiative which they held "as 
65 Ibid. 
86 Ibid. 
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dictators and potential aggressors" enabling them to 
mobilise and re-deploy their forces much more quickly and 
secretly than the West could. Consequently, if there was to 
be a local balance of power, the West was in the terrible 
dilemma of having in some cases to initiate at least limited 
atomic war in retaliation for serious local aggression by 
conventional forces. For Buzzard this, despite Bell's call 
for 'no first use', was a fundamental factor from which the 
West was unable to escape, at least until disarmament had 
proceeded dramatically. 
Another fundamental factor was that the West was more 
likely to deter, or repel, serious conventional aggression 
with limited atomic war even though this meant the Soviets 
may respond with nuclear weapons. This was because limited 
atomic war always favoured the defender of a territory more 
than the attacker; it enabled a given front to be defended 
with far fewer forces; and it enabled effective retaliation 
to be much swifter and thus made a rapid fait accompli by 
the aggressor much more difficult. 87 This strategy, 
however, also made Soviet aggression less politically 
profitable as it meant they either faced a first crucial 
atomic blow, or they initiated nuclear aggression, which for 
a limited local issue was likely to bring much more harm 
than good. Although this was not a desirable state of 
affairs for the West, it was nevertheless, a policy of 
87 p. 3 of the transcript of Buzzard's speech to Council, 29 October 
1957, Box BCC/DIA/l/l/4. 
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limiting nuclear war to which the USA was now committing 
itself to in the stead of its previous massive retaliation 
strategy. 
According to Buzzard most people accepted the very idea 
of nuclear limitation and d 
meant that before such a 
entertained it was necessary 
the issues. What were the 
meant moving the debate from 
To Buzzard, Britain had 
Lstinction as outrageous. This 
limited war policy could be 
to comprehend the complexity of 
alternatives? To answer this 
facts to opinions. 
three possible alternatives to 
limited war: first, to continue on its existing path and 
endorse a massive retaliation strategy -- the 'all or 
nothing" option. Second, invest in many more conventional 
forces, the expensive and hence unrealistic option. 
Finally, the passive resistance option; the logical 
development of which was that the West should give up its 
intention to fight any war and spend its resources to better 
effect. Because there was no prospect of a Western 
Government ever taking responsibility for this it was as 
unrealistic as "option twol. 80 The practicable choice was 
" Frank Myers' 1965 PhD is of interest here. Myers details how 
British 'peace organisations' such as the PPU, CND, and the Committee of 
100 were involved in developing 'Gandhian' (see particularly Bondurant 
1958 for an over-view) tactics of passive or non-violent resistance as 
an alternative to waging war in a nuclear age. Gandhi's success, 
particularly in putting the British government on the defensive in India 
in the 1920s and South Africa in the 1930s, had showed the potential of 
non-violent techniques against hostile governments. Richard B. Gregg's 
The Power of Non-Violence (New York: Fellowship of Reconciliation, 1951) 
and Bart de Ligt's The Conquest of Violence: An Essay on War and 
Revolution (London: Routledge, 1937) were especially influential in the 
fostering of this debate. Both Gregg (a US lawyer and active trade- 
unionist) and de Ligt (a Dutch pacifist priest) proposed detailed plans 
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henceforth between massive retaliation "abandoning the local 
balance of power and admitting that we cannot deal with 
Communism without threatening genocide"' 69 or limited war a 
via media between Realpolitik extremes. 
There were problems of course. On one hand Christians 
needed to ask whether nuclear war could be sufficiently 
limited in proportion to the issues likely to be at stake. 
In a word, could limited war be controlled and made 
discriminate, could it be prevented from escalating to 
thermonuclear war? On the other hand, the f act that the 
Armed Forces were particularly against the idea of limited 
war because they believed hands would be tied in advance if 
the West indicated the sort of limitations it might adopt in 
a particular situation. on this view the use of H-bombs 
could not be precluded if the old military principle of 
economy of force was to be relied on. 
Limitations 
Buzzard argued that the problem of limitation and 
discrimination was not so difficult as to be incapable of 
being made practicable. Limitations could be made 
practicable after much preparation, and considerable 
of individual and collective action to prevent war and make war 
impossible. Proposals ranged from propaganda campaigns, and 
conscientious objection, to general strikes and the sabotage of 
machines, bridges and transport necessary to conduct war. Sybil 
Morrison however, points out (1962, p. 60) that 'passive resistance' was 
also controversial because some British pacifists thought even non- 
violence was coercive and therefore not pacifist. 
69 p. 3 of the transcript of Buzzard's speech to Council, 29 October 
1957, Box BCC/DIA/1/1/4. 
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modifications to present military practice. Hostilities 
would of course have to be localised. Weapons would need to 
be restricted by size and radio-active fall-out, targets 
restricted away from centres of population, and above all, 
war aims strictly limited. For Buzzard in this last point 
lay "'the key to the whole problem. We must surely give up 
all ideas of unconditional surrender, or indeed of victory 
as such, and only aim at a return to negotiations on the 
basis of the minimum conditions required to remove the 
original injustice. "90 Limitations such as these needed to 
be worked out and aired in general terms so the world could 
be conditioned to them beforehand. only then did they stand 
a good chance of being effective as a local deterrent. The 
reason was that the Soviets, despite their propaganda, were 
just as anxious to conform to reasonable limitations for the 
sole reason that it was in their self-interest to do so. 
This was the way to override the mutual terror of total 
thermonuclear war. 
What was needed, if limited war was to serve as a 
credible nuclear just war strategy, was: first, the 
restoration of local balances of power; and second, 
convincing the world that limited atomic warfare could be 
strictly limited and that it did_not need to degenerate into 
total war. To this end he was pleased to report that US 
Secretary Dulles was beginning to endorse this approach. 
90 Ibid., p. 4. 
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However "as yet, NATO policy does not seem to have begun to 
move in that direction, and in this country the recent White 
Paper9' and subsequent Government statements have left the 
ti 92 country in disunity and confusion on this point . 
Buzzard's fourth and final proposal involved facing one 
more disagreeable fact. In one area, the German or Central 
Front in Western Europe, it was considered militarily 
impractical to stop all-out Soviet aggression even with 
limited atomic weapons. To maintain the local balance of 
power in this area it was necessary to retain the right to 
initiate the use of the H-bomb. 93 Whilst such a major 
local aggression was extremely unlikely, there was still the 
possibility that the threat would arise unintentionally as a 
result of some smaller conflict: 
To tolerate any longer than absolutely necessary this 
situation, in which we may have to be the first to use 
the H-bomb, is utterly repugnant by any moral or legal 
standards. Nor is it expedient, if we want to deal 
with Communism without destroying all, and if we want 
to negotiate the reunification of Germany from a 
position of realistic power balance. "94 
Escape from this dilemma required two things. First, 
transferring to Germany some of the economic resources 
wasted in trying to overweight an already saturated global 
balance of power. (This would be achieved by Buzzard's 
91 Buzzard is referring to the 1957 White Paper, Defence: Outline of 
Future Policy, Cmnd. 124. 
92 p. 4 of the transcript of Buzzard's speech to Council, 29 October 
1957, Box BCC/DIA/1/l/4. 
93 Ibid. 
94 p. 4 of the transcript of Buzzard's speech to Council, 29 October 
1957, Box BCC/DIA/1/1/4. 
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second proposal to halt the arms race. ) Second, persuading 
the Western public that it was absolutely vital and 
advantageous to divert the resources needed for the local 
balance of power in Germany. This task seemed futile at 
present when all that was offered was a total war in 
exchange for serious conflict in that area. The task could 
nevertheless be made possible, by the proposal to 
distinguish limited war from massive retaliation, because 
this would make the preparations for limited atomic war seem 
worthwhile. The Sandys" White Paper had made both these 
considerations harder to achieve. The damage could only be 
repaired by Western Governments illustrating to their public 
(and the Soviets) the nature of the dilemma they were facing 
in Germany and stating that they were nevertheless 
determined to find a solution by restoring the local balance 
of power. 
Buzzard's Four Points 
Buzzard's thesis can be summarised: first, lawyers should 
re-state the legal principles of the just war, supported by 
the Churches, as a target at which the policy makers should 
aim. Second, the West should ease the arms race in total 
war weapons by openly accepting the global balance of power 
and stating that only enough of these weapons would be kept 
to make the prospect of massive retaliation thoroughly 
repugnant. This involved stating that the West was no 
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longer prepared to fight such a war to the finish, nor spend 
the necessary resources preparing for it. Third, the West 
should restore the local balance of power by explaining 
publicly the differences between limited war and massive 
retaliation. This involved advocating whyý limited nuclear 
war might have to be initiated in particular circumstances, 
and why it was felt it could be limited and not escalate 
into total war. If this proposal was not carried out it was 
necessary to give up limited war preparations and put the 
money into stronger and more mobile conventional forces. 
Finally, the West should openly resolve to complete the 
restoration of the local balance of power in Germany -- both 
limited nuclear and conventional -- in order to escape from 
the danger of the first use of the H-bomb. Buzzard summed 
up his proposals by adding that: 
M-art from the first proposal -- concerning the 
principle of the just war, the key to the rest lies in 
the third -- that of distinguishing between limited 
atomic and total war -- and this must come first. For 
until that has been done, it is impossible to relax the 
race in total war weapons which we must brandish for 
every minor issue, and it is impossible to build up our 
strength in Germany, for as we saw that appears futile. 
Together, all four proposals should provide the 
workable balance of power which must surely help 
equitable disarmament, as well as peace. And they 
would begin to introduce moderation, control and the 
rule of law, disciplined by a healthy mutual fear of 
total war, until disarmament or a world police force 
can come to our rescue. 9-9 
For Buzzard all these proposals were complementary to, not 
instead of, present efforts to secure disarmament save in 
95 p. 5 of the transcript of Buzzard's speech to Council, 29 October 
1957, Box BCC/DIA/1/1/4. 
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one respect. This was, instead of pressing for the 
cessation of all nuclear testing and production, the West 
should press only to stop the testing and production of H- 
bombs. This was because it was vital to the whole concept 
of limiting war that small and clean (i. e. weapons producing 
less radioactive fall-out) nuclear weapons should be made as 
discriminating as scientists could make them. 
In conclusion Buzzard submitted his four steps and hoped 
they were acceptable to the Church, Whitehall and 
Washington. He noted that support for some of them had been 
growing and felt nothing more ambitious could be acceptable 
at present. Buzzard maintained that nothing less would meet 
the present urgent situation. Indeed: 
Whatever action the Church may, or may not, think 
appropriate to take, may I suggest that, at all events, 
it should insist on the people being given sufficient 
facts to enable the public conscience to wrestle with 
the tremendous moral issues at stake, not merely when 
we are threatened, but in the long term preparations 
beforehand, which will largely commit us, in advance, 
to the action we take in a crisis. The challenge is 
therefore before us now, and it is nothing less than 
whether nuclear power shall prove to be man's triumph 
or his downfall. 96 
By any standards Buzzard made a dramatic impact on the BCC 
with his key-note speech to Council. To many in the BCC his 
speech reminded them that Christians were involved in 
97 
practical decisions as well as in moral statements . 
Following the speech the BCC General Assembly resolved to 
welcome the initiative of the International Department in 
96 Ibid. 
91 Mackie to Bell, 15 November 1957, Box 14. 
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inviting Sir Anthony Buzzard to address it, and expressed 
its appreciation of his contribution to their thinking on 
nuclear weapons. 9" The BCC then passed a Private Member's 
resolution moved by Kenneth Grubb which resolved: 
That the Council further requests the International 
Department to set up a special group from its own 
membership and from people related to defence policy 
which would give continuous study to the moral aspects 
of the disarmament problem and of defence policy in the 
light of nuclear armament, with a view to advising the 
Council from time to time on these matters. 99 
The DIA Chair Robert Mackie, however, strenuously denied 
that this motion indicated that the BCC had adopted the 
Buzzard thesis. 100 Yet Buzzard's long address did have the 
effect of creating a lack of discussion time that meant the 
Yale suggestions were not adequately dealt with. Additional 
resolutions simply welcomed the Yale statements noting that 
the Council "was impressed by the consensus of ecumenical 
"101 opinion expressed in these resolutions This is 
significant in itself, especially considering the 
unilateralist significance of the Yale statements. 
Pacifists and nuclear pacifists proved to be unhappy with 
this situation. 
98 See Section (I) of the resolution passed in October 1957, contained 
in a supplement to The Churches and the Hydrogen Bomb, n. d. but 1955. 
99 Copy of resolution taken from the July 1958 supplement to the BCC's 
The Churches and the Hydrogen Bomb, n. d. but 1955. 
100 Mackie to Bell, 15 November 1957, Box 14. 
101 Section (iii) of BCC's October 1957 resolution. Resolution 
contained in a supplement to The Churches and the Hydrogen Bomb, n. d. 
but 1955. 
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Opposition to Buzzard 
Those BCC representatives who had served on the WCC 
Central Committee at Yale were particularly disappointed 
with Buzzard's address. The British press had failed to 
report that the WCC was urging governments to stop nuclear 
weapons testing and that this policy was 'welcomed' by the 
BCC and had been communicated to the Prime Minister. But 
the press could hardly be blamed. As the Rev. Dr. Eric 
Baker 102 ,a Methodist WCC representative 
(and General 
Secretary of the National Peace Council) present at 
Buzzard's paper pointed out, the effect of Sir Anthony "was 
to divert attention from the real issue created by the Yale 
resolutions, which in consequence were never properly 
debated by the Council. "103 
Another Methodist minister, the Rev. John Vincent'", 
wrote to Keighley'05 seriously questioning the logic and 
legitimacy of the BCC having a speaker and a Study Group 
looking into a matter upon which the WCC thought that there 
was only one thing to say, '"leave it alone". Vincent (a 
good friend of Keighley"') requested Keighley write back 
with the logic behind the study group. For Vincent it 
seemed the DIA had committed itself to Buzzard's line which 
'" Baker to Keighley, n. d. but probably October 1957, Box 14. 
103 c. f. report in The Methodist Recorder, 31 October 1957. 
104 Vincent became a sincere supporter of CND, and firm critic of the 
BCC 'multilateralist' approach. Vincent wrote a useful book Christ In a 
Nuclear World (1962) that criticised both the theology and politics of 
the BCC approach. 
105 Vincent to Keighley, 4 November 1957, Box 14. 
106 Reference in Keighley's letter to Baker, n. d. but probably October 
1957, Box 14. 
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at least implied a criticism of the WCC one. To him the 
possibility of a limited nuclear war was simply absurd: 
"'... that the Church of all folk should toy with the idea is, 
to my mind, very serious. I thought you were a pacifist, 
anyway! " 107 Indeed, the BCC had set up a group to "'give 
continuous study to the moral aspects of the disarmament 
problem ... with a view to advising Council. "108 This group 
was not, of course, supposed to be officially committed to 
Buzzard's views though the Council did "express its 
appreciation of his contribution to its thinking on nuclear 
weapons. "109 The very existence of such a group, for 
Vincent, not only suggested that those in authority would 
not take very much notice of the Yale resolution's call for 
abandonment of tests, but also implied that there was 
something further and more particular to be said from the 
Christian point of view as strategic thinking altered. For 
people like Vincent, until the gap in Christian ethics 
between outright condemnation and occasional use of nuclear 
weapons was bridged (and Buzzard was aware that he was not 
bridging it), the Churches should have only one thing to say 
about nuclear weapons: "abandon them. "'10 Buzzard's 
alternative was not limited disarmament but complete 
armament with nuclear war as a deterrent. The British 
Council were not helping matters by suggesting in even the 
IV, Vincent to Keighley, 4 November 1957, Box 14. 
108 BCC October 1957 Resolution, Box BCC/DIA/1/l/4. 
109 Ibid. 
110 Vincent to Keighley, 4 November 1957, Box 14. 
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slightest way that the Churches could see any but one way 
out of the stark alternative which faced the world. "' 
Keighley, however, was not at all impressed by Vincent's 
reasoning and wrote a reply. 112 For Keighley, Vincent's 
argument rested on three erroneous premises. First, that 
once the WCC had spoken its message remained permanently 
relevant. Second, that when the WCC said something a 11 the 
BCC should do was accept it. Finally, that the WCC Central 
Committee had really considered the issues represented by 
the limited war alternative. For Keighley, Vincent's third 
point was simply not true nor could he accept either of the 
other two: 
When the Church in these days wants to say something 
about industry, it normally consults those who know 
something about industry, before doing it -- it has 
learned better than to pontificate in vacuo. Similarly 
in education and other f ields -- why not in peace and 
war, i. e. defence, upon which the Churches are liable 
to pronounce more often than on any other subject. 
Pace Eric Baker, a considerable number at the Council 
meeting saw what we were trying to do. I will not 
discuss strategy with you except to say that you are 
seriously out of line with- a good many people who know 
what they are talking about. 113 
Baker and Vincent were not the only people bothered by 
'Buzzard's bombshell' at Council. Charles Judd, the 
Director General of the UN Association of Great Britain and 
Ireland, wrote Keighley'14 inquiring whether or not Buzzard 
had made the impression which some reports suggested. For 
ill Ibid. 
112 Keighley's reply to Vincent, 7 November 1957, Box 14. 
113 ibid. 
114 Judd to Keighley, 5 November 1957, Box 14. 
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'Judd it was a "great relief" to hear that the BCC approved 
of the CCIA and WCC statements which "... clearly go far 
beyond any plea for a restraint of the legal principles of a 
just war. "'15 Judd, however, requested access to any report 
on the discussion that followed Buzzard's speech to see if 
it might cast some light on the inwardness of the decision 
which followed (i. e. the setting up of a special group). 
Speaking for himself (for as an Association they had not 
studied Buzzard's proposals) "... I am completely unable to 
believe that -- if once the Great Powers were involved in 
war -- they would be able to limit themselves to the use of 
weapons of a certain size. All history suggests the 
contrary. With whatever good intentions (or wise intentions 
of self-interest) they started, one nation would always feel 
obliged to throw in everything it had in its armoury in 
order to avoid defeat or because it believed (perhaps quite 
wrongly) that the other side was about to overthrow all such 
restraints. "116 
Keighley's Support 
Keighley wrote 
official report a, 
Buzzard's paper. 
criticism. The BCC 
going on and the 
back' 17 saying he didn' t know of any 
7ailable of discussion that followed 
Keighley was also puzzled by Judd' s 
was only trying to understand what was 
issues involved by discussions with 
115 Ibid. 
116 Ibid. 
117 Keighley to Judd, 6 November 1957, Box 14. 
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experts. In part the invitation to Admiral Buzzard was an 
attempt to begin a process whereby this deficiency could be 
overcome. 118 Keighley thought it clear that a great many 
people, including many Christians, were "bemused by the 
spectre of the hydrogen bomb" so that the ability to think 
clearly about day to day affairs of this-world had been 
impaired. Keighley could well understand the horror caused 
by any contemplation of what could happen and yet it would, 
he thought, be a clear advantage if the BCC could suggest to 
Christian people that this was not bound to happen and was 
not the only kind of war which could happen. To him this 
"existing paralysis" was no good for anybody. Keighley was 
at pains to draw Juddrs attention to the fact that the Yale 
statements tried to survey the whole field of defence rather 
than singling out one issue. 
Keighley also wondered if it was really true, as Judd had 
argued, that history suggested that those who go to war 
"throw in all they have almost automatically. " His 
impression was that only this century had wars involved 
maximum force and unconditional surrender: "In any case, I 
think history is a bad guide because we have never before 
had the circumstances which obtain today, chief among which 
is that Russia, even if she should attain a very 
considerable superiority in arms, could never ignore the 
possibility, to put it no higher, that if nuclear war came, 
lie Ibid. 
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she would herself be reduced to ruin and the leadership of 
the world pass to China or India. That, I should have 
thought, was the last thing Mr. Kruschchev would care to 
contemplate. ""9 
Judd was perplexed, that Keighley was surprised by his 
criticism. 120 He was not in the least puzzled by the fact 
that in various fields the Church had tried to understand 
what is going on and the issues involved, by discussion with 
experts, before delivering its mind. To Judd the more that 
was done by the Church the better. What concerned him was 
rather the reports that the Council had been so impressed by 
Buzzard's thesis, that minds and consciences were being 
prepared for a just war fought with nuclear weapons. For 
Judd this was wrong for three reasons: first, because he 
felt, once war between the major powers had started, any 
considerations would weigh in the balance against some power 
being the first to use, for an all-out blow, thermonuclear 
weapons; second, because military experts would probably 
admit this; and finally because it seemed to be a betrayal 
of the Christian faith to set out to condition people's 
minds to the possibilities of limited nuclear war when the 
whole effort of the Christian Church should surely be to 
convince every country that they must give the avoidance of 
war absolutely top priority. 
119 Ibid. 
120 Judd to Keighley, 8 November 1957, Box 14. 
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Judd noted however that the CCIA statement did, as the 
UNA had constantly urged, concern itself with the whole 
problem of disarmament. He agreed that nothing could be 
gained (and indeed much might be lost) in prohibiting atomic 
weapons unless it was part of a drastic curtailment of all 
weapons. Keighley was, he admitted, quite right to pull him 
up in his appeal to history -- between the wars of 
extermination there had certainly been more periods of 
civilised peace when totalitarian wars had not been waged, 
and when countries had not insisted on unconditional 
surrender. Did this necessarily mean: ",... that the chariot, 
the bow, the cannon, the bombing aeroplane or any other 
weapon has been deliberately held back by any country when 
it felt it use would be to its advantage -- or, at any rate, 
that it is possible to think of more than the most 
infrequent exceptions ? "121 
Judd believed that neither the USA or the Soviets wanted 
to destroy themselves. Therein lay one of the world's chief 
hopes: that the logic of events was to agree to scrap the 
weapons all dreaded, because in retaining them there was 
always the risk that they would be used. The price of 
scrapping them however, was a drastic reduction in other 
weapons since the West would not abandon (for perfectly 
understandable reasons according to Judd) the weapon which 
it believed to be the chief deterrent to war until the 
121 
Ibid. 
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Soviet Union agreed to cut other forces and weapons in which 
it had such preponderance. 122 
Keighley responded by sending Judd a copy of Buzzard's 
speech 123 and contending that it was a quite wrong impression 
to say that the Council has committed itself to Buzzard's 
thesis. The Group had been set up to discuss the moral 
aspects of disarmament with Buzzard and some of his 
colleges, though these were not being invited because they 
shared the same strategic views. Keighley argued that many 
people would not share Judd's view that war between the 
major powers would inevitably lead to the use of 
thermonuclear weapons, and thought they were obviously 
consulting different groups of military experts. He 
strenuously rejected the accusation that the BCC were 
conditioning people's minds to the possibilities of a 
nuclear just war being fought. Whilst the position of some 
was '"that all war is contrary to the spirit and teaching of 
Jesus Christ. The Church should teach that and should never 
relax from teaching it, but if the Church is to say anything 
at all to the situation of this day and generation as it 
finds it, then it must try and say something very practical. 
It does not seem to me to be an immoral approach to gain an 
ultimate end by a number of steps rather than by one great 
"124 big and impossible one . To Keighley it seemed that the 
122 Ibid. 
123 Keighley to Judd, 14 November 1957, Box 14. 
124 Ibid. 
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Church was not fulfilling its duty if it carried on 
repeating that war was contrary to the spirit and teaching 
of Jesus Christ. What was needed were some practical steps 
towards easing tension. This was what the BCC were aiming 
to help achieve. As to whether states in war would always 
throw everything they had got Keighley felt not in a 
position to argue with knowledge, however he did feel that 
many who were better informed would support him: "I think 
our difficulty is plainly not understanding the way we each 
think the Church can best act in the present situation. I 
do not think we have any disagreement as to her ultimate 
task. ft125 
Robert Mackie wrote to Bishop Bel 1126 (Bell had been too 
ill to attend Assembly) informing him of the discussion at 
the October meeting and of the line being taken. Mackie 
wanted to say how inexpert he felt with regards to the BCC. 
He found it quite a different body to the WCC: *"I never 
know how the discussion is likely to go. Also we meet for 
such a short time that it is impossible for any issue really 
to be thrashed out adequately. I am afraid therefore that 
some people were upset by the handling of the discussion at 
the last meeting. on the whole,, however, I feel that we 
came out of it a real step forward. //127 Mackie informed Bell 
that it was only the lack of discussion time after Buzzard's 
125 
Ibid. 
126 Mackie to Bell, 15 November 1957, Box 14. 
127 Ibid. 
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speech that meant the WCC resolution was not adequately 
discussed. He apologised for this but also he felt the BCC 
had did all that was asked of it (i. e. welcoming the 
resolution and passing it on to Government) . The real step 
forward came from Grubb's motion where the International 
Department was asked to set up a special group of its own 
members with strategic and political experts. 12B 
Conclusion 
This Chapter developed the proposition that the 
controversy surrounding the failure to secure a H-bomb test 
ban, rather than the immorality of massive retaliation as 
such, brought the BCC to a considered attention of strategic 
policy. The BCC view since 1946 had given primary attention 
to the need to maintain deterrence, and the need to halt or 
reverse nuclear proliferation. This was for two reasons. 
on one hand, the Council's Officers were keenly aware that 
many Christians felt that nuclear weapons, and in particular 
thermonuclear weapons, were abhorrent and immoral. This 
sense was only exacerbated when considered from the 
perspective of Britain's nuclear strategy as outlined in 
Duncan Sandys' 1957 White Paper Defence: Outline of Future 
Policy. Yet on the other hand, the Council's Officers felt 
unable to disavow nuclear devices and condone nuclear 
128 Ibid. 
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abstention. This brought into question the manner with 
which the BCC had approached the nuclear dilemma. 
The International Department was increasingly relied upon 
to speak on behalf of the Churches. To this extent its 
officers recognised their potential radically to affect not 
only the terms with which the nuclear debate was conducted, 
but perhaps also the attitudes of the individual Churches 
for whom they spoke. It would be difficult to underestimate 
the Department's responsibility on these terms. Yet the 
impression is that the International Department had begun as 
an amalgamation of several interests, like the Council as a 
whole, and had become more ecclesiological and conservative 
with the passage of time. The Council's Officers concluded 
that a constructive nuclear policy offered the most 
politically sensitive yet ethical alternative to an 
unpalatable situation. For these reasons Rear Admiral Sir 
Anthony Buzzard was invited into BCC circles. A more 
considered approach from the BCC began with Buzzard 
presenting his limited war thesis to the Council meeting of 
October 1957. 
Buzzard introduced to the BCC the novel idea that nuclear 
weapons on their own would not deter but that they could, 
nonetheless, be part of a Christian just war approach. He 
advocated both the retention of nuclear weapons and a more 
credible strategy for their use if deterrence should fail. 
Whilst Buzzard avowed that a nuclear capability did not 
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necessarily mean nuclear weapons would be used if deterrence 
failed this, of course, was a matter of political judgement. 
To counter his proposition with the argument that there was 
no adequate defence against nuclear weapons was really to 
miss the point. Buzzard's realism was not separated from 
the Manichean advocation of massive retaliation through 
moral evaluation alone but by, and more fundamental ly, an 
understanding of the nature of war itself. To Buzzard acts 
of thermonuclear (%strategic') violence simply surpassed the 
boundaries of war as "rational' activity. Indeed, his de 
facto claim that a war waged with "tactical' (i. e. non- 
thermonuclear) devices could be rational began with the 
assumption that the State did not necessarily need to limit 
itself to trying to avoid nuclear confrontation. Buzzard's 
conviction about the need to limit strategic nuclear devices 
was henceforth less moral evaluation and more a function of 
his belief that, given the nature of international affairs, 
war was unavoidable. For him disarmament and defence were 
part of the same paradigm because, following classical 
realist logic, if peace is desired a State must prepare for 
war. Buzzard's speech made a dramatic impact on BCC 
attitudes. Its main corollary was that a Study Group on the 
Moral Aspects of Disarmament was formed. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: 
THE MORAL ASPECTS OF DISARMAMENT 1957-58 
Intrcduction 
on the 14th November 19571 the International 
Department Chair, Robert Mackie, together with Kenneth Slack 
(the BCC General Secretary) and Alan Keighley (the DIA 
Secretary) met to discuss the Council's October request that 
the "International Department set up a special group f rom 
its own membership and from people related to defence policy 
which would give continuous study to the moral aspects of 
the disarmament problem and of defence policy in the light 
of nuclear armament". Here Mackie officially2 entrusted 
Keighley and Slack with the task of forming the Group, the 
choosing of personnel and agenda setting. Keighley (who 
became the Group's secretary) Slack quickly recruited 
Admiral Buzzard's friend Alan Booth 3 (London Secretary of 
the CCIA) , the experienced Rev. Dr. Norman Goodal 
14 (the 
See Minutes dated 14 November 1957 in BCC Box 14. 
Mackie makes clear this task was discharged to Keighley and Slack in 
a letter to Keighley dated 19 November 1957. See BCC Box 14. 
3 Letter of invitation written by Keighley to Booth, 19 November 1957, 
BCC Box 14. 
4 Goodall had served on the BCC commission that produced The Era of 
Atomic Powez in 1946 and was also Chair of the DIA from 1945-46. A 
letter from Goodall to Keighley dated 21 November 1957 shows however, 
that he was less than enthusiastic about the current venture. Goodall 
wrote: "I wish you would consider putting someone else in my place on 
the Disarmament Group, partly because of ... 
difficulties in attendance, 
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Secretary of the Joint Committee of the IMC and the WCC) , 
and Canon Herbert Waddams (General Secretary of the Church 
of England's Council on Foreign Relations) as the new 
Group's 'staff team. ' The consequences of this were to lead 
the DIA and, indirectly the BCC, to being involved in more 
continuous consideration of the problems of defence and 
disarmament. Alan Booth noted 5 that people in the post- 
Brighton Conference discussions particularly welcomed the 
focusing of Christian judgement in this area. - Buzzard's 
speech had been the catalyst that turned the BCC to consider 
views that appreciated "the complexity of the problems 
"6 facing those concerned with defence This chapter 
examines the formation of the Study Group and its subsequent 
processes and method. 
Part I: The Formation of a Study Group 
Whilst Robert Mackie had delegated recruiting to his 
staff team he did feel any action must first be prefaced by 
but chiefly because I feel completely at a loss for bringing to the 
group any fresh light on this baffling business. " Yet the Group's 
%staff team' persisted . Keighley replied with a letter on the 26 
November, which regretted Goodall's reluctance to join the Group and 
asked Goodall to reconsider. The organisers felt Goodall "would be able 
to contribute out of a very wide ecumenical awareness, particularly of 
the approach and feeling of people in Africa and Asia, and that you 
would bring to meetings a particular theological approach which it was 
felt indispensable to have represented. " Keighley argued it was very 
difficult to find anyone else fulfilling these requirements with 
anything like Goodall's abilities. Goodall consequently "reluctantly 
accepted" theF invitation in a letter to Keighley (27 November 1957) but 
still felt someone with more conviction than himself was needed to 
answer the problem implied by the Group's criteria. Above correspondence 
in BCC Box 14. 
5 Mackie paraphrases Booth in his letter to Bell, 15 November 1957, BCC 
Box 14. 
G Minutes of International Department meeting dated 10th December 1957, 
Box BCC/DIA/l/l/4. 
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a strong statement about the avoidance of war. Mackie Is 
view was that the new Group should primarily build on the 
sentiments expressed by the Yale statements the foundation 
that advocated the banning of nuclear weapons testing. 7 In 
this way Mackie showed himself sensitive to the controversy 
that surrounded Admiral Buzzard's paper and keen to remedy 
the lack of BCC discussion of the Yale resolutions. 
Buzzard's second point8 was for Mackie "his best point"9 and 
the most effective way forward for the Group. It wasn' t 
that Mackie felt the Group should condone the limited war 
thesis as such, it was rather that Mackie thought Buzzard's 
approach to be useful in discussing how the just war could 
be upheld without resorting to massive retaliation. For 
Mackie this would still allow for various contrary points of 
view to be expressed. Whilst it seems individual Church 
leaders had little of note to add to the tumultuous events 
of 1957, it was the place where some sort of answer could be 
given to the King-Hallslo and the Priestleys" (i. e. radical 
unilateralists). 
1 Mackie wrote: "I always take this for granted, but now I see (i. e. 
referring to the controversy surrounding Buzzard's speech) that lots of 
people think you have forgotten if you do not restate it. " See Mackie's 
letter to Keighley dated 19 November 1957, BCC Box 14. 
8 i. e. that the West should try to ease the arms race in total war 
weapons, by openly accepting the global balance of power, and stating 
that only enough of these weapons will be kept to make the prospect of 
total global war thoroughly repugnant. Buzzard's second point involved 
the West stating that they were no longer prepared to fight such a war 
to the finish, nor spend the resources preparing for it. 
9 Mackie to Keighley, 19 November 1957, BCC Box 14. 
10 Mackie refers to Commander Six Stephen King-Hall's call in April 
1957 for the instigation of a Royal Commission to study the 
possibilities of unarmed resistance as a national policy. King-Hall, a 
retired naval officer and former independent National MP, was the 
publisher of a somewhat idiosyncratic but widely read Newslettex. He 
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Mackie wanted to accommodate recent theoretical 
developments in 'peace circles' and thought they were 
compatible, not mutually exclusive to, Buzzard's limited war 
thesis. He felt confident that the conflict between 
traditions was not insurmountable. It was the sum of these 
contributions that raised the question, for Mackie the key 
question, whether we must either become pacifists or 
cynics? I think this is our real job and the place where we 
should try to help the men who are involved in the defence 
of our country. -" Mackie was certain that such a task 
could not be carried out in abstract terms: "Ought something 
to be thought and perhaps said about the strategy of not 
13 being engulfed by world communism? " . He was also aware 
that the BCC, acting as national representatives of an 
international ecumenical body should not be tactless and 
uncompromisingly Western in its bias. 
Mackie's sensitivities were reaffirmed when the 
Protestant Churches of Czechoslovakia 14 passed a resolution 
was also a nuclear pacifist who believed the possibility of nuclear 
obliteration now made armed defence redundant. Driver 1964, pp. 326-54 
considers King-Hall's role in the peace movement. King-Hall summarised 
his beliefs in his Defence in the Nucleaz Age (1958). 
11 Mackie was clearly aware of the play-wright's recent (November 2 
1957) New Statesmen article "Britain and the Nuclear Bombs". This 
article is frequently cited as the catalyst for CND. For detail on 
content and significance see Driver 1964, pp. 37-8; Groom 1974, pp. 331- 
32; Taylor 1988, p. 20; and Veldman 1994, p. 148 also agree with Driver's 
assessment. It is, however, surprising that the otherwise fastidious 
Driver gets the date of such an important article wrong: Driver dates 
the article February 2 1957, not the correct November 2 1957. 
12 Mackie to Keighley, 19 November 1957, BCC Box 14. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Like the BCC, a WCC Associated Council. 
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in early December 1957. "5 The Eastern Europeans challenged 
Western Churches to join them in condemning and rejecting 
all nuclear weapons. The Churches called on Christians 
throughout the world to join together and impress upon 
humanity that the use of nuclear weapons -- even their 
testing -- threatened the continued existence of 
civilisation. The Czechs called for the exertion of the 
greatest endeavours to see that nuclear energy was utilised 
for the good of all humanity. They also called on 
theologians to work out clear theologically based 
standpoints on the question of peace and war, and weapons of 
mass destruction. 16 
Mackie found it was not just Church leaders from behind 
the Iron Curtain who held such sentiments. The Executive of 
Manchester, Salford and District Council of Churches (a BCC 
constituent) urged similar activism on the British 
17 Council . The Executive abhorred war as a means of 
international policy and called upon Christian people in the 
Soviet Union, the United States, France and Britain to 
impress upon their governments the need to resolve the 
issues that divided the world by peaceful means. The 
Resolution: "... commends to the attention of member churches 
the urgent and important questions raised by present 
campaigns for nuclear disarmament and urges Christians to 
15 Resolution of the National Conference of Church Workers, dated 3-4th 
December 1957, BCC Box 14. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Executive resolution not dated but early December 1957, BCC Box 14. 
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make known a responsible political choice between specific 
policies leading towards the abolition of weapons of mass 
destruction. ""' 
Recruitment Begins 
In accordance with the Assembly's request, and mindful of 
Mackie's initial recommendations, the Study Group's. staff 
team began their recruitment drive. Although Keighley, 
Slack, Booth, Goodall and Waddams were all Group officials, 
the actual task of finding enthusiastic members fell largely 
to an 'inner circle' staff team comprising just Alan 
Keighley and Alan Booth. It was thought that a balanced 
group of five or six people, representing the various 
schools of strategic thinking, were needed to speak on 
behalf of those "'people related to defence policy. "9 
20 
Admiral Buzzard appears as the first and obvious choice . 
The Admiral thought the "special Group' only needed his 
limited war camp-follower Michael Howard 21 (lecturer in War 
18 Ibid. 
19 Keighley uses this phrase in his various letters of invitation. All 
letters in BCC Box 14. 
20 There is no record of any member of the 'staff-team' questioning 
Buzzard's inclusion. Perhaps this should not be surprising considering 
the Group's foundation was a consequence of Buzzard's paper at Council 
and a resolution that called for the setting up of a "a special group 
from its own (i. e. DIA) membership and from people related to defence 
? 
1OliHcoYwa`rd was about to become particularly well-known in British 
strategic-political circles thanks to a influential book (see Howard 
1958, commentary in Groom 1974, pp. 369-70) that called on the Soviet and 
Western powers to 'disengage' foreign troops from both Eastern Europe 
and Germany. Howard's own view was "that the Russian leaders have 
abandoned none of their belief in the historic mission of communism to 
conquer the world and in their personal responsibility to ensure that it 
does. But it is a conquest of which in the long run they feel certain 
and for which they are prepared to wait... A relaxation of military 
precautions would be permissible if it led to compensating economic or 
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Studies at King's College) and himself as defence experts. 22 
Buzzard was of the opinion that himself and Howard would be 
the only two strategists prepared to be permanent members 
although others might come to single meetings to act as 
witnesses. To KeighleY23 this surprising suggestion made it 
desirable to have one other permanent member from outside 
the Admiral's circle. Booth, however, thought that among 
his correspondents the only possibility was the unavailable 
Alastair Buchan. 24 
Mackie was nonetheless alarmed 25 that Buzzard thought he 
and Howard were sufficient defence experts for the Group's 
purposes. Mackie was adamant that the Group should contain 
a much wider opinion than limited war strategists and 
thought it very important that among the technical experts 
who were members they should have diversity of view. 
Although he did not rule out Buzzard's thesis he was keen 
that there should be some 'expert' who disagreed with 
Buzzard. Booth tried to reassure Mackie that Howard was not 
a Buzzardi St26 but Mackie felt the differences so slight to 
political advantages, but it remains essential to retain some degree of 
'deterrence' to discourage Russian leaders from taking unwise risks. It 
is in this context that the question of 'disengagement' must be 
examined" (Howard 1958, pp. 22-4). To Howard such a policy of 
'disengagement' would serve as a form of arms control whilst avoiding 
the sensitivity of the test ban issue. 
22 Keighley informs Mackie of Buzzard's attitude in a letter dated 27 
November 1957. BCC Box 14. 
23 Keighley informs Mackie of Buzzard's attitude in a letter dated 27 
November 1957. BCC Box 14. 
24 Defence correspondent of The Observer, and sympathetic to Buzzard's 
strategy. 
25 See u. d. memo (early November 1957) from Mackie to Keighley, 
BCC Box 14. 
26 See the long detailed letter from Booth to Mackie, 4 December 1957, 
BCC Box 14. 
249 
be insignificant. Mackie was sure that ""If we (the Group) 
can't get that (a opposite view to Buzzard), I'm inclined to 
soft-pedal .... This 
is not to stop us doing what we are 
doing, but to warn us that we must not appear to have fallen 
into a trap. ff27 Keighley had, however, succeeded in 
recruiting the Labour MP Geoffrey de Frietas, Under 
28 Secretary for Air, 1946-50. Roy Lewis, a military writer 
on The Economist, had also shown a willingness to support 
the Group's work 29 and this meant for Booth at least, that 
Mackie should be rest assured that the Group would not be 
delivered into the hands of the Admiral. Mackie was not 
convinced. For him sufficient ideological balancing could 
only be achieved if the seasoned peace warrior the Bishop of 
Chichester, George Bell joined the Group. 30 
Bell's Concerns 
As we have seen Bishop Bell, whilst not an absolute 
pacifist, had become a stout advocate of the nuclear 
pacifist position. The choice, although potentially 
promising in creating a balance with the Buzzardists, was 
not popular with Booth. Booth saw Bell's inclusion 
unnecessary and thought Mackie was worrying needlessly about 
21 Ibid. 
28 de Frietas accepted the invitation in a letter to Keighley, 
21 January 1958, BCC Box 14. 
29 Booth informs Mackie that Roy Lewis was keen to support the Group as 
he saw himself as a "... buttress of the Church, i. e. supporter from 
outside, and would like to see Church having something useful to say. " 
Booth's letter to Mackie dated 4 December 1957, BCC Box 14. 
30 Keighley's various letters of invitation made clear this was 
Mackie's decision alone. See BCC Box 14. 
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ideological balancing. 31 Robert Mackie soon found himself 
under considerable pressure from the Bishop not to let the 
Group discuss the Buzzard thesis lest it deviate them from 
pure disarmament arguments. Bell's attitude was driven by 
both his attitude to the idea of a nuclear just wax, and by 
his understanding of what had happened when Buzzard's paper 
had been presented to the BCC in October. The Bishop' s 
concerns were based on his impression that many at the 
autumn Council meeting were disappointed that attention had 
been diverted from the Yale statements to the Buzzard theme. 
Bell shared this disappointment. 
A Quaker delegate from the Council meeting, Margaret 
Hobling, reaffirmed Bell's impression when she urged the 
staf f teaM32 to be cautious in their programme and to 
remember that there was still some disappointment in BCC 
circles regarding the time devoted to Buzzard's thesis at 
the October meeting. Council delegates were particularly 
disappointed that subsequent time constraints had prevented 
a BCC statement being prepared which could have been forward 
to the British government, independent of the Yale 
statements. 33 It was Alan Keighley' s contention, however, 
that Council officers present at Yale had spoken to him with 
a sense of relief that the BCC were no longer talking in 
31 This suggests clearly much about Booth's own ideological 
y. redisposition. Booth to Mackie, 4 December 1957, BCC Box 14. 
Keighley repeats Hobling's conversation in a letter to Mackie on the 
27th November 1957. See BCC Box 14. 
33 See detail and Prime Minister Macmillan's reply in Chapter Four. 
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general principles, but seeking with the help of the new 
Group to find out what actually was happening: 
Admittedly it (the Council's Yale statement debate) was 
not a good discussion. I find it very difficult to see 
how you can get a good discussion on such complex and 
vital matters in such hurried meetings. My particular 
disappointment was in the letters I received from 
Central Committee (i. e. WCC) members. It was pretty 
clear that few of them saw that voting for the 
resolution in Yale implied serious consideration of 
what the churches in this country should do. it 
confirms me in my opinion that resolutions of that kind 
have a soporific effect upon the churches, and no 
effect at all upon the governments. 34 
For Keighley those present at the meeting of the WCC Central 
Committee had also spoken of a long and often difficult 
discussion that had occurred before their August 1957 
resolution could be drafted. For Keighley it would have 
been clearly irresponsible for the BCC, without going 
through a similar exercise, to seek to have anything of its 
own to add. Keighley was a practical man who wanted to wake 
the Churches from their stupor and offer Government 
constructive advice. Buzzard's four proposal S35 in this 
sense not only sought to close the gap between Church 
opinion and the formation of defence policy, but had 
succeeded, as The TimeS36 averred, in having a "'stunning 
effect" on the Council's attitudes. It was Keighley's hope 
34 See letter from Keighley to Bishop Bell dated 4 December 1957, BCC 
Box 14. 
35 i. e. (i) re-stating the principles of the just war; (ii) persuading 
the West to accept the global balance of power; (iii) restoring the 
local balance of power by explaining to the public why limited nuclear 
war might have to be initiated in particular circumstances; and (iv) 
help to persuade the West to a 'no first use policy' with regards to the 
H-bomb. 
36 23 October 1957. 
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that the British Churches, through the Group, would now be 
able to give serious consideration to defence issues in a 
way they had not before. As Group Secretary he saw his sole 
task as helping the Churches in Britain formulate a joint 
and informed policy on nuclear matters. 
With regard to Admiral Buzzard's gradualism, Keighley 
thought that his presence at Council and in the Group "'does 
not of course mean that in any sense we have adopted his 
thesis. " 37 The time devoted to Buzzard's paper at the 
Council meeting was simply testimony to its intellectual 
coherence not wide spread validity. Keighley saw Buzzard's 
value as that of a Christian lay-member trying to relate 
Christian teaching to the problems with which he was 
involved. His principal desire was to enable a group to be 
formed of such character. The time spent discussing the 
Admiral's thesis at Council should not be held against him. 
Keighley was aware that different Church leaders were saying 
different things and this made it difficult to help the 
Council (through the Group) speak with a considered 
judgement. It was thus better to have a vocal and 
passionate unilateralist like Bell inside rather than 
outside the Group. Such an approach was akin to that of the 
Prime Minister who includes a bothersome 'back-bencherl in 
Government to keep them quiet and placate potentially 
divisive sectional interests. This did not mean that 
Keighley to Bishop Bell dated 4th December 1957, BCC Box 14. 
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Keighley saw himself driven unconditionally to support the 
Buzzard approach. The distance between Buzzard and Bell 
were seen as differences of means not ends. It was these 
practical considerations that shaped Keighley's attitude to 
Bell. 38 
Whilst Keighley tried to reassure Bell about the Group's 
impartiality towards multilateralist approaches, Booth was 
rather less diplomatic and more direct. Alan Booth 
contended that the Bishop of Chichester's intervention was 
39 
an attempt to sabotage the Group's work before it began . 
When Sir Kenneth Grubb, Chair of the CCIA (who along with 
Bishop Bell and Norman Goodall had served on the Commission 
that had produced the BCC's 1946 Era of Atomic Power 
repor t40) was recruited, he too supported the views of 
Booth. Grubb shared many of Booth's belie fS4 1 and was very 
influential with Mackie by virtue of his being a ex-Chair of 
the International Department (1947-56). 
Grubb used his influence to reinforce the consensus that 
persuaded Robert Mackie not to listen unduly to the Bishop's 
38 Ibid. 
39 A revealing view which sums up the attitude which dominated the 
Group's 'staff-team'. Booth wrote (with reference to Bell) "... I do not 
think you should worry about... the Admiral. We (Booth and Grubb) are 
not quite sure what Chichester has said to you.. Is he trying to sink 
the ship? ". Booth to Mackie, 4 December 1957, BCC Box 14. 
40 Bell, Grubb and Goodall were the three Group members with experience 
of this first BCC Report. Bell would eventually resign from the Buzzard 
Group, Goodall was reluctant to join in the first place, whilst Grubb 
went on to serve on the 1961 BCC Commission that produced The Valley of 
Decision. 
41 It should be remembered that Booth was also London Secretary of the 
CCIA. Grubb as Chair of the CCIA, clearly shared with Booth a common 
bond. 
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concerns. It was Bell, Grubb would point out, who in fact 
introduced Buzzard to the CCIA (and consequently BCC) 
circles in the first place. 42 
For Bishop Bell the real challenge before the Group was 
not a discussion of the ways in which Buzzard's thesis could 
be transformed into a Christian nuclear judgement. 
Buzzard's thesis was not just quantitatively, but 
qualitatively different to what he envisioned a Christian 
approach to be. Bell called for a choice to be made between 
specific policies leading to nuclear disarmament. Yet these 
differences could not be reconciled by simple debate. 
Recruitment Continues 
Soon after Sir Kenneth Grubb was recruited, Dr. Kenneth 
Johnstone 43 (Chair of the Christian Frontier Council), and 
the Rev. Edward RogerS44 (General Secretary of the Methodist 
Conference's Christian Citizenship Department) were 
approached and recruited. It was decided that the Group 
needed a 'representative theologian' 45 to balance the 
military experts. This posed problems. The staff team's 
first choice was the respected radical theologian Canon 
42 Booth informs Mackie of Grubb's attitude in 4 December 1957 letter, 
BCC Box 14. 
43 Johnstone would also eventually help produce the BCC's 1961 Valley 
of Decision and 1963 British Nuclear Deterrent Reports. 
44 Rogers would serve in the BCC working group that produced the 
j3ritish Nuclear Deterrent in 1963. 
45 It should be remembered that the commission that was formed to 
prepare The Era of Atomic Power report in 1946 was comprised of three 
academic theologians/philosophers (i. e. Dr. Newton Flew, Donald 
Mackinnon, and Professor Ritchie). 
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Vidler. 46 When Vidler declined their invitation, Professor 
Richardson was approached, 47 when Richardson refused"' a 
invitation to the Rev. Daniel JenkinS49, Professor of 
Theology in the University of Chicago was forwarded. The 
Group was relieved when Jenkins accepted the invitation, and 
turned to a hesitant Alasdair MacIntyre, political theorist 
at Leeds University, to add philosophical depth. 50 
The Group officials tried also to recruit an expert on 
international law. " Gerald Draper, lecturer at King's 
College, was approached. Draper rejected the Group's 
52 
request with a scathing attack on Christian subservience . 
This attack is relevant and worth repeating to illustrate 
the problems the Group had in being taken as a serious 
'open' concern. Draper declared that war had been a 
respectable Christian activity since the conversion of the 
Emperor Constantine and why nuclear war should present any 
particular difficulty for the Christian Churches eluded him. 
46 Editor of the Anglican journal Theology (1939-64). Edwin Robertson 
(1989, p. 463) notes that Vidler's keen mind penetrated so many 
discussions on peace, justice, nuclear weapons, the welfare state etc. 
in the Fifties and Sixties that if he were not present at an important 
discussion you needed to ask why. 
47 Keighley to Richardson, 26th November 1957, BCC Box 14. 
48 Booth informed Mackie of Richardson's decision (no reason given) 4th 
December 1957, BCC Box 14. 
49 Jenkins, a close friend of Booth, became an important advocate of 
the limited war approach through his articles in the journal Theology 
(e. g. June 1961) testify. 
50 MacIntyre informs us that he was hesitant for both political and 
moral reasons -- his politics were too radical and his attitude to 
nuclear weapons pacifist. This is supported by his decision to support 
CND after his eventual resignation. See MacIntyrels resignation letter 
to Keighley, 19 April 1958, BCC Box 14. 
51 A practical necessity if Buzzard's first proposal (the re-stating of 
the just war theory) was to be acted upon in a professional manner. 
52 Draper to Keighley, 24 January 1958, BCC Box 14. 
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He doubted whether he had much to offer and suggested the 
issues before the Group had created no new problem for the 
Church. For Draper the Churches had found little difficulty 
in anathematising sexual deviation so let the Churches apply 
the same approach: "The history of the Church might be "the 
long war on Sex and the long peace with War. ' "53 
The National Peace Council (NPC) were, however, keen once 
more to offer their services to the BCC. Eric Baker as 
General Secretary, approached Keighley5l suggesting that the 
Group"s work would benefit from close contacts (formal or 
otherwise) with the NPC. Baker wondered whether the Group 
might bring in Kenneth Ingram5-5 the well known and respected 
lay member of the Anglican Church. Ingram was vice-chair of 
the Peace Council and whilst not a pacifist he was very near 
to this position. 56 Keighley seemed initially quite 
sympathetic to this suggestion5" but after discussion with 
Booth rejected Baker's overtures. 513 The reasons given were 
that although it was accepted the Peace Council had great 
experience, the Group feared if it began consulting various 
bodies who had something to contribute they should have to 
initiate a programme they would be unable to cope with. It 
53 Ibid. 
54 Eric Baker to Keighley, 13 January 1958, BCC Box 14. 
55 In 1937 Ingram had published a book called Ch-ristianity -- Right oz 
Left? in which he argued that the Churches had no alternative but to 
choose the hard left in the struggles between Communism and Fascism. 
56 Presumably this meant Ingram was at least a nuclear pacifist. 
57 Keighley pencilled "Ingram: free lance author, political interests, 
independent means, leftish, travelled, balanced judgement. " see 
comments on Baker's letter to Keighley, 13 January 1958, BCC Box 14. 
58 See Keighley to Baker, 22 January 1958, BCC Box 14. 
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was better not to start along such a line. 59 It was also 
argued that as the BCC regarded itself as a consultative 
body of its member Churches, the question of relations with 
the NPC was a matter for each Church to decide for itself. 
Although the stated reasons for refusing the NPCIs offer are 
legitimate enough, it is certainly true that the Council's 
exclusion served to strengthen the established bias in the 
Group and allow the development of a strong Buzzard 
approach. 
By February 1958 the Group's staff team were at one in 
agreeing that a sufficiently balanced membership had been 
achieved and that it was no longer necessary to seek new 
members. " This meant there were sixteen Group members: 
Robert Mackie (Chair), Bishop Bell, Alan Booth, Admiral 
Buzzard, Geoffrey de Freitas MP, Rev. Dr. Goodall, Sir 
Kenneth Grubb, Michael Howard, Rev. Dr. Jenkins, Dr. Ken 
Johnstone, Roy Lewis, Alasdair MacIntyre, Rev. Rogers, Canon 
Waddams, Kenneth Slack and Alan Keighley (Secretary). The 
Group was mainly made up of ecumenical 'insiders' and people 
actively related to the formation of defence (as opposed to 
disarmament) policy. 
59 Ibid. 
60 The minutes of the second meeting of the Study Group on the Moral 
Aspects of Disarmament meeting of 17 February 1958 make it clear that 
the consensus of opinion was in favour of supporting the view that 
'diversity of opinion' had now been achieved. See minutes in BCC Box 
14. 
2-58 
Escaping the Hiroshima or Belsen Dichotomy 
The first meeting of the Group on the Moral Aspects of 
Disarmament was held on the 11th December 1957 in the BCC's 
London Council Room. Robert Mackie remind the Group of its 
terms of reference which was to advise the BCC from time to 
time, and not to produce a single lengthy report. The Chair 
outlined the events which had led to the passing of the 
autumn 1957 resolution, describing the debate at the spring 
meeting of the BCC Council, the statements made by the 
Executive Committee of the CCIA and the Central Committee of 
the WCC at Yale in the summer of 1957. Copies of Prime 
Minister Macmillan' s reply and his comments on the 
statements of the CCIA and the WCC were put before the Group 
for discussion. 
The Group's initial meeting inclined to suggest that the 
real problem created by the dilemma of nuclear war was not 
in determining how evil war was but rather how to tackle the 
injustice which lay behind it. There was consensus on the 
Augustinian dictum that the realm of war was necessarily the 
realm of evil. 61 It was appropriate to first assert 
Mackie's wishes that all war be seen as contrary to the 
spirit, teaching and purpose of Jesus Christ. The ultimate 
purpose for all Christians was to avoid war and help achieve 
total disarmament. In contradistinction to Bell's approach, 
61 Minutes of the First Meeting of the Group on the Moral Aspects of 
Disarmament, 11 December 1957, BCC Box 14. 
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the differences between the pacifist and just war approaches 
to war were defined as differences of means rather than of 
ends. This was because both traditions agreed war was evil 
and only disagreed as to whether war should be considered a 
62 necessary evil . The Group could not reach agreement as 
to 
whether nuclear weapons were different in kind, or degree. 
Whilst they accepted that 'total destructionr was now 
possible, lack of agreement on whether nuclear weapons were 
qualitatively or quantitatively different made it difficult 
to demand a radical review of the traditional Christian 
debate towards war. It was decided that the Group's task 
best be discharged by rejecting the dilemma between 
'Hiroshima or Belsen. r 63 This meant escaping from 
discussing in what circumstances nuclear war should be 
endured, and at what point Christians should think it 
preferable to submit rather than provoke nuclear war. A 
consensus in the Group asserted that most Christians agreed 
that the British government should be in a position to 
resist aggression, this was not withstanding the recognition 
that some could not assent to this out of deep Christian 
conviction. For the Group the main point of issue was not 
deciding between "Hiroshima or Belsen' but rather deciding 
(as Mackie wished 64 ) how 'justice' could be upheld, and 
minor aggression prevented or resisted without the risk of 
62 Ibid. 
63 Ibid. 
64 As illustrated in shown in Mackie's letter to Keighley, 19 November 
1957, BCC Box 14. 
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involving the total destruction of mankind. The question, 
however, was war the ultimate evil? Many felt Soviet 
Communism was one threat that could kill the soul as well as 
body. 65 The threat was not so much that of territorial 
aggression, but that Christianity in the West and elsewhere 
66 
may be engulfed by an anti-Christian system and ideology 
The Group determined to devise an appropriate Christian 
strategy in this Manichean context. 
Following from this it was only logical for the Group to 
discuss what attitude Christians should hold towards 
potential opponents. This would involve discussion of what 
submission to the Soviet bloc would imply. Yet the 
meeting's minutes show that the Group did realise that there 
was a danger in always equating human progress with the 
values of Christianity. 67 The consequences of this was that 
the division between East and West should be seen as 
relative -- a distinction the Group felt Christians should 
be able to recognise more easily than others. Echoing 
George Kennanrs Reith lecture sentiments6", the attitude was 
65 Ibid. 
66 Minutes of the First Meeting of the Group on the Moral Aspects of 
Disarmament, 11 December 1957, BCC Box 14. 
67 Ibid. 
68 i. e. Russia, the Atom and the West where Kennan targeted Manichean 
moralism, the worth of nuclear weapons, the logic of the arms-race, and 
offered a new perspective on the Cold War and the role of the West there 
in. Kennan, the United States Ambassador to Moscow from 1952 to 1953, was 
a devout Christian and active producer of 'Christian Realistf contributions 
to international politics. He favoured diplomacy instead of balance of 
power politics and serves as a good example of how subscription to realism 
does not necessarily lead to the same conclusions about nuclear policy. 
Indeed, Kennan's approach acknowledged the obsolesce of the nation-state as 
guarantor of survival and gave new life to Kantian universalism. Besides 
Russia, the Atom and the West (published by oxford University Press in 
1958) his most significant contribution was Foreign Policy and Christian 
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that the West should be grateful that the 'Russians, were 
making progress. A hysterical competitiveness with the 
Soviets was accepted as wrong. What was required was for 
Christians to enable the conditions in which it was seen as 
worthwhile to maintain the balance of power, rather than 
disrupt it . 
69 This task included taking account of the 
psychological difficulty of convincing the East that the 
West had a sincere desire for peace. It also needed a 
modification in the fear and lack of understanding which 
were prevalent in Christian attitudes towards Communism. 
The problems raised by such thinking on the Communist 
"threat' were seen in terms of defence rather than arguments 
for and against disarmament. The accepted attitude was that 
discussions of defence were seen as logically preceding 
discussions of disarmament since the latter was based on the 
former. It was this approach that was necessary in order to 
discover a distinctively Christian approach to 
70 
disarmament . It was also the approach Bishop Bell had 
tried to prevent. Here the debate could only naturally move 
beyond disarmament to Buzzard's realist analysis of the 
strategic implications of the contemporary 'balance of 
power'. This meant discussing the likely impact of gestures 
Conscience (Philadelphia: Peace Education Programme, American Friends 
Service Committee, 1959). See Hare and Joynt 1982, pp. 42-6 for a 
discussion of Kennan's moral realism and his support for a nuclear just war 
theory. Also Smith 1986. 
69 Minutes of the First Meeting of the Group on the Moral Aspects of 
Disarmament, 11 December 1957, BCC Box 14. 
70 Minutes of the First Meeting of the Group on the Moral Aspects of 
Disarmament, 11 December 1957, BCC Box 14. 
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such as the limited unilateral suspension or cessation of 
tests. Buzzard and Howard wanted to stress that they felt 
the invocation of the risk of thermonuclear war in fact 
affected military credibility . 
71 This approach saw the H- 
bomb as a consequence, not so much morally repugnant, but as 
strategically inadvisable. Here policy makers would be 
called upon to realise that there was no need, from a strict 
military point of view, to be always a step ahead of other 
powers (still less to possess the ultimate deterrent -- the 
H-bomb) in order to be in a position to make major 
aggression not worth while. The committee believed the NATO 
powers could do this already. There was, therefore, no need 
to continue hydrogen bomb tests. The NATO powers could 
afford to suspend tests, unilaterally if necessary, without 
losing the power of major deterrence. Nuclear deterrence 
still formed the appropriate basis for British defence. 
Unilateral action here was not the same unilateral action 
demanded by Bell and MacIntyre. When Buzzard and his 
supporters talked of "unilateralism' they didn't mean non- 
contingent renunciation, but rather a small step that would 
materially lower tension and provide some ground for hope in 
a particular and specific circumstance. '72 Contingency plans 
for the possibility of limited nuclear war were still to be 
made. 
71 Ibid. 
12 This approach would form the basis of the argument presented by the 
church of England in their seminal 1982 report The Chuzch and the Bomb. 
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The meeting concluded with the question raised as to what 
end product was desirable from such discussion. The Group's 
remit was not to produce a report in order to inform British 
public, or even Christian opinion. At this time it was felt 
highly unlikely that the Groupfs discussions would result in 
73 producing a sizeable pamphlet . The purpose of the 
committee was to produce considered judgements on which they 
could advise the Council from time to time. 7' The Council 
was the only audience the Group was concerned with. 
Nevertheless, it was still necessary to decide how 
'considered judgements' and the basis on which they had been 
arrived at, be presented to Council frequently enough in 
order to ensure that the two bodies did not get out of step. 
No answer was given to this outstanding logistical problem. 
Part II: Group Processes 
At the end of the first meeting of the Study Group Mackie 
had suggested it would be useful to invite Dr. Robert 
Bilheimer, 75 Associate General Secretary of the World 
Council of Churches, to the next meeting of the Group in 
order to outline one possible ecumenical approach to 
73 Minutes of the First Meeting of the Group on the Moral Aspects of 
Disarmament, 11 December 1957, BCC Box 14. 
74 Refer to the text and discussion of the Council's Autumn 1957 
resolution above. 
75 Dr. Bilheimer was the driving force behind the WCC Report Christians 
and the Prevention of War in a Atomic Age (WCC Press, 1958). Although 
this report was the result of a international commission appointed in 
1955 Bilheimer was given major credit for its authorship. This approach 
served as an important influence in the production of the Group's own 
report Christians and Atomic War in 1959. 
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Christian thinking about nuclear weapons. The second 
meeting of the Study Group was largely dominated by the Rev. 
Dr. Robert Bilheimer's ideas. Mackie hoped Bilheimer would 
help focus attention and serve as a useful basis for 
continued discussion. 
For Bilheimer the basic problem created by nuclear power 
was not political but essentially scientific. Science and 
technology were impersonal yet dynamic processes. Each 
process was inherently dynamic because each new scientific 
or technological discovery inevitably led to the next 
advance. This dynamic was irreversible -- once a discovery 
was made it could not be ignored. Whilst the impersonal 
processes of science and technology were not neutral they 
were made ambiguous by the nature of the human responses 
they elicited. 76 Unfortunately human attitudes to science 
and technology were all too often idolatrous. Because 
Christians had not established the right relationship with 
science and technology, they had become captive to rather 
than controller of productive forces. For Bilheimer, the 
appropriate Christian response should be a 'Yes' to science 
and technology, but a 'No" to the idolatry of science and 
'77 technology . This was because first and foremost, 
scientific and technological processes were indiscriminate. 
This indiscrimination made total war possible. But the 
76 See Bilheimer's Paper recorded in the Minutes of the Second Meeting 
of the Study Group on the Moral Aspects of Disarmament, 17 February 
1958, BCC Box 14. 
77 Ibid. 
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Christian faith was able to counter this with a Gospel of 
discriminateness. Again the appropriate response was a 
'Yes' to the discriminate use of science and technology, but 
713 a 'No' to their indiscriminate use . 
This analysis raised important issues regarding 
application. The working out of the appropriate 
relationship between science, technology, and humanity 
raised four practical issues. First: nuclear war. Here the 
Christian was asked to say 'No' to the indiscriminate use of 
destructive power, but 'Yes' to all efforts towards securing 
a limitation of this indiscriminate power. This was seen as 
crucially relevant to the task of negotiation, to the 
justification of the use of force, and even the selection of 
objectives and targets in war. Second: power. Christians 
were obliged to say 'No' to all forms of centralised power, 
and 'Yes' to all forms of decentralised power. This should 
be a key factor, for example, in Christian attitudes towards 
the United Nations and totalitarianism in its various forms. 
The third practical issue raised was that of resistance 
to evil. It was Bilheimer's contention that the Christian 
should say 'Yes' to the resistance of evil by any 
discriminate means, but "No' to the resistance of evil by 
indiscriminate means. These issues could serve as an 
important guide in creating a just society. The Christian 
was obliged to say 'Yes' to all efforts to create a just 
78 Ibid. 
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society. This meant the progressive anticipation of human 
needs, rather than the preservation of the status quo. 79 
Bilheimer"s paper provoked a lengthy and vigorous, if 
somewhat indeterminate discussion. 80 It was not directed 
nor any indication given as to the desired outcome from such 
analysis. Several issues that were discussed, however, give 
some indication of attitudes prevalent in the Group and a 
sense of the meeting's nature. Issues dealt with included 
the problem of 'centralised power'. It was pointed out that 
the control of nuclear weapons, which many Christians 
supported, implied a form of centralised power. The real 
issue was whether the control over a particular 
concentration of power was centralised or not. Where there 
was a concentration of scientific power, there was usually a 
compensating centre of political power. 81 In 
contradistinction to Bilheimerl s Actonian thesis that "all 
power corrupts" it was suggested that power in itself was 
amoral. Corruption occurred when power was used 
irresponsibly. 
Members of the Group found a certain ambiguity in 
82 
science. It was felt that indiscriminateness was a 
79 Ibid. 
80 This was included in the meeting's minutes. It is a shame that the 
ensuing discussion was not attributed to individual Group members. It 
is therefore impossible to locate the views with particular individuals, 
but the discussion is still revealing as to the consensus of opinion. 
See 'Discussion of Bilheimer's Paper' within the minutes of second 
meeting of the Study Group on the Moral Aspects of Disarmament, 
17 February 1958, BCC Box 14. 
81 Ibid. 
82 Ibid. 
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personal attribute, inapplicable to science as Bilheimer 
indicated. The ambiguity lay in the use of science by a 
human agent. This meant political factors were no less 
important than scientific factors. Whilst the autodynamism 
of science was not disputed it, was pointed out political 
factors determined the attitude of those who decided on the 
uses of science and technology. 83 
It was Bilheimer's view on the appropriate Christian 
contribution to the nuclear debate that provoked most 
discussion. The question arose as to the appropriate 
Christian contribution to the situation. There were some 
areas where a specifically Christian contribution was not 
required-a' Whilst Bilheimer's thesis took account of the 
unity of God the relevance of the whole doctrine of 
humanity's redemption was not clear. 
The Group also felt that much Christian moral thinking 
was indistinguishable from liberal morality. While it was 
accepted that not all non-Christians were well-intentioned 
humanists, the absence of a strong Christian contribution to 
the debate was noticeable. 85 
In spite of these criticisms the Group decided to use the 
more relevant issues raised by Bilheimer to advance their 
own study. The more immediate issue to be incorporated 
concerned the question of responsibility in terms of 
83 Ibid. 
84 Minutes of the Second Meeting of the Study Group on the Moral 
Aspects of Disarmament, 17 February 1958, BCC Box 14. 
85 Ibid. 
268 
scientific, technological, and political processes. It was 
accepted that "the H-bomb, although very unlikely to be 
used, induces a paralysis of thought. "'35 The key question 
raised by this meeting was how Christians could live in a 
divided world, under the shadow of the H-bomb, whilst 
reducing international tension. This was because "the 
fixation on the H-bomb exists, and will have to be reckoned 
with. f187 
Mackie's Appeal to his Staff Team 
By the end of February 1958 Robert Mackie was feeling 
increasingly dissatisfied with his commission. Despite 
Bilheimer's contribution the resulting discussion had left 
him feeling unsure of the direction in which the Group 
should be led whilst politically and theologically 
incompetent to guide it. Up to this point the committee's 
activities had evolved in a vague and uncertain way neither 
acting with a sense of unity, or being driven in a 
purposeful direction. All that seemed to have been agreed 
upon was the questionable decision to escape from the so- 
called Hiroshima-Belsen dichotomy whilst pursuing Buzzard's 
thesis. This state of affairs was clearly a product of the 
imprecise terms of the BCC resolution that had commissioned 
the Group's task. Mackie felt it was no longer possible to 
avoid questioning the usefulness of the Group and called for 
86 Ibid. 
87 Ibid. 
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immediate efforts to achieve a clarification of aims. To 
this end he wrote anxiously" to the Group's staff team 
(Slack, Keighley, Booth, Goodall, Waddams) requesting frank 
comments in order to determine how forth-coming meetings be 
conducted, and what the Group should be aiming to achieve. 
Mackie found the committee's work hard-going39 and found the 
Group's lack of solidarity" a particularly obvious problem. 
This lack of Group cohesion presented itself in two ways: 
first, members did not know each others minds, and yet were 
required to tackle a sensitive subject; and second, 
resulting analysis was neither directed nor sufficiently 
deep. Despite this, three lines of possible inquiry 
nevertheless presented themselves for more serious 
discussion. 
First, the armament question based on Buzzard's analysis. 
Buzzard had communicated to Mackie his concern that the 
profitability of this theme had been somewhat diminished in 
the committee's eyes by the Soviet's February 2 1958 offer 
to suspend nuclear tests, if the USA and Britain did 
88 Copy of Mackie's letter to "staff team', 21 February 1958, 
BCC Box 14. 
89 Mackie wrote: "In particular I find the period of two and a half 
hours at intervals of several weeks a very difficult one to handle. I 
have been used to groups which met for a longer time at less frequent 
intervals. It is part of the difficulty of changing from a world tempo 
to a national one. " (before becoming the International Department Chair, 
Mackie had been Director of Inter-Church Aid based in Geneva). See 
Mackie's letter to 'staff team', 21 February 1958, BCC Box 14. 
90 This lack of solidarity would disappear as a problem after MacIntyre 
and Bell resigned from the Group in April and May 1958. This fact also 
questions The Christian World's assertion (30 April 1959) that Goodall 
was the only orthodox pacifist in the Group. If Goodall was a pacifist 
little in the eventual 1959 Christians and Atomic War report or Group 
discussions suggests his influence. 
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likewise. 91 Buzzard felt that this had led people into 
being fooled that there was now less danger of a nuclear 
exchange. It was his belief that because of this, 
insufficient attention was being given to the ""trigger- 
happy" mentality of some. Buzzard suggested to Mackie that 
any pronouncement by the BCC should be on ethical and moral 
grounds, but nevertheless, should demand moral 
considerations be taken into account both generally and on 
individual matters. 92 The Churches should question whether 
political, military and economic considerations outweighed 
moral considerations. With this in m ind Buzzard suggested 
the Group might pronounce upon two tenable attitudes towards 
war. The Christian pacifist attitude, defined as acceptable 
personally but not practical for governments. (No 
differentiation was made between absolute and nuclear 
pacifism. ) And the Christian non-pacifist alternative: just 
war where war is acceptable only where the cause is 'just' 
and the aim limited to the upholding of justice, and where 
means are proportionate. Buzzard thought that the H-bomb 
needed much more analysis in this context because it brought 
to bear new moral factors, different in kind and 
discrimination. 
91 Buzzard's fears had been verbally communicated to Mackie who 
subsequently passed them on to his 'staff team' in the letter dated 
21 February 1958. An undated memo drafted by Buzzard, outlining his 
views on the possible courses of Group action, can however be seen as a 
precursor to Mackie's appeal. The memo entitled "Possible Action by 
BCCII is found in BCC Box 14. Groom 1974, pp. 359-60 details attitudes to 
the Soviet offer to suspend tests. 
92 See Buzzard's undated memo, "Possible Action by BCC", Box 14. 
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For Mackie Buzzard's ideas of limitation needed further 
consideration and would benefit by being linked to 
Bilheimer's ideas of discrimination: 
My mind is yet quite open as to whether the limited 
warfare theory holds water or not. I suspect the 
enthusiasm of those who advocate it, but I also suspect 
the rather quick way in which some people turn it down. 
There is a real issue here. My trouble is whether it 
is the actual issue on which we should be concentrating 
at this moment. My guess is that by the April Council 
meeting, Christian opinion will be concerned with 
politics rather than with armaments. 93 
The second area worthy of continued discussion for Mackie 
was East and West relations. Mackie's hunch was that the 
Group should prepare itself with relevant statements as to 
the course which they believed the Government should pursue 
at any summit meeting. Whilst he didn't pretend that any 
definitive statement could be prepared, he did think that by 
working ahead the Group could develop some leads which could 
be introduced in a speech at the Council's spring Assembly 
meeting (i. e. in April). Mackie's main fear was that if, as 
he thought best, military strategy was dealt with in the 
next meeting only, Buzzard, Howard, and Lewis would quickly 
lose interest. 94 Mackie was determined not to lose this 
'defence interest. ' 
For Mackie the third area of profitable inquiry would be 
on deeper philosophical issues. It was his personal feeling 
that the Group had too readily escaped from estimating the 
93 Mackie's letter to 'staff team', 21 February 1958, BCC Box 14. 
94 Ibid. 
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"demonic character" of scientific knowledge. 95 Mackie was, 
however, also convinced that it was pretty useless to 
indulge in "clever conversation" without some profound 
discussion of Biblical realities beforehand. 96 He felt that 
as soon as the Group began to discuss the real nature of 
power in any situation they immediately found themselves 
thrown back upon their Christian faith. 97 Here Mackie hoped 
the theological expertise of the Rev. Dr. Norman Goodall and 
the Rev. Dr. Daniel Jenkins could bring forth important 
points to bear: 
There is a sense in which more reflective Christians 
can help the rest of us greatly. On the other hand, we 
verge for a time on the suggestion that Christian 
theology is a body of knowledge and principles, which 
can be referred to without the individual on every 
occasion being personally engaged. I think personally 
that some dis-service has been done by people who have 
suggested that the nuclear age brings new moral 
problems. That seems to me nonsense. The moral 
problems are those we find in the Bible, but they have 
been given a new and difficult setting. There is 
sometimes a suggestion that those of us who are not 
pacifists, can be wafted into a pacifist position by 
nuclear energy without having to make the essential 
personal decisions required. This curious hesitation 
of the Christian Church in face of new factors, seems 
to me to weaken its influence greatly. Is there any 
hope of our picking out a few fundamental 
considerations, which seem unusually apposite at this 
particular moment of history, but are not new 
theological solutions of a new problem? 9" 
Mackie's plea for guidance met with various suggestions from 
his staff team. 
95 Ibid. 
96 Ibid. 
91 Mackie to 'staff team' 21 February 1958, BCC Box 14. 
98 Ibid. 
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Deciding Future Policy 
Canon Waddams believed that the problems raised by the 
Group were essentially theological ones concerning the 
nature of guidance and of revelation. " Although he 
asserted that Christians were well prepared to tackle 
political problems if they choose to, because their faith 
made them realistic, this did not mean that one Christian 
method could or should be utilised. For Waddams there was 
only one important question for British Christians to 
pursue: deciding on the appropriate but general attitude of 
Britain to international affairs. It was guidance on this 
matter alone that was most likely to prevent war and ensure 
peace. The legitimacy of pacifist or non-pacifist argument 
was not the issue. Whether a specifically Christian 
judgement could be brought to bear on this was just too 
difficult a question to answer. This clear exposition of 
the "middle axioms' approach to Christian social ethics'00 
meant Waddams was of the opinion that no ecclesiastical 
organisation should provide any specific answers. The Canon 
felt the Group incapable of reaching any decisive answer to 
the Buzzard hypothesis. 'O' Awareness of this made it clear 
to Waddam's that the Group's main task should consequently 
be to encourage Christian citizens to discuss the issues and 
99 Herbert Waddams responded to Mackie's plea for guidance in his reply 
dated 24 February 1958, BCC Box 14. 
100 c. f. Chapter Three of this thesis on the 1937 Oxford Life and Work 
Conference PChurch, Cormnunity and State'). 
101 Waddams to Mackie, 24 February 1958, BCC Box 14. 
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contribute in only a general sense to the debate. In short, 
Waddams thought the question of authority, who speaks for 
who, was uppermost here: 
... it would be quite wrong for the Churches as such, 
whether individually or through the BCC or its 
International Department, to try to answer the question 
definitely because by doing so they would imply a claim 
to special guidance and knowledge which they have not 
in fact got. I find myself driven to the inexorable 
conclusion that the most which such a group as 
ourselves could or ought to do is to set out clearly 
and succinctly the problems about which the discussion 
ought to take place, and to recommend Christians to 
make their own contributions to this discussion in 
whatever way is available to them. 102 
This call for a conscious withdrawal from the debate raises 
the question why the experienced Canon joined the Group in 
the first place. As General Secretary of the Church of 
EnglandrS Council on Foreign Relations Waddams was only too 
aware of the nature of the nuclear dilemma. Waddams 
pessimism stands in contrast with the attitude of the 
Group's most reluctant staff team recruit Norman Goodall, 
who despite his reservations, had clear alternatives for 
Mackie. 103 
For Goodall it was essential first and foremost to 
determine how the Group saw its task in the wider setting. 
Clarifying this would involve understanding the Government 
position, Christian thinking, and what the BCC may wish to 
have said. 'O' Knowledge of these issue's would make it easier 
102 Ibid. 
103 See Goodall's reply to Mackie's 'staff letter', 26 February 1958, 
BCC Box 14. 
104 Ibid. 
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to reach agreement over the future direction of the Group. 
Once attitudes were clarified there were several practical 
steps, not necessarily mutually exclusive, that could be 
taken. 
First, Goodall suggested that the Group could press the 
BCC to pass a resolution urging the Government to take a 
particular view. This was the situation, as Goodall 
understood it, most likely at present. Second, he thought 
the Group could bring forward statements (about 1,000 words 
long) that might help enlighten Christian public opinion as 
to what the Council thought individual Churches should be 
doing in the present climate. Third, the Group could accept 
'Buzzard's approach. " This involved the presentation of a 
thesis which the experts in the Group could criticise. 
Goodall felt that such a presentation should be by someone 
who knew the BCC and thereby had a realistic understanding 
of the possible lines the Council might take. This would 
have the benefit of focusing discussion and preventing 
someone "lead off" with their own agenda. 105 Goodall's 
fourth and final recommendation was for the Group to discuss 
why some defence experts thought the case for the H-bomb, 
the 'great deterrent', were still valid. This was 
essentially the Conservative Government's view outlined in 
the 1958 White Paper. "' 
105 Ibid. 
106 Report on Defence: Britain's contribution to Peace and Security, 
Cmnd. 363,1958. For commentary see chapters 13-20 in Groom 1974, and 
Navias 1991. 
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This final suggestion had become particularly relevant 
and immediate. George Brown, the Opposition spokesperson on 
defence, had just delivered' 07 a devastating indictment of 
Government policy in the Commons. Brown had complained that 
the Conservatives had no military means for dealing with 
anything between a border incident and all-out thermo- 
nuclear war. The charge was that the British governme nt was 
relying too much on the H-bomb. Brown's response was to 
call for the immediate development of tactical nuclear 
weapons to remedy the situation. 108 What Goodall thought was 
needed here was a clear response from the Group to this 
call. Such criticism would involve various political and 
moral, as well as theological arguments. "' 
The Consequences of Mackie's Letter 
As a consequence of Mackie's appeal four decisions were 
arrived at. First, Mackie rejected Canon Waddams' call to 
rely on 'middle axioms' and not produce a definitive nuclear 
policy. Second, Anthony Buzzard was asked to write a paper 
elaborating what was involved in maintaining the balance of 
power, the possible consequences of a British unilateral 
lut Brown actually made his attack in the Commons on the same day 
Goodall wrote to Mackie. Brown complained: "The White Paper provides 
for nothing but conventional troops, conventional weapons and a thermo- 
nuclear weapon.... If we do not provide for tactical atomic weapons and 
for large-scale forces ... then, in fact, we have nothing with which to 
meet the in-between areas at all. " Hansard: House of Commons, Vol. 583, 
col. 410,26 February 1958, George Brown. 
108 A sentiment, for example, The Manchester Guardian thought was a 
"grave mistake" for the Labour Party to encourage. See Leader dated 27 
February 1958. 
109 Goodall's reply to Mackie's 'staff letter', 26 February 1958, BCC 
Box 14. 
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suspension or cessation of tests, and to discuss the nature 
of a nuclear just war. Here Mackiels, Goodall's, and 
Keighley's suggestions would be accounted for. Finally, 
Alan Booth was asked to develop a paper outlining the main 
issues at stake in the East-West conflict. "" 
Admiral Buzzard's task was accomplished and presented as 
a short paper, "Notes on Western Defence and Disarmament 
Policy", at the third meeting of the Study Group on the 5th 
March. 111 He suggested that there were three areas of 
discussion, within approaches to Western defence policy, 
relevant to the concern of the Churches. These were the 
means with which the West would wage war, the ways in which 
war could be avoided, and the potential for unilateral 
action. 
For Buzzard the West talked of modern war far too easily. 
This meant it was important that war should only be 
considered as a last resort -- as an action to uphold 
justice. If war was engaged, the means utilised should 
always be proportionate to the ends sought. It was 
necessary, therefore, to remember that former conceptions of 
victory were now no longer tenable -- the invention of 
nuclear weapons meant there must be a readiness to return to 
negotiation at all times. The inescapable conclusion of 
11v Booth's paper EastlWest -- A Theological Comment was written in 
December 1957 and can be found attached to a letter to Keighley dated 20 
December 1957, BCC Box 14. 
111 Minutes of the Third Meeting of the Study Group on the Moral Aspects 
of Disarmament, 5 March 1958, BCC Box 14. 
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this was the need to develop in what ways the West could 
avoid the possibility of genocide in dealing with a limited 
issue. Such a conclusion presented certain possibilities 
for unilateral Western action. 
First, it was necessary for the West to accept the 
stalemate on the level of total global war and relax the 
race for H-bombs. This meant accepting the adequacy Of the 
present deterrent. Second, the outstanding question was to 
decide whether H-bomb tests were essential for the 
development of tactical nuclear weapons. Buzzard thought 
not. The West, Britain specifically, with the support of 
the Churches should call for the unilateral suspension of 
hydrogen bomb testing. Third, the West should state that it 
would never be first to use the "great deterrent' . This 
involved the Churches calling for the adoption of a 'No 
First Use' policy of strategic weapons. Finally, Buzzard 
called for additional unilateral action from the West in 
order to limit nuclear proliferation. 
Booth's East-West Theology 
The paper on East-West relations written by Booth began 
with the assertion that the conflict between East and West 
112 was irreconcilable . This was 
because both liberal 
democracy and Communism demanded total victory. Whilst the 
112 Many of Booth's ideas expressed here prefigured his later 
publication Christians and Power Politics (Booth 1961) that was so 
favourably received by journals of international politics. For detail 
of this reception see Epp's 1990 PhD pp. 287-8. 
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desired victory was not necessarily envisaged in military 
terms, it was necessarily a spiritual and ideological war. 
Nonetheless: 
It is (also) true to say that the East/West conflict, 
in God's sight, is a conflict of greys, not of black 
and white -- and it is properly asserted that in God' s 
providence each side needs to some degree the other' s 
criticism.... The issue we (i. e. Christians) seek is one 
in which both sides, no doubt in varying degrees,. allow 
themselves to be changed creatively by their impact on 
one another. "' 
Even though the conflict was without an absolute (i. e. 
theological) significance this did not mean that it was 
without significance. The task of Christians was to expose 
the pride and self-righteousness which led states to 
describe their enemies in wholly negative terms. The West 
was morally predisposed to recognise the partnership of the 
East in working out the destiny of humanity. What was 
needed was not only time for repentance, but a resolute 
refusal to surrender those 'good giftS#'114 that have been 
entrusted to Western societies. Liberal democracy must 
refine, under communist criticism, an understanding of what 
the West was charged to preserve. A consequence of this 
would be the development, in Western public psyche, of a 
steadfast willingness to resist invasion and destruction. 
Total surrender to the West's enemies, total capitulation to 
the Communist way of thinking, could never be envisaged. 
The constant witness of the Church was needed to guard 
113 EastlWest -- A Theological Comment, BCC Box 14. 
114 Not specified. 
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against the temptation to absolutise the conflict. The 
Church was vital in reminding people that God was judge of 
all states and content with none. 115 The significance of 
this last point was that first, militarily speaking, Booth 
saw a Christian obligation to ensure the communist world was 
not destroyed: "We are responsible for our enemy's 
welfare. " 116 Second, as far as Booth understood Providence, 
the West had a responsibility to preserve those 'good gifts' 
God had given it. This meant not letting the West be 
destroyed wantonly by states that did not share the same 
values. In essence the West and the Christian Churches 
should 'aim to parley' : 
But the parley is not simply about a modus vivendi -- 
it must by one means or another be directed towards 
humanity's common problems: -- the problems of emerging 
industrial societies; the sharing of riches of skill, 
knowledge and wealth with under developed countries; 
and the means of enabling man to live as man in highly 
organised societies. "" 
Booth expanded these most Augustinian-like themes in a 
private letter to a 'peace activist' . 
118 Ray Stagles (a 
nuclear pacifist) had called on the Group to have the 
courage to locate their attitude to the H-bomb on two 
levels. First, Stagles called on the Group to support calls 
for the abolition of the H-bomb because it was a legitimate 
%absolute principle'; and second, to see its abolition as 
115 EastlWest -- A Theological Comment, BCC Box 14. 
116 Ibid. 
117 Ibid. 
lie Stagles's letter to Booth (n. d. ), and Booth's reply dated 31 January 
1958 in BCC Box 14. 
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being a practical 'first step' towards global disarmament. 
Booth rejected both calls. 
In the first instance Booth did not subscribe to the view 
that the acceptance of the H-bomb as a deterrent implied 
envisaging occasions when it should be used. Whilst Booth 
accepted there was no conceivable situation in which the use 
of the H-bomb could be justified, he nevertheless felt that 
seeing the argument in terms of pure 'human cost' was 
spurious: 
The continuance of human history is not a prime 
priority, is it? Some of the noblest acts of men have 
meant the acceptance of death and destruction rather 
than the betrayal of a principle. So we must not make 
mere continuance of life on this planet a sole 
consideration. Is resistance to communism worse than 
surrender? Is vast destruction worse than the 
domination of minds and spirits by a political machine 
and view capable of shutting out man's true humanity?... 
For Booth it was not a simple choice. He was not assessing 
what he thought public opinion could be persuaded to accept, 
but thinking of what the Study Group on the Moral Aspects of 
Disarmament, as both BCC and Christian representatives 
should do. The logic of this argument moved people off 
'principles' and back to calculations and guesses of 
consequences. He argued that a Church which is led to 
choose the second risk (i. e. surrendering to communism) must 
face the consequences -- in effect a deliberate policy of 
abandoning participation in military defence against 
119 p. 1 of letter from Booth to Ray Stagles, 31 January 1958, 
BCC Box 14. 
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communism. 120 For him this was not an acceptable option. 
Booth was similarly not persuaded by King-Hall's passive 
resistance ideas . 
12 1 All such argument was representative of 
what he called "the Jesus fetish" -- a simplistic idealism 
that suggested differences in approach all boiled down to 
different views of how the Church should best bear witness 
before the State. 
In the second instance, on the practical level, Stagles 
had suggested that notions of 'absolute principle' were 
meaningless to the soldier or politician who needed to know 
"next steps'. Why not call for the unilateral abandoning of 
all nuclear testing? For Booth "'Enough is plenty, you 
cannot kill a nation deader than dead", stopping tests and 
refusing to participate in an endless arms-race was a policy 
worth pursuing eagerly. Yet he sympathised with technical 
objections -- the need for better bombs, better systems of 
delivery: "The logic is sound, but the race is endless. 
That is why I think there is a chance to call a halt. "122 
This letter gives us a good understanding of Booth's view 
on the purpose of the Churches, and the Moral Group, in this 
debate. For Booth the Church's task was clear. He 
complains bitterly of ecclesiastical authorities always 
120 As Booth himself averred "You cannot have it both ways". Argument 
of p. 2 of Booth's letter to Stagles, 31 January 1958, BCC Box 14. 
121 See above for detail on King-Hall and 'passive resistance'. For 
Booth the Soviets were not likely to come to conquer in such a situation 
but would simply turn off the Middle East fuel taps and wait for the 
ensuing economic confusion to break up society. 
122 p. 2 of Booth to Stagles, 31 January 1958, BCC Box 14. 
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"scolding" the country. 123 What Booth wanted to determine 
was did the Christian Church really mean business? He had 
two criticisms: the first was the "cheapness" of the 
Church' s action. For him resolutions and speeches 'cost' 
nothing. When the German Church took a stand against 
Hitler, it was costly -- and so it was heard. In short: 
"If it [the Church] is really going to proclaim God's word 
of judgement and start men on a new way, what money, time 
and imagination does it offer? 11124 Differences in approach 
thus boiled down to differences in emphasis. To Booth 
unilateralism was costly, too costly. Unilateralist 
sentiments had simply emerged from a minimum of study. The 
problem with contemporary Christian research on the nuclear 
dilemma was that the time devoted to it was infinitesimal 
compared to the time given by journalists, the Armed 
Services, and politicians. Because politicians were only 
too aware of how little time the Churches were giving to the 
matters they pronounced upon, the Moral Grouprs task was to 
seek to restore professional credibility. Busy schedules 
were not an excuse for insufficient analysis. The point for 
Booth was that ". . if you have not the time, you must keep 
quiet, and if you feel bound to speak you must talk sense. 
It is tempting to try to side-step this costly business by 
being "prophetic", but it is phoney prophecy. it 12 5 Booth' s 
123 Ibid., p. 3. 
124 Ibid. 
125 p. 4 of Booth to Stagles, 31 January 1958, BCC Box 14. 
284 
avowed aim (and by consequence the Group' s) was to be both 
considered and constructive and this meant first freeing the 
Churches from the dilemma posed by Hiroshima and Belsen. 126 
Booth thought it worth resisting Communism because he saw no 
alternative, but he wanted to find 'safeguards' to prevent a 
nuclear exchange as quickly as possible. In this sense he 
was willing to bet hydrogen bombs would not be used, except 
as a result of miscalculations. The appropriate attitude 
for the West to take was: "Keep it (the H-bomb) and let it 
cancel itself out -- but try to stop any further development 
of it. " The West could afford limited unilateral action 
here, even more, the UK could. 
Booth thought the West needed to ensure the global 
military stalemate, the balance of power, but in a way that 
reduced reliance on nuclear weapons. For him this meant 
increasing defence budgets and re-introducing 
conscription: 127 "... somehow the West has to escape from 
preoccupation with its own standard of living and be 
prepared to resume the hard road of helping the rest of 
mankind much more effectively. The question of balancing 
military and aid demands on the budget is vastly 
difficult. ,,, 128 This last argument would figure strongly in 
subsequent Group discussions. 
126 i. e. Booth wanted the debate moved beyond discussing in what 
circumstances nuclear war should be endured and at what point Christians 
should think it preferable to submit rather than to provoke atomic war. 
127 This was important because the Government saw nuclear weapons as the 
essential means with which to pay for their pledge to end conscription. 
128 p. 4 of Booth to Stagles, 31 January 1958, BCC Box 14. 
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Booth' s sincerity comes through in these arguments. He 
believed passionately that the Church needed to respond 
ecumenically to the issues in a serious, professional, and 
considered way: "The odd speech or resolution is not enough 
-- it needs something more resolute, corporate, and 
substantial .... somehow we have got to get round 
the 
elevation of amateurish opinion to false importance by the 
device of labelling it 'Christian. ' 11129 For him the Buzzard 
thesis and a nuclear just war, was only a natural way to 
forward such an approach. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that as a direct corollary of 
Admiral Buzzard's paper delivered to Council in October 1957, 
a Study Group on the Moral Aspects of Disarmament was formed. 
Whilst Robert Mackie, the Group's Chair, desired an even- 
handed or "ideologically balanced" approach the Study Group 
was dominated by representatives of the realist "if you want 
peace, prepare for war" perspective. The Priestleys and the 
King-Halls were not accounted for. The nature of the 
eventual BCC contribution should come as little surprise 
once the powerfully articulated ideological preferences of 
those selected to serve in the Group are considered. 130 The 
fact that the Study Group was generally unsympathetic to "if 
129 Ibid. pp. 4-5 
130 c. f. Anthony Dyson's "Styles of Documentary Engagement" in Bauckham 
and Elford (eds. ) 1989, pp. 95-114. 
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you want peace, prepare for peace" 131 idealism, led to the 
notion that a realist approach was inevitable. This is 
notwithstanding the sense that Mackie and Group Secretary 
Keighley (who became converted to Buzzard's position) were 
not particularly driven to support Buzzard at first. It was 
their "neutrality', and not just Buzzard's coherence, that 
resulted in the adoption of a gradualist, multilateralist, 
and just war approach to the nuclear debate. Bringing 
Bishop Bell and Alasdair MacIntyre into the Group to 
represent "peace activism' created no serious challenge to 
the Buzzardist hegemony. 
The inclusion of Bell and MacIntyre into the Study Group 
produced an initial lack of agreement on whether a 
specifically Christian contribution could be made to the 
problem of defence and disarmament. The common denominator 
in the Study Group's thinking was an agreement in favour of 
the broad desirability of "peace' -- anything that reduced 
Cold War tension and made war less likely. Any agreement 
beyond this proved difficult. Here Alan Booth appeared as a 
vitally important contributor to the Group's thinking, 
second in importance only to Buzzard. It was Booth who 
became largely responsible for the clarification of policy 
and process in the Group. 
131 The phzase is Professor Rotblat's. Cited in The Coventry Evening 
Telegraph November 11 1997. 
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Booth was particularly 'Augustinian' in his perspective. 
He believed passionately that the Church needed to respond 
in an ecumenical fashion to the issues in a serious, 
considered way: the Group's task was to restore professional 
credibility to the Church. Booth was responsible for the 
idea that there had hitherto been a frequent failure on the 
part of Christians to sit down humbly before the facts and 
to consider them realistically. His contribution led the 
Study Group to concentrate on the idea that nuclear weapons 
could be controlled once a realist-type understanding of 
international affairs was conceded to. The extent to which 
this approach would be affected by the birth of the Campaign 
for Nuclear Disarmament is now discussed in Chapter Eight. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT: 
A NUCLEAR JUST WAR THEORY 1958-59 
Introduction 
1957 had been a significant year for the British peace 
debate. Christopher Driver saw' four events in that year that 
precipitated the emergence of the Campaign for Nuclear 
Disarmament (CND) . The events were: first, the Labour Party's 
Conference where Nye Bevan denounced nuclear unilateralism as 
tantamount to "sending a Foreign Secretary naked into the 
conference chamber. " Secondly, J. B. Priestley's infamous 
riposte to Bevan in the New 5tatesman 2 which argued that 
Britain's massive retaliation policy negated democratic 
politics and placed crucial decisions beyond ordinary 
citizens. He argued that nuclear unilateralism was the only 
way for Britain to 'regain' her moral political leadership in 
the world. Thirdly, George Kennans Reith Lectures because, 
for many people, they were the first indication that there was 
a considered alternative to massive retaliation. The fourth 
event had been the launching of Sputnik I which proved to the 
West that the Soviets now had the system technology to launch 
inter-continental ballistic missiles. To these events of note 
I Driver 1964, p. 37-38. 
2 New Statesman November 2 1957. 
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may be added Commander King-Hall's appeal for a Royal 
Commission to study the possibilities of unarmed resistance as 
a national policy. This was greeted with much sympathy by the 
nuclear pacifist left and, as Driver has also suggested, 3 
meant that probably for the first time in Britain's history 
not everyone was prepared to dismiss the notion of "passive 
resistance' as totally absurd. Against this background the 
British Council of Churches formed a Study Group to consider 
the moral aspects of defence. 
This chapter analyses the impact of CND on the peace debate 
within the British Churches by locating its attitude to the 
State, and discussing its understanding of democratic 
political responsibility. It argues that, as a consequence of 
the CND, the debate in the Churches moved beyond differences 
between pacifist and just war into a conflict essentially 
between gradualist multilateralism (j us t war) , and non- 
contingent unilateralism (nuclear pacifist) . It concludes 
with a detailed study of the final product of the Study 
Group's labour, the report Christians and Atomic War. 
Part I: CND's Democratic Protest 
On 17 February 1958 5,000 people crowded into the Central 
Hall, Westminster and its four overflow halls to listen to 
speakers including Canon Collins, J. B. Priestley, Sir Stephen 
King-Hall, Bertrand Russell and A. J. P. Taylor denounce 
Driver 1964, p. 36. 
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Goverment defence policy. 4A detailed history5 is not 
necessary here, but understanding the Campaign's impact on 
Church thinking is vital. 
CND originated as a moralistic, anti-political crusade. 6 
It was anti-statist in the sense that the movement expressed 
the achievement of its goals as more important than any other 
policy objective that may be pursued by conventional political 
leadership. Its distinctive symbol, a circle enclosing the 
semaphore signals for N(uclear) and D(isarmament), became an 
7 
important legacy for protest movement throughout the world . 
The Campaign's main tactic was the mass demonstration. 8 Here 
a diverse assortment of individuals: Christians, Marxists, 
anarchists, pacifists, Labour leftists, New leftists, and 
liberals all marched under the CND banner. 9 All were united 
by a sense of moral outrage against the Bomb, a conviction 
that Britain was on the road to physical and spiritual 
destruction, and the hope (ultimately misplaced) that if their 
voices were heard, they could redirect Britain's foreign and 
military policy, strengthen Britain's future, and save the 
4 Duff 1971, pp. 123-5. 
5 See for example: Driver 1964; Parkin 1968; Taylor and Pritchard 1980; 
Taylor 1988; Duff 1971; and Collins 1966. 
6A hypothesis developed by Frank Myers' 1965 PhD. 
7 Duff 1971, p. 116 and Veldman 1994, p. 115. According to Frank Myers 
(1965 PhD, p. 107) the symbol's resemblance to the semaphore signals was 
coincidental. He writes that the symbol's creator, Gerald Holtom 
intention was to depict a drooping cross as a sign of his despair at the 
failure of the churches to speak out against nuclear weapons. 
8 The famous marches to the Nuclear Weapons Research Establishment at 
Aldermaston were, for example, said to represent the "greatest movement in 
this island since the days of the Chartists". The first March over the 
1956 Easter Weekend was a great success with 3000-5,000 people at the 
opening rally in Trafalgar Square, 500-700 hard-core marchers and 5000- 
10,000 at the closing rally. Driver 1964, p. 59. 
9 Veldman 1994, p. 116. 
291 
earth. 'O Their initial aim was the simple demand to "Ban the 
Bomb". " The British State was called to do this unilaterally 
in order to set an example to the world. 12 CND was not an 
absolute pacifist organisation (although absolutists supported 
it) but rather the first nuclear pacifist mass movement. 13 
Frank Myers categorised the CND as a mass movement, a 
N%collective enterprise to establish a new order of life". 14 
The movement called upon people to make a more careful 
distinction between notions of human power, human control, and 
15 human responsibility in the nuclear age. It was an 
expression of the feeling that, in an age of mass 
technological destruction, political power was too 
concentrated and vast numbers faced death as a result of an 
10 Veldman 1994, p. 119. For an analysis of the Campaign's political 
impact and significance see Taylor 1988. This book is a substantially 
revised version of his 1983 PhD. 
11 1 am concerned here with the period prior to Labour's 1959 General 
Election defeat. After 1959 CND's programme changed beyond 
unilateralism by calling for the British withdrawal from NATO. At the 
same time the movement changed its primary tactic to the infiltration of 
the Labour Party. When this tactic failed CND modified their goals to 
make them more 'realistic'. Myers 1965 PhD argues that at this point 
the movement lost its anti-political quality and became a conventional 
F2 ressure-group. 
This call for British national affairs to be conducted in accordance 
with a categorical moral imperative is very Kantian in the sense that it 
was seen as the basis of the development of a higher national community 
based on the rule of law. 
13 Out of CND's first Executive, Driver suggests Canon Collins and 
Arthur Goss were the only pacifists, and the committee was cautious 
about adding pacifists to its number due to their lack of standing in 
society writ large (Driver 1964, p. 44). Driver's assertion of attitudes 
to pacifism are confirmed by this research. 
14 Myers 1965 PhD, p. iv. 
15 See Bauckham in Bauckham and Elford (eds. ) 1989, p. 43 for an 
excellent consideration of these themes. Bauckham's essay "Facing the 
Future: The Challenge to Secular and Theological Presuppositions" 
(pp. 29-46) develops a 'theology of hope' that helps understand the 
theistic resources drawn upon by Christians involved in CND. He argues 
first, that the nuclear threat was responsible for the loss of hope in 
contemporary society, and secondly, that the Christian tradition offered 
a source of hope, once the challenge to theological presuppositions was 
appreciated and met. 
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unresponsive and intransigent political decision-making 
process. " The movement accepted that a select number of 
human beings had the power to end all human history but, 
although most citizens did not have direct control of this 
power, it should not diminish the citizen's responsibility to 
help create a safer world. Their distinct linking of 'peace' 
to 'democracy' challenged the very notion that the State could 
legitimately sacrifice the life of society in defence of its 
apparatuses. Their approach not only questioned the level of 
confidence that should be placed in liberal democratic 
political processes, but argued that the important issue to be 
faced was not one of national security but one of popular 
sovereignty and the relationship between political 
institutions and the people's needs. Ultimately, the CND's 
idealist vision of 'new democracy' encompassed a critical 
appraisal of dominant political institutions both Western and 
Soviet. 17 
From this perspective the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament 
was a protest for greater democracy. It did not so much want 
to persuade the political establishment of the desirability of 
its demands but rather persuade civil society of the 
corruption of its political leadership. By demanding an 
increased role for democratic social movements in the 
16 See Myers' 1965 PhD for a full descriptive treatment of the 
unilateralist campaign and its significance as a large-scale public 
response to changes in international politics brought about by nuclear 
armaments. 
17 An excellent and complementary discussion of the peace movement's 
role in "Rethinking Cold War History" is provided by Mary Kaldor in 
Booth (ed. ) 1991, pp. 313-31. Elshtain 1985 offers a feminist view on 
the discourse. 
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formulation of State policy the organisation saw itself, as 
Olson convincingly argues", building an alternative social 
dynamic and one that would operate outside the cycle of 
established Cold War responses both Atlanticist and Stalinist. 
To CND supporters the roots of the arms race, and by 
implication the solution to the Cold war, were not to be found 
in the interaction of mutual threat (as realists would have 
it) but through the instigation of social change. This was 
not simply something that was or could be requested of 
Government. It meant accepting that change could only be 
brought about through soico-political organisation -- by 
taking an independent responsibility and actively struggling 
against the nuclear Establishment. This mobilisation of 
popular forms of economic and social groupings saw itself as 
an alternative to a system based on States that competed 
internationally, whilst suppressing national popular 
aspirations. The movement was a reaction against the process 
of bargaining itself, Realpolitik definitions of politics as 
force, and a challenge to Christian ideas of political 
responsibility. This subversive estimation of the worth of 
liberal democracy constituted a most important divide between 
the CND's revolutionary, non-contingent unilateralism, and the 
its Olson's 1962 PhD, p. 12. Olson's work is particularly interesting in 
that his focus on the campaign for unilateral disarmament centres on the 
theology, implied and explicit, in the documents produced by the 
movement in the years 1957-1961. 
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BCC"s incremental, gradualist multilateralism. 19 These points 
are key elements in reaching an understanding of the CND. 
CND and the Just War Debate 
For many concerned Christians the traditional debate 
between pacifists (those, who absolutely oppose war) and 
pacific-ists (the rest ) 20 was invalidated with the formation 
of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament. For these people it 
had become nonsensical to suggest the use of nuclear weapons 
could be a proportionate, indeed moral, means of defence 
simply because the result would be national suicide. As 
Margaret Thrall has put it ""The moral justification for non- 
pacifism ... disappeared in the nuclear context. t, 
21 The 
formation of the CND was important because it served to 
institutionalise the sense that the main issue for Christians 
to consider was no longer between pacifism and just war as 
such, but between gradualist multilateralism or unconditional 
unilateral disarmament. 
It has been shown in previous chapters that the tension 
between pacifists and just war theorists had been the dominant 
feature in the peace debate within the Churches, and one 
largely untroubled by the introduction of thermonuclear 
devices. Differences in approach had, however, been 
exemplified by a relative willingness to act and organise 
Ili See Milbank 1986 for a more general discussion of this divide 
between Christian multilateralists and Christian unilateralists. 
20 c. f. Chapter One. Ceadel 1980, pp. 3-8 offers an interesting 
discussion on the etymological differences between these terms. Hinton 
1989, p. xi follows this approach. 
21 Thrall 1966, p. 340. 
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opposition. While absolutists like Dr. Donald Soper, the 
Revd. Dr. George Macloed, and Canon Charles Raven were 
respected for actively encouraging and promoting pacifism in 
their Churches they had been marginalised in society at large 
by their opposition to the Second World War. Because many 
Christians thought the war against Hitler was just, Soper, 
Macloed and Raven diminished the credibility of the pacifist 
approach. A Christian nuclear pacifist (non-absolutist but 
anti-nuclear) stance suggested itself to be a much more 
productive platform from which to galvanise radical opposition 
ever since it was first enunciated by the US Calhoun 
Commission in 1946. It was not until the formation of CND and 
its acceptance by a mass movement, however, that the nuclear 
pacifist approach was truly legitimated in the minds of many 
Christians. 
Many of the Christians who participated in CND had, 
nevertheless been first drawn to the struggle through their 
continued activism in the pacifist organisations. The 
official Church position of accepting nuclear weapons had 
encouraged individual Church leaders to speak out, and small 
groups to agitate. Some members of groups, such as the 
Anglican Peace Fellowship and the Fellowship of 
Reconciliation, were still to figure largely in continued 
Government opposition despite the formation of CND. This also 
served to fragment oppositi on and is one reason why the 
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Campaign's impact on the Churches was not greater than it 
was. 22 
Canon John Collins, as first Chair of CND, 23 was perhaps 
the most famous and representative of this new breed of 
Christian nuclear unilateralists. Although Collins' lack of 
pacifism would alienate him from some, his approach typifies 
the CND approach. He was univocal in his feelings towards 
nuclear weapons: 
I say that I am not an absolute pacifist; but where 
nuclear, biological, or any other indiscriminate or mass- 
destructive weapons are concerned, I have never doubted, 
certainly since 1945, that their manufacture, let alone 
the threat to use them or their actual use, is not only 
wholly contrary to the Christian conscience, but 
24 
also 
something to be actively opposed by every Christian . 
This modified pacifism captured the spirit of the times. it 
argued that modern weapons could no longer be compatible with 
the requirements of just wa-r. Collins saw his ministry as one 
which brought together pacifists and nuclear pacifists in a 
mutual rejection of just war. To him the hitherto 
ineffectiveness of pacifist social movements could be seen in 
terms of three persistent problems: the widespread notion that 
pacifists had enfeebled resistance to Hitler; the divisions 
bbtween peace organisations; and prior to 1958 and CND, the 
failure to appreciate that Hiroshima demanded a radical change 
22 A good example of this is shown when both the Peace Pledge Union and 
the Fellowship of Reconciliation officially withheld their support from 
the incipient CND on the grounds that if the Campaign were successful it 
might encourage outbreaks of conventional warfare. See Collins 1966, 
? 
3.268. 
Canon at St. Paul's from 1949 until his death in 1983, Chair of CND 
1958-1964. See Chapter Three for detail and significance of Collins' 
activism with '*Christian Action. ' 
24 Collins 1966, p. 277. 
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of approach to the whole question of peace-making. The three 
problems facing Christian anti-nuclear campaigners were 
henceforth: first, to communicate that the just wa-- doctrine 
was irrelevant in the nuclear age; second, that new and 
radical (i. e. unilateralist) approaches to disarmament were 
necessary; and third, to mobilise sympathetic comrades in one, 
united mass movement. The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament 
brought a solution to these problems. 
The Impact of the Movement on the BCC 
CND speakers achieved gratifying effects by ridiculing the 
behaviour of the Churches, who as represented by the BCC Study 
Group in particular, were arguing the moral problems raised by 
multilateralism and unilateralism alike. This ridicule was 
only to be expected since not all Campaigners were Christians, 
nor all Christians Campaigners. 25 The formation of CND 
demanded a clear moral choice to be made by all, not just 
Christians. As Driver argues: 
For CND, it was a question of choosing which type of 
moral revulsion one preferred: against the genocide 
implications of all-out nuclear war, against the 
sacrifice of future generations' health in return for 
the present expediency of nuclear testing, or more 
generally against the assumption, implicit in the White 
Paper and the reasoning of some of the new generation of 
defence experts, that moral considerations of any kind 
were irrelevant to the formation of a nation's 'policy 
for survival'. 26 
z: ) This fact was represented in the CND Executive with Arthur Goss, 
Canon Collins and Sir Richard Acland being the only members known to be 
active Christians. 
26 Driver 1964, p. 77. 
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For Christians the choice was not necessarily seen in these 
terms. To the Churches the formation of CND gave four clear 
choices for concerned Christians: first, they could support 
the Government view as articulated through their massive 
retaliation strategy; second, Buzzard's brand of just war 
gradualism could be supported. This meant, in effect, putting 
defence first and calling for multilateral approaches to 
disarmament as a consequential second. Third, Christians 
could support CND unilateralism. Finally, they could commit 
themselves to the absolute pacifist cause. For most 
Christians the serious choice, following the Campaign for 
Nuclear Disarmament, became one between nuclear pacifism or a 
nuclear 3ust war. 
Whilst individual Christians and Church leaders who 
supported massive retaliation were primarily motivated by 
abject and unconditional hostility to Communism/ more 
C 
considered and moderate articulation of this approach was 
represented by the BCC's ever-increasing interest in Buzzard's 
limited war thesis. Many of the more Manichean Christians, in 
this way, also found themselves able to support Buzzard 
without compromising their hostility to Communism. 
CND, alternatively, asserted the impropriety of nuclear 
bluff as well as the need for anti-nuclear democratic 
organisation. Bluff and deterrence were seen as psychological 
weapons whose effectiveness depended on their credibility -- 
that is, on the effect they produced in the mind of an 
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enemy . 
27 This 'bluff and deterrence' were a necessary aspect 
of Buzzard's approach. It is the main reason why Canon 
Collins was critical of the realism of Church leaders such as 
Archbishop Fisher who accepted deterrence and helped reinforce 
the opinion that it was fear that made the world go round. 
For the same reasons Campaigners saw deterrence theory not 
only morally unacceptable but essentially opposed to. their 
faith in the validity of unilateral political action. This 
assertion, nevertheless, raised practical as well as moral 
questions which exposed the Campaign to counter attacks. 
The principal form these counter-attacks took were based on 
Buzzard's thesis. Campaigners found it difficult to rebut the 
limited war approach on the strategists ground because it 
demanded a more vigorous and intellectual cohesion than the 
movement possessed. But this was not really the point . The 
principal objection was the moral, theological and political 
incompatibility of nuclear pacifism with multilateralism or 
any form of gradualism. You were either for or against the 
Bomb. If you were unconditionally against its use, you 
renounced it and embraced unilateralism as a consequence. For 
Campaigners it was illogical to suggest you could be a nuclear 
(or H-bomb) pacifist and then call for a gradualist approach 
to ensure its renunciation as the Buzzardists argued. For 
them nuclear pacifism (as a programme for action) could only 
be compatible with unilateralism. To threaten to destroy, to 
keep the deterrent albeit in limited form, still allowed the 
27 Driver 1964, p. 77. 
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possibility of actually using the weapons. The only "safe' 
and logical course of political action was a call for 
renunciation (i. e. unilateralism) even if it proved impossible 
in practical terms. You had to be a Campaigner, or have faith 
in just war doctrine. This was not a distinction the BCC 
Study Group felt able to accept. 
CND institutional ised the main division in the Churches as 
one between nuclear pacifism and just wa-r. CND did not, 
therefore, revolutionise Church thinking but rather 
intensified, polarised and codified existing divisions. 
Whilst the formation of the Campaign did not in any way create 
a new situation for the British Churches it did create a 
coherent challenge to the Buzzardists. The arrival of CND 
enforced the contention that in the nuclear age, the 
significant division in the Churches was no longer between 
pacifism and just war, but rather between gradualist (just 
war) or unilateralist (nuclear pacifist) approaches to 
disarmament. This was the conclusion Bell and MacIntyre 
reached. 
Bell and MacIntyre Resign 
In April 1958, shortly before the Study Group on the Moral 
aspects of Disarmament's fourth meeting, Alasdair MacIntyre 
tendered his resignation. 28 In May Bishop Bell resigned. 29 
Both determined to give their time and attention to CND. This 
40 MacIntyre to Keighley, 19 April 1958, BCC Box 14. 
29 Citing ill-health (Bell died later in the year) Bell resigned in a 
letter to Keighley, 28 May 1958, BCC Box 14. 
301 
was not surprising. The Group's progress had reinforced 
MacIntyrels and Bell's belief that their own standpoints were 
both socially, morally and theologically too far away from 
that of the committee. It was precisely this fear that had 
made MacIntyre hesitate in agreeing to join the Group. The 
birth of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament had changed 
things both intellectually and practically for the Group. CND 
was now a clear focus and home for those unconditionally 
opposed to nuclear weapons. MacIntyre wanted to give all his 
time to the incipient movement: 
My own feeling is that the issue as to whether to support 
or not to support the campaign is as simple as the moral 
issue over the abolition of slavery and that all other 
discussion on this topic has become trivial and 
irrelevant. " 
For MacIntyre it was a waste of money and time to remain in 
the committee . His feeling was that the Group"s work was 
largely irrelevant to the important issues . 
31 For Bell, 
MacIntyre, and CND, their argument turned on a different 
interpretation of "facts' and conceptions of 'power' within 
international relations. Margaret Thrall an Anglican pacifist 
has nicely summarised the argument: 
The actual facts of the present situation, i. e. the 
component elements of the balance of terror, the pacifist 
[both nuclear and absolutist] would claim to take very 
seriously indeed, and would maintain that only a quite 
radical change in our whole way of thinking is adequate 
to deal with them. What the Christian pacifist refuses 
to accept is that such a change of outlook is totally 
30 Ibid. 
31 In response to the Group's plea for him to reconsider his 
resignation MacIntyre writes "... I am afraid that I still feel the work 
of the committee is largely irrelevant to the important issues and that 
it would be unfair to you as well as a waste of time for me to 
reconsider my resignation. " MacIntyre to Keighley 16 May 1958. 
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impossible, that we are so deeply enslaved by our present 
political circumstances that we cannot break free of them 
to shape our future history in accordance with the 
Christian ethic. He cannot believe that man is enslaved 
against his will to political forces beyond his control. 
The Christian believes that man has been freed by Christ 
from all powers in the world which might otherwise 
rigidly determine and control his history. 32 
Such opinion was reinforced when Bishop Bell resigned from the 
Group. While Bell had suffered from several enforced absences 
from the Group's discussions due to health reasons, it was 
clear both he and MacIntyre represented the minority view 
within the Group. It was a case of numbers and philosophy. 
No matter how forcefully MacIntyre and Bell presented their 
approach the consensus of opinion was firmly in favour of, not 
the renunciation of nuclear weapons, but limiting their use in 
Buzzard's sense. 
Both Bishop Bell and MacIntyre represented a stout defence 
of the nuclear pacifist and unilateralist CND position. 
Buzzard's approach was methodologically, theoretically, and 
morally wrong to the Campaigners. For Bell and MacIntyre the 
only policy for the Group to advocate was one where the 
Churches concentrated the whole of their energies on 
advocating a unilateral disarmament policy. The differences 
in approach between Bell and Buzzard could not be reconciled 
through discussion and conciliation, they were separate and 
diametrically opposed. The staff team of the Study Group, 
however, felt unable to accept this. 
32 Thrall 1966, p. 344. 
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Staff team members and Buzzard essentially shared a 
modified Government approach. Progress in disarmament was 
likely to come by an incremental piece by piece process. This 
enunciation of gradualism meant that if war broke out, after a 
certain amount of disarmament had taken place, then it would 
to that extent have to be limited. This was principally 
Buzzard's thesis. The CND's alternative policy was for the 
Churches to press purely for total nuclear disarmament. This 
as Keighley represented it, was unacceptable because it was 
just as much an ""all or nothing" policy as massive 
retaliation. For Keighley, Bell's approach was a "a counsel 
of despair': ""Surely we have to repeat again and again what we 
believe as Christians to help to find ways in which the 
nations can begin to obey that judgement. Does that not in 
fact mean trying to rule out certain forms of armament while 
others are retained? "33 
It was not only Bell and MacIntyre who were critical of the 
Christian Church for its inability to stand together on the 
nuclear issue. 34 But the division was no new thing. For many 
of the Christians who became involved in CND, true 
Christianity had ceased when Constantine adopted it as his 
official state religion, and Augustine helped adapt it to the 
'temporal' purposes which eventually built. up the power- 
Jj Keighley had made his attitude clear in a early letter to Bishop 
Bell dated 4th December 1957, BCC Box 14. 
34 See for example a powerful letter from Percy S. Beales to the Editor 
of The Wiltshire and Gloucestershire Standard, 24 May 1958. 
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complex known as Christendom. For them this was not what 
Christ taught: 
It is Christendom that has failed not Christ. .. It is 
quite futile to engage in mud-slinging and cheap jibes as 
between and against the Churches on the one hand and 
pacifists on the other. 35 
For these people the WCC, CCIA, and BCC had declared war to be 
against the will of "God', and then thrown 'God's will' or 
Providence to the ravens by approving of war when it was "the 
lessor of two evils". It was as though God was seen as not 
capable of providing a third alternative. Even the Quakers, 
whose peace testimony against all war was respected throughout 
Christendom, were being criticised for lacking corporate unity 
on this matter. 36 
Attitudes of BCC Associated Councils 
As CND established itself as a mass movement various 
resolutions were passed by ecclesiastical bodies. Churches 
were aware of the depth of feeling in the country. 
Christians, as much as anyone else, read the newspapers and a 
look at any one of the 65 letters published by The Times alone 
between February 27 and March 27 195 837 testified to the depth 
of feeling in the country. All the main Churches, in time, 
took a position on the gradualist or unilateralist issue. 
Here the Churches made an attempt to respond to the depth of 
public feeling. The numerically most important ecclesiastical 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Reprinted as The Muclear Dilemma, The Times Publishing Co., 1958. 
305 
bodies were the Anglicans (Lambeth Conference), the Methodists 
and the Church of Scotland. 
The Lambeth Conference of the Anglican Communion was 
divided. Whilst Owen Chadwick 3" asserts that the Conference 
united in asking the Government to abolish nuclear weapons, 
this is not the complete picture. The Times reported 39 that 
nuclear weapons was the one subject that divided the 
conference. It asserts there was no difference of opinion on 
any other subject. Lambeth essentially divided over whether 
there was any circumstance in which the use of nuclear weapons 
was acceptable. Some delegates supported CNDfs nuclear 
pacifist position, whilst others thought there were just war 
circumstances in which the use of these weapons was preferable 
to political enslavement by the Communists. There was, in any 
event, no agreement on the renunciation of the use of nuclear 
weapons. 
For the Methodists, at their conference in Grimsby, there 
was confusion amongst the delegates over both the voting on 
the resolution and amendments dealing with nuclear weapons. 
Despite a strong Christian Citizenship Department, and a long 
tradition of leftist inclination in political matters, a 
strongly worded amendment calling for the unconditional and 
unilateral renunciation of the production and use of nuclear 
38 Chadwick 1991, p. 100. 
39 The Times, 26 August 1958. 
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weapons was defeated. 'O With one hand the Methodists 
declared: 
The dreadful devastation caused by such weapons and the 
possibly more dreadful consequent and persistent effects 
of radio-active contamination, make it extremely doubtful 
if a war so waged could achieve a good outweighing the 
evil it would involve. If the result of such a war is to 
make the world a desert and call it peace, it can no 
longer be presumed that there is a reasonable hope of 
victory for justice. Nor can it be argued that the 
extinction of a nation or a continent is in acc9rdance 
with man" s nature as a rational being or with Christian 
moral principles. " 
Here the Methodists again referred back to the just war but 
concluded that nuclear weapons were incompatible with its 
requirements. They were resolving that the H-bomb did not 
allow war to be waged with any hope of achieving victory for 
justice "its method was not legitimate or in accordance with 
either man's nature as a rational being, or Christian 
principles and international agreements. " Nevertheless with 
the other hand, and although the Conference went on record 
against the hydrogen bomb, their declaration also argued that 
"the conditions of "just warfare" could be observed if the 
combatants agreed to wage war with a limited range of 
graduated and controllable nuclear weapons. 1/42 As Groom 
recognises, this was just the sort of advice Admiral Buzzard 
was giving to the British Council of Churches. 43 
The General Assembly of the Church of Scotland also 
rejected a resolution that called on Britain to commit itself 
40 The Grimsby Evening Telegraph, 15 April 1958. 
41 Methodist Church Declarations 1959, p. 44. 
42 Ibid. p. 45. 
43 Groom 1974, p. 328. 
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to unilateral action. Whilst the Moderator of the Church of 
Scotland General Assembly (John Pitt-Watson 44 ) supported 
nuclear pacifism, the Church's Church and Nation Committee 
expressed the opinion that not until there was some 
constructive, positive act of policy could a halt be called to 
the race in nuclear weapons. The resolution called for a 
multilateral approach to disarmament. The Kirk's preference 
for 'realistic' pragmatism is clearly stated in its appeal on 
grounds political, moral, and theological for Britain to 
approach the Soviet Union and the USA and seek co-operative 
efforts in securing general disarmament. 45 
Smaller ecclesiastical bodies were saying similar things. 
The General Assembly of Unitarian and Free Christian Churches 
passed a resolution that called for the end to nuclear testing 
on genetic grounds but expressed no opinion on the rights and 
wrongs of manufacturing nuclear weapons and of using them as 
instruments of deterrence. The resolution urged the 
Goverment to seek immediate, but multilateral agreement under 
the supervision of a United Nations agency, for the cessation 
of all nuclear tests and the production of nuclear weapons. 
Calls for the unilateral abandonment of nuclear tests by 
Britain were defeated. 46 
Many of these ecclesiastical bodies including the BCC, had 
felt able to give their support to the CND's predecessor 
NCANWT. Yet it was these same people who now refused to 
44 c. f. Chapters Three and Four of this thesis. 
45 The Times May 28 1957. 
46 The Times May 25 1957. 
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support CND. In terms of the BCC, the refusal to condone CND 
can be best seen as a consequence of a substantial gradualist 
shift in Council thinking about disarmament since the 
introduction of Buzzard's thesis. 
Part II: The Gradualist Response 
In March 1958, less than one month after the. CNDrS 
inaugural meeting, Alan Keighley prepared a paper for the 
Study Group on the Moral Aspects of Disarmament presenting 
the 
issues before the Group as a stark choice between gradualism 
47 
and unilateralism. . This 
discussion paper can be seen as the 
first coherent articulation of the gradualist approach 
by a 
member of the GroUprS staff team. The paper represents 
the 
intensification of gradualist thinking in BCC circles. 
Secretary Keighley suggested that the Study Group should 
proceed with their remit by calling on the BCC to welcome 
the 
prospect of an early summit meeting between major heads of 
state. The greatest need was for increased confidence between 
Communist and non-communist countries. This could only 
be 
achieved, however, by recognising that agreement on major 
issues would have to await the establishing of "greater 
confidence, " and discounting support for the type of 
unilateral action that the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament 
called for. The BCC should be mindful that an unprofitable 
meeting between the heads of state of the major world powers 
47 Keighley's paper entitled The British Council of Churches' Study 
Group on the Moral Aspects of Disarmament: Discussion Paper for Meeting 
on March 6 1958, dated 4 March 1958, BCC Box 14. 
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might lead to an increase of harmful tension and 
disillusionment. The Council should call upon British 
Christians, by prayer and an increased understanding of the 
complicated issues involved, to support the efforts of the 
British Government to find, in concert with other governments, 
means of relaxing the tension between East and West. 48 
Secondly, Keighley argued that the Council should i. ssue a 
statement that reminded people that war was contrary to the 
spirit, teaching and purpose of Jesus Christ. Whilst for 
Christian Campaigners this meant that all nuclear war should 
immediately be renounced, for others (especially limited war 
theorists) it meant, with equal sincerity, that in the present 
situation this aim would be more surely achieved by a gradual 
approach by all sides. The BCC should be advised to appeal to 
people to have faith in peace being achieved through 
multilateral political methods. The ultimate objective must 
not be in doubt: no war can be "just' except in the relative 
sense as the lesser of two evils. 49 Once this just war 
foundation was built Keighley felt the Council could then 
argue that warfare waged by the most destructive modern means, 
such as the strategic (i. e. the H-bomb but not by smaller, 
less powerful 'tactical' weapons) nuclear bombs and missiles, 
were unrelated to any conceivably legitimate war aim. No 
State should have the right to threaten to commit whole 
populations to destruction, and any who survive to a dangerous 
40 Ibid. 
49 Ibid. 
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level of atomic radiation. 50 This meant following the Labour 
Party"s approach: 
The Council (should) therefore call upon Her Majesty's 
Government to seek, as a matter of utmost urgency, for an 
alternative to the strategic nuclear deterrent, as a 
basis for the national defence policy. 51 
In this way Keighley suggested Buzzard's recommendations as 
the sensible and most Christian alternative to the existing 
policy of massive retaliation. Here it was appropriate for 
the Council to issue a statement that respected and understood 
the widespread feeling of revulsion towards strategic nuclear 
weapons. It would be of the utmost necessity to point out to 
Christian people the practical consequences of unilateral 
renunciation. 52 
Keighley saw the implications of British unilateralism on 
two levels. First, he thought it must be recognised that the 
real issue was not renunciation but control. 53 It was control 
that would ensure no country could use these weapons -- it was 
not enough for a Christian to simply declare strategic nuclear 
weapons abhorrent. Duty could only be fulfilled and 
responsible citizenship affirmed, if Christians sought to 
contribute to the control of these weapons. This was a 
crucial point. Keighley saw CND campaigners as both morally 
and politically wrong because they failed to combine moral 
fervour with responsible citizenship. For him it was only 
50 Ibid. 
51 Keighley's paper entitled The British Council of Chuxches' Study 
Group on the Moral Aspects of Disarmament: Discussion Paper for Meeting 
on March 6 1958, dated 4 March 1958, BCC Box 14. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid. 
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through the facing up to responsibility that the danger from 
nuclear weapons be minimised. The attitude was that no 
advantage could be gained by what he saw as CND's hysterical 
outburst against nuclear weapons. What was needed was to 
understand the difficulties in which Prime Ministers and 
Governments are placed with the type of study the BCC's 
, special group' was attempting. 54 
For Keighley the second implication of CND's immediate and 
unilateral renunciation of strategic nuclear weapons was that 
it was a policy tantamount to absolute pacifism. If CNDI s 
principal objection to these weapons was a moral one there 
could be no question of sheltering Britain behind the nuclear 
shield of the United States. As Keighley understood the CND 
position, unilateral nuclear disarmament implied that the 
British should submit to a lower standard of living, in order 
to permit a vast increase in expenditure on conventional arms. 
For Keighley this was not an acceptable demand. The Council 
should af firm that there was no adequate way of defending 
Britain other than the threat of nuclear retaliation. 
Keighley conflates the nuclear pacifist position with the 
absolute pacifist when he declared, the only other alternative 
would be to consciously take the way of Christian pacifism -- 
55 a course not lightly to be entered upon . 
54 Ibid. 
55 Ibid. 
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An Interim Statement 
In April 1958 the various strands of thought pursued by the 
Study Group, and developed mainly by Mackie, Booth, and 
Keighley (under the shadow of Buzzard) began to come together. 
The last action taken by the BCC regarding nuclear weapons was 
the reception and communication of the Yale statements to 
Prime Minister Macmillan. Two separate developments. since 
then presented new opportunities for a BCC statement. The 
first of these was the Soviets' February 2 offer to suspend 
nuclear tests. The second development concerned the 
communication of an appropriate response to an address made by 
Dr. Frederick Nolde, Director of the Commission of the 
Churches on International Affairs (CCIA). 56 
Nolde urged that the US Government should not regard their 
position as inflexible and unalterable. He accepted that the 
process of seeking agreements with the Soviet Union required 
negotiation with representatives of a government whose 
57 
philosophy and outlook did not inspire confidence , yet still 
believed the US and Britain could seek agreement on a date 
after which nuclear testing should cease. Nolde hoped that 
ecumenical bodies, like the US Federal Council of Churches and 
their BCC counterparts, would take supporting action to this 
end. 
Do See transcript of Nolde's address Next Steps: Prevention of War and 
Promotion of Peace, 18 April 1958, BCC Box 14. 
57 Nolde justified this position by recalling the "many broken 
promises" and the tragedy of the 1956 Hungarian Uprising. Ibid. p. 6. 
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Despite Nolde's appeal for concerted action the Study Group 
felt unable to "take up a position on the resolution, as it 
had not fully discussed the problems before it. "'5" All Mackie 
felt able to do was give the Council a verbal indication of 
some of the topics which had so far occupied their study. 59 
Sir Kenneth Grubb, however, was prepared to move another 
Private Member's motion with the approval of both the. Study 
Group and the International Department. Because Grubb's 
motion covered only a limited part of the committee's 
concerns, the Group in full concurrence with the DIA, '60 felt 
able to recommend certain sentiments to the Council. The 
following was passed as an official BCC resolution at the 
Council's spring Assembly on the 22 April: 
The Council welcomes the Prime Minister's statement on 
April lst that it is the policy of Her Majesty's 
Government to negotiate a disarmament agreement which 
will provide for the ending or suspension of tests under 
proper conditions. We therefore urge Her Majesty's 
Government, in co-operation with the Government of the 
United States, to give a positive answer to the recent 
Russian initiative by agreeing to an immediate temporary 
suspension of nuclear tests so as to re-open the way for 
negotiations to progressive and controlled disarmament. 61 
Following normal BCC procedure the resolution was passed to 
the Prime Minister. 
58 Minutes of the Fourth Meeting of the Study Group on the Moral 
Aspects of Disarmament, 21 April 1958, BCC Box 14. 
59 Ibid. 
60 There is some confusion over whether Grubb's resolution was passed 
in full concurrence of both the DIA and its surrogate Study Group. A 
letter from Keighley to Slack on 25 April 1958 argues that in no way was 
it moved on behalf of Group. Another letter from Keighley to Gordon 
Evans, United Nations Association, on the 19 May suggests it was passed 
in full concurrence of both bodies. See letters in BCC Box 14. 
61 The resolution can be found in as a supplement to the BCC's 1955 
publication The Churchas and the Hydrogen Bomb. 
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Harold Macmillan doubted the wisdom of the suspension of 
British tests. 62 The Government feared that such a step, in 
the present climate, would increase and not lessen the danger 
of war. The position of the Government, which had frequently 
been explained in the House of Commons and elsewhere, was that 
unilateral declarations of intention to suspend tests were in 
themselves of little value and that the suspension of, tests 
should not be considered in isolation from other aspects of 
disarmament. What was needed in this f ield, as in other 
disarmament matters, was an international agreement including 
adequate measures of inspection and control. Macmillan's 
Government asserted that the only way to prevent proliferation 
was to stop the production of fissile material, under 
international control, as proposed by the United Nations in 
its November 1957 vote. 63 
Macmillan's response to Grubb's resolution suggests that 
the Government saw the BCCI s response as too extreme. The 
Group were disappointed with his reaction. The BCC never 
intended to involve themselves in a criticism of the 
Government. The avowed intention was not to embroil the BCC 
in any argument. Keighley consequently suggested Slack should 
write back to Macmillan pointing out that the BCC took 
particular care not to advocate anything more than a temporary 
suspension of tests at this juncture. 64 
62 Letter from PM's Secretary (de Zulueta) to Keighley, 9 May 1958, 
BCC Box 14. 
63 Ibid. 
64 See Memo. from Keighley to Slack 12 May 1958. 
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Towards a Report 
Soon after Macmillan received notice of the BCC's Spring 
resolution the WCC's Commission, headed by Dr. Bilheimer, 
published Christians and the Prevention of War in an Atomic 
Age. 65 The authors of this report were drawn from several 
countries and denominations. Whilst there were some 
reservations of assent and emphasis, the Commission was-at one 
when they announced: 
We are agreed on one point, this is that Christians 
should openly declare that the all-out use of these 
weapons should never be resorted to. Moreover, that 
Christians must oppose all policies which give evidence 
of leading to all-out war. Finally, if all-out war should 
occur, Christians should urge a cease fire, if necessary, 
on the enemy's terms, and resort to non-violent 
resistance. We purposely refrain from defining the stage 
at which all-out war may be reached. 66 
Paul Ramsey made the document the subject of a chapter in his 
important book War and the Christian Conscience. Here Ramsey 
characterises the report when he writes: 
In a curious way this document stands squarely within the 
tradition of just-war theory, and yet not so squarely 
there, because of an unsureness and ambiguity introduced 
throughout, I can only say, by the Calvinistic impulse to 
transform the world gone to seed in an inarticulate 
pacifism that has in mind at every point the final and 
complete prevention of war. It stands squarely within 
the modern Protestant movement to 'renounce' war 
altogether (whatever that may mean), yet not so squarely 
there because of the lingering force exerted by the 
rightfulness 
67 
under certain circumstances of the just or 
limited war. 
This insight is useful and suggests an unresolved tension 
between nuclear pacifism and just war approaches in the WCCs 
65 See WCC, 1958. 
66 Ibid., Section 66. 
67 Ramsey 1961, p. 114. Commentary in Potter 1969, pp. 114-15. 
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f indings. The WCC Commission was coming out strongly against 
massive retaliation but, like the BCC, felt unable to embrace 
CND-type renunciation. The alternative strategy for defence 
in the report was tantamount to a form of modern just wa-r: the 
"discipline' of possessing nuclear armaments but using them, 
if at all, in a limited way. " Indeed, the report allowed 
room for a version of the very approach Admiral Buzzard was 
recommending. If total war broke out despite these safe- 
guards (and assuming there still was a humanity) it advocated 
an unconditional cease fire and King-Hall type pacifism. 
69 
Mackie read the WCC document and was impressed . The 
problem in formulating a joint policy here, however, was that 
Mackie felt there was little real meeting of minds between 
empiricists (the practical or technical) and the theological. 
Mackie was of the opinion that the highlighting of this 
tension by the WCC called for a urgent review of official BCC 
policy towards the Study Group and its basis of policy 
formation. 70 Kenneth Grubb agreed and pointed out that a 
revised approach should seek to enunciate Christian principles 
by which Christians would be helped to formulate or criticise 
policy, even though the BCC themselves should not itself 
attempt to formulate that policy. He also felt that the BCC 
and DIA were failing in their duties -because the current 
debate on disarmament was not really reflected in the 
68 WCC 1958, Section 40. 
69 Minutes of the Fifth Meeting of the Study Group on the Moral Aspects 
of Disarmament, 30 May 1958, BCC 14. 
70 This debate is repeated in a letter from Keighley to Slack, 25 April 
1958, BCC Box 14. 
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Department's work, only in the Group's. Grubb was not sure 
how this could be done without producing a detailed study 
document. 
Mackie brought his concerns, and Grubb' s observations, 
before the Study Group on the 30 May 1958. It was here that 
71 
Mackie suggested that the Group produce their own pamphlet . 
This was met with much approval. It was decided that such a 
pamphlet should be seen as a basis for discussion among 
Christians. It was envisioned that the pamphlet would explain 
why the old issue between pacifist and just war approaches was 
now irrelevant. This approach could henceforth create a new 
balance between the empirical and the theological in British 
Christian thinking without resorting to nuclear pacifism. 
British Christians needed strong guidance on facts and issues, 
and one based on a sufficiently considered theological 
72 foundation . The WCCs report would serve to carry 
the 
discussion forward. 
In June 1956 the Labour MP Philip Noel-Baker, an important 
writer associated with disarmament problems since the League 
of Nations, published his new book The Arms Race -- A 
Programme for World Disarmament. 73 Booth and Grubb thought 
this book would be a worthy discussion point with which to 
74 begin the Group's projected pamphlet . 
71 Minutes of the Fifth Meeting of the Study Group on the Moral Aspects 
of Disarmament, 30 May 1958, BCC Box 14. 
72 Ibid. 
73 The enormous significance of this text in the development of 
strategic thinking is explored by Hedley Bull in his essay "Disarmament 
and the International System" in Garnett (ed. ) 1970, pp. 136-48. 
'74 Booth mentions this to Keighley in a letter dated 12 June 1958, 
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Noel-Baker' s book was an attempt to put disarmament and 
arms control into a wider theoretical perspective. This 
approach was unusual in ideal 
iSt75 circles because, as Groom 
notes, "'the traditional so-called empirical approach held 
sway, with its melange of unstated theoretical assumptions and 
lack of 'hard data. ' 
76 Booth persuaded Noel-Baker to produce 
77 
a memorandum which in effect summarised his book .. His 
thesis amounted to the proposal that attempts by the nuclear 
powers to reach partial disarmament schemes should be 
abandoned in favour of a more ambitious disarmament conference 
in which all the states of the world worked out a total 
scheme. This was another version of the multilateralist 
approach and one vindicated by the Group's final report. 
The CCIA and WCC 
As the Study Group proceeded with producing a report, two 
resolutions by the CCIA and WCC in the summer of 1958 served 
to influence thinking. Before these statements are considered 
it is necessary to note that disarmament efforts at this time 
were mainly geared to halting the testing of nuclear weapons 
or war-heads. Motives were two-fold: first, to stop the 
release of radiation, a world-wide health hazard; and second, 
to discourage proliferation. This first motive had, however, 
lost weight as soon as the ability to test explosions 
BCC Box 14. 
75 Smith 1986, pp. 54-67; Howard 1977, p. 367; and Hedley Bull in Der 
Derian (ed. ) 1995, p. 185 all label Noel-Baker as idealist. 76 Groom 1974, p. 357. 
77 Memorandum by Noel-Baker, dated 26 June 1956, BCC Box 14. 
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underground was developed. Two important developments in 1958 
were therefore encouraging the course of CCIA and WCC 
thinking. First, a conference of technical experts concluded 
that underground nuclear explosions could be detected by 
seismic and other devices. "3 Second, the three nuclear powers 
announced separately that they would suspend tests while 
79 
attempting to negotiate a comprehensive Test Ban . 
In August the CCIA announced that they were still concerned 
that countries had not made decisive progress towards 
disarmament. "O Whilst recent developments afforded ground for 
hope many grave problems remained. The conference on 
technicians, by reaching agreement on the detection of tests, 
had made clear advances which might be applied to such fields 
as cessation of production and the danger of surprise attacks. 
The CCIA felt the Soviet offer to suspend tests, albeit 
conditionally, must be judged by its contribution to mutual 
trust and sound agreement. Christians in their eagerness for 
peace must henceforth not oversimplify tortuous questions 
because this needlessly opened the door to violation of 
justice and the reign of force. An 'open society' was one key 
to peace and first steps lay in making more friendships and 
contacts between peoples. This was particularly so because 
78 UN document A/3897,21 August 1958, BCC Box 14. 
79 This moratorium continued until 1961 when first, the Soviets and then 
the US resumed testing. A period of intensive testing had therefore led to 
increased fears about radiation from nuclear fall-out. 
80 August 1958 Statement of CCIA Executive Committee, Nyborg. 
See BCC Box 14. 
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armament control involved teams of inspectors and there was a 
need to understand one another better. 
The Central Committee of the WCC31 welcomed the efforts 
governments producing nuclear weapons had taken as a first 
step towards bringing the testing under international control. 
At the same time they urged that these efforts should be the 
beginning of attempts to halt the production of nuclear 
weapons and reduce existing armaments. Like the CCIA, the WCC 
called for an 'open society' where people could meet freely 
and learn to trust one another. The WCC appealed to the 
Churches to help prepare the way for such an open society. 
By July 1958 the Study Group on the Moral Aspects of 
Disarmament had concentrated their efforts by setting up a 
specialised drafting sub-committee. They had been greatly 
encouraged in this respect by the prospect of a conference 
between the powers concerning the suspension of nuclear tests. 
It was this fact, the Group felt, that constituted a 
constructive step towards progressive and regulated 
disarmament. Mindful of these resolutions the Group's 
committee became responsible for the mechanics of drafting 
chapters and sending them to the larger Group for critical 
comment. 82 
The drafting committee was originally made up by the five 
most influential Group members. The members of this committee 
were Robert Mackie, Alan Booth, Admiral Buzzard, Alan Keighley 
81 August 1958 Statement by the Central Committee of the WCC. 
BCC Box 14. 
82 Keighley to Slack, 3 July 1958, BCC Box 14. 
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and Edward Rogers. Analysis of the relevant primary sources 
however shows that only Mackie, Booth, Buzzard, and Rogers 
were responsible for the actual writing of the chapters. it 
was these who were largely responsible for the final product 
and would consequently determine the character of the 
subsequent report. Booth as much as Buzzard figures largely 
in the discussions and actual writing process. 
The Report's Drafting 
Chapters were completed and a draft available for 
discussion by the end of September 1958. once the chapters 
had been written the sub-committee retired to Westminster 
College Cambridge (September 26-27th) where an intensive 
residential weekend served to highlight problems. When 
Keighley learnt he could not attend this weekend Kenneth Slack 
was asked to join the drafting sub-committee. The first 
chapter (written by Mackie) threw open the real moral issues 
by discussing the situation that faced those in authority. 
The second chapter (Booth in collaboration with Buzzard) aimed 
to discuss these issues in greater detail. The third chapter 
(Booth and Rogers) made recommendations in light of previous 
discussion. Chapter four (Booth and Buzzard) presented the 
contemporary dilemma of defence and disarmament. An appendix 
(Booth and Buzzard) would give factual information about 
nuclear weapons and their effects. 
It was not just the BCC that were wrestling with the 
distinction between nuclear pacifism and the idea of a just 
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nuclear war. The Swiss Churches, for example, had divided on 
the question of nuclear armament in a similar way to the 
British Churches. 83 Whilst a Christian study conference in 
the United States had taken a firm line against nuclear just 
wa. r. This interested Mackie. 84 To him it seemed that 
unilateralism had become a convincing argument amongst 
American Christians. " For Mackie this proved how careful the 
drafting sub-committee had to be in handling the issue. For 
his own part Mackie could not sympathise with the American 
refusal to discuss limited war, since it seemed a practical 
step between total war and the absence of hostility. 86 To 
Mackie nuclear weapons were like any other compromise 
necessary in international relations. For unilateralists in 
Britain, the States and elsewhere, however, it was seen as a 
lowering of standards if deterrence theory was even discussed. 
The second draft of the report was ready by December. The 
drafting had been hard work. Booth's drafting had been 
particularly criticised. " Despite the drafting committee 
agreeing at Cambridge something to the contrary, Booth had put 
the whole report's argument in one of his chapters. As 
B3 Mackie informs Keighley of this in a letter, 10 December 1958, 
BCC Box 14. 
B4 Ibid. 
85 It is interesting how radical US Churches were in the nuclear debate 
especially when compared to the British. Chapter Three of this thesis 
recalls how the US Federal Council of Churches were the first organised 
body to enunciate the nuclear pacifist position. Here, thirteen years 
later, the unilateralist approach was also been embraced. 
86 Ibid. 
87 See for example Keighley to Booth, 17 December 1958. Norman Goodall 
was also considerably troubled by Booth's approach. Goodall went to 
see Slack to make the point that Buzzard's approach was only one 
approach to the problems before the Group. Keighley informs Mackie of 
this in a letter, 17. December 1958. Both letters BCC Box 14. 
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Keighley saw it this was a problem because there could be 
little justification for the BCC issuing a pamphlet which made 
clear the final recommendations before having gone through 
examining the moral issues involved. "" Keighley thought it 
would be disastrous if the pamphlet was issued and even a 
small group of Council members attempted to disavow it -- as 
they might well have done on these grounds. Any publicity 
that came from this would certainly have been of the wrong 
kind. 
A particular facet of Keighley's general criticism was the 
sure way the influence of Buzzard's ideas had entered at an 
early stage. Keighley was all for the discussion of Buzzard's 
views, but doubted whether they should intrude in this way. " 
He did support an overt discussion of Buzzard's theme much 
later in the pamphlet, but felt the drafts had not gone far 
enough in isolating the moral issues at stake. 90 
Additions and alterations of emphasis to the drafts 
continued throughout December. Kenneth Slack, the BCC's 
International Department Secretary, saw the draft pamphlet and 
considered it extremely important and controversial. 9' 
Because the reference terms of the Group was to advise the 
Council, he requested that it should not be available for 
general distribution before the BCC could discuss it. For 
this to be achieved it was decided that the final copy should 
88 Ibid. 
89 Ibid. 
90 Keighley to Mackie, 19 December 1958. 
91 The Minutes of the Eighth Meeting of the Study Group into the Moral 
Aspects of Disarmament, 18 December 1958, BCC Box 14. 
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be at the printers by the third week in February. The 
pamphlet was hence set to be published before the spring 
meeting of the Council. 
On the 22nd April 1959 the completed Report was presented 
by Mackie to the Council for consideration at its half-yearly 
meeting in London. 92 The long awaited pamphlet had taken an 
incredible (considering the Oldham Report had taken only three 
weekends to produce) eleven months to produce. At the Council 
meeting the following resolution was passed: ""The Council 
receives the pamphlet entitled Christians and Atomic War and 
authorises its publication, commending it for careful study of 
the issues raised, in the interest of an informed Christian 
opinion capable of influencing public PoliCy. /193 
Part III: Christians and Atomic War 
The pamphlet Christians and Atomic War: A Discussion of the 
Moral Aspects of Defence and Disarmament in the Nuclear Age 
was the completed study of the Moral Aspects of Disarmament 
Group" appointed by the BCC. For purposes of clarity it will 
92 Five thousand copies were printed. By September 1959 four thousand 
of these had been sold or distributed to BCC and WCC associated councils 
and Churches, Government representatives, strategic analysts, and 
various individuals. See Minutes of the Eleventh Meeting of the Study 
Group on the Moral Aspects of Disarmampnt, 23 September 1959, BCC Box 
14. 
93 File ID/19/59 in Box 14. 
94 There are several differences in the composition of the two groups 
who wrote BCC Reports in 1946 and 1959. First, the 1959 Report was not 
authored by any women; second, the 1946 Report had three 
theologians/philosophers, the 1959 Report one; and three, whereas the 
1946 Report had no politicians or technical experts, the 1959 Report had 
one MP and two technical experts. These differences, quite naturally, 
is reflected in the style of the reports. The former being more 
philosophical, the later heralding the much more technical BCC approach 
to defence influenced by Buzzard. 
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be shown which individuals authored which chapter. This is 
not indicated in the published document. 
The Report began by defining the Group's responsibilities 
as outlined by the October 1957 Council Resolution. It added 
that the International Department or Council did not 
necessarily endorse the opinions expressed. The opening 
chapter, written by Robert Mackie, explained the purpose of 
the pamphlet. It defined the Group's goal as seeking a 
pragmatic approach to defence and disarmament. This started 
with the fact of power in relationships between States. 
Disarmament as a 'concept' was dealt with in this fashion 
because it was thought Christians could not divorce their 
'responsibility' for defence from a practical consideration of 
the likely "consequences' of a particular course of action. 
Reviewing the situation meant considering the intentions of 
those responsible for defence. The Group felt that, in 
forming opinions and making recommendations, they were 
applying themselves to the actual situation before them. In 
realist fashion the Group applied themselves to situations 'as 
they are', not as they 'could' or 'ought to ber. This was the 
crux of the argument. Competing traditions, pacifist and non- 
pacifist alike, had legitimacy. It was down to Christians to 
make a unique contribution: 
This pamphlet is offered as a contribution to Christian 
thinking on the disarmament problem and defence policy in 
the nuclear age. It is designed to encourage responsible 
reflection and political action by individuals. This is 
the necessary basis of responsible statements by church 
groups, whether local or national. The pamphlet starts 
with the fact of power in the relationship between 
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nations, and particularly with the political and military 
decisions which Britain must take in its own defence, and 
in the interests of the wider policies with which it is 
in sympathy, and the nations with which it is allied. 95 
The Group conceded that many lines of study and discussion 
sprang from the Oldham Report. 96 They acknowledged other 
possible approaches to the problem. These were defined as: 
(i) the absolute pacifist approach; (ii) that which considers 
disarmament without considering defence (i. e. n uclear 
pacifism) ; and (iii) that which seeks to solve outstanding 
questions which cause international tension (i. e. in IR terms 
a Kantian-type idealism). It is significant, given the 
understanding of unilateralism. as democratic protest, that 
most CND supporters would probably have associated their 
position not with the 'irresponsibilityf of (ii) but more as a 
practical expression of position (iii). 97 
The first way, the pacifist way, contended that "it is a 
valid Christian position to suggest that full Christian 
obedience involves the refusal to participate in war... "98 
Yet "those who take this view recognise that it involves them 
in the agonising dilemma of being inescapably involved in 
society and yet contracting out of some of their obligations 
to it. -19 Whilst a minority'00 within the Group had felt it 
95 Christians and Atomic Power: A Discussion of the Moral Aspects of 
Defence and Disarmament in the Nucleaz Age. Report of a Group appointed 
b the BCC, n. d. but 1959, London: BCC Publications 
97 See Chapter Four of this thesis. 
97 c. f. Marx: "The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in 
various ways; the point is to change it. " Theses on Feuerbach XI in 
McLellan (ed. ) 1977, p. 158. 
98 Christians and Atomic War, p. l. 
99 Ibid., p. 2. 
100 The Christian World (30 April 1959) asserts that Norman Goodall was 
the only orthodox pacifist in the Group. 
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was possible to rebel against the State and still be faithful 
to God, the majority felt that for most Christians this could 
not be seen as a sufficient answer to the questions before it. 
In this sense: 
Christian pacifism can be defended in terms of individual 
acts of obedience and faith. It has not -- in the, view 
of the Group -- found clear articulation in terms of a 
political policy that can be responsibly adopted by a 
government. It is this kind of responsibility. -- in 
which Christians as citizens are inescapably involved -- 
that the mandate of and task of the Group are directed. "" 
The second way for Christians to approach the nuclear dilemma 
was to argue that the real concern of the Churches should be 
with disarmament and not defence. Here nuclear pacifists 
argued that by considering defence before disarmament the real 
pressure for disarmament is lost. The Group disagreed. They 
felt there was more value in studying defence first, not only 
because of the moral issues involved in it, but because any 
step towards disarmament must involve the lessening, or 
altering, of defence measures which were a primary duty of the 
State. 
A third way would be for Christians to follow the ways 
prefigured by Kant and suggest that the "moral aspects' of 
disarmament and defence were not confined to technical 
questions. Because both defence and disarmament depended upon 
the state of the world, the best way to end the production of 
nuclear weapons would be to remove the need for them. 
Settlement of disputes and removal of injustices, by peaceful 
101 Christians and Atomic War, p. 2. 
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means, were essential steps in any advancement towards 
disarmament. The Group conceded that there was a pressing 
need to deal with this 'larger setting' but that their 
intention was restricted to focusing Christian thinking on the 
dangers of nuclear armaments and the urgency of steps to limit 
them. 
The Moral Aspects of Disarmament and Defence 
The position of the Group was that the primary loyalty of 
Christians was to God, *coupled with the realisation that 
Christians are not in any way detached from the world: 
All of us owe our livelihood, our standard of living, our 
democratic freedoms, to the present position of Britain 
in the world. In so far as we believe we should accept 
those benefits, we must face the facts that that they are 
dependent upon the use of political and military power. 
It is therefore irresponsible not to try to understand, 
'the disarmament problem and defence policy'. 102 
In earlier centuries Christians were able to remain detached 
from the cruder aspects of State power. Weapons were now in 
existence which, once used, no public opinion could affect. 
This meant: "'we must now live with the bomb, or with the 
possibility of it being made. 11103 
In a fashion similar to the Oldham Report's "Platonism', 
the problems of defence were ones that could only be gradually 
solved and the dilemmas they raised not 'ignored' . 
104 The 
102 Ibid., p. 3. 
103 Christians and Atomic War, p. 3. 
104 It is significant that the pacifist 'voice' on the 1946 Oldham 
Commission and CND activist, Donald MacKinnon, was particularly critical 
of such Christian Platonism. In his 1968 Gore Memorial lecture (re- 
printed in MacKinnon 1969 pp. 12-40) MacKinnon argued that Christianity 
had been truly damaged by those who inflicted Plato's flight from the 
tragic into theological fancy as the ultimate religious category. 
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Group hence saw their contribution as a Christian study on the 
moral aspects of defence. Their duty was to comment on the 
nature of policy and assess the implications of the means used 
to prosecute that policy from the perspective of Christianity. 
The Report's authors did not believe Britain could be 
legitimately defended without taking the consequences for 
Britain, and the whole world, into urgent consideration.. This 
movement away from 'middle axioms' was justified because "The 
whole meaning of 'defence' has been altered. The validity of 
the concept is in question"' 05 . 
Defence and disarmament were not just problems but 
dilemmas: "that is, they are not problems for which there are 
a complete set of answers, problems which can be absolutely 
solved by any reasoning or any device available to us, 
problems that have solutions devoid of evil. They are, 
instead, problems to be suffered with, to be lived with, to be 
controlled, to be mitigated, to be gradually reduced to some 
manageable proportions -- to be completely overcome, if at 
MacKinnon may well have had the BCC in mind when he decried the way an 
uncritical trust in God's providential care inevitably leads to a view 
which sees little else in this-world but political dilenunas, false, 
', tragic' or necessary. MacKinnon pursued this theme in Borderlands of 
Theology when he wrote: "Too often today we fob off men and women crying 
out for a world of hope with an academically precise pessimism, which 
seems to glory less in the cross than in the disintegration of human 
societies and the coming of despair. We have reached the truly 
appalling position of pointing to the threat of the atom bomb as 
evidence of the disorder of our being, and at the same time, like men in 
a trance, accepting and preparing to follow to the end the way to which 
such expedients belong, calling it our western way of life" (1968a, 
p. 149). The problem with such thinking, as Elshtain has argued 
elsewhere, was that "locked into dangerously self-confirming ways of 
thinking, embracing 'progress' as a standard of evaluation, we manage to 
convince ourselves that good will come out of horrendous things; that 
somehow, in history, the end does justify the means" (Elshtain 1985, 
05 Ibid. 
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all, only in the fullness of time"'Or'. This 'realistic 
attitude' was supported by the WCC Evanston Assembly in August 
1954 . 
107 Disarmament could only come about with ', patience and 
persistence'. Every Christian must make up their own mind, 
and then do all they can to further the policies they believe 
to be best in the circumstances. 
The pamphlet did not intend to be a theology in relation to 
nuclear armaments. 108 Whilst many Churches had published such 
statements, and member Churches of the WCC had continually 
considered the issues, the Group were concerned rather with 
'the moral aspects' -- the 'means' of defence and disarmament. 
This involved comprehending that Christians lived in a moral 
universe where God reigned supreme. This order, Augustine 
would have agreed, stands fast in peace and war. If people 
should violate its demands so grievously as to extinguish all 
earthly life, the inexorable justice of God would still be 
vindicated not impugned. '09 Although all live in a moral 
universe, this universe is more than a moral order. The 
crucial difference between the Christian view and that of 
other religions was: 
106 Ibid. , p. 4. 101 The WCC Resolution argued that, "Without forsaking their convictions 
that all weapons of war are evil, the Churches should press for 
restrains in their use. Christians in all lands must plead with their 
governments to be patient and persistent in their search for means to 
limit weapons and advance disarmament'. See BCC Box 14. 
108 See Oldham Report in 1946 for many relevant and challenging 
passages. 1,6-9 The Report here refers to the US Federal Council of Churches 1944 
publication Atomic Warfare and the Christian Faith: Report of the 
Commission on the Relation of the Church to the War in the Light of the 
Christian Faith. December 1944 (supplement March 1946). See Chapter 
Four. 
331 
... not simply that a higher ethical standard runs through this moral universe, a standard which can be described as 
'Christian morality'. The distinctive Christian 
testimony is that God is within this moral order as well 
as beyond it and controlling it. He is within it as 
Christ was completely within history, within the human 
nature in which He was incarnate and within the stuff of 
the world's corporate life. But He is within it to 
redeem it by that power which is also beyond it and which 
lies behind all other power. 110 
Because of this the Report contained much that was technical 
and political. Its suggestions had to be 'realistic' and 
keyed to the possibilities of the national and global 
situation. There were no short cuts to disarmament or world 
peace. There was no easy optimism about the future. Yet it 
was believed that Christians should battle against the odds 
and never give up trying to be practical. 
A Christian Approach 
Chapter two of the Report, written by Alan Booth and 
Admiral Buzzard, comprised an overview of the defence and 
disarmament situation facing the West in the late 1950s. it 
was concerned with understanding the problems facing those who 
def ended Britain. It was assumed the British and Western 
states had a responsibility to provide military defences 
against the encroachment of totalitarian regimes. This meant 
in effect "... to protect their own way of life, to serve the 
cause of law and justice, or to keep open the road to an 
international system in which power is made the servant of 
law. ... ""' 
110 Christians and Atomic War, pp. 5-6. 
111 Ibid., p. 6. 
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The chapter goes into great detail outlining the defence 
and disarmament situation as regards the Cold War situation in 
Europe, the Middle East, and the Far East. The first point 
made was that: 
... there can 
be few illusions on either side at the 
moment that serious military operations. . would imply a 
purpose of dealing something approaching a mortal blow, 
and would be resisted with great violence. This is the 
area therefore, which is least likely to . 
breed 
intentional war. But this fact does not dispose of our 
difficulties for two reasons -- the danger of war by 
mistake, and the consideration that the apparent 
stalemate depends on the existence of effective military 
power on both sides. 112 
'Russia' had available about 60 divisions in Eastern Europe, 
whilst NATO had 20 in Western Europe. NATO forces, armed with 
nuclear weapons, were designed to deter the Soviets from 
exploiting this military advantage: 
This is the reason why official policy of the West, of 
NATO and of the United Kingdom is to threaten to initiate 
nuclear attack on Russia if she began any serious 
aggression in Europe. And were nuclear weapons to be 
abandoned, they would in present circumstances have no 
coherent military defence left for Europe. 113 
Such a 'terrible dilemma" had compelled authorities to look 
for some means of escape. The problem was that if the Soviets 
launched a limited attack (say Berlin, Scandinavia or Turkey) 
the danger was that the West's massive retaliation strategy 
would meet it with thermo-nuclear war. If the Allies did not 
use nuclear weapons the Soviets would have succeeded in 
calling a great bluff, and the question posed: Could the 
Alliance survive if Allies had to expect each other to commit 
112 ibid., p. 7. 
113 Ibid. 
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suicide to defend one frontier? Furthermore: Did this policy 
not set a premium on each state having its own thermo-nuclear 
weapons under independent control? These kind of questions 
were forcing the West to review nuclear strategies and seek 
one that established a reasonable chance of matching smaller 
outbreaks with a response proportional to threat. 
one of the problems facing the West was that some arjalysts 
viewed any weakness in resolution to use nuclear weapons as 
making war more likely, whilst others increasingly saw an 'all 
or nothing' policy as either a bluff which events might call, 
or as a totally irresponsible way of handling thermonuclear 
power. This final group believed megaton weapons should only 
be used to neutralise the enemy, that is to deter the enemy 
from using them or from bringing them to the conference table; 
and to ensure that if war broke out there was the strongest 
possible incentive for the enemy to control and limit its 
violence since they know there was no length they could go to 
without fear of equivalent reprisal. Holders of this limited 
war approach wished to see the West escape from any necessity 
to use those weapons first. The problem was that there must 
be a means found with which to match the numerical and 
geographic advantages of the Soviet Union. If the West could 
not match the Soviets 'gun for gun' it raised the question of 
smaller nuclear weapons. Such weapons could be shot from 
guns, dropped from the air, or carried in short range 
missiles: NATO tactical plans were based on the assumption 
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that these will be used. Another dilemma that this created, 
however, was: How can the West use them without starting a 
nuclear war that will not stop short of the biggest bombs? A 
crucial point, therefore, was that whilst radiation was more 
limited in the smaller Nclean' versions, "both 
developments... depend on the ability to conduct further 
nuclear testing at least on a restricted scale. ""' 
Although these 'tactical' nuclear weapons were accepted as 
normal issue to NATO they still required urgent attention. It 
was necessary to educate people in the need to establish 
limitations before war, and announce general intentions for 
the conduct of war itself. This need for pressure was 
particularly urgent because the official Government view was 
that such decisions could not be taken and announced for 
hypothetical situations, it was considered better to keep the 
enemy guessing. This uncomfortable situation meant: 
... it is clear that at present the West would not hesitate to be the first to use nuclear weapons of 
smaller size, and against military targets, in order to 
halt large-scale conventional aggression. And the reason 
is that the West has at present no practical alternative 
for discouraging the outbreak of war. 115 
The chapter goes on to summarise Western defensive options. 
The Situation 
The first option involved 'Preparations for Total war' . 
official policy at the beginning of 1959 was peace by the 
"balance of terror' . The numerical superiority of Soviet 
114 Christians and Atomic War, p. 9. 115 Ibid. 
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conventional forces in Europe had led to a strategy that 
involved the West being ready to initiate total nuclear war on 
the Soviet Union. To the Group this massive retaliation 
policy raised serious doubts on both moral and technical 
grounds. 
Under the heading 'Preparations for Limited war' the Report 
outlined Western policy options. These included prepaiýations 
to counterbalance Communist conventional forces by equipping 
armies with small nuclear weapons (i. e. tactical nuclear 
weapons) that had strictly localised effects with regards to 
both blast and radiation. This policy, however, still left 
the West in the position of having to initiate nuclear war in 
certain circumstances, even if on a limited scale, in order to 
offset the superiority of Russian conventional forces. Such a 
strategy created local balances of power which reduced the 
danger that one side or the other would be driven or tempted 
to risk all-out war. The problem was that the Soviet Union 
also possessed these weapons and the danger was that, on the 
outbreak of war, they might try to gain an advantage by 
'stepping up the size'. Avoiding this meant increasing 
conventional forces: 
Every move in this direction provides some relief from 
danger. The tragic and fateful possibility exists, 
however, that our society is now of a kind which will 
prefer not to meet the cost of this relief, but to choose 
to maintain its material living standards instead. In 
that case we could not blame 'the government' for our 
predicament. 116 
116 Ibid., p. 16. 
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Total war was not, however, the main problem. The chief 
problem was how to prevent small, but carefully prepared 
outbreaks of violence, escalating into nuclear conflict. 
Buzzard and Booth felt their survey showed that methods of 
defence had great repercussions on the whole complex of 
British relations with other states -- 'enemies', allies, and 
neutrals. Defence made sense only as a means for on one hand, 
the exercise of a decisive yet constructive foreign policy, 
and on the other, the vehicle for the pursuit of disarmament. 
Defence plans must be shaped to harmonise with all other 
responsibilities and relationships in order to take a coherent 
view. This meant: 
** . the quarrel between Communist powers and the West 
is 
not felt to be of primary importance in comparison with 
the problems of creating new nations and solving their 
economic problems. Defence policies which attempt to 
hitch half the world behind our own particular chariot 
are self-defeating. But a refusal to recognise a defence 
problem at all is not less obscurantist. An obvious 
objective would be to enable new nations to defend 
themselves, by helping them to build up their military 
potential. The advantage however has to be weighed 
against their prior need of butter before guns, and the 
political consequence of putting military power at the 
disposal of untried and hard pressed governments. 117 
The West, Britain in particular, needed to acknowledge that 
'true defence' against the threat of thermonuclear weapons lay 
in successful disarmament agreements. One of the Report's 
main objectives was thus to show that the possibility of 
disarmament agreements were substantially affected by the kind 
of defence preparations Britain adopted. 
117 Ibid., p. 17. 
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Defence and Disarmament 
A major problem was that in Britain defence and disarmament 
were handled by two different Government departments. 118 While 
co-ordinating machinery existed and it was unlikely that one 
would propose a scheme for disarmament which defence people 
regarded as dangerous, it was not unlikely that the other 
party would proceed with defence plans without too. much 
reference to their influence on disarmament. This meant that 
the West was compelled to offer a 'package deal' on 
disarmament, i. e. one which exchanged nuclear disarmament for 
a substantial reduction in the conventional and other 
armaments of the Communist bloc. Any approximation to a 
balance at these lower levels would certainly make easier an 
offer on nuclear arms. Disarmament, however, could only be 
seriously considered if it involved a reliable system of 
inspection. What this meant was that: 
Somehow, therefore we have to learn to live with nuclear 
weapons, at least for many years. If we cannot abolish 
them, we must do everything possible to bring them under 
control. And if large steps like this prove too 
difficult, then we should be satisfied initially in 
taking such small steps as are possible. Hence the need 
for achieving anything we can in stopping tests, guarding 
against surprise attack, and preventing the spread of 
nuclear weapons to other countries'19. 
The argument was: in the negotiation on tests, if agreement 
cannot be gained for the high degree of inspection required to 
achieve complete cessation, then there was much to be said for 
settling for the cessation of all tests which could not be 
118 It is not clear which department Buzzard and Booth thought handled 
disarmament -- presumably they were referring to the Foreign Office. 119 Christians and Atomic War, p. 19. 
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readily inspected and which were most harmful to health. Yet 
it should not be forgotten that "the fact of possession in 
itself ensures an influential voice in the conduct of foreign 
policy of the western alliance. it120 In terms of immediate 
policy this situation could be improved by placing nuclear 
weapons under international control -- the control of NATO. 
Whilst this may not have been possible for the USA, ýn its 
unique position of power, for Britain 'prudence and 
statesmanship' was the correct policy. 
In sum, Booth and Buzzard's chapter argued that there were 
three conditions that favoured successful disarmament 
agreements: first, that the parties involved appreciated the 
need to reduce the armament load. Increasing costs, 
apprehension on health grounds regarding testing, and the 
apprehension of a uncontrollable proliferation of nuclear 
states all worked favourably to secure this end. Second, that 
there was a rough 'balance of power' on both sides. This 
meant halting the race in thermonuclear weapons and a closer 
approximation to balance at lower. 1tacticall levels. Finally, 
that there were secure means available to verify disarmament 
agreements. Systems of inspection and control were 
fundamental here. Buzzard and Booth argued that Britain 
should internationalise its nuclear weapons even though 
"... to put them in the hands of those "not responsible to 
parliament' -- appears a tremendous abdication of sovereignty. 
But is the appearance false in so far as that kind of 
120 Ibid., p. 20. 
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sovereignty has long since evaporated with the disappearance 
of the island fortress and its exchange for the role of 
Europe's bull's eye ? 
121 jr 
The Christian Approach 
Alan Booth and Edward Roger' s 'chapter three' looked at 
some of the implications of such discussion. These included 
(i) theological considerations; and (ii) a critical analysis 
of the choices before Government. It argued that all 
Christian ideas on defence, whatever their starting point, had 
their place in forming Christian judgement. 122 Christians 
should, however, remember that: 
... 
it is part of the secularisation of the times that men 
think there must be a simple way forward to "broader 
sunlit uplands' of historical progress. The Christian, 
while full of longing and hope, knows that history is not 
like that. His abiding confidence does not lie in any 
certainty that history will work itself out to a 
millennium but rather that it will remain a struggle of 
good and evil until the day God chooses to complete His 
123 purpose and bring all things to their end.... 
Optimism alone would not make matters better. Indeed: "as the 
Christian seeks his duty in the nuclear age, he will not be 
surprised to find that there is no way at one stroke to 
abolish the dangers in which mankind stands. A thousand acts 
of disobedience creates a tangle which demands the patience of 
a thousand acts of faithfulness to begin to unravel. And that 
requires a close and detailed study of the knot itself, in all 
its obstinate reality. " 
124 What was needed was a new 
121 Ibid., p. 21. 
122 Ibid., p. 22. 
123 Christians and Atomic War, p. 22. 124 Ibid. 
340 
examination of Christian duties. On one hand, by standing 
back from a close examination of defence problems and looking 
at them afresh in the larger Christian picture. On the other 
hand, by looking at actual choices and seeing if it was 
possible to judge between them in the light of Christian duty. 
There were several questions to answer here. 
The first question was: Is the issue between the West and 
Communism an ultimate one? The core of this was that: 
.:. our 
faith calls in question at once the kind of self- 
righteousness which proclaims the West-East conflict as 
simply the confrontation of good and evil. ... Christians 
therefore must look beyond conflict to reconciliation. 
Our resistance to what we believe dangerously wrong in 
the Communist method and objective must be of a kind that 
looks beyond the real but partial issues of the moment to 
the day when our enemies are overcome in a repentance to 
which we ourselves contribute as well as they. The man 
who knows how great is his own cancelled debt should make 
a bad debt-collector. 125 
What this meant, in terms of defence policy, is that 
Christians were governed by the necessity to match a resolute 
defence of the public interest with tempereteness and 
restraint in the means used. The 'door of reconciliation' 
must always be left open and Christians must love their 
neighbours as themselves allies and enemies alike. 
The second question that Christians need to answer was: Are 
Western values worth defending? This involved a consideration 
of the fact that: 
Peace is not simply the absence of armed conflict, but 
the state of human affairs in which men are enabled to be 
true men in their relationship with one another .... 
Dedication to peace involves a constant and costly 
responsibility for our neighbours, that the life open to 
125 Ibid., pp. 23-4. 
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them may be of the kind for which they were created. This 
is the potentiality which is worth defending. 126 
The third question that demanded a response was: Are power and 
force proper instruments for states to use in the light of 
nuclear weapons? This involved facing yet another dilemma -- 
the dilemma in which the Christian is both citizen and 
church-goer. 
Christian Political Responsibility 
Booth and Rogers believed Christian service began with a 
particular witness. They recognised that, in Augustinian 
fashion, the functions of the State and Church were 
fundamentally different. In order to behave 'justly' the 
State must have the right and power of compulsion, not only to 
restrain the criminal but crucially "to pursue any coherent 
policy amidst the clash of a multitude Of Wills. t. 127 It was 
vital that such force and compulsion were tempered by 
'necessity' and subject to 'humane laws'. The problem 
remained, however, that the -realm of 
international relations 
was necessarily anarchical. Indeed without: 
:** the slightest development of law, and until there is 
in sight some international authority to enforce law, the 
situation is in the strict sense one of anarchy. 
Christians with many others are concerned to develop 
international organs of law and order and to preserve the 
authority of such as already exist, the International 
Court of Justice, for instance. But nothing is gained by 
exaggerating their present capacities or imagining that 
at such a moment of spiritual confusion as the present, 
an international rule of law enforced by international 
government is just round the corner. 128 
126 Ibid., pp. 25-6. 
127 Christians and Atomic War, p. 26. 126 Ibid., pp. 26-7. 
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Whilst it was accepted that 'international order' was built on 
State enforced structures of power, Booth and Rogers argued 
that a long Christian tradition existed to temper excessive 
use of force. Just war theory taught that the exercise of 
force by a State could be justified only to the extent that 
the cause it was used to defend was grave enough to balance 
the evil it produced. In the same way that certain uses of 
force to catch domestic criminals could constitute a threat to 
democratic liberty, there were degrees of international force, 
now in British possession, that would cause devastation out of 
all proportion to the gain. The tendency in the last two 
Great Wars had been to throw all available force without 
restraint, and it was this that had called into question the 
role of force in international affairs. Nuclear weapons had 
brought humanity to the end of this particular Realpolitik 
road. It was the just wa-r or the limited war that offered a 
means with which to turn back along this path to f ind a more 
humane alternative. Bearing this in mind, the authors felt a 
need to look again at the practical situation disclosed 
earlier and ask whether Christian insight could suggest right 
choices in defence and disarmament. 
Limited War as Just War 
This section posed the key issue: is it right to continue 
deliberately to threaten the initial use of nuclear weapons? 
Was it possible to escape from this position? Massive 
retaliation dictated that it was the West that was in the 
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danger of threatening to be the first to use nuclear weapons. 
Because the Group felt nuclear weapons, especially 
thermonuclear weapons, represented the use of force and 
destruction out of all proportion to any human ends they might 
serve, a first duty was to work for policies to get the West 
out of this position. The possession of Megaton weapons could 
only be justified if it was the sole practical means of 
inhibiting adversaries from using them. Until a system was 
devised to put this power out of the reach of international 
conflict then it had to be the 'bitterest problem' because for 
it to work either side had to believe that retaliation was a 
danger to be reckoned with. The Group accepted that this 
problem could not be solved by reasoning alone, thus: 
A first duty is to work for policies that get the West 
out of this position with the utmost speed.... To avoid 
the dilemma of having to initiate the use of these 
weapons, as at present, the West would need to increase 
manpower and equipment for conventional forces very 
considerably. 129 
Another step in the process of control and mitigation seemed 
clear. It was not necessary to surpass the enemy in 
'frightfulness' in order to prevent them from using nuclear 
weapons, it was necessary rather to face them with the 
certainty of severe retaliation to make the adventure too 
costly. Christians should bear in mind "it is not his (i. e. 
the enemy's) destruction that Christians seek, but a restraint 
upon his power to destroy. 11130 It remained technically 
necessary, however, to ensure nuclear retaliation could take 
129 Ibid., pp. 27,16. 
130 Ibid., p. 27. 
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place for this was preferable to guaranteeing to match the 
utmost the enemy could do. 131 
The Cost in Money and Sovereignty 
The road leading away from the West's reliance on total war 
weapons would involve reliance on nuclear weapons in the small 
ranges. This was not desirable, but it was an inescapable 
stage on the way to reducing the danger of massive 
retaliation. The objective must be to escape, if possible, 
from this 'necessity' also. Two obstacles lay in the way of 
securing this objective. 
First, the fact that building up conventional forces to 
hold situations, then defended by nuclear weapons, would cost 
money. Because of this "'it is a proper duty of Christians to 
help our society to see the hard choice with which it is 
presented, that if it wants to escape present dangers it will 
be expensive. t,, 132 
Second, escaping from the reliance on nuclear weapons 
called for a more co-ordinated defence effort by the West. 
This was no easy task: 
Here Christians, for whom patriotism ought to be ennobled 
by a larger view of mankind, have witness to give to a 
God who raises up nations and brings them down, and who 
is surely calling us to-day to adventure in wider 
loyalties than those of the nation states of recent 
centuries. The traditional pattern of national 
sovereignty is under judgement and an attempt to cling to 
it may well be one of the reasons for our present 
dangers. 133 
131 
Christians and Atomic War, p. 27. 132 Ibid., p. 28. 133 Ibid., p. 29. 
345 
Christians should, therefore, serve as a stabilising influence 
that ensured a conflict 'begun with rifles' did not extend to 
a thermonuclear exchange. Military operations must not be 
directed to force unconditional surrender, but simply to 
secure the enemy's adherence to a 'just pattern of 
international behaviour' . Another way to inhibit the rapid 
spread of hostilities would be to take the militaiýy and 
psychological preparation necessary to reduce danger because 
"'if the public and the enemy know that a policy exists to 
limit rigidly the military response to an attack, and keep it 
proportionate to the threat offered, there is less chance that 
misunderstanding or panic will provoke an unintentional 
catastrophe. 1/134 The Group felt strongly that the existence of 
such standing orders, if they were known, would be a strong 
incentive for the enemy to also exercise restraint. Restraint 
was the key Christian objective. 
The Christian Community 
The Report had thus focused on the discrimination 
Christians could bring to bear on public policy. This raised 
the question about how the Churches should be orchestrating 
the debate. For the authors the characteristic contribution 
of the Church was to exhibit a new order of being. Such a 
vision worked by precept and example, by the kind of people it 
nourished. It had several dimensions. 
134 Ibid., pp. 29-30. 
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In the first place it was a community of people whose hope 
was fixed on God. The very horror of the dangers that 
surrounded humanity was a temptation to f ear. In fact there 
was never a greater need for Christians to control their 
passions. In short "*such people ought to be able to go on 
thinking clearly and wisely when others around the m greatly 
need that service. As a stabilising factor in the community 
they will have a role to play not less important because it is 
so hidden in the daily round. ir135 In the second place the 
Church was, or should be, the open society par excellence: the 
people who acknowledged the partial and corrupted nature of 
all achievements. In this way "the worship and prayer of the 
Church. .. [could serve as) the prophylactic of mankind against 
the disease of political fanatici SMif136. Third, the Church's 
own peace should be exhibited. The Church should be a place 
where people looked for a unity 'over-arching the political 
137 curtains of the day' . With this final point it is possible 
to condense the report's basic findings. 
(A) General Recommendations: 
(1) The debate on the nuclear situation should be an open one 
and the public should be treated as adults and given 
%reasonable access to the facts'. 138 
(2) Defence and disarmament should be treated as 
complementary, not competing, aspects of State policy. The 
135 Christians and Atomic War, p. 30. 
136 Ibid., p. 31. 
137 Ibid. 
138 Ibid. 
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Governmental machinery for integrating defence and disarmament 
policy should be designed accordingly. The danger in pursuing 
a defence policy too narrowly, and out of relation to other 
aspects of foreign policy was that "'in considering defence 
before disarmament the real pressure for disarmament may be 
lost. "I" 
(3) Every effort must be made to get the West out. of a 
position in which it may be tempted to use nuclear weapons 
f irst. "0 
(B) Policy Recommendations: 
(1) "The first duty here is to accept the fact that the race 
for supremacy in total war is vain. ""' This acknowledgement 
made it easier to agree upon the cessation of thermonuclear 
tests and limit the multiplication of nuclear powers. 
(2) Britain should be particularly aware of not clinging to 
her 'special relationship' with the USA. She should watch 
that her own development of megaton armaments was not dictated 
by a misguided ambition to hold a special place in the sharing 
of defence secrets with the USA. The acceptance of Britain's 
due role in the western alliance suggested a switch of 
resources from total war capabilities to those forms of lesser 
139 Christians and Atomic War, p. 31 
140 There is some ambiguity on this point. It is not apparent whether 
this constituted an advocation of a 'no first use' policy just for 
strategic (thermonuclear) or for tactical (atomic) devices. If the 
Report was advocating, as it seems to be, a 'no first use' policy for 
all nuclear weapons (i. e. both atomic and thermonuclear) there is severe 
inconsistency in logic. John Elford has made the point (1985, p. 198) 
that the doctrine of flexible response (i. e. the modern term for limited 
war approaches) depends upon the early, and possibly first, use of 
tactical nuclear devices and that to qualify it by denying such a first 
was to call it totally into question. 
141 Christians and Atomic War, p. 32. 
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armaments (i. e. conventional weapons) that would allow Britain 
to meet threats more 'soberly and rationally'. 
(2) The Government should work for a greater balance of power 
vis-&-vis lower levels of armaments. Costs cannot be allowed 
to rise without limit but "... if our western society faces a 
choice between comfortable living standards plus nuclear 
defence, and reduced living standards plus less . risky 
armament, then the Christian has a duty to make his voice 
heard. fi 14 2 
(3) The British government should marry firmness with 
restraint in the exercise of international affairs. If war 
occurred the main objective must be to halt aggression and 
restore the status quo as the basis of negotiation. 
(4) Hostilities should never be entered into without a public 
announcement of limited objectives. There should be a clear 
public statement of the limits which the West proposes to 
observe in waging war "so long as, at each stage, the enemy 
also observes them. 1114 3 
(S) Britain should give a lead in international affairs by 
offering to co-ordinate her defence programme more closely 
with her allies. The Government should be willing to abate 
its claim to national sovereignty, both towards her allies and 
towards the Soviets, with regard to an international system of 
control and inspection. 144 
142 Ibid., p. 33. 
143 Christians and Atomic War, p. 34. 
144 Ibid. 
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(C) Recormnendations for the Individual Christian: 
(1) The call to service in the defence forces or its reserves, 
or in the industrial and scientific activity that supports 
them, is one calling which Christians must face and not evade. 
This "**pamphlet may be judged as supplying some of the facts on 
it 14 5 which (such) a responsible decision rests 
(2) In the event of war it the Christian's civic duty and 
privilege "to give succour to their fellows and seek to 
preserve such shreds of humanity as survive. ri146 
(3) Christians have the task of working for the development of 
the "open society" which their country claims to defend with 
arms -- this meant "to resist encroachments prompted by a 
narrow concept of defence, to enlarge the area of justice and 
the respect for minorities, to subject power in society to the 
1,147 rule of law and to protect the weak and powerless . 
(4) Christians needed to face the nuclear issue with: "the 
absence of panic, the hard discipline of facing facts however 
grim with an honest gaze, and freedom from narrow and unworthy 
passions -- and all this in a temper of unyielding concern for 
,, 148 human welfare 
Conclusion 
This chapter began by arguing that the formation of the CND 
in 1958 did not create a new situation for the British 
Churches rather, as Driver pointed out, it only intensified 
145 ibid., p. 35- 
146 Christians and Atomic War, p. 35. 
147 Ibid. 
148 Ibid., pp. 35-6. 
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and polarised reactions which had already found expression. '" 
To the British political and religious Establishments CND's 
birth became a pertinent symbol of growing rebellion against 
existing structures of authority and accepted ways of policy 
making. CND proved to be an agency for a progressive but 
informal lecumenicalism' (i. e. a forum for uniting Christians) 
which formal ecumenicalism had failed to do, because n. uclear 
weapons proved to be a more focused standard of judgement with 
which to foster unity. Its principal of criticism was more 
focused, less abstract, with specific goals to secure. The 
CND programme constituted an idealist (people-centred) 
alternative to realist state-centricity. The unilateralists 
were ideologically opposed to Buzzard's limited war realism. 
To Campaigners, the Group's limited war approach was not 
appreciably different to the massive retaliation doctrine 
expounded by the British State. For them the Study Group's 
defence of gradualism only resulted in the loss of real 
pressure for disarmament. The moral judgement of the CND 
began from a different position to that of the BCC. CND 
rallied against the very tendency, exemplified by the BCC's 
Study Group, to conduct the nuclear debate in terms of 
rational means-end calculations. Limited war was understood 
by the CND as a response to purely empirical questions which 
they thought it unethical to entertain. 
CND institutional ised the debate in the Churches between 
gradualist and unilateralist approaches. Its formation 
149 Driver 1964, p. 198. 
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brought home to the Churches the sense that abstract 
discussions of the rights and wrongs of violence vis-&-vis 
non-violence were rendered irrelevant by the nuclear age. The 
only issues of meaning were: (i) questions of the justified 
and unjustified level of force; and (ii) questions that asked 
in whose interests such power was exercised. CND felt that no 
gain from the use of nuclear weapons could possibly justify 
the annihilation it would bring in a just war sense. In other 
words, CND' s formation was based on the presupposition that 
the traditional Christian debate between pacifism and just war 
was redundant in the nuclear age. A proposition the Study 
Group felt unable to accept. CND, however, aimed to motivate 
believers into action with the knowledge that real progress 
could come through struggling against accepted thinking. Such 
an attempt to understand and re-model the world allowed a 
comparison with the early Church before Augustine: they were 
pacific-ist rather than outright pacifist. 
The Study Group, however, could not accept that a 
gradualist approach was largely irrelevant even if nuclear 
pacifists felt that war could no longer be just in a nuclear 
age. Bell and MacIntyre's resignation from the Study Group 
symbolised this new battle line. 
The clearest statement of the Council's attitude to nuclear 
affairs was their 1959 Report Christians and Atomic War. Like 
the Oldham Report, the 1959 Report subscribed to a 
confrontational view of international relations. it 
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envisaged not so much the gradual containment of nuclear war, 
but rather its final and catastrophic extension. The 
underlying assumption appeared to be that the status quo was 
worth defending even if the cost to human life was the death 
of millions. The BCCIs intention was to construct a modern 
theoretical framework in which the use of nuclear weapons was 
subject to ethical calculation. Their starting point was the 
collective body of norms known as just war. This study was 
completed against a background of: first, the emergence of an 
organised anti-nuclear movement; second, growing public 
concern over nuclear testing; and finally, the continued 
polarisation of opinion, both inside and outside the Churches, 
regarding the viability of the just war in the nuclear age. 
Despite these events the Council line had not changed 
significantly from the conclusion first drawn by the Oldham 
Commission thirteen years previously: the Bomb was to be lived 
with. By urging Christians to "learn to live with the Bomb" 
the BCC counselled, as MacKinnon puts it, "not an effort at 
radical understanding, aimed at eliminating the appalling 
distortion of human achievement, seemingly built into the 
fabric of our world, but an acceptance of what it was alleged 
could not be changed. 1150 
The Report shows that in the late 1950s the BCC was 
agitated most with the fact that the West was intending, if 
war came, to use nuclear weapons first. The Study Group 
150 MacKinnon 1968b, p. 25. 
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believed that Britain could escape from this moral predicament 
known as massive retaliation by transferring its nuclear 
armoury from national to international control. In this way 
the concept of deterrence could be underwritten by 
international law. The CND view that the supreme ethical 
requirement was to prevent massive retaliation by abolishing 
nuclear weapons in the first place did not carry výeight. 
Rather, the Report relied on accepted methods of diplomacy and 
argued that the ultimate aim of all states should be to 
abolish nuclear weapons through multilateral effort. This 
goal could be achieved by establishing international control 
of nuclear materials. So long as the State came out in favour 
of the ultimate aim of abolition and the intermediate aim of 
collective control, the BCC believed Britain should retain 
nuclear weapons as a contribution to Western deterrence. 
Nuclear weapons were seen as a symptom and cause of political 
tensions, the need for control on an international basis was 
therefore acknowledged. Yet the BCC primarily saw this 
control as coming from the cessation of nuclear weapon 
testing. Whilst the BCC were prepared to learn to live with 
nuclear weapons, they also favoured every effort to bring them 
under international control. The Report was comprehensively 
incremental, conservative, and gradualist. 
The pamphlet Christians and Atomic War was offered as a 
contribution to Christian thinking on defence and disarmament 
in the nuclear age. It was designed in order to: first, 
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encourage responsible reflection and political action by 
Christian individuals; and second, as the necessary basis for 
responsible statements by Church groups local and national. 
Yet for all its talk of participation the Report demanded very 
little action. All that was required was a fundamental 
support for the State and its right to orchestrate decision- 
making process. It blended a liberal optimism with realist 
'common-senser. Christian responsibility was to be kept alive 
by calling for restraint in face of the harshness of 
Realpolitik as personified by the massive retaliation policy. 
This bleak view on the possibility for change and 
transformation, though it called for moderation in the conduct 
of international affairs and acknowledged the Christian ideal 
of love, provided justification for a British nuclear arsenal. 
Christians and Atomic War was the first British ecumenical 
report to attempt to move the debate in Christian ethics away 
from 'middle axioms' to a consideration of the means with 
which a Christian policy should be formulated. 
3SS 
CHAPTER NINE: 
CONCLUSION 
Chapter One introduced this thesis as an empirical study 
of The British Council of Churches' attitudes regarding 
defence and disarmament in the Cold War years 1945-59. Its 
specific intention has been to understand why the BCC 
responded to the controversial policy of massive retaliation 
by promoting an alternative nuclear strategy known as limited 
war. This just wa-r theory was seen by the BCC as the 
appropriate Christian response to an unethical defence policy 
despite the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament's demand for the 
immediate unilateral and non-contingent renunciation of 
British nuclear weapons. The study's main contribution has 
been to lay bare the discussions and policy options that led 
The British Council of Churches to endorse the idea that a war 
fought with nuclear weapons could still be 'just' . This end 
has been achieved by: first, suggesting how Christians in the 
BCC understood the role of the British State and their own 
responsibility as citizens; and second, illustrating how such 
evaluations affected a Christian policy-making process that 
aimed to influence Western defence attitudes. For these 
reasons the work is offered as an original contribution to 
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substantive research in an area largely ignored by the 
literature on politics and international studies. 
Section I, Chapter Two, theoretically located just war 
ideas. Here it was shown that, although there are competing 
Christian traditions, it was St. Augustine who fashioned just 
wa. r in order to determine the circumstances in which war 
could, or should, be waged by Christians. His distinctive 
approach to questions of authority, legitimacy, and 
responsibility effected the Church's first significant 
accommodation with the presuppositions of political realism. 
Augustine moved the Church away from the anti-militarism, 
quasi-pacifism, and idealism of many of its early Fathers 
(e. g. Tertullian, Origen, Lactantius). The just war approach 
thus begins with the conviction that existing societal 
arrangements are (albeit relatively) justified and worth 
saving through violence. 
Section II, Chapter Three introduced the ecumenical 
movement as a product of an optimistic world view that aimed 
to further a spiritual and material reformation -- to bring 
'God back' into social life -- as a counter to post- 
Enlightenment interpretations of secularised historical 
progress. After World War Two the BCC became the principal 
(the only truly interdenominational) non-Catholic body dealing 
with political issues for the British Christian community. 
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Chapter Four argued that the extent to which political 
crisis had shifted ecumenicalism's essential optimism into 
pessimism was particularly apparent in the Oldham Commission's 
exploration, and comment on, the atom bomb. The Era of Atomic 
Power was strongly anti-pacifist and endorsed the idea that 
Britain should retain the Bomb both to protect her "Great 
Power' status, and as a legitimate just war deterrent; The 
Report's understanding of the appropriate Christian response 
to the atomic dilemma was based on a Augustinian-style via 
media between moral and political responsibility. Because the 
British State was a just, trust-worthy, and legitimate 
authority it was also an acceptable holder of the nuclear 
means. The Report was representative of the 'middle axioms' 
approach -- one that paid attention to the ends rather than 
the means of policy. To the Commission there was no novel 
ethico-political implication in atomic power. 
Chapter Five showed that the development and deployment of 
thermonuclear weapons in the years 1950-57 raised new ethical 
questions for Christians. The rationale for keeping or 
renouncing nuclear weapons was no longer the same as when a 
Western monopoly existed before 1949. The attitudes of the 
BCC and its member Churches towards the development of 
thermonuclear devices were, however, as divided as their 
attitudes to atomic weapons. The BCC stance affirmed the 
notion of a British thermonuclear deterrent. The development 
of the H-bomb had, nonetheless, intensified just war debate. 
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Although differences of opinion between Christian pacifists 
and just war advocates were continuing to dominate the terms 
in which the debate over war was articulated within the 
Churches, thermonuclear developments put increasing strain on 
the just war demand for conflict to be determined by 
'legitimate' authority. For many post-war Christians involved 
in the campaign against nuclear weapons, individual activism 
(i. e. outside their constituent Churches) became a vital part 
of a wider political agenda. To move against nuclear weaponry 
was to move against the type of elitist and unrepresentative 
war-culture that produced such technology without democratic 
consultation. A coherent Christian anti-nuclear perspective 
began to show signs of winning greater support if it could 
successfully engage dialogue on two main levels: first, by 
communicating the idea that the nuclear age demanded new 
Christian thinking about the citizen's democratic 
responsibilities; and second, by claiming that the just war 
synthesis between force, political expediency, and morality 
was rendered obsolete in the nuclear era. 
Section III, Chapter Six, developed the proposition that 
the controversy surrounding the failure to secure a H-bomb 
test ban, rather than the immorality of massive retaliation as 
such, brought the BCC to a considered attention of strategic 
policy. The BCC view since 1946 had given primary attention 
to the need to maintain deterrence, and the need to halt or 
reverse nuclear proliferation. This was for two reasons. On 
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one hand, the Council's Officers were keenly aware that many 
Christians felt that nuclear weapons, and in particular 
thermonuclear weapons, were abhorrent and immoral. This sense 
was exacerbated when considered from the perspective of 
Britain's nuclear strategy as outlined in Duncan Sandys' 1957 
White Paper Defence: Outline of Future Policy. Yet on the 
other hand, the Council's Officers felt unable to disavow 
nuclear devices and condone nuclear abstention. This brought 
into question the manner with which the BCC approached the 
nuclear dilemma. 
The International Department in particular, was 
increasingly relied upon to speak on behalf of the Churches. 
To this extent its Officers recognised their potential 
radically to affect, not only the terms with which the nuclear 
debate was conducted, but perhaps also the attitudes of the 
individual Churches for whom they spoke. It would be 
difficult to underestimate the Department's power on these 
terms. Yet the impression is that the International 
Department had begun as an amalgamation of several interests, 
like the Council as a whole, and had become more 
ecclesiological and cautious with the passage of time. The 
Council's Officers concluded that a constructive nuclear 
policy offered the most politically sensitive, yet ethical 
alternative, to an unpalatable situation. For these reasons 
Rear Admiral Sir Anthony Buzzard was invited to present his 
limited war thesis to the Council meeting of October 1957. 
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Buzzard introduced to the BCC the novel idea that nuclear 
weapons on their own would not deter but that they could, 
nonetheless, be part of a viable just wa-r approach. He 
advocated both the retention of nuclear weapons and a more 
credible strategy for their use should deterrence fail. 
Whilst Buzzard avowed that a nuclear capability did not 
necessarily mean nuclear weapons would be used if detqrrence 
failed this, of course, was a matter of political judgement. 
To counter his proposition with the argument that there was no 
adequate defence was to miss his point. Buzzard's realism was 
not separated from the advocating of massive retaliation 
through moral evaluation alone but by, and more fundamentally, 
an understanding of the nature of war itself. To Buzzard acts 
of thermonuclear ("strategic') violence simply surpassed the 
boundaries of war as 'rational' activity. Buzzard's de facto 
claim that a war waged with 'tactical' (i. e. non- 
thermonuclear) devices could be rational thus began with his 
assumption that the State did not necessarily need to limit 
itself to trying to avoid nuclear confrontation. His 
conviction about the need to limit strategic nuclear devices 
was a function of his belief that, given the nature of 
international affairs, war was unavoidable. For Buzzard 
disarmament and defence were part of the same paradigm because 
if peace was desired a State must prepare for war. Buzzard's 
speech made a dramatic impact on BCC attitudes. Its main 
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corollary was that a Study Group on the Moral Aspects of 
Disarmament was formed. 
In Chapter Seven it was suggested that the likely 
ramifications of including a strategist (i. e. Admiral Buzzard) 
in the BCC Study Group was under appreciated by its Chair, 
Robert Mackie. Whilst Mackie desired an even-handed or 
"ideologically balanced" approach the Study Group was 
dominated by representatives of the realist "if you want 
peace, prepare for war" perspective. At this point it was 
argued that the nature of the eventual BCC contribution should 
come as little surprise once the powerfully articulated 
ideological preferences of those selected to serve in the 
Group were considered. The f act that the Study Group was 
generally unsympathetic to "if you want peace, prepare for 
peace" idealism, led to the notion that a realist approach was 
inevitable. This is notwithstanding the sense that Mackie and 
Group Secretary Keighley (who became converted to Buzzard's 
position) were not driven to support Buzzard at first. Rather 
it was their 'neutrality', and not just Buzzard's coherence, 
that allowed the retention of a gradualist, multilateral is t, 
and just war approach to the nuclear debate. Bringing Bishop 
Bell and Alasdair MacIntyre into the Group to represent 'peace 
activiSMr created no serious challenge to the Buzzardist line. 
The inclusion of Bell and MacIntyre into the Study Group 
produced an initial lack of agreement on whether a 
specifically Christian contribution could be made to the 
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problem of defence and disarmament. The common denominator in 
the Study Group's thinking was an agreement in favour of the 
broad desirability of 'peace' -- anything that reduced Cold 
War tension and made war less likely. Any agreement beyond 
this was proving difficult. Here Alan Booth appeared as a 
vitally important contributor to the Group's thinking, second 
in importance only to Buzzard. It was Booth who jDecame 
largely responsible for the clarification of policy and 
process in the Group. 
Booth was particularly representative of Augustinian-style 
realism. He felt the Group's task was to restore professional 
credibility to the Church. Booth was responsible for the idea 
that there had hitherto been a frequent failure on the part of 
Christians to sit down before the facts and consider them 
realistically. It was his contribution that led the Study 
Group to concentrate on the idea that nuclear weapons could be 
controlled once a realist understanding of the nature of 
international affairs was conceded to. 
Chapter Eight began by arguing that the formation of the 
CND in 1958 did not create a new situation for the British 
Churches but rather intensified and polarised existing 
divisions. To the British political and religious 
Establishments CND's birth became a pertinent symbol of 
growing rebellion against existing structures of authority and 
accepted ways of policy-making. It proved to be an agency for 
a progressive but informal lecumenicalism' (i. e. a forum for 
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uniting Christians) which formal ecumenicalism had failed to 
do. This was because nuclear weapons proved to be a more 
focused standard of judgement with which to foster unity. 
CND's principal of criticism was more focused, less abstract, 
and had specific goals to secure. In this sense its programme 
constituted an idealist (people-centred) alternative to 
realist state-centricity. Unilateralists were both morally 
and ideologically opposed to Buzzard's limited war thinking. 
To Campaigners, the Group's approach was not appreciably 
different to the massive retaliation doctrine. For them the 
defence of gradualism only resulted in the loss of real 
pressure for disarmament. The moral judgement of the CND thus 
began from a different position to that of the BCC. CND 
rallied against the very tendency, exemplified by the Study 
Group, to conduct the nuclear debate in terms of rational 
means-end calculations. Limited war was understood as a 
response to questions which the CND thought it unethical to 
entertain. 
CND institutionalised the debate in the Churches between 
gradualist and unilateralist, contingent and non-contingent 
approaches to disarmament. Its formation brought home the 
sense that abstract discussions of the rights and wrongs of 
violence vis-A-vis non-violence were rendered irrelevant in 
the nuclear age. The issues of meaning were: (i) questions of 
the justified and unjustified level of force; and (ii) 
questions that asked in whose interests such power was 
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exercised. CND aimed to motivate believers into action with 
the knowledge that real progress could come through struggling 
against accepted thinking. Such an attempt to re-model the 
world allowed a comparison with the early Church before 
Augustine: CND were pacific-ist rather outright pacifist. 
Campaigners' felt that no gain from the use of nuclear weapons 
could possibly justify the annihilation it would bring in a 
just war sense. CND's formation was thus based on the 
presupposition that the traditional debate between pacifism 
and just war was redundant. The Study Group felt unable to 
accept such a proposition. Bell and MacIntyre's resignation 
from the Study Group symbolised, this new battle line. 
The Study Group could not accept that a gradualist approach 
was irrelevant or that war could no longer be just. The 
clearest statement of such thinking was the 1959 Report 
Christians and Atomic War. Like the Oldham Commission, the 
1959 study subscribed to a confrontational view of 
international relations. It envisaged not so much the gradual 
containment of nuclear war, but rather its final and 
catastrophic extension. The underlying assumption appeared to 
be that the status quo was worth defending even if the cost in 
human life was intense. The BCC's intention was to construct 
a modern theoretical framework in which the use of nuclear 
weapons was subject to ethical calculation. Their starting 
point, inevitably, was the collective body of norms known as 
just war. This study was completed against a background of: 
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first, the emergence of an organised anti-nuclear movement; 
second, growing public concern over nuclear testing; and 
finally, the continued polarisation of opinion, both inside 
and outside the Churches, regarding the viability of the just 
war in the nuclear age. Yet the Council line had not changed 
significantly from the conclusion first drawn by The Era of 
Atomic Power thirteen years previously: the Bomb was -to be 
lived with. 
The Report shows that in the late 1950s the BCC was 
agitated most with the fact that the West was intending, if 
war came, to use nuclear weapons first. The Study Group 
believed that Britain could escape from this moral predicament 
known as massive retaliation by transferring its nuclear 
armoury from national to international control. In this way 
the concept of deterrence could be underwritten by 
international law. The CND view that the supreme ethical 
requirement was to prevent massive retaliation by the non- 
contingent abolition of nuclear weapons did not carry weight. 
Rather, the Report relied on accepted methods of diplomacy and 
argued that the ultimate aim of all States should be to 
abolish nuclear weapons through multilateral effort. The 
Report was incremental, gradualist, and 'realistic'. By 
rejecting calls for British unilateralism the BCC confirmed 
Christian support for gradualist multilateralism and endorsed 
just war theory for the nuclear age. 
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The pamphlet Christians and Atomic War was offered as a 
contribution to Christian thinking. It was designed in order 
to: first, encourage responsible reflection and political 
action by Christian individuals; and second, as the necessary 
basis for responsible statements by Church groups local and 
national. Yet for all its talk of participation the Report 
demanded very little action. All that was required was the 
fundamental support for the State and its right to orchestrate 
decision-making process. Christian responsibility was to be 
kept alive by calling for restraint in face of the harshness 
of Realpolitik personified by the policy of massive 
retaliation. This bleak view on the possibility for change 
and transformation, though it called for moderation in the 
conduct of international affairs and acknowledged the 
Christian ideal of love, provided justification for acts of 
nuclear violence. Christians and Atomic War was the first 
British ecumenical report to move the debate in Christian 
ethics away from "middle axioms' to a consideration of the 
means with which a Christian policy should be formulated. 
In drawing these elements together into final analyses it 
is necessary to refer to the hypotheses introduced in Chapter 
One. It was claimed that this research has been based on two 
hypotheses: the first of these was that, from the perspective 
of IR, the BCC1's approach can be understood as a form of 
"Augustinian' realism. This is to argue that the Churches 
maintained a confrontational view of international relations 
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by subscribing to a particular conception of the State, 
national interest, and Christian political responsibility. 
The second hypothesis was that the BCC's just war was thus 
more representative of the realist rather than idealist 
theoretical frameworks. This suggested two possible 
conclusions. On one hand, the idea that the significance of 
the BCC approach lay not in its challenge to Government. policy 
but in its role in helping to marginalise the radical idealism 
represented by the CND position. On the other hand, the 
notion that discussions of just war cannot be separated from 
qualitative judgements about the State. These conclusions are 
reached by three points. 
First, the just war was seen by the Study Group' s that 
produced the Reports as the most accurate theoretical 
expression of their approach to the essence of politics among 
States. In 1959 the BCC applied the insights of this strategy 
in order to oppose, in specific terms, the massive retaliation 
formulation. This limited war policy, however, did not 
advocate a change in foreign policy practice, but rather a 
change in defence norms: i. e. the BCC were concerned not so 
much with the dangers of nuclear weapons but in advocating a 
'realistic' policy in which the use of nuclear devices could 
be seen as a rational defence option. The concept was 
intimately linked to the notion that an unacceptable degree of 
freedom would result in a Soviet invasion of the West. Whilst 
the concept of survival lay at the heart of the BCC' s policy 
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recommendations, the concept was understood not in universal 
terms (i. e. the survival of humanity) but as the specific 
survival of the Western State. Survival, in other words, was 
a normative judgement on the State, liberal democratic values, 
and the adversarial view of the Cold War struggle between the 
West and the Soviet Union. The chief beneficiary of such 
formulation was the nuclear status quo. 
Second, by urging a Augustinian ethic of responsibility the 
BCC provided a realist set of answers to what they saw as the 
recurrent and ultimately insoluble moral dilemmas of state- 
craft. In the calculation of policy the pragmatism of 
deterrence prevailed. The BCC formulation presupposed a 
system composed of States, acting as unitary actors, who 
needed to maximise their power vis-a-vis other States. The 
Soviet Union, as the main State with substantial military 
capabilities opposed to Western values, was assumed to be 
expansionist. In this way the need to make national interest 
the exclusive goal of foreign policy was a realist judgement. 
The just war was intended to provide an appropriate basis for 
retrospective censure and punishment if the Soviet Union 
violated the terms on which the established status quo was 
built. Hence the BCC formulation of the necessity for a 
Western 'balance' in the international system. 
Finally, the BCC1s approach was not radical. Limited war 
acted as an "opium of the people" directing the public away 
from CND struggle against the State. The BCC served as a 
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counter-revolutionary force whose response to the nuclear 
dilemma appears as a matter of expediency. Just as Augustine 
rejected the idea that human agency was the means with which 
to create a better world, the BCC rejected the possibility 
that nuclear disarmament could be a possible option for 
Britain. Even a revolutionary act of unilateral disarmament 
could not break the continuous cycle of force, power, and war 
that Augustinians saw as inevitable. To this end pacifism in 
both its absolute and nuclear forms was rejected, and 
multilateral not unilateral disarmament advocated. 
To conclude, in the years 1945-59 the BCC showed over- 
respect for the just war tradition. By understanding its 
criteria in positivistic fashion the BCC substituted novel 
theorising for established narrative. Rather than the just 
war being understood in terms of a moral expression of how 
States ought to act, its significance lay in the way it was 
used to recast moral evaluations of the viability of the 
Western State in the guise of national interest. This 
emphasises that discussions of just war cannot be separated 
from qualitative judgements about the character of the State. 
Christian attitudes to war are grounded in ethical and 
theological assumptions concerning legitimate authority, the 
right of the State to determine policy, and Christian 
politic-al-, res-ponsibility both individual and collective. To 
fully appreciate the significance, and the limitations, of the 
tradition just war must be placed in this wider setting. 
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APPENDIX: 
THE RESEARCH PROCESS' 
This study has been rewarding, thought-provoking and, at 
times, frustrating experience. In its finished form this 
thesis has addressed a political problem. It reveals how 
the discussions and policy options formulated by the British 
Council of Churches gave Christian support to the ethics of 
nuclear deterrence in a specific historical period. 
Although this is easily stated, the main problem I faced 
with this research was the articulation of a viable topic. 
This was no mean task and remained the most difficult part 
of the entire project. 
The initial formulation of a viable project struck me as 
a bad joke the point was appreciated or not, and enfeebled 
when explained. My MA in International Studies (1992-93) 
did not prepare me for how challenging this exercise would 
be or suggest how projects, questions or hypotheses are 
generated. 
The initial problem was to translate a broad interest in 
politics and Christianity into a working hypothesis. I 
wanted to research an area in which the Church's 
. This appendix appears in modified form as "Investigating 
Methodologies: A Comparison of the MA and PhD Research Processes" in P. 
Burnham's (ed. ) Surviving the Research Process in Politics. See Gorry 
1997. 
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responsibility for both public life, and the renewal of 
political struggle, could be highlighted and stressed. I 
was sympathetic to the view that a critical commitment to 
Christianity could lead to a willingness to question the 
political and moral assumptions of capitalist democracy, and 
followed Alasdair MacIntyrels assertion that shared beliefs 
and values were necessary to bind a society togeth. er and 
generate a sense of meaning, purpose and above all hope. 2A 
theoretical approach, like my Masters dissertation 3, was 
favoured in which knowledge on the Church-State relationship 
could be expanded by examining Christian philosophy as a 
moral alternative to the authority of the Western State. 
Thus I had firm ideas regarding the debate to contribute' to 
yet was not sure what questions to ask in order to develop a 
serious project. I had a research area but no clear topic. 
For the first few months my time was spent in producing 
book reviews on Marx, neo-Marxist accounts on the role of 
Christianity, and evaluating radical theories of Church and 
State. Three factors soon suggested this would not be a 
viable research theme. First, Marx and his followers 
underestimated the cognitive importance of religion. Most 
criticism remained implied. Second, where opinions were 
explicated religion was normally seen as an instrument of 
class domination. Where space was generated for religious 
belief the general response was to revise historical 
2 MacIntyre 1985, p. 263. 3 i. e. Challenging Positivism: Gramsci, Civil Society and International 
Political Economy (University of Warwick, 1993). 
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materialism in functional terms so that it was reduced to a 
'superstructural' element (Gramsci) reflective of the 
economic 'base', or it gave religion a neutral "relatively 
autonomous level' (scientific Althusserianism). Finally, I 
had plenty of ideas that involved the Church-State 
relationship yet could not think of an appropriate question 
to ask that would lead me deep into the research process. I 
had no particular angle with which to focus my energies. 
With the benefit of hindsight one of the problems I faced 
was that because I was genuinely interested in all aspects 
of the subject, I could not bring myself to focus on one 
p articular area. After two months I was still without a 
viable topic and began to think I was too 'stupid' to do 
'Proper' research. I simply couldn't grasp what was 
required of me. I was thinking, reading and writing (in 
that order 4 but every attempt I made at solving the puzzle 
that would suddenly reveal a do-able proposition was 
frustrated. 
In my desperation I tried reading (and even buying) both 
research "handbooks 5 and 'experience-based' accounts6 which 
I hoped would make sense of what was required of me. The-se 
accounts made me no wiser. It was only when I proceeded to 
read as many PhD's as I could manage that things finally 
began to become clearer. One thing that struck me was that 
In hindsight my labour would have been made much easier if I had 
written more than I read, and read more than I thought. 
5 e. g. Watson 1987. 
e. g. Salmon 1992. 
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a number of the more interesting PhD's were based on 
archival analysis. As a consequence of this I put any idea 
of a purely theoretical PhD behind me. 
It was not just reading PhD's that led me to a historical 
methodology. I realised that archival material could be 
used to develop both a comparative and analytical insight. 
A theoretically informed approach to the Church and po. litics 
could both describe and analyse past events in order to shed 
light on the contemporary situation. Archives also seemed 
appealing because it appeared to me that historians did not 
theorise enough when using them, and political scientists, 
in the main, were not using them at all. In short, archival 
analysis presented an opportunity. 
The British Council of Churches Archives 
The primary reason for choosing the archives of the BCC 
was that (unlike the Church of England 7) no one had 
attempted to research them within the discipline. 
The BCC archive is found in the Church of England Record 
Centre, Galleywall Road, Bermondsey, London. Because there 
is no automatic public access I required a letter of 
introduction from Rev. Dr. Colin Davey, the General 
Secretary of the Council of Churches. This happily proved 
to be a formality and the Church authorities were pleased to 
see records used for PhD purposes. 
7 i. e. Virginia Austin's 1991 PhD "The Church of England as an 
International Actor in Southern Africa: 1970-80". 
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Once past the security door, the archivist furnished me 
with a copy of "Transfer and Box Lists' relating to the 
political activities of the BCC. These indexes gave me some 
idea of the type of material I could expect to find but 
presented two immediate limitations: first, closure rules 
limited access; and second, material was inadequately 
indexed. 
In the first instance a 30-year closure rule on 
administrative files (100-year closure on personal files! 8) 
effectively forced the historical period I could research to 
before 1963. This served to discipline me into researching 
angles that would locate my study in the 1950s or early 
1960s. The fact that material was not only inadequately 
indexed, but also incoherently catalogued9 caused more of a 
problem. Indexes only gave a vague idea as to the contents 
of particular files. For example, the index suggested 
records for the BCC's "International Department 1959: 
Miscellaneous" was located in 'Box 14r. Such limited 
information was frustrating and I had little choice but to 
recall plenty of files before gaining some sense of the 
nature of the archive. 
Bearing in mind these limitations, and with the help of 
the transfer lists, I selected 1962 as a starting point and 
worked back chronologically hoping to appreciate the issues 
of political significance that had most exercised the 
' Archives normally operate with a 75 years closure. 
9A more systematic and coherent system is now in operation. 
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interests of the Churches. I found the material contained 
in files varied greatly but most included information on: 
resolutions and reports issued by the Council; 
correspondence with Government and other bodies particularly 
the WCC and the Federal Council of Churches; minutes of the 
regular meetings of the BýC's Assembly and its various 
departments (of particular interest to me wa: 5 the 
International Department) ; reports from associated regional 
Church councils; letters and memoranda; reports written by 
Council officials returning from foreign visits; reports on 
the activities of visiting foreign dignitaries; newspaper 
cuttings; and transcripts of telephone conversations. 
This initial perusal revealed two issues that dominated 
the Churches' attention in the five years 1957 to 1962: 
nuclear weapons, and decolonisation in Central Africa. I 
initially favoured researching the politics of the Churches 
in the formation and dissolution of the Central African 
Federation 1953 to 1963. On closer inspection however the 
nuclear debate proved to be a much more interesting 
proposition. This was partly because the nuclear debate is 
still with us, partly because it is both controversial and 
highly political, and partly because of the success of 
movements like the CND in galvanising opinion in the 
Churches. This subject could also give me the ground from 
which I could examine the activities of Councils and 
Assemblies of the present day. 
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Once the decision to research Church attitudes to the 
nuclear arms race was taken the research process became much 
easier. I selected a certain number of files to work with 
each day in order to become acquainted with my new topic. 
Interesting information would be entered straight into a 
laptop computer to be written up at leisure. Whilst much 
was learnt from studying the official Church publications 
found in the archives, more interesting information was 
revealed by looking at the way these publications were 
produced. Draft chapters and correspondence between the 
writers gave me a good sense of the tension between 
different attitudes held by Christians. 
It is worth noting, however, that these archives like any 
other do not give a complete picture of events. Anyone who 
has looked carefully at declassified Government documents from 
the post-1945 era would recognise how inadequate the public 
record is as a guide to what was happening. Studying 
contemporary newspapers such as The Times henceforth became 
an invaluable ancillary research tool. Newspapers were 
particularly important because there is a serious lack of 
published information in book form in my specific area (i. e. 
BCC attitudes in the late 1950s). 
one time-consuming aspect of the process was the fact that 
many of the names I came across were not familiar to me. This 
meant, if I was to make my research more relevant, I had to 
discover whether they were important figures -- perhaps known 
377 
for a particular scholarly approach. This involved the time- 
consuming activity of searching library data bases, 
biographical dictionaries, and secondary account 
bibliographies to try and locate the names, and if possible, 
locate them within a broader intellectual context. Quite 
naturally many names were not intellectually renowned, but I 
am sure it was a productive, if labour-intensive exercise. 
After deciding to focus on a particular historical 
response to war I was now free to engage secondary material 
in a more theoretical manner. This involved understanding 
Church attitudes to war generally, and the long tradition of 
just war thinking particularly. 
Theoretical Issues 
From the start I was aware that I didn't need to justify 
that the BCC approach was or should be seen as the correct 
Christian approach. Rather, all I needed to show was how a 
particular constituency of believers, in a given historical 
period and condition, responded to the problem of war. In 
short, there was no need to equate the BCC approach as the 
'authentically' Christian approach. This may seem obvious but 
it was important because I was sympathetic to Christianity 
generally, but unsympathetic to the particular notion of just 
war. It also seemed that a simple literature review of the 
just war would not help comprehend the diversity of Christian 
attitudes in the Cold War. Indeed, it could not theorise 
Christian CND opposition. 
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Two issues soon presented themselves: f irst, that it was 
necessary for me to gain a distinct conception of how and why 
the just war evolved and what needs and problems it set to 
address; and secondly, I needed to be sensitive to the 
historical context, both political and intellectual, in which 
the doctrine was articulated in the fourth century and why it 
was adopted by the BCC in the nuclear age. 
The question arose, quite naturally, what was the Christian 
attitude to war before the just war, and what were the 
conditions in which it was presupposed that a codified 
approach to war was necessary? This, in turn, led to a host 
of other questions such as: What were the political 
implications behind the adoption of just war? What did the 
approach say about Christian attitudes to political authority, 
and the right of political authority to wage war on behalf of 
its citizens? Did Christendom's adoption of just war doctrine 
prevent it from comprehending the magnitude of the changes 
that nuclear weapons wrought in the waging of war -- did it 
prevent Christens seeing the nuclear crisis as it actually is? 
I thus found myself confronted by a double task: to make 
clear to myself the evolution of the just war in its own 
restricted historical sense, and the intellectual and 
practical situation of its adoption by the British Churches in 
the nuclear age. 
Inevitably this research has led me some way into 
previously uncharted fields: theology, the methodology and the 
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philosophy of the Graeco-Roman world, and the early Church's 
history in which Augustine's ideas were built. In the process 
the more I studied the just wax- doctrine the more I found that 
it presupposed certain attitudes to political authority. This 
led to the research conclusion that the contemporary adoption 
of the just war doctrine was based not on religious inclusion 
but, I argued, on a particular political ethic. 
When I pursued this line of thought, moreover, I was 
confronted by a further question: What was the appropriate 
Christian response to both political authority and war in a 
nuclear age? Further, could such a conception, be graf ted on 
to the old Church organisations at all and, if this were 
possible, what kind of Christian fellowship would deal with 
the unique nature of the nuclear dilemma? 
These considerations became more obvious the more 
appreciated the extent individual Christian's attitudes had 
been conditioned by a conflict between theology, doctrinal 
heritage, ecclesiastical organisation, and socio-political 
situation. This disunity or tension between private ethics 
and public policy was, I found,. always evident. The 
important divide in Christian approaches to the nuclear 
debate was therefore not one between pacifism and just war 
but on one hand, between those who accepted the pragmatism 
of deterrence, with the implied adversarial relationship 
between the Soviet Union and the West; and on the other, 
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those who were persuaded that such a view could only lead to 
disaster in the long term. 
This line of thinking led me to a particular conception of 
the just wax- tradition, its general relationship to Christian 
attitudes to war, and its conceptual location within IR. it 
again led to progress in my general ability to articulate the 
study's hypotheses. The results are summarised in the 
concluding chapter. It is important to note that these 
theoretical findings are genuine research results gained from 
the process of research, not theses which my PhD was written 
to support. It was necessary to supplement the actual text by 
illustrations in the form of extensive footnotes which I hope 
explain the issues from which my ideas are based upon. 
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